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MD. GOLAM MOSTAFA

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THE GULF WAR AND 'THE NEW WORLD ORDER' : IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THIRD WORLD

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Gulf War ended more than a year ago but the issues in conflicts in the Middle East are still very much alive and far from resolved. Saddam Hussein is still in power and is refusing to fully comply with the UN cease-fire agreement. International sanction against Iraq is in place and its victims are innocent civilians, particularly women and children. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Kurds and Shiites, forgotten by the West, continue to be the victims of torture and repression by the regime of Baghdad. The Gulf region is more volatile and insecure now than it was before the crisis. The Arab world is more divided and antagonistic than ever before and disillusionment and frustration of Third World nations are deeper and greater than any other time in history. Meanwhile, the West is suffering from severe economic recession and the general mood is one of frustration, uncertainty, protectionism and neo-isolationism. Despite colossal material and human losses, the Gulf War raised new hopes and aspirations for many. It was widely believed that the experiences in the Gulf could be used as a model in resolving problems and conflicts in other parts of the world. But those hopes and aspirations have quickly evaporated in the face of the changing realities of international politics and growing tensions and conflicts worldwide.

To understand the US role in the Gulf crisis and subsequent developments, it has to be placed in historical perspective. Changes and reforms in the former Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, revolutions in Eastern Europe, reunification of Germany and improvements in Sino-Soviet, Sino-Japanese, Soviet-Japanese and Soviet-German relations in the late 1980s brought about fundamental changes in the existing world system with far-reaching implications. Almost all these

phenomenal changes took place with active and spontaneous participation of the masses. The states and their powerful machineries proved to be ineffective, and often irrelevant in fulfilling the changing needs and demands of the society. Ironically, all these events and developments of crucial historical importance took place without any direct or active involvement of the United States—the only remaining superpower. By 1990 the US was on the verge of marginalization with the developments in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. There were also debates on a possible future European security arrangement without any reference to the US. The general mood in Washington was that the US was gradually turning into a by-stander or passive observer of world historical events, and there was growing demand for active US involvements worldwide.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 created a unique opportunity for the United States to capture "driver's seat" in world politics, to exercise its power and influence and to prove to the rest of the world that even in the changed circumstances the US military power is indispensable. In the Gulf crisis, the US diplomacy was successful to organise a loose anti-Iraqi coalition by bringing together 28 countries, including some major powers, with divergent political, economic and strategic interests. Washington was also able to neutralise China and to persuade the Soviet Union, its arch rival during the Cold War era and an ally of Iraq, to support the US initiatives against Iraq. Finally, the US was able to successfully use the UN Security Council to get approved its initiatives against Iraq. In the most unequal war ever fought in history, the US-led anti-Iraqi coalition force came out victorious and the US emerged as the only and unchallenged superpower of the world.

In the early days of the Gulf crisis when European powers and leading Arab countries agreed to join the US-led coalition force and the Soviet Union assured that she would not oppose US plans in the Gulf, Washington had no doubt about its global hegemonic re-emergence, and the idea of a New World Order was born to describe the new situation. Subsequent events, particularly the collapse of communism and disintegration of the

Soviet Union, provided further impetus to the US leaders and policy planners to be more optimistic about the success of a US-designed and dominated New World Order. Although domestic economic problems, upcoming Presidential election, escalation of worldwide conflicts and strong criticisms from Third World countries, have overshadowed the concept of the New World Order temporarily, it is still very much in the mind of the US Administration¹.

The main purpose of the present paper is to study the New World Order proposed by President George Bush, its basic premises, scopes, limitations and prospects, and most importantly its implications for the Third World. It is not the purpose of the paper to study the Gulf War itself, but since President Bush repeatedly referred to the Gulf War as a test case or model for a New World Order, focus will be given to those aspects which are directly related to the New World Order.

The Study begins with a brief discussion on the concept of order and its various aspects. The evolution of the notion of order in international relations, and the US role and attempts to establish world orders at different historical periods are also reviewed in this part.

Part-III analyses the New World Order proposed by President Bush, including its various aspects, assumptions, goals, objectives, limitations and prospects for future.

1. The draft of a classified Pentagon document titled "The Defence Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999" published in the *New York Times* shows that the main US defence policy objectives in the post-Cold War era are "to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or anywhere else to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would be sufficient to generate global power". To achieve this objective the Strategy Plan suggests three additional objectives; "First, the US must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defence areas to discourage them (industrialised nations) from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role". For details of the Strategy Plan see Patrick E. Tyler, "US Strategy Plan Calls for Ensuring no Rivals Develop", *The New York Times*, March 8, 1992.

Although, as mentioned earlier, it is not a study of the Gulf War, Part-IV discusses the Gulf War in terms of a New World Order and tries to explain why it cannot be a basis or model for the proposed New World Order.

Since, according to its authors, the idea of a New World Order originated with the Gulf crisis, Part-V briefly reviews the implications of the New World Order for the Gulf region as well as for broader Middle Eastern issues and conflicts in the post-Gulf War period.

Part-VI focuses on "New Thinking" proposed by former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and its relevance to the current debate of the New World Order. Although many analysts believe that the "New Thinking" is dead with Gorbachev's departure and with the disintegration of the USSR, this chapter argues that the Third World countries are still interested in some of the points raised in it.

Part-VII presents a Third World perspective on the New World Order. An argument is developed here that in the post-Gulf War, post-Cold War and post-Soviet era the Third World does not require any new order based on military might and power but an arrangement to attend its age-old economic and social problems of backwardness on an urgent basis.

Part-VIII analyses the possible role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security in the changed international situation, and its various problems and limitations.

II. WORLD ORDER IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

(a) The Notion of Order

The term "order" is widely used both in natural sciences and in social studies. For natural scientists order is mainly associated with structure or pattern, and the level of order in any setting is determined by the endurance and complexity of the pattern.² But even natural scientists differ on the

2. R. D. McKinlay and R. Little, *Global Problems and World Order*, (The University Press, USA), 1986, p. 4.

concept of order. For physicists, order is a decreasing, while for biologists order is an increasing concept.³

In social studies the term order is mainly used to analyse the enduring patterns of social behaviour and to compare levels of order in different social contexts. But since social behaviours are purposeful and goal oriented, order in social studies is understood in terms of both pattern and goal. Order is ubiquitous and may have different meanings and connotations to different individuals, nations or states. And as a result, although the term is broadly used in the study and practice of international relations, there is no serious attempt to conceptualise it. The concept of order is unsatisfactory, because of the following:

(a) The term has so many connotations that it becomes difficult to select a particular way of looking at it. Some analysts describe the term order as "ambiguous", "dangerously simplistic" or "elusive" and reject the notion of order altogether.

(b) The concept of order has degenerated and its essential meaning has been rather lost. It has been used by so many people in so many different ways and purposes that the term has lost its credibility and proper utility.

(c) The term was also used to legitimise some of the most destructive events of world history, and thus has often got a negative connotation. It has also a repressive connotation and is usually related to force and coercion.

(d) There is no acceptable definition of order. It may have different notions, often contrary to each other. It may also create confusions. For example, Hedley Bull considers that the old world order was sustained by the cooperation of the superpowers, while A. L. Burns thinks that the superpowers served as the sources of disorder.⁴

(e) The term order is also somehow status quo oriented. It mainly denotes either to maintain the existing status quo or to establish new status quo, and there seems to be no room for movement or change.

3. For details about the notion of order in natural sciences see, J. Needham, *Models of Understanding: A Pattern of Natural Philosophy*, (George Allen and Unwin, London), 1976, p. 182.

4. McKinlay and Little, *op. cit.* pp. 2-3.

(f) The term order is also deceptive. Theoretically, any stable arrangement whether tyrannical or exploitative may be treated as order. So to avoid controversy, some analysts prefer to replace the term world order with more dynamic though often value laden expressions such as "a movement for a just order", "just world order", or "human world order".

Order is also not non-contentious. Attempt by one party to establish order may precipitate controversy or conflict with another. Order has to be understood in relative term, particularly as compared to disorder, and its meanings and implications may also change depending on the goals and agendas of its architects and initiators.

Attempts at establishing order beyond national boundaries were taken at different periods by different countries, but only those which had global implications were considered as world order. Historically, attempts at building new world order came either from the victorious nations after catastrophic wars or from great powers trying to pursue their hegemonic goals and objectives.

Despite definitional problems and confusions, analysts in the field of international relations attempt to define world order from different perspectives. The participants of a symposium held at Bellagio, Italy in 1965 took serious efforts to define world order. Raymond Aron, the Chairman of the Conference, provided five possible meanings of the term order. As Hoffmann summarised,

Two of the meanings were purely descriptive; order as any arrangement of reality, order as the relations between parts. Two were analytical — partly descriptive, partly normative; order as the minimum conditions for existence, order as the minimum conditions for coexistence. The fifth conception was purely normative; order as the conditions for good life⁵.

The Conference, however, accepted Aron's fourth definition of order, e.g., order as the minimum conditions for co-existence. Contending definitions of world order are also given by other experts of international relations. By "world order" Bull means "those patterns or dispositions of

5. Stanley Hoffmann, "Report of the Conference on Conditions of World Order, June 12-19, 1965", (Bellagio, Italy), *Daedalus*, Spring 1966, p. 456.

human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole."⁶ For Bull order is an essential precondition for realization of other goals, including justice. Martin Rochester defines world order purely in terms of international institutions. According to him, if states use international judicial facilities more frequently and often to resolve their mutual disputes then it can be said that a growth of world order has taken place.⁷ The problem with such approach is that it is purely empirical and totally ignores the political context of a world order. Saul Mendlovitz and Thomas Weiss define world order in normative terms. For them study of world order is,

the study of international relations and world affairs that focuses in the manner in which mankind can significantly reduce the likelihood of international violence and create minimally acceptable conditions of worldwide economic well-being, social justice, ecological stability, and participation in decision-making processes. In short, a student of world order seeks to achieve and maintain a warless and more just world to improve the quality of human life.⁸

Richard Falk in his normative study of world order combines the analytical, descriptive, empirical, ideological and normative notions of world order. For him the conception of a world order involves,

studying the extent to which a given past, present or future arrangement of power and authority is able to realize a set of values that are affirmed as beneficial for all people and apply to the whole world and that have some objectivity by their connection with a conception of basic human needs, as required for the healthy development of the human person'.⁹

Falk suggests the consideration of a set of values that are beneficial to all by studying arrangements of power and authority in historical

6. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*, (Columbia University Press, New York), 1977. p. 20

7. William Coplin and Martin Rochester, "The PCII, ICI, League and UN: A Comparative Empirical Survey", *American Political Science Review*, No. 62, pp. 529-50.

8. Saul Mendlovitz and Thomas Weiss, "The Study of Peace and Justice : Towards A Framework for Global Discussion" in Louis Rene Beres and Harry Targ (eds.), *Planning Alternative Future*, (Praeger, New York), 1975, p. 157.

9. Richard Falk, *The End of World Order : Essays on Normative International Relations*, (Holmes & Meir, New York, London), 1983, p. 46.

perspectives. But the pertinent questions are; How to identify a set of objective values acceptable to all? How to ensure that they will be beneficial to all? Whose values it should be? And, why others should accept it?

The definition of world order given by Mendlovitz and Weiss seems to be more convincing, because it includes wide range of issues, speaks against war and violence and emphasises the need for worldwide economic well-being, social justice and ecological stability.

However, the definitional problems are less significant for a world order, rather more important questions are: Why do we need a world order? Who should define it and whose interest and purpose it should serve? Is it possible to establish a world order? And, is there any alternative to a world order?

(b) Historical Review of World Orders

The concept of world order is not new. Victorious powers always attempted to create world orders with a view to establishing their dominance and control over others. But efforts by major powers to secure world orders failed to resolve international conflicts and disputes, and could not limit the level of extra-systemic conflicts associated with colonial and imperial wars.¹⁰

The first attempt for European world order was made in the Westphalian state system created in 1648 after the Thirty Years' War which had wrecked Europe for more than a century. Despite occasional problems and challenges, the Westphalian order managed to keep conflicts within acceptable bounds and interstate violence at low levels. After Napoleonic wars the Vienna Congress of 1815 set up the Concert of Europe primarily to check new imperialist ambitions of any power and to police the European system. The Concert which was an advanced stage over the Westphalian order worked well for about 100 years because the major European powers

10. For details see, Jeffery J. Schabeczenki "Explaining Relative Peace: Major Power Order, 1816-1976", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1991, pp. 304-20.

had mutual interests to preserve the system for maintaining their respective positions within the system as well as for pursuing common interests in international arena.

However, geo-politically, the European attempts for world order were mainly confined within Europe. The idea of a real world order came, in fact, from the United States after the World War-I. Although globalist tendencies and aspirations were nourished and developed by the US in the late 19th century,¹¹ until the end of the World War-II she was more or less committed to geopolitical detachment and preoccupied primarily with the hemispheric affairs." President Woodrow Wilson actively and enthusiastically participated in the post World War-I peace process in Europe and advocated the transformation of traditional notions of geopolitics into of an organised community based on law and order to maintain genuine peace and security at international level. He apparently wanted to transform the US values and notions of freedom and democracy from hemispheric to worldwide through the League of Nations. But as it appeared, the US was neither ready nor willing to assume a world leadership role at that time and failed to join the League of Nations.

The League of Nations was formed without the US, Soviet and German participations. Severe political, economic and military conditions were imposed on the vanquished aggressors of the World War-I with the expectation that it would never again be able to gain strength to challenge peace and security. But only within a decade Europe felt the smoke of another catastrophic war, and failed to take appropriate measures to avoid it mainly because of narrowly defined selfish national interests. And humanity suffered from another catastrophic war more horrible than the earlier one.

11. By the late 1890s the US had fulfilled its so-called "manifest destiny" by extending borders outside the hemisphere. With a powerful Navy and strong economy the US power projection was manifested in as early as 1900 when a Senator proclaimed, "He (God) has made us the master organizers of the world that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples. Were it not for such a force as this the world would lapse into barbarism and night." Cited by Narasingha P. Sil in "Caesapopolism in Action; US Military Intervention in Panama and the Persian Gulf", *India Quarterly*, Vol. XLVII, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1991, p. 38. Even an American President confessed that he was mandated by God "to put the Philippines on the map of the United States". G. A. Malcolm and M. M. Kalaw, *The Philippines Government*, (Manila, Associated Publishers), 1923, p. 65.

Initially it appeared that the lessons of World War-II were taken seriously and world leaders started serious talks about a new world order even before the war was over. Finally, the United Nations was born with the promise to save future generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, to establish conditions for justice and to social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.¹² But soon it was clear that the world had learned hardly anything from the past, the memories of holocausts of the two World Wars were forgotten, and major powers were engaged in unprecedented power rivalries followed by arms race at astronomical scale for which humanity had to pay extremely high price both in material and spiritual terms.

Show of power and military might was considered to be a remedy for future aggression, but it proved to be a great failure. No serious attempts were made to eliminate mutual hatred and distrusts among the warring parties, rather the victors imposed their wills and orders on the vanquished. The issues were interpreted in terms of politics and solved in terms of power and strength without considering moral, ethical and psychological aspects of it. Ends justified all means used, and hate begot further hate.

Although the United Nations was formed in the post-World War II period with the promise of maintaining peace and security, it failed to fulfil its missions mainly because of power rivalries among the great/super powers. The ideal juridical view of a world order under the UN was soon superseded by geopolitical dictations and necessities and containment of communism over legalistic considerations and idealistic hopes took priority in American foreign policy.¹³ And in the absence of deep and reliable foundations, the superstructure of the world order soon went into pieces.

In the post-World War-II period the US foreign policy was mainly dominated by realist perception of international relations which viewed world politics in terms of national interests defined by nation-states. According to realists, international peace and security can only be maintained by the prudent construction and preservation of balance of

12. *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*, (United Nations, New York), p. 1

13. Richard Falk, *op. cit.* p. 111.

power. World order in the post-World War-II was mainly built on the perception of a balance of power between the two major power blocs without taking into consideration the needs and aspirations of vast majority of population of the world living in the periphery. Balance was, however, maintained for more than four decades and the superpowers were able to avoid direct confrontations although proxy wars and conflicts at regional levels continued, gaps between rich and poor widened, production and consumption of per capita food declined and environmental degradation occurred in almost all aspects of life.¹⁴

Goals of post World War-II world order were essentially to seek order and stability to enhance managerial roles and capabilities of the US, and thus to establish its geopolitical superiority. The United States, as an unchallenged superpower, was able to maintain a world order conducive to its interests and influence in the 1950s and 1960s without much trouble. But domestic, social, political and economic constraints and growing power and influence of the Soviet Union and of some Third World countries challenged the US hegemonic power and stability.

In the 1970s growing power and influence of the USSR and global economic crisis with radical policies by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries challenged the traditional realist view of world order. The "modernist observers" came forward with the idea that "rising interdependence is creating a brave new world of cooperation to replace the bad old world of international conflicts".¹⁵ However, in the absence of a single hegemony, capable of managing the affairs of the world, multiple power blocs emerged and the notions of interdependence or "complex interdependence" were seriously undermined.

By the late 1970s, the general conclusion was that the US had lost its hegemonic power and influence which could not be re-established because only world wars create hegemonic powers and world civilization might not

14. For details of environmental impacts of security policy, see, Richard J. Barnet, *The Lean Years: Politics in the Age of Security*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1980.

15. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, (Little Brown, Boston), 1977, p.10

survive such a war in the nuclear age.¹⁶ So in the hegemonic period the emphasis was on international regimes to protect and preserve interests and influence of the lost hegemony. As Keohane wrote in the 1984,

The network of international regimes bequeathed to the contemporary political economy by American hegemony provides a valuable foundation for construction of post-hegemonic patterns of co-operation, which can be used by policy makers interested in achieving their objectives through multilateral action.¹⁷

Contending theories of international relations in the post World War-II period were directly related to US power and influence whose underlying purposes and objectives were to provide broad theoretical frameworks for seeking and maintaining US hegemonic role in international affairs not only in politico-military and security spheres but also in economic and cultural fields. Almost all successive US Administrations had ideas and dreams of establishing and maintaining world orders. President Carter, who championed human rights and democracy as major principles in American foreign policy, outlined a blueprint of a new world order in his policy, inaugural address in 1977. He said,

I want to assure you that the relations of the United States with the other countries and peoples of the world will be guided during my own Administration by our desire to shape a world order that is more responsive to human aspirations. The United States will meet its obligation to help create a stable, just and peaceful world order".¹⁸

President Reagan also came to power with the promise of "regaining the control over world affairs" and "to restore the US to a position of

16. According to Robert Gilpin, during peacetime weaker states tend to gain more from the hegemon and only in wartime a hegemon can maximise its power and control. For details of Gilpin's views on changes in international relations see, Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press), 1981.

17. Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey), 1984, p. 245.

18. "Address by President Carter to People of Other Nations", *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 76, (February 14, 1977), p. 123.

global dominance in the economic, military, political and ideological spheres".¹⁹ However, for the purpose of our study we will concentrate on the New World Order proposed by President Bush.

III. "THE NEW WORLD ORDER"

As observed earlier, the ideas for world orders are not new in US foreign policy. But with the end of the East-West confrontation and remarkable progress in arms control negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, the idea of a new world order got renewed importance and validity in American foreign policy in the late 1980s. President Bush first used the phrase "New World Order" on August 25, 1990 in his speech at Yale University. The phrase was coined by his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and President Bush reportedly liked it.²⁰ Although President Bush frequently used the term "New World Order", he did not develop that idea systematically, rather provided some aspects of it in his various speeches and remarks during the Gulf crisis and in its immediate aftermath.

The Iraq invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990 came as a surprise to Washington. Initially President Bush was in a dilemma on how to respond to the critical situation. However, developments in August and early September, 1990, particularly indication from Moscow that it would cooperate with the US in the Gulf crisis and positive responses from the NATO allies encouraged President Bush to launch his New World Order. Addressing a joint session of the US Congress on September 11, 1990 the President provided some details of his proposed New World Order when he said,

Today, that new world order is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known, a world where the rules of law supplants the rule of jungle, a world in which nations recognise the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.²¹

19. Jeff McMahan, *Reagan and the World*, (Pluto Press, London, Sydney), 1984, p. 3

20. But before that in April 1990 President Gorbachev in his address to a conference of the World Media Association in Moscow used the term when he remarked, "We are only at the beginning of the process of shaping a new world order". *The New York Times Magazine*, February 17, 1991, p. 14.

21. President Bush, "Toward a New World Order", US Department of State, *Dispatch 1*, No. 3. September 17, 1990, p. 91.

As it appears, President Bush emphasised mainly on two aspects of his new vision of world order; first, it was completely different from the old order, and second, it was based on freedom, justice and the rule of law. But as events unfolded and the US strengthened its political, diplomatic and military positions vis-a-vis Iraq, President Bush apparently became more normative and philosophical about his New World Order. In his speech at the United Nations on October 1, 1990 the President said,

I see a world of open borders, open trade, and, most importantly open minds I see a world where America continues to win new friends and convert old foes and where the Americas—North, Central and South—can provide a model for the future of all mankind; the world's first completely democratic hemisphere.²²

President Bush seemed to be too idealistic and emotional, and at the same time "somewhat in advance of history" in his remarks about Americas as completely democratic hemisphere. In many respects, he repeated the Wilsonian idealistic vision of a world of the 1930s.²³

In early January, 1991 after getting approvals from the UN Security Council and from the US Congress to use force against Iraq, President Bush was certainly more confident and enthusiastic about his New World Order. But at that point of time the President's main preoccupation was to sell the War both to the American public and to the world. In his statement from the Oval Office on January 16, 1991 the President announced, "We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the rule of jungle, governs the conduct of nations."²⁴

As the War continued and the US-led coalition force made success in its air attacks on Iraq, President Bush provided more clues about his New World Order. In his State of the Union address to the joint session of the US Congress on January 29, 1991, the President said :

22. "The UN; World Parliament for Peace", President Bush's speech at the UN General Assembly on October 1, 1990, US Department of State, *Dispatch 1*, No. 6, October 8, 1990, p. 153.

23. For details of Wilsonian vision of American power see, Lloyd C. Gardner, *A Covenant with Power; America and World Order from Wilson to Reagan*, (Oxford University Press, New York, Toronto), 1984, Chapter 1, pp. 3-28.

24. "Transcript of the Comments by Bush on the Air Strikes Against the Iraqis". *The New York Times*, January 17, 1991.

What is at stake is more than one small country, it's a big idea; a new world order where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind — peace and security, freedom and the rule of law The world can, therefore, seize this opportunity to fulfil the long-held promise of a new world order, where brutality will go unrewarded, and aggression will meet collective resistance.²⁵

President Bush tried to convince the world that Iraqi invasion of Kuwait not only threatened international peace, security and freedom, but at the same time jeopardised the prospects of a New World Order. At the same time he asked the American people to bear major responsibilities, because, according to him, "Among the nations of the world, only the United States of America has both the moral standing, and the means to back it up. We are the only nation on this earth that can assemble the forces of peace."²⁶

For President Bush there was no real world order before the Gulf crisis, rather all previous orders were conflicting and full of disorders. In his own words, "Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and Cold War". According to President Bush the US victory over Iraq was not only a triumph of "the principles of justice and fair play", but it also ensured the real prospect of a world order.²⁷

In the absence of a clear definition or perception of the New World Order, it has been interpreted by different people in different ways. Some believe that it is the fulfilment of the original ideas behind the UN where the world body, in the absence of the Soviet Union, will be able to work as a genuine guarantor for international peace and security, while others are sceptical and view it as a re-emergence of Pax Americana where the UN will only be used as a tool for promoting American influence and interests. Some US analysts try to interpret the New World Order as a combination of

25. Selected Parts of President Bush's State of the Union Address on January 29, 1991. *The Washington Post*, January 30, 1991, p. A14.

26. *Ibid.*

27. Speech by George Bush to the joint session of the Congress of the United States, on March 6, 1991. United States Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, Text (91-18), p. 1.

moral and legal authority of the UN and military might of the US for maintaining international peace and stability. As far as President Bush is concerned, usually, in prepared speeches he emphasised the importance of the UN and the rule of law and justice, but in more spontaneous remarks and comments his ideas and visions of the New World Order were very close to the ideas of hegemonic stability and returning to Pax Americana.

Secretary of State James Baker and former Deputy National Security Advisor, Robert Gates added some more substance to the concept. According to their views, the New World Order is not a new United Nations, but it may involve the UN as in the Gulf War. It is an order where the US is the sole superpower, but not the policeman or social worker of the world. It is not a Pax Americana, but the US is the catalyst for collective action in world community.²⁸ Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger thinks that the New World Order "is actually composed of two pillars : a pillar of democracy and a pillar of freedom from aggression".²⁹

So does it mean that under New World Order the United States military force will be used for repelling any kind of aggression anywhere in the world? No, not really. The US will interfere or intervene only when the President will consider it "correct". The US will not "police" the world, but "will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our (American) interests but those of our allies and friends or which could seriously unsettle international relations."³⁰

The Participants of the Fletcher Roundtable Conference on New World Order held in May, 1991 tried to define the New World Order in terms of collective security, regional organization, international law, disarmament and conflict prevention. They advocated for a new definition of sovereignty and a balance between the notion of sovereignty and international

28. T. B. Millar, "A New World Order?", *The World Today*, Vol., 48, No. 1, January 1992. p. 8

29. "New World Order : Democracy, Freedom and Aggression", address by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger to the White House Conference on Management Training and Market Economics Education in Central and Eastern Europe, on February 27, 1991. (The United States Embassy in Ottawa, Canada), (91-16), p. 1.

30. Draft of the Defence Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999. (Pentagon, February 18, 1992), *The New York Times*, March 8, 1992, p. A14.

cooperation. They also emphasised the need for institutional responses (primarily the UN) for maintaining international peace and security. But even the select group of participants of the Conference were not able to come to a consensus on the definition of a New World Order.³¹ The participants rather recognised the difficulty of defining a New World Order and compared it with, "the establishment of the seventeenth century Westphalian order in which the ideas of territorial sovereignty and international co-operation coexisted".³²

Alan Henrikson, one of the participants of the Fletcher Roundtable Conference, developed a precise concept of the New World Order. According to him the key idea of the New World Order is "the concept of collective intervention for peace and security, even in what traditionally have been regarded as the domestic affairs".³³ He proposes to redefine the notion of sovereignty and interference and advocates interventions in three possible occasions :

Intervention to prevent or stop the widespread violation of human rights ("humanitarian intervention"); intervention to halt the imminent or continued use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons perhaps borne by ballistic missiles ("security intervention"); and intervention to block or contain the release of materials causing severe and wide damage to the climate, landscape, or seascape ("environmental intervention").³⁴

31. For details of the Conference report on the New World Order see, The Fletcher Roundtable, "Defining A New World Order", The Conference Report May 2—3, 1991, (The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy).

32. *Ibid.*, p. 7. The New World Order can not be compared with the Westphalian system because : (a) The Westphalian system was an outcome of long religious conflicts and wars in Europe whose main purpose was to create mutual trust and confidence among European powers through multilateral agreements. (b) The Westphalian system was a decentralised one where states were weak and disorganised, compared to modern states, and had only "fragmented capabilities". (c) The core values of the Westphalian system were neutrality, non-intervention and mutual respect and recognition for independence and sovereignty, but the New World Order suggests for compromising sovereignty and advocates for interventionist policies. (d) The Westphalian system was primarily a European one, not a world order, but the New World Order is an attempt at global systemic order. Finally, (e) The main objectives of the Westphalian system were to keep conflicts at low levels and to manage and resolve interstate problems through negotiations, while the main objective of the New World Order is to establish control and domination in international relations through power and influence. For more discussions on the Westphalian system, see Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order; Values and Power in International Politics*, (second edition), (Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, London), 1990, pp. 19-72.

33. A Discussion Paper on "Defining A New World Order" by Alan K. Henrikson, *The Fletcher Round Table*, (The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy), May 2 and 3, 1991, p. 2.

34. *Ibid.*, 27.

Henrikson's proposals deny the basic foundation of the state system — the notions of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs — guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, there is no consensus on: How to define human rights? What should be considered as security or environmental threats? Who will define it and where are the guarantees that others will comply with it? The notions of human rights, security and environmental threats are so broad and vague that it will give almost unrestricted power and authority to strong states to intervene and use force against weak neighbours. Even if it is argued that not the individual states but international community, as a whole, will decide to intervene or use force, questions will be raised: Who will form and dominate the international community? What will happen if it fails to come to a consensus on specific issues? And, what will happen when a major power is an aggressor or when the interests of great powers will be at stake? Furthermore, keeping in mind that every state has its own agenda, interest and priority, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the international community, as a whole, to reach a consensus on how, when and where to intervene. Ultimately the questions of intervention or use of force will be decided by individual states. If states are legally allowed to intervene or use force for security and environmental reasons, then theoretically Canada should intervene in the US or the US should intervene in Mexico for environmental reasons, or India should intervene in Sri Lanka or in Pakistan for security reasons. In other words, it may create a Hobbesian situation of "war of every one against everyone".³⁵

Moreover, the issue of compromising sovereignty will not be acceptable even to the most disadvantaged Third World nations, because for them the questions of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs are related to the decolonization process, and are considered to be the most valuable symbols of their separate entity and independent statehood. Finally, even while the Charter of the United Nations recognises sovereignty and

35. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited by Michael Oakeshott, (Collier Books, New York, London), 1967, p. 100.

inviolable rights of all states and strictly prohibits interference in internal affairs of other states, the world has witnessed brutal aggressions and interventions on the parts of great powers. So one can easily imagine what will happen when interventions and use of force will be authorised and legitimised by international law.

Although President Bush was reluctant to relate democracy and human rights to his New World Order, some US officials raised the issues. For example, Eagleburger views New World Order in terms of worldwide democratic developments. He said, "We have secured peace for the sake of democratic change throughout the world. Now we must secure democracy for the sake of world peace".³⁶ Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs also appeared to be ready to help democracy worldwide under a New World Order. As he said "We are in the need, in the first instance, to do what we can to help the development of democratic politics and free economies with stable relationship among them yes, in the world at large"³⁷

Frank Gaffney, a former senior Pentagon aide, wants to relate the New World Order with Pax Democratica policy, where the United States will assist democratic forces everywhere. He is aware that "All democratic changes will produce instability, and may have results, like success by Islamic fundamentalists, which we (the Americans) do not like at all", but at the same time he believes that only democracy can bring peace and stability worldwide.³⁸

As soon as the euphoria of the Gulf War was over, the plans and ideas of the New World Order appeared to have been modified and shifted. Since mid 1991 the US officials started to put more and more emphasis on Europe as a centre for New World Order. According to James Baker, the Secretary of State, in the era of New World Order the main US objective is "to

36. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, *op. cit.* p. 2.

37. Reginald Bartholomew, "New World Order calls for New Agenda". (United States Embassy in Ottawa, Canada), (91-62), p. 1.

38. Richard Gwyn, "Bush's 'New World Order' a Cynical Ruse" *Toronto Star*, April 14, 1991.

build a genuine Euro-Atlantic community—stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok—based on shared values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and free and open markets". Regiland Bartholomew thinks that no New World Order can be achieved if "Europe and North America do not remain united in a Trans-Atlantic community with a common agenda".³⁹ So questions are raised; What about the rest of the world? What are their roles in a New World Order? Are they not included in the proposed New World Order? Can they be participants, or are they destined to be outsiders in the process that makes the world history as they always used to be.

We are indeed confused as far as the meaning of New World Order is concerned. Despite occasional mentions by some US officials, democracy and human rights are not designed to be serious issues in the New World Order. The reasons are very simple (a) the US has no proven record of supporting democracy in the Third World, (b) the Arab allies of the US in the Gulf War were not democratic regimes and often violated human rights,⁴⁰ (c) few of the US allies in Gulf War from Third World countries were democratic regimes, and almost all of them had proven records of brutality and violation of human rights.⁴¹

The idea of a New World Order came mainly as an outcome of a debate within the US Administration on the concept of power in the post-Cold War period. There were reportedly two main camps within the Administration — those who favoured "geo-economic" approach advocated to build the US economy more competitive along the line of Germany and Japan, and those who favoured "geo-strategic" aimed at the enhancement of

39. Regiland Bartholomew, *op. cit.* p. 2.

40. After two years of the crisis there were no signs for democratic reforms in those countries. Even in liberated Kuwait human rights were grossly violated and the Palestinians were arbitrarily executed as enemies of the state without fair trials. Syrian President Hafeez al-Assad, another US ally in the Gulf War, is known as a dictator for years who also ruthlessly suppressed peaceful demonstration against the Gulf War.

41. In Pakistan, one of the US allies in the Gulf War, the democratically elected government of Benazir Bhutto was overthrown by military in early August, 1990 and there was no US response. In Bangladesh, another US ally in the Gulf War, the military regime of General Ershad brutally suppressed the democratic rights and movements in the country, while the US provided all types of financial and military support to the regime.

US military power and prestige. President Bush, apparently preferred the second option for his New World Order.

The proposed New World Order came under severe criticism not only from the Third World countries, but also from many Western leaders and analysts. James Schlesinger thinks that the New World Order was "never more than a bazz-phrase"⁴² John Steinbrunner of the Foreign Policy Institute, does not criticise the idea of a New World Order itself but claims that "there never was any real commitment to it" on the part of the US President. As early as in April, 1992 Richard Gwyn concluded that "Like the Cheshire cat in *Alice in Wonderland*, it seems that the New World Order appeared briefly, grinned and now is vanishing".⁴³

The New World Order also came under criticism from Japan and China. China made it clear that the New World Order was not acceptable to her because it was defined by some big countries as community of "free nations", and the purpose was to impose their social, political, ideological and economic order on the world with economic and military strength as their backing force. So for the Chinese it was not a world order, but "new imperialism".⁴⁴ Japan also viewed the New World Order with "deep pessimism". Many Japanese felt that the New World Order was based only on military power and strength, and, as a result, despite their economic might, they could never be a part of it. Many Japanese believe that the War in the Gulf served US interests in two ways; first, it helped to erase the Vietnam memory, second, it helped to restore US Technological pride to see "smart weapons" in action.⁴⁵ Most of the Japanese believe that their government should pursue a broad policy goals aimed at promoting a world order which will promote Japan's self-image and interests.

In fact, the idea of a New World came as a strategic military doctrine whose main purpose was to preserve and promote US hegemonic

42. Richard Gwyn, *op. cit.*

43. *Ibid.*

44. Dou Hui, "Order Through Peaceful Coexistence", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1991, p. 24.

45. John W. Dower, "Japan and the US Samurai Spirit", *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, June 1991, p. 30.

managerial role worldwide in the post-Cold War period. The Gulf crisis did not bring anything new in the US strategic thinking, rather it created new situation and opened new opportunities for realizing already defined and worked out strategic goals and objectives. Despite President Bush's claims, the Gulf War can not be a basis or model for the New World Order. In the following chapter we will discuss elaborately why a New World Order can not be built on the experience of the Gulf crisis.

IV. THE GULF CRISIS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

The United States, after initial hesitation and indecisiveness, was able to mobilise huge force against Iraq and under the US leadership more than half million troops from 28 countries were deployed in the Gulf region. The UN Security Council adopted a series of resolutions against Iraq demanding immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Finally, on November 29, 1990 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 678 which authorised the member states, "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement the Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent Resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area".⁴⁶

Leaving the details of events apart, we take up below the examination of the reasons why a New World Order can not be built on the experience of the Gulf crisis.

(a) The Gulf War Could Have Been Avoided.

According to many analysts the Gulf war could have been avoided by taking appropriate measures beforehand. Concerns were expressed in the United States about Saddam Hussein's growing military power and strength and its possible consequences long before the crisis started. But as the Bush

46. UN Security Council Resolution 678 adopted on November 29, 1990. *New Thinking and Developments in International Politics : Opportunities and Dangers*, edited by Neil Riemer, (University Press of America, New York, London), 1991, Appendix 2, p. 186.

Administration considered Iraq as a strategic ally against "number one enemy" in the region — Iran, Washington did not pay any serious attention to the disputes that were developing between Iraq and Kuwait. Even on July 25, 1990 only 8 days before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the US ambassador to Iraq Mrs. Glaspie during her long meeting with Saddam Hussein told him that President Bush "personally wants to expand and deepen the relationship with Iraq", and she also assured that "We do not have much to say about Arab-Arab differences, like your border differences with Kuwait. All we hope is that you solve those matters quickly"⁴⁷ However, in a subsequent testimony Mrs. Glaspie claimed that she warned Saddam Hussein against military action directed against Kuwait. Only two days before the invasion of Kuwait, John H. Kelley, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, indicated in a Congressional testimony that the United States considered the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border dispute as the countries' private affair.⁴⁸ Critics believe that the US neutrality and indifferent attitude towards the crisis were interpreted by Iraq as a "green light" to invade Kuwait. The participants of a Non-proliferation Forum in Washington also concluded that the War in the Gulf could have been avoided "If the United States had indicated its intentions clearly in the days before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait".⁴⁹

(b) The US Acted Hastily Without Giving Chance to an Arab Solution.

Although it is widely claimed that the US intervened in the Gulf crisis at the request of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, and that the war was unavoidable because of the failure of the Arab League to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, credible evidences do not fully subscribe to those views. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries did not ask for US

47. *Time*, October 1, 1990, p. 23.

48. For details about Mr. Kelley's testimony, see *Newsweek*, January 28, 1991, p. 57.

49. *Report of the Nonproliferation Forum*, November 6, 1990, (Washington D. C. Sponsored by the Stanley Foundation), p. 5.

military help immediately after the invasion of Kuwait, rather it was the US who persuaded them to accept US troops on their soils.

On August 2, 1990, as soon as Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Bush spoke with King Fahd and President Mubarak on telephone for more than an hour and explained the seriousness of Iraqi threat to Saudi oil and security and requested them to accept the deployment of US troops in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. There are also reports that the Saudi Royal Family was divided on what action to be taken against Iraq and it was considering to pay Iraq \$10 billion, as Baghdad demanded from Kuwait before the invasion, as a price for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.⁵⁰ The US reportedly came to know about it and President Bush called king Fahd and pressed him to support the US intervention in the crisis. King Fahd asked for more information and briefing about the US plan and any immediate Iraqi threat to Saudi security. President Bush requested King Fahd to accept a US delegation headed by Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, while the Saudi King asked to send a lower level delegation. Prince Bandar, the high profile Saudi ambassador to the US, apparently played a key role in persuading King Fahd to accept the US delegation headed by Dick Cheney. The US Defence Secretary proposed a two-tier strategy; first, to deter a possible Iraqi aggression in Saudi Arabia, and second, to take punitive measures against Iraq, starting with economic measures. King Fahd agreed to accept the US proposals, but Crown Prince Abdullah was reportedly critical to the US plan.⁵¹ Even some analysts believe that Saudi Arabia and Egypt were pressured and manipulated by the US to accept troops in the Gulf region.

The Arab League was not given enough time to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, and the League was sharply divided on the issue of the US role in the crisis. On September 3, 1990 the Secretary General of the Arab League Chadli Klibi resigned when Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak forced to pass a resolution in an emergency Summit meeting allowing the

50. Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, (Simon and Schuster, New York), 1991, p. 253.

51. John Sigler, "Conflict in the Middle East" *Conflicts Around the World 1990-1991*, Annual Report, (Centre quebecois de relations internationales, Universite Laval, Quebec), 1991, p. 71.

deployment of US troops in Saudi Arabia. Klibi believed that the Gulf Crisis was not the first one in the Arab World, the Arabs faced many such problems in the past and given time and opportunity they could find an Arab solution to the crisis, but western involvements in the crisis closed such possibility. Klibi also accused that "with no justification, the west hastened to intervene in an inter-Arab conflict without leaving chances for Arab efforts, without leaving necessary time to try and find a solution."⁵²

(c) Diplomacy was not Given Enough Time and Opportunity.

Many leaders and analysts believed that the United States and her European allies, particularly Britain, were preparing for a military solution to the Gulf crisis from the very beginning, and diplomacy was not given enough time and opportunity to solve the crisis. On the next day of the invasion, August 3, 1990 King Hossein of Jordan visited Baghdad and announced a plan to hold a meeting of the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iraq in Jeddah on August 4-5, 1990 to discuss the situation in the Gulf. But that meeting was never held and the Iraqis claimed that the meeting was postponed because of the US pressure on Saudi Arabia and Egypt.⁵³

By the end of October, 1990 special Soviet envoy Yevgeny Primakov, a veteran Soviet Middle East expert who was personally known to Saddam Hussein for long time, visited Baghdad and proposed to offer Iraq two islands — Bubiyan and Warbah — and a slice of Ramallah oil fields, but the US rejected those proposals.⁵⁴ The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the US criticised Primakov's mission and accused the Soviet Union for trying to split the coalition, so the mission had to be abandoned. France was also interested in similar initiatives, but apparently

52. George D. Moffett, "Looking to a Postwar Arab Order", *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 8, 1991, p. 6.

53. John Sigler, *op. cit.* p. 70

54. *Newsweek*, October 29, 1990, p. 20.

did not succeed. The EC countries wanted to keep diplomatic options open to negotiate with Iraq. In early January, 1991 Germany took initiative to set up an independent EC committee to negotiate with Iraq, but Britain vigorously opposed any European initiative without the US involvement in it.⁵⁵ The Non-aligned Movement also offered its good offices to mediate the crisis, but, as it appeared, they were neither heard nor given any opportunity. The United States and Britain took strong stand and refused to negotiate with an "aggressor". As it appeared, from the very beginning of the crisis the US, along with Britain, was preparing for a war and not for a peaceful resolution of the Gulf Crisis.

For the United States time was an important factor because Yemen was supposed to take over the chairmanship of the UN Security Council from December, 1990. In fact, by the end of November 1990, any chance for peaceful resolution of the Gulf crisis was closed. Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US armed forces David Jones and Admiral William Crowe told the Armed Services Committee on November 28, 1990 that the military build up was closing off the President's options by forcing an early decision to use force rather than waiting for economic sanctions to work.⁵⁶

(d) Diplomatic and Economic Pressures were used to form the Anti-Iraqi Coalition

The formation of an anti-Iraqi coalition during the Gulf crisis encouraged President Bush to design a collective security arrangement for his New World Order. President Bush claimed that the whole world joined the US and the coalition against Iraq. But serious questions have been raised on the way the coalition was formed and functioned. As it has been observed earlier, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries very reluctantly agreed to accept the deployment of US troops in the Gulf region. As far as other Arab

55. For details about European peace initiatives during the Gulf crisis, see Ronald Dannreuther, "The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis", *Adelphi Paper*, (IISS, London), No. 264, Winter 1991-92, pp. 40-44.

56. John Sigler, *op. cit.* p. 74.

participants in the coalition were concerned, they were also under various pressures to join the US-led coalition forces. There were lot of deals and trade-offs in forming the coalition. For joining the coalition, Egypt was relieved of a debt of \$7 billion and Syria got Western recognition and a free rein in Lebanon. Moreover, there were strong deep-rooted personal reasons for the leaders of Egypt and Syria to join in an anti-Saddam coalition.

Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, organised the Arab world against the US sponsored Camp David Accords of 1979, and led the anti-Egyptian Steadfastness Front. There were also long and endless battles between Baghdad and Cairo for leadership in the Arab world. Furthermore, thousands of Egyptian workers lost their jobs in Iraq as she was suffering from severe economic crisis after the long Iran-Iraq war. There were also reports that Egyptian workers were mistreated and discriminated by the Iraqi regime. So an anti-Iraqi sentiment was rising high in Egypt. Moreover, Saddam Hussein allegedly lied to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak about the Iraqi intention before the invasion and thus undermined Mubark's credibility before the Arab leaders. Finally, being the largest recipient of US aid, after Israel, Egypt, for obvious reasons, could not afford not to support the US plan.

As far as Syria was concerned, with the loss of her old patron, the Soviet Union, Damascus was eagerly looking for opportunities to improve relations with the West, particularly with the United States, and the Gulf crisis brought that unique opportunity. Moreover, there were long and deep-rooted hatreds and animosities between the two Ba'athist parties of Iraq and Syria. During the long Iran-Iraq war Syria was the only Arab country that supported Iran against Iraq. Personal hatred, animosities and rivalries of Hafeez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein also played a role in Syria's joining in the US-led anti-Iraqi coalition force. As journalist John Cruickshank put it, Syria had such a profound interest in seeing Iraq crippled that it could hardly remain outside the tent.⁵⁷ As far as other participants of the coalition were

57. John Cruickshank, "So what's New About New World Order?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 25, 1991, p. A17.

concerned they had their own interests and compulsions to join the alliance. Britain, the most enthusiastic European participant to the Gulf crisis, was, in fact, in war with Iraq since early 1990. Personal vendetta and ego of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher against Saddam Hussein also played a key role in Britain's joining in the US-led coalition force and punishing Iraq.⁵⁸

As far as France was concerned it is difficult to understand her position towards the Gulf crisis. But there was a clear division within the government about France's role in the Gulf War. It may be noted, however, that in the post-Cold War era America was emerging as an unchallenged superpower and France joined the coalition force with a view to playing more active role in the post-Gulf War international system.

Initially, the Soviet Union refused to join the anti-Iraqi coalition led by the US and opposed the use of force against Iraq. Moscow considered the Gulf crisis as an "intra-Arab" one and preferred an "Arab solution" to it, but domestic political and economic situation, particularly the dire economic needs left it with no option than to support the US initiatives. And supports to the US on the Gulf crisis brought good dividends for her.⁵⁹ Germany and Japan had no options than to support the US because of their security dependency on the US. Germany and Japan could not participate in

58. There were also other reasons for Britain's enthusiasm for joining in the Gulf crisis. (a) After the victory in Falkland war, the old colonial nostalgia reemerged in Britain under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher. (b) As Britain's disputes with the European Community were growing over a number of issues, the conservative government wanted to develop a close political and military-strategic relations with the United States. (c) The execution of British journalist Farzad Bazoft by Saddam Hussein in March, 1990 on the charge of spying against Iraq further deteriorated relations between the two countries. Finally, and most importantly, (d) Iraq Invaded Kuwait, a former British protectorate, where Britain had enormous economic interests in terms of trade and investment, and the already troubled British economy could not afford to loose Kuwait.

59. Issues of wide economic cooperation between the US and the USSR were discussed in the Helsinki Summit. President Bush promised to lift "all obstacles" to joint ventures in the Soviet Union, and agreed to "facilitate not hamper" more fruitful co-operation between the Soviet Union and other countries. It was also agreed that the Secretary of State James Baker along with a group of American businessmen would visit Moscow within three days for further discussion on economic cooperation. For details see, "Soviet-US Joint Statement in Helsinki", *Press Release* by the press information department of the USSR Embassy in Dhaka, Bangladesh, P. R. No. 07/110, September 11, 1990. The US also reportedly secured the USSR \$ 3 billion (according to another estimate \$ 4 billion) loan from Saudi Arabia. Narasinsha Sil, *op. cit.* p. 46.

the War because of their constitutional limitations but had to pay for it, while Israel was paid for not participating in the war.⁶⁰

Although President Bush claimed that the Gulf War was a war of Iraq versus the whole world, factually it was not correct. Only twenty - eight countries (about 16% of the UN members) participated in the US - led anti - Iraq coalition force and only 10 countries took part in the final hostilities that broke out on January 16, 1991. The two non - Arab Third World participants in the Gulf War - Bangladesh and Pakistan - were ruled by authoritarian regimes with debatable political support and legitimacy at home, and were fully dependent on the West and OPEC for their survival.

However, public opinion in those countries was overwhelmingly against the war. In the case of Bangladesh the decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia was taken by the military regime of General Ershad whose government had no popular support and legitimacy at home. The military government was overthrown by popular uprisings in December, 1990. There were considerable anti-war and anti-US demonstrations all over the country, and the transitional government had to take extraordinary steps to ensure security of embassies and citizens of countries which participated in the Gulf War. The government was also under serious pressure to bring troops back home from the Gulf.

For Pakistan sending troops to Saudi Arabia was nothing new. Thousands of Pakistani troops were already serving in the Saudi defence forces before the Gulf-crisis. And considering the dependence of Pakistan's military regime on the US and Saudi aid Islamabad could not afford to respond otherwise. However, the public opinion was so anti-war and anti-American that even the government had to change policy and criticise the US and allied attacks on Iraq.

Although some major Arab countries participated in the US-led coalition force against Iraq, the Arab world was sharply divided on the issue. The Iraqi invasion was denounced by almost all Arab countries, but many

60. According to reports Japan paid \$12 billion (more than Japan's annual foreign aid) to the coalition forces for the Gulf War. Germany paid \$ 9 billion for the War, while US aid to Israel in 1990-91 increased from \$ 3 billion to \$ 5.6 billion.

Arab leaders simply could not support the idea of endorsing the US-led multinational forces destroying Iraq, once the bastion and centre of Arab culture and civilization. As far as the Arab public was concerned, they were never given chance to express their views, and were mainly horrified and disillusioned by the events in the Gulf. Although political activities and demonstrations were banned in most Arab countries by autocratic and dictatorial regimes, anti-war demonstrations broke out in many countries, including Egypt and Syria. Despite strict control and censorship over press and media, the War was criticised and denounced by various sections of Arab press and media.

In the Gulf War the US managed to pull all the strings together and to set up a central switch board to control the situation, but it may not be repeated, and major powers may have their own switch board in future conflicts. The equation of the Gulf War worked well mainly because it brought something for everybody, except for the aggressor and the victims of it. In the words of Laurence Martin,

Western Europe, Japan and not least the United States itself have a real and almost obsessional interest in the Gulf oil.....the United States, France and Britain were also paid off in cash.....China began to be forgiven what it was, Egypt got cash, weapons and prestige.⁶¹

(e) Fragile Alliance

Although it was widely publicised that the anti-Iraqi coalition was formed spontaneously with a view to implementing the UN resolutions, records show that the allied countries were sharply divided on the Gulf War and the coalition at the UN was formed mainly through vigorous diplomatic and economic pressures and persuasions by the US. As it has been mentioned earlier, the French government was divided on the War and the Defence Minister resigned because of his disagreement with the Government on the Gulf War. The Soviet government was also deeply divided on the issue and foreign minister Edward Shevardnadze had to resign before the War started.

61. Laurence Martin, "National Security in the New World Order", *The World Today*. (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), Vol 48, No. 2, February 1992, p. 22.

And there is hardly any guarantee that the Gulf alliance will hold together in future conflicts in the region and beyond.

During the Cold War the US Strategic argument was that it provided defence shields for Germany and Japan from Soviet nuclear attacks and in the new circumstances the US military is ensuring secured oil supply for them. However, it appears that these arguments are not being bought by Japanese and German leaders without question. As it has been mentioned earlier, the Japanese government agreed, very reluctantly, to contribute to the Gulf War and many Japanese believed that the supply of Middle Eastern oil would have been more secured without the US military intervention into the region. Although Germany supported the US in the Gulf War and provided aid, she was also concerned about the crisis and appealed for restraint in the War. In an interview with *Die Welt* in early December, 1990, Chancellor Kohl expressed concern when he said, "Armed conflict in the Middle East would hit us very hard". He also concluded that "there will be no peace unless the Arab-Israeli and the Lebanon conflicts are ended by negotiations."⁶² For future conflicts a strong united Germany may set her own agenda and priority rather than simply following the US commands. Assertiveness in German foreign policy was already evident as it hastened to recognise the independent states of Croatia and Slovenia at a time when the US was maintaining rather ambivalence towards the Yugoslav civil war.

(f) Disputed UN Role in the Gulf Crisis.

Although the UN Security Council adopted 12 Resolutions against Iraq, the process of adoption was not all too easy. China, one of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, was reluctant to support the use of force against Iraq. The US assured China of a huge loan guarantee from the World Bank on favourable terms and it was also promised that the Chinese Foreign Minister would be received in the White House, for the first time since the Tiananmen square incident of 1989. Hence, as the trade-off China did not veto the UN Resolution 678, but abstained, and the US delegate in the World Bank did not veto the loans to China but abstained.

⁶² *Time*, December 10, 1990, p. 16.

In September, 1990, on the eve of the Helsinki Summit Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze made it clear that Moscow would not support the use of military force against Iraq. The Soviet Union also placed three conditions for joining the anti-Iraqi coalition in the Gulf crisis; (a) The troops must be designated as UN troops and serving under UN flag, (b) The commander of the UN forces should not necessarily be an American, and (c) the war must be approved by the UN⁶³. However, Mr. Shevardnadze agreed that if more impressive steps were required, the Soviet Union should suggest to reactivate the UN Military Staff Committee.⁶⁴ But as it appeared from the Joint Statement of the Helsinki Summit, the Soviet Union failed to pursue its objective under the US pressure and agreed to "consider additional ones (steps) consistent with the UN Charter".⁶⁵

Yemen and Cuba, who abstained when the UN Security Council Resolution 678 was adopted, were under pressure from the United States. *The New York Times* disclosed a story that minutes after the Yemeni delegate joined the Cubans in voting against Resolution 678 at the Security Council, a senior American diplomat was instructed to tell him, "that was the most expensive "no" vote you ever cast"— meaning that it could end American help to Yemen⁶⁶. According to one Arab leader, "Washington simply hijacked the UN in order to cloak its foul designs in a cloak of international respectability, and as a result the institution has been ruined. Bush's 'new world order' is just American imperialism and militarism rampant, and nobody will ever trust the poor old UN again".⁶⁷

Political leaders and experts on international law also raised questions about the procedure and legitimacy of the UN Resolution authorising the use of force against Iraq. Richard Gardner, a professor of international law at Columbia University challenged the UN role when he said, "The UN can't be.....an authorizer of war and at the same time be a mediator"⁶⁸

63. *Time*, October 15, 1990, p. 43.

64. Golam Mostafa, "Soviet Policy Towards the Gulf Crisis", *BISS Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1991, p. 66.

65. *Ibid*.

66. *The New York Times*, December 2, 1990.

67. *The Gazette*. (Montreal), March 6, 1991.

68. Lucia Mouat, "United Nations' Multiple Roles at Odds in Confronting Gulf", *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 22, 1991, p. 5.

Eric Hoskins accused the UN for violating its own Charter by declaring war against one of its member states.⁶⁹ During the Gulf crisis, for the first time, the UN approved the use of food and medicine as weapon against innocent civilians. Some Arab leaders raised questions about the role of the UN in the Gulf War. According to one Arab leader,

The irony of this War is that it is waged under the cloak of international legitimacy and in the name of the UN which was created to preserve, peace, security, justice and to resolve disputes through dialogue, negotiations and diplomacy.⁷⁰

He also wondered "If this is an example of the future role of the UN in the new world order, what an ominous future lies before all nations".⁷¹ He surely echoed voices of many Third World leaders.

It is often argued that the Gulf War was authorised by the UN and was fought under its banner. The allied members also believe that the Gulf War was a victory for the United Nations in the new international situation which can be replicated for a New World Order. But serious questions have been raised on whether the Gulf War was fought under the banner of the UN and whether it was a victory for the UN. The dominant view is that in the Gulf war the UN compromised its credibility no matter how the West explains it. Even the former Secretary General of the UN Peres de Cuellar argued that

The victory over Iraq was not at all a victory for the United Nations, because it was not its war. It was not a United Nations war. General Schwarzkopf was not wearing a blue helmet.⁷²

He also expressed concern about the Organization's diminishing credibility in the Arab world, and concluded that if next Saddam Hussein would come either in the Middle East, Africa or in Latin America and gobble up a peaceful neighbour, the response of the world body would never be the same.

69. Eric Hoskins, "Iraqi civilians were the real losers", *The Ottawa Citizen*, January 17, 1992, p. A 11.

70. Aileen McCabe, "Crisis for the UN", *The Ottawa Citizen*, February 12, 1991.

71. *Ibid.*

72. *The Ottawa Citizen*, February 9, 1992.

During the Korean War and the Gulf War the US was willing to use the UN (during the Gulf War the Soviet Union was also a strong supporter to involve the UN) for achieving her foreign policy goals because there was no serious opposition, but it may not happen in future crises, particularly when the US interests will be at stake and other major powers will not agree to subscribe to the US views. Historically also the US and the USSR were behind many of the impediments which limited the scope for the UN in fulfilling its roles in maintaining international peace and security.

There are other reasons why the UN role in the Gulf crisis cannot be generalised and made a model for future collective security.

i. The US had no intention of going through the UN, but the allies, particularly Canada, France and the Soviet Union inveigled the US administration to go through the UN and thus to give an international legitimization of the War. Britain strongly opposed the idea of going through the UN for the approval of the war against Iraq. There was also a strong lobby in the US Administration for not going through the UN Security Council because of the apprehension that any veto from a Permanent Member could jeopardise the US plan. While the ultra-conservatives accused President Bush for making the US policy subservient to the UN at a time when the UN was pleased to be subservient to the US. However, there was a clear understanding that even if the Council failed to approve a resolution authorising the use of force it would not stop the US to go to the War in the Gulf.⁷³

ii. The United Nations was neither formed nor equipped for dealing with wars. It is not possible for the UN to draw a line on how much force, when and by whom to be used. For example, in the case of the Gulf War, the UN Security Council authorised "to use all necessary measures" against Iraq if Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991, but it never explicitly approved the use of military force against Iraq. And there was also

73. British Prime Minister John Major was strongly against going through the UN Security Council, because of the apprehension that any veto from a Permanent Member would kill the war efforts. Even Canada which always insisted on acting through the UN was ready to support the US to use force against Iraq without the UN approval. The US agreed to get the War authorised by the UN Security Council only when Washington was assured by France, USSR and China that they would not oppose the move.

no mention of where (meaning which parts of Iraq or Kuwait) and how much military force to be used to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The UN had no control over the Gulf War and the Secretary General was not even informed about the start of the War and its subsequent developments ⁷⁴.

iii. In the Gulf Crisis the UN intervention served the interests of major powers so it was easy to act through the UN. But in future conflicts when such action may jeopardize the interests of major powers, it will not be possible for the UN Security Council to act collectively, rather individual powers will act independently and unilaterally to achieve their goals and objectives.

A new world order can not be built on the experience of the UN during the Gulf War. The Gulf War rather demonstrated how the UN can be used and manipulated by the United States in the absence of a balance of power in international system. Leonard Johnson believes that, the Gulf War was not a triumph for the United Nations, rather it demonstrated the dependence of that body on the power and consent of the United States. ⁷⁵

(g) Divided US Public Opinion

The Gulf War was supported by majority of the American people, but it was not supported by all American people as claimed by the Administration and media. The division in public opinion was clearly reflected in the voting pattern of the US Congress on the Gulf War. On January 12, 1991 the US Congress authorised President Bush "to use United States armed force pursuant with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 678" against Iraq. The vote in favour was 52-47 in the Senate, 250-183 in the House. ⁷⁶

The US Administration was also reportedly divided on the issue of the use of force against Iraq. There are reports that Collin Powel, the Chairman

74. These points were raised by two lecturers at the University of Melbourne Law School in the monthly journal of the United Nations Association in Australia, May, 1991.

75. Leonard V. Johnson, "Time for Common Security", *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, June 1991, p. 28.

76. *The Global Report*, op. cit. p. 1.

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was against the war and tried to convince the President to give sanctions at least two more years to work, but President Bush dismissed the argument.⁷⁷ There were continued debates within the Administration between those who preferred to continue the embargo and those who preferred immediate solution of the crisis by using force.

Brzezinski, the former National Security Adviser and Paul Nitze, Deputy Secretary of State and arms control negotiator, also favoured the continuation of embargo against Iraq for years. Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee on November 19, 1990 said.

Sanctions are working and the blockade and embargo are biting. The sanctions policy must be given a chance to prove itself and not be cut short by offensive action initiated by the United States.⁷⁸

Even General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the allied forces in the Gulf, in an interview in November, 1990 published on January 28, 1991, said, "If the alternative to dying is sitting out in the sun for another summer, then that's not a bad alternative..... I am not rushing into a battle. I'm not General Custer."⁷⁹

The International Institute of Economics, a Washington based think tank, published the result of an extensive study of 115 cases of sanctions and concluded that sanctions worked only in 34% of cases, but on the case of Iraq the study predicted 100% chances of success. The Institute predicted that sanctions against Iraq would succeed by the fall of 1991.⁸⁰ Most of the US allies, including Japan, were in favour of continuing the embargo against Iraq for a longer period. Kan Ito, a foreign policy analyst for ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan wrote,

Keeping severe economic sanctions, boycotting Iraqi oil for a long time, say the next 50 years, will deprive Iraq of almost all of its export income and drive its economy back to a primitive, impoverished one. The majority of Japanese prefer this type of harsh but non-violent punishment to a violent one.⁸¹

77. Bob Woodward in his book, *The Commanders*, (Simon and Schuster, New York), 1991, gives details of the decision-making mechanism within the US Administration during the Gulf War. pp. 40-42.

78. *The Global Report*, op. cit. p. 3.

79. *The New York Times*, January 28, 1991.

80. G. Hufbauer, K. A. Elliot and J. J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1991.

81. *The New York Times*. January 30, 1991.

The US public opinion on war against Iraq was also sharply divided by other considerations. The entire Congressional Black Caucus, except Gary Franks, voted against the January 12, 1991 resolutions to use military force against Iraq. Although polls showed that more than two-thirds of the Americans supported the War in the Gulf, only 50% of African Americans supported it, in contrast with more than 80% of white.⁸² In addition, massive anti-war demonstrations took place throughout Europe and North America.

(h) Domestic Compulsions

There were also a number of domestic considerations and compulsions for President Bush to go to the War in the Gulf. President Bush was lacking personal charisma of his predecessor Ronald Reagan and only 48% of Americans were satisfied with his performance.⁸³ The grim realities of domestic politics and economy made it difficult for the President to keep his election promises and at the same time the Savings and Loan scandal with his son's involvement in it further damaged the credibility of Bush Administration. Moreover, with the Cold War coming to an end and the Soviet Union on the verge of collapse, the powerful military industrial complex in the United States was really worried about possible defence budget cuts and losses of lucrative arms trade worldwide. So there was a strong lobby in Washington either to preserve existing conflicts or to create new ones to justify military build up and arms sales worldwide. Iraqi invasion of Kuwait apparently served the above mentioned interests.

After the war itself, President Bush tried to use the victory in the Gulf War to increase his personal image and popularity, as he said, "Our success in the Gulf will shape not only the world order we seek but our mission here at home."⁸⁴ Asking the Congress to support his initiatives on transportation and crime he said, "If our forces could win the ground war in

82. *The New York Times*, March 2, 1991, p. A 23.

83. *The World Press Review*, October 1990, pp.15 -16.

84. President Bush's speech at the joint session of the US Congress on March 6, 1991, *op. cit.* p. 3.

100 hours, then surely the Congress can pass this legislation in 100 days."⁸⁵ However, it appears that it was not too easy for President Bush to fully convince the American public about the justification of the war.

(i) US Hidden Agenda in the Gulf War

Although the declared objectives of the Gulf War were to seek immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait, to ensure the security and stability of the Gulf region, and to protect the lives of American citizens abroad,⁸⁶ the US had a number of hidden items in the agenda, to take control over Near Eastern oil resources, to destroy Iraq's military potential and capability and thus to ensure Israel's security, to test the accuracy, effectiveness and deterrent power of some modern weapons like the Patriot missiles in a real war situation, to show Japan and Germany that the US is the only power that can ensure their economic security and prosperity, and finally, of course, to emerge as the undisputed world leader.

There is no doubt that oil was an important factor in the Gulf War. On August 2, 1990 in the first meeting of the US National Security Council on the Gulf crisis, much of the discussion was on oil, and President Bush expressed concern that "with control of 20% of the world's oil, Saddam could manipulate the price and threaten the US economic recovery".⁸⁷ The President also recognised the importance of oil in his State of the Union address in January, 1991 when he said the Americans know, "we must make sure that control of world's oil resources does not fall into his (Saddam Hussein) hands, only to finance further aggression".⁸⁸ According to Pam Solo, "The new world order was merely the higher principle needed to Middle Eastern oil".⁸⁹ Judith Kipper, a Middle East Expert at the Brookings

85. *Ibid* p. 4

86. President Bush outlined these objectives in his address from Oval Office on August 8, 1990. President Bush, "The Arabian Peninsula: US Principles", *The US Department of State Dispatch* 1, No. 1, (September 3, 1990), pp. 52-53.

87. John Sigler, *op. cit.* p. 70.

88. *The Washington Post*, January 30, 1991.

89. Pam Solo "Talking Law Waging War", *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* June 1991, p. 25.

Institute put it more bluntly, "The truth is, the US has just two interests in the Middle East oil and Israel. And everything else is peripheral".⁹⁰

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security adviser to President Carter, while assessing the benefits of the War concluded that the US access to oil was no more in jeopardy as America clearly emerged as a predominant power in the Gulf and the Middle East and the Soviet Union had been reduced in the area to the status of spectator.⁹¹

There is also a widespread view, held by most of the Arab and other Third World countries, that one of the major US objectives in the Gulf War was to destroy Iraq's military machine, although the US denied it. Questions were raised about the way the War was conducted, whether it was necessary to destroy the civilian economy of Iraq, power plants, communications, transportation, water and sanitary systems which only added to the sufferings of innocent civilians. Some Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, including the Soviet Union and China, expressed their concerns about the excessive damage of Iraq. Even Iran, an arch rival of Iraq, accused the US for seeking the destructions of Iraq's military and economic capabilities.

Another US objective in the Gulf War was to demonstrate the US power and capability in the post-Cold War era and to ensure "who is in charge there (Middle East)",⁹² as one Arab expert put it,

From all indications, the term (new world order) aptly describes an unipolar world in which the political will of the US, supported by a preponderance of American military power, can no longer be challenged by smaller power with impunity. In the context of the US-Iraq confrontation, the new world order is viewed by many Arabs as heralding the onset of a process of recolonization of Arab land (through American military presence) and an unremitting American monopolization of Arab oil resources.⁹³

90. *Ibid.*

91. *The New York Times*, April 21, 1991.

92. Joan Galtung, "What would Peace in the Middle East Look Like, Or Is It Possible?" *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*. Vol. 22, No. 3, 1991, p. 246

93. Khalil Barhoum, "The Gulf Crisis and a New World Order", *MEI*, 11 January 1991, p. 21.

It was also an opportunity for the US to prove to the Japanese and Germans that despite the end of cold War their economic security is still uncertain and vulnerable, and only the US has the necessary power and potential to protect them. Ola Tunander went even further and observed that the Gulf War was directed at Germany and Japan indirectly, and in the ultimate analysis once again Germany and Japan were "defeated" by the United States.⁹⁴

Since the fall of Iran, one of the "twin pillars" of US policy in the Gulf, the United States was looking for permanent military presence in the Gulf, but the members of the GCC opposed any direct US involvement into the the region. The Gulf crisis brought an opportunity for the US to be directly involved into the Gulf security system and to persuade the oil rich Arab Gulf countries that only the US can ensure the security and stability of the region. The Gulf crisis broke out at a time when the future of American troops in Europe and around the world, including Germany and the Philippines, were uncertain and the US was looking for new base facilities in strategic places with possible economic gains, and the Gulf region was obviously the best choice. And last but not the least, the victory over Iraq in the Gulf War had washed off the Vietnam syndrome.

There are other political, economic and military constraints and limitations making the Gulf War a model for the New World Order.

(i) Iraq occupied Kuwait, one of the richest countries in the world, which had great economic and strategic importance to the West. The Victims of Iraqi aggressions (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Gulf countries) had financial resources to pay back for the War.⁹⁵ But if a poor country were the victim of aggression by a powerful neighbour; will the response be the same as it was during the Gulf War? The answer is obviously debatable. The experience of the Gulf War was a unique one. It was more of an exception than a rule, and it is hard to foresee that it will be repeated.

94. Ola Tunander, "Bush's Brave New World: A New World Order, A New Military Strategy", *Bulletin of Peace Proposal*, Vol. 22, No. 4, December 1991, p. 365.

95. Saudi Arabia agreed to pick up all fuel, water and the war costs, whereas the Kuwaiti government-in-exile took the transportation costs of the US troops stationed in the Kingdom. In early September, 1990 the Kuwaiti government-in-exile promised US Secretary of State James Baker to pay \$1 billion monthly for maintaining the US troops in Saudi Arabia. The Emir also promised to pay \$5 billion, and assured Baker that "We will not spare any amount or any value. We will give whatever is necessary", *The Ottawa Citizen*, September 8, 1990. It will never be known how much that Gulf countries had paid or still paying to the allied countries for the Gulf War.

The participants of a Non-proliferation Forum held in Washington in November, 1990 also cautioned against "making the Gulf crisis a model for future action because of significant differences - cultural, economic and political - with other areas of the world."⁹⁶

(ii) The Gulf War can not be a model for a New World Order even from a purely military point of view. Iraq was not at all a major power. The allied countries and Western press and media created an image of Iraq's army as "the fourth largest" in the world to glorify the win and make it more worthwhile, but, as Professor Jacobsen notes "The image was clearly a mirage", and Iraq's military was only that of a Third World nation.⁹⁷ Even then the United States had to ask military help from all over the world, including from major European powers and to deploy more than half a million troops with all sophisticated weapons in the US arsenal to fight against Iraq. It took the coalition forces 42 days to defeat Iraq. The Gulf war has also proved that the US weapons are not as superior, accurate and smart as they are thought to be.⁹⁸ K. Subrahmanyam, a noted Indian defence analyst wrote,

It is ridiculous to talk of a new world order after a short war in which a large coalition, including the military forces of a number of major powers, defeated a mid-level developing nation with a paranoid dictator.⁹⁹

On the first anniversary of the Gulf War, columnist George Will wrote, "If that war (Gulf War), in which the United States and a largely rented and Potemkin coalition of allies smashed a nation with the GNP of

96. Report of Nonproliferations Forum, *op. cit.* p. 2.

97. Carl G. Jacobsen, "The Gulf War Revisited: New World Order or Old?" *Securite & Strategies Asie*, (Centre de Reserches sur l' Asie, Hull, Quebec), No. 3, April. 1991, p. 26. For Brzezinski's views on sanctions see, *The Washington Post*, March 3, 1991.

98. According to Pentagon reports, 148 US troops died in the Gulf War, 35 were killed by "friendly fire" (American troops firing mistakenly at each other). The percentage of friendly fire in the Gulf War was 10 times higher than any other war in the 20th century. The US Army announced to spend \$20 million in training and technology to reduce friendly fire casualties during any future battles, *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 10, 1992. More than 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Iraq, only seven percent of it were "smart" or electronically-guided bombs and 75 percent of the bombs missed their military targets. For details see, Eric Hoskins, *op. cit.*

99. K. Subrahmanyam, "Some Nations More Equals than Others", *The Bulletin of Atomoc Scientists*, June 1991, p. 21.

Kentucky, could.....make America feel good about itself, then America should not feel good about itself".¹⁰⁰

(iii) The US economy simply cannot finance another war like the Gulf War and there is no guarantee that in any future war the allied forces will pay for the American bills. In terms of many economic and social indicators America is much weaker now than it was in the 1950s and 1960s.¹⁰¹ During the Gulf War, it was for the first time, the US had to solicit huge contributions from Japan, Germany and the Gulf countries to finance the War, and they paid because of their economic, security and strategic interests. The US Administration was also satisfied that it did not need to bear the burden of the war alone. As President Bush said in his State of the Union Address in January, 1991:

I am heartened that we are not being asked to bear alone the financial burden of this struggle. Last year our friends and allies provided the bulk of the economic cost of (Operation) Desert Shield, and having now received commitments of over \$40 billion for the first three months of 1991, I am confident that they will do no less as we move through (Operations) Desert Storm.¹⁰²

Paul Kennedy and others were afraid that the US, like old empires in the past, was in danger of "imperial overstretch" and the victory in the Gulf War may feed an illusion in the minds of the Administration that the US will remain number one power for generation after generation. But to remain a great power, according to Kennedy,

100. George F. Will, "America shouldn't feel good about its victory over Iraq", *The Ottawa Citizen*, January 17, 1992.

101. In 1945 the US produced about 65% of global manufactured goods, now the share reduced to only 25%. America is the largest debtor nation in the world with huge trade and budget deficits. America is no more the principal donor country to the Third World nations. The US foreign aid, including economic and military, has fallen to 0.21 percent of its GNP from 0.35 percent during the 1960s. Despite the slogans of free trade, until the World War-II the US market was virtually closed for outsiders. A study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1989 shows that during the 1980s when most industrialised countries moved towards lower barriers, the US erected new barriers. For details, see David Gergen, "America's Missed Opportunities", *Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1991-92*, pp. 4-5.

102. President Bush's State of the Union Address on January 29, 1991, *The Washington Post*, January 30, 1991.

America requires not just military capability (and) national will, but also a flourishing and efficient economic base, strong finances and a healthy social fabric, it is upon such foundations that the country's military strength rests in the long run.¹⁰³

Domestic economic problems of the US worsened during the Gulf War. According to a report the number of jobless workers increased by 700,000 between August 1990 and March, 1991 to 7.7 million.¹⁰⁴ Although President Bush relentlessly tried to reinvigorate the economy by using the success in the Gulf War, no result was visible. As Richard Joseph of *New York Times* observed,

And, of course the fog of war did not hide the deepening crisis at home; disgraceful public schools, inadequate health care and cities sinking in drugs and crime. While tens of billions must be found to cover the war's cost, states are sharply cutting health, education and welfare programs.¹⁰⁵

Peter Pringle, a British journalist, might have echoed opinions of many ordinary Americans when he wrote, "What America really needed was a way of outsmarting Japanese televisions, VCRs, computers, and cars, not some distant dictator's stock of nasty weapons".¹⁰⁶

(iv) Despite triumphant victory, the Gulf War failed to generate enthusiasm and long lasting impressions among the American public, although President Bush repeatedly tried to reinvigorate the spirits. Even after one year of the War, there is no consensus on how to evaluate the Gulf War and the US victory. As Kenneth Phillips, managing editor of *Empire Press*, puts it, "If you ask 10 people, you'll get 11 opinions".¹⁰⁷ The victory in the War appears to have been overshadowed by the hard reality of domestic economic and social problems. Analysts wonder how such a well publicised victory in the Gulf War can be forgotten in such a short time. And in the election year when President Bush was facing angry voters and his challengers used "America first" as a popular slogan, the New World Order was no doubt, shelved at least for the time being.

103. "Pax Americana and the New World Order", *Development Hotline*, Issue No. 4, 1991, p. 2

104. *The New York Times*, March 7, 1991, p. A9

105. Richard Joseph, "Injustice Taints the Just War", in *The New York Times*, March 2, 1991, p. A23.

106. *The Washington Post*, March 3, 1991, p. E3.

107. David Holmstrom, "Cheers for Gulf War Fade as US Economy Staggers". *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 10, 1992.

(v) The Gulf War has not only polarised the West and the Arab world, but further antagonised North-South relations. Rightly or wrongly, the Gulf War has been interpreted by many as a war of West vs the Third World or the US vs the Arabs or the rich vs the poor. Massive anti-war and anti-American demonstrations took place not only in the Islamic countries but also in non-Islamic. Third World countries like India, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka. In a way the Gulf War reinvigorated the ideas and spirits of the decolonizations process. There are shared understandings among the developing countries that the West through the Gulf War tried to exploit their resources and sought to establish political dominance in the Gulf region. So despite military victory over Iraq, the US failed to regain its lost credibility and sell ideas of a New World Order to the Third World countries. Already many countries in the region, including Iran, have rejected the ideas of the proposed New World Order on the ground that it can neither benefit the region nor the world pro-peace camp.¹⁰⁸

(vi) Information on the Gulf War was severely censored. Both the sides had great interests to hide the damages and casualties of the war. As James der Derian concluded,

in the Gulf War, the tightly controlled, aesthetically clean images presented an appealing portrait of military technology solving intractable diplomatic problems. This was a war whose victory was measured in the field of perception not political reality and played out in the method and metaphor of gaining, not the history and horror of warring.¹⁰⁹

As a result even one year after the War the total human and material costs of the War were still not known. The UN damage assessment team under Under-Secretary Marti Ahtissari assessed the Iraqi damage as, "near apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what has been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanised and mechanised society".¹¹⁰ In an indepth study of 9,000 Iraqi households, a team of 90 Harvard researchers

108. "Bush's Call for Mideast 'New Order' Criticised", Tehran Radio Domestic Service in Persian, January 19, 1990, *FBIS-NES-91-020*, 30 January 1991.

109. James Der Derian, "S/N : International Theory: Balkanization and the New World Order", *Millennium*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter 1991, p. 502.

110. *The Nation*, January 28, 1991.

found that the rate of child mortality in Iraq trippled since the War. The study also concluded that about 50,000 of Iraqi children might die due to war and sanctions, and more than one million children may suffer from malnutrition.¹¹¹

All the parties, including Iraq, had interests in not disclosing the total casualties of the War. The total death of coalition forces was 268. There is no confirmed casualty figures for Iraq.¹¹² According to *Washington Post* an estimated 100,000 Iraqis died in battle. Estimated 5,000 to 15,000 Iraqi civilians died in coalition air attacks, and upto 100,000 might have died from diseases and malnutrition.¹¹³ According to Iraqi Health Minister close to 100,000 Iraqis, including 31,033 children under five, had died by the end of 1991 from sanctions-related shortages of food and medicine combined with bad sanitations.¹¹⁴ The deaths of Kurds and Shiites in post-Gulf War civil wars are not known.

The total economic costs and environmental damages of the Gulf War are still not assessed. Upto June, 1991 *Christian Science Monitor* estimated the costs (only damages and income loss) as \$ 270 billion for Iraq, \$ 84 billion for Kuwait, \$ 34 billion for Saudi Arabia and \$ 21 billion for Jordan. The War had also serious implications for the Third World countries, particularly in the forms of lost revenues, trade incomes, refugee problems and economic burdens. No figures for the losses of Third World countries in the War are available. The War also had serious environmental implications. The Gulf War created one of the most severe man-made environmental damages in history.¹¹⁶ As Professor John Sigler pointed out,

111. *Ibid*.

112. *The New York Times* (March 1, 1991) quoting some US military officials gave the figure of 25,000-50,000 dead. James Adams of Times (March 3, 1991) believes that the Iraqi toll could be 200,000. William Eckhardt, Research Director for the Lentz Peace Research Laboratory of St. Louis, estimated 100,000 soldiers and 100,000 civilians died in the Gulf War. *The Ottawa Citizen*, December 28, 1991, p. 88

113. *The Washington Post*, June 23, 1991.

114. *The Ottawa Citizen*, February 7, 1992.

115. *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 26, 1991.

116. For details see, Anne McIlroy, "Mopping Up the Gulf War Mess", *The Ottawa Citizen*, November 23 and 24, 1991.

the flood of refugees and the massive scale of human sufferings have raised new questions about the human costs in the opening chapter of what President Bush labelled as a New World Order.¹¹⁷

(vii) There are also some analysts who believe that a world order can not be built on the experience of the Gulf War, because ideas of world orders originated in Europe and any new world order must be Euro-centric and Euro-based and its fate must be decided in Europe, not in the Middle East.¹¹⁸

In the following chapter we will analyse the implications of the Gulf War for the issues and conflicts in the Middle East after more than one year of the War.

V. THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Although President Bush denounced Saddam Hussein's claim to link Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait with Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, with a view to keeping the fragile alliance together Washington had to make serious commitments, particularly to its Arab allies that it would work hard for peace in the Middle East immediately after the War. In his speech to the joint session of Congress on March 6, 1991 President Bush unveiled his detailed plan for Middle East peace in post-Gulf War period. He outlined four key challenges to be met for peace in the Middle East.

First, to create New Security arrangement in the Gulf with the US participation in the joint exercises involving both air and ground forces, and a permanent presence of US naval forces in the region. The US also proposed for a new security system in the Gulf involving the US to protect its vital interests in the region.

Second, to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles used to deliver them. President Bush noted that it would be tragic if the nations of the Middle East and Persian Gulf were, in the wake of War, to embark on a new arms race.

117. John Sigler, *op. cit.* p.77

118. David Stafford, "Cracking the whip at a new world order" *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 5, 1991, p. 15.

Third, to create new opportunities for peace and stability in the Middle East. To close the gap between Israel and the Arab comprehensive peace settlement based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on the principle of "territory for peace".

Fourth, to foster economic development for the sake of peace and progress, to address the immediate economic consequences of Iraq's aggression and to foster economic freedom and prosperity for all people of the region.¹¹⁹

President Bush's proposals appeared to be a good start. But after more than one year of the Gulf War the US has failed to address these issues, except for the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. In the following, we will analyse the implications of the New World Order on major issues and events in the Gulf and in the Middle East.

(a) The Gulf Security

The future security of the Persian Gulf was one of the most important issues during the Gulf crisis. There were a lot of debates and discussions about regional security in the Gulf even before the War was over because, according to some experts, how the War would have ended should depend on what type of security arrangement would emerge in the post-War Gulf. In early February, 1991. The US Secretary of State James Baker outlined his security plan for the post War Gulf which was to include "the states of the Gulf and regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council". Baker also reaffirmed that "no state should be excluded from these arrangements..... Postwar Iraq could have an important contribution to play. And so could Iran as a major power in the Gulf".¹²⁰ As far as the US role was concerned he was in favour of permanent presence of US naval forces in the region and regular participation of ground forces in joint military exercises.

119. President Bush discussed his detailed Middle East peace plan in his address to the joint session of the US Congress on March 6, 1991.

120. Thomas Friedman, "Baker Sketches Future Gulf Role", *The New York Times*, February 7, 1991, p. A17.

Despite her declared neutrality in the War, Iran was a major actor in the Gulf crisis and the US had no intention to keep her aside in any post-War security arrangement. Even the GCC members who all along opposed any Persian involvement in the Gulf security system, accepted the reality that there is no alternative to an understanding with Iran. Secretary General of the GCC Abdullah Bishara recognised Iran as a very important player in the Gulf security, expressed readiness of the GCC members to hold talks with Iran about normalizing and strengthening relations, and hoped to reach an agreement with Tehran.¹²¹ As far as the role of future Iraq in the new security arrangement was concerned, there was no consensus. For James Baker post-War Iraq would play an important role in the regional security system, while Abdullah Bishara could not imagine "any new order in which this (Iraqi) regime participates".¹²²

Soon after the War the hopes for strategic cooperation between Iran and the Gulf countries in the post-War period disappeared. The Gulf countries, despite their short alliance with Iran during the crisis, could not trust the Islamic government of Iran. The situation was complicated further when it was reported that Iran was developing nuclear programs with the help of the former Soviet Union and acquiring sophisticated weapons from various sources. The Persian Gulf Arab countries became more concerned and suspicious when Iran openly supported radical Islamic movements in the Arab world, including the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria. The independence of former Soviet Muslim Republics and their hobnobbing with Iran, Pakistan's open declaration of having nuclear capability and the idea of a regional security arrangement involving Iran, Pakistan and the Soviet Muslim states, have made the future of the Gulf security more complicated and uncertain.

The blueprint for security in the Gulf was drawn on the premise that Saddam Hussein would not survive. But when it appeared that he not only

121. Peter Ford, "Gulf Council Head Looks at a New Post-War Order", *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 29, 1991, p. 5.

122. *Ibid.*

survived, but consolidated his position, despite the devastation of his country, the parties, including the US, were in dilemma on how to build a security arrangement in the Gulf with Saddam Hussein in power. In fact, Saddam Hussein's survival is a constant threat to the Gulf countries and a personal defeat and embarrassment for President Bush who personally wanted Saddam Hussein to go and took a number of initiatives to overthrow him.¹²³

The Gulf countries would favour a strong Iraq, without Saddam, as a counterbalance to Iran, while no one in the US Administration is sure how a post Saddam Iraq will look like and what role Tehran will play in the new situation. So for the US Administration a crippled Saddam is better than no Saddam, because getting rid of him might transform Iraq into a larger, bloodier version of Lebanon in a oil-rich region. Majority of the Iraqis are Shiites, and with the support of Iran they may take control over Iraq which will definitely go against the US and Saudi interests and pose more serious threats to the Gulf security.

Meanwhile, the rapidity with which the GCC countries returned to isolationism surprised many observers. The Gulf countries refused to invite Syrian and Egyptian troops to ensure Gulf security in return for financial aid, although such a provision was agreed in the Damascus Declaration signed in April, 1991.¹²⁴ The leaders of the Gulf countries were also extremely concerned about the fact that Saddam Hussein was still in power and declined to destroy his weapons of mass destruction. They were also worried about growing waves of nationalism and neoisolationism in the United States and in other Western countries which may ultimately compel the US Administration to withdraw supports or reduce commitments towards its allies in the Gulf.

123. President Bush authorised a CIA contingency fund of about \$ 20 million for covert operations to eliminate Saddam Hussein *The Ottawa Citizen*, February 9, 1992. CIA Director Robert Gates visited Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel with a plan to train and arm Kurds and other insurgent groups inside Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein, but some of the US allies in the region, particularly Egypt refused to participate because of Israeli participation in it. *The Ottawa Citizen*, March 1, 1992.

124. Peter Ford and Lamis Andoni, "A Year After War, Unity Eludes Arabs", *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 15, 1992.

Even after more than one year of the War, border disputes between Iraq and Kuwait were still not resolved, UN peacekeeping forces were deployed in the demilitarised zone of Kuwait-Iraqi border, US troops were still in the Gulf countries and multinational forces headed by the US were enforcing the sanctions imposed against Iraq by the United Nations. As past experience shows an externally designed and dominated security system may work for the Gulf region for sometime, but with the growing complexity and uncertainty in the region and President Bush's overwhelming preoccupation with domestic affairs and up-coming presidential election, no radical change was expected.

(b) Arms Control

There were lot of frustrations among the Western public against their governments for supplying arms of all kinds to Iraq. Even General Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of the allied forces in the Gulf, expressed his frustration when he was asked whether Iraq could pose any threat to Gulf countries in future, he replied "no", if someone did not decide to arm her again. So from the beginning of the Gulf crisis the coalition leaders were stressing controlling and limiting arms supplies to the region. Secretary of State James Baker also expressed his frustration when he said that five Middle Eastern countries had more battle tanks than Britain or France. He asked the allied partners to take measures so that Iraq could never acquire weapons of mass destruction, and to tighten restraints on the flow of weapons and dual use technology into the region.¹²⁵

But ironically just within few weeks of the war arms supplies to the region started in full swing. Arms traders became busy in selling "winning weapons" into the region. According to one arms lobbyist, there was no issue of arms control in the Gulf War, rather it created new opportunities for arms sale in the region. President Bush regarded arms sales to coalition partners "as a reward" to their support in the War.¹²⁶ There was no control

125. Thomas Friedman, *op. cit.*

126. *Newsweek*, April 8, 1991, p. 23.

on arms supplies to the Gulf region in the post-War period, rather the market became more competitive and more and more states joined into the race.

Proposals for arms control in the post-Gulf War period, including the ones to hold a disarmament summit, to register arms delivery with the UN, to establish international arms control regime, to regularly monitor and inspect by the IAEA of the production of biological, chemical and all other weapons of mass destruction and to create sufficient mechanism of punishment for defaulters, came from different countries, including Canada, but the US was not interested in those proposals.

Arms control is not an easy task, particularly when there are so many free riders in the world arms market. The situation has become more dangerous and volatile with the disintegrating of the old Soviet Union and the formation of new independent states who are ready to sell arms to anybody for financial reasons. So far the profit motive dominates the arms market and as the Western economies are in recession and unemployment is high no one expects that the arms production and distribution will be reduced and controlled in near future.¹²⁷

The issue of arms control in the Gulf, including the destruction of all types of Iraqi chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and "nuclear usable materials" is still not resolved. Saddam Hussein is still in power and there seems to have no breakthrough in Iran's relations with other Gulf countries. The arms race in the Gulf region is continuing in full speed with Iran acquiring sophisticated weapons from China, Korea and the Commonwealth of Independent States, while the US and other Western countries are

127. There are also strong lobbies from business groups for continuing exports of arms and arms related materials. For example, the US State Department wanted more control on export of ingredients that could be used for producing chemical weapons and set new export regulations, but the Commerce Department argued that the new rules could affect between \$50 to \$75 billion in American exports annually, and blocked the bill under strong lobby from business groups. For details see, *The New York Times*. March 6, 1991.

supplying sophisticated weapons, including Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.¹²⁸

Disintegration of the Soviet Union and Russia's open door policy to sale huge stockpile of arms at reduced price has further escalated the situation.¹²⁹ So far the US does not seem to be keen about introducing an arms control regime for the developing countries in general and for the Gulf region in particular. Meanwhile, the US policing role in the Gulf is being criticised by its allies in the region. Recently when the US, at the request of Israel, dispatched warships to challenge the North Korean freight which was reportedly carrying missiles for Iran, the move was criticised not only by Iran but also by the Persian Gulf Arab countries, closest US allies in the region. The Bahrainian daily *Akbar Al- Khaleej* accused the US for restricting Arab states from getting arms on behalf of Israel without taking similar measures against Israel.¹³⁰ The US has, in fact, no immediate plan to control arms supplies to the Gulf region. But if any arms control regime is ever established in the Middle East it must be equally applicable for all countries in the region, including Israel.

(c) Refugee Problems

The Gulf War also created huge refugee problems. Millions of Kurds and Shiites were dislocated by the war. During the final days of the war President Bush urged the Iraqi people to "take matters into their own hands" and "force the dictator to step aside" which was interpreted by the Iraqi

128. During 1983-89 Saudi Arabia and Iraq purchased one third of arms procured by the Third World countries. During that period the Saudis bought arms of \$44.2 billion, the Iraqis \$42.8 billion, Iran ranked fourth with \$17 billion and Syria fifth with \$15.6 billion. *The New York Times*, March 2, 1991. According to a recent report, only the US has sold \$21.4 billion in weapons to Middle East countries since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The major share of US arms went to Saudi Arabia \$14.8 billion, followed by Kuwait \$2.9 billion, Egypt \$2.2 billion, UAE \$0.74 billion and Israel \$0.47 billion. For details see, Mark Thompson, "Arms manufacturers in US pin hopes on foreign markets", *The Ottawa Citizen*. April, 15, 1992.

129. According to reports, Russia wants to sell \$1 trillion worth of arms at about one quarter of the prices charged by Western countries. There are also unconfirmed reports that Kazakhstan has sold three nuclear weapons to Iran. *The Ottawa Citizen*, February 4, 1992.

130. For details see, *The Ottawa Citizen*, March 9, 1992.

Kurds and Shiites as the US support to their cause. In the south the Shiites took control over the cities of Najaf, Basra and Karbala, but soon they were crushed by government troops, and Washington declared its neutrality "in the internal affairs of Iraq". In the north the Kurds also took control over a vast territory, but they were also brutally crushed by Saddam Hussein's army, and more than 2 millions kurds had to flee to Turkey and Iran. The allied forces moved in and helped to create security zones for Kurds in northern Iraq, but no such assurances were given to Shiites in the south. But soon the relief operations stopped and the Kurds were forgotten. The irony is that the US urged the kurds and Shiites to revolt, then abandoned them, and when the Kurds fled to Turkey the US forced them back to Iraq with a view to protecting its ally Turkey from the effects of militant Kurdish nationalism. So the Kurds are bitter and frustrated with the US, so are the Palestinians. Any new world order in the Middle East must attend the problems and sufferings of the Kurds and ensure the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people for their self-determination.

(d) Sufferings of the Iraqi People

The Gulf War brought miseries to the Iraqi people, particularly to women and children. The War caused severe damages to Iraqi civilian economy, including the destruction of infrastructure. Coalition bombardment blasted everything vital to human survival in Iraq. Water was so scarce and contaminated that epidemics broke out and thousands of children died of cholera and typhoid. Saddam Hussein is still in control and the US is adamant that the sanctions will be in place as long as Saddam Hussein is in power. Sanctions are seriously hurting the Iraqi people, particularly those who are the most vulnerable. Even the supplies of basic and emergency medicines are extremely limited. Meanwhile, anti-American sentiment is rising high among the Iraqi people, as Bernd Debusmann, a Reuter reporter in Baghdad, wrote, "one of the most striking aspects of

change is the extent of agreement on who is the chief villain in the latest drama in the country's long blood-soaked history: George Bush."¹³¹

Questions are being raised about the moral basis of punishing the Iraqi people indefinitely. The Iraqi people are also the victims of their repressive regime which was, in fact, nurtured and supported by the West. Some accommodations have to be worked out otherwise hatred will create further hatred and attempts for total destruction of the vanquished may backfire as it happened many times in history.

(e) The Palestinian Issue

As mentioned earlier, President Bush promised to deal with the Palestinian issue on urgent basis immediately after the War. Secretary of State James Baker rushed to the Middle East as soon as the War ended and tried to persuade the parties to sit together to discuss broad Arab-Israeli disputes. The Palestinians, no doubt, lost much of their credibility because of their support to Iraq in the Gulf crisis, and had to accept almost all Israeli demands to participate in the Middle East peace conference. After long and painful diplomatic efforts the Middle East peace conference opened in Madrid in October, 1991 under the joint US-Soviet sponsorship. However, the US avoided to play any direct role or take any control of the peace process. As President Bush mentioned in his speech in Madrid conference,

Peace can not be imposed from the outside by the United States..... The United States is prepared to accept whatever the parties themselves find acceptable..... We're prepared to extend guarantees, provide technology and support, if that is what peace requires.¹³²

The US has a profound interest to see the peace process continuing as a symbol of success of the Gulf War. As *New York Times* correspondent Clyde Haberman put it,

131. *The Ottawa Citizen*, February 7, 1992.

132. President Bush's Speech at Madrid conference, October 30, 1991, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXI No. 2, Winter 1992, pp. 125-26.

It is difficult to see what magical glue is keeping the peace talks together at this stage, other than the desire of the American President and his Secretary of State to nudge the process along, step by painful step, to prove that the anti-Iraq War a year ago accomplished something nobler than restoring the Kuwaiti emirate.¹³³

Despite sporadic clashes and violence in the occupied territories and southern Lebanon the peace process continued because neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians wanted to be blamed for jeopardizing the process. And Lebanon, Syria and Jordan had no other option than to continue the peace process. As a result, despite all odds the process continued under the US pressure and the parties met several times although without any concrete results. The US had a stake in delivering something tangible because otherwise it would be difficult to sell the New World Order to the Middle Eastern people. Walid Khazzhia, an economist at the American University in Cairo, reflected the Arab frustration and suspicions as he said,

Americans always come to the Middle East in times of crisis and make lot of promises..... Remember the Rogers Plan? The Reagan Plan? The Baker's proposals? But gone is the crisis and gone are the Americans. (Secretary of State James) Baker leaves his phone number and that's that.¹³⁴

On the other hand, the Gulf War failed to solve old problems of the Arab world, rather it created new wounds and made the region more unstable and vulnerable than it was before the crisis. There are much more rivalries, divisions, mistrusts and animosities among the Arab leaders now than ever before. As Ali Dessuki, a Cairo University political scientist put it, the Gulf War "has crystalised all the agonies, all the conflicts, all the differences in the region".¹³⁵

The Gulf War has failed to create new trust or understanding in US-Arab relations. As long as the United States is seen as an imperial enemy by the populist Arab and Islamic movements in the Middle East, its relationship in the region will be vulnerable and susceptible to sudden and drastic change.¹³⁶ Arab world witnessed many turmoils in the past, but the

133. Clyde Haberman, "U.S. pressure keeps both sides at table", *The Ottawa Citizen*, February 23, 1992.

134. *Ibid.*

135. *The Washington Post*, February 24, 1991, p. B1.

136. Richard K. Hermann, "The Middle East and the New World Order", *International Security*, Fall 1991, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 75.

Gulf War injured the Arab body politic so deeply that there are doubts whether it will be ever healed, and any attempt to project stronger western power and presence into the region may be counter productive.

Despite the US help to Arab countries and liberation of the Gulf War created deep frustrations and resentments in Arab minds which are being manifested either in the form of a new wave of anti-Americanism or in a new religious revivalism. These are reflected at two levels; frustration with their own system and leaders for their inability to resolve intra-Arab crises and conflicts peacefully, and frustration with, what they call, the Western conspiracy playing "in the hands of zionism". Even in Egypt, the most moderate Arab country and one of the closest US allies in the Middle East, there are doubts and suspicions about the US role in the Middle East in post-Gulf War period.

The Gulf War further polarised the Arab world and sharpened the division between the haves and have-nots. Although President Bush promised to foster economic development in the region and help War affected countries, such help was only limited to the US allies in the region and/or the parties to the Middle East peace conference. Those who opposed the War have been suffering from serious consequences. Moral and ethical questions have been raised about the cost of the war compared to the help offered to the refugees dislocated by the war. Analysts wondered why the nations that were capable of coordinating 2,000 sorties a day to bomb Iraq could not provide food and shelter to the Iraqi refugees. The have-nots in the Arab world are wondering whether they have learned any lesson from the New World Order.¹³⁷ Tahseen Bashir, a retired Egyptian ambassador, warned that if Washington failed to understand and attend the growing wave of nationalisms and resentments of the Arab public, a real war may begin between moderates and extremists for the control of the Arab world, and unless democratic reforms and fair distribution of resources are encouraged, a vacuum may be created which "will be filled by next Saddam Hussein."¹³⁸

137. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "From Europe, A Ray of Hope", *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, June 1991, p. 26.

138. *Ibid*

President Bush characterised the Gulf War as a just war against unjust and tried to reinvigorate the old debate of the notion of just and unjust wars. But in doing so he alienated the Muslims all over the world who also denounced Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait. The US won the Gulf War militarily, but it brought Western values, ideals, principles and assumptions into a conflict with populist Islam which could otherwise be a close ally to the West for establishing democracy, human rights and peace in the Middle East. The West appears to be afraid of Islam, its values and culture, though historically it was Islam that provided the most credible resistance against communism — the number one enemy of Western values and way of life. In building any viable world order the west would need a minimum understanding with the emerging Islamic forces, and as a first precondition the West has to take a fresh objective look towards Islam without bias and delink it from terrorism.¹³⁹

Although it is still early to conclude, but as events are unfolding in the Arab and Islamic world it is unlikely that the US policy will go unchallenged, and in the long run the ultimate winner of the Gulf War may not be the Western values and ideals but Islamic forces.¹⁴⁰

In the Middle East, as elsewhere in the Third World, the US policy is not necessarily designed to serve the popular masses, rather it operates on the principle of "divide and rule", whose main purpose is to support and protect "Friendly" regimes and narrow elites, and when interests and principles collide, it is always interests that prevail. But in the long run US interest in the Arab world can only be safe if it is viewed as legitimate by the majority of the people, not by the leaders and elites only.

139. Fred Halliday analyses various reasons why the West should delink Islam and terrorism. For details see, Fred Halliday, "International Relations : Is There a New Agenda?" *Millennium*, Spring 1991, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 57-72. The same point has been raised by Vitaly Naumkin who thinks that, "In Europe and the US, there is a tendency to regard Islam almost as an embodiment of terrorism..... such an approach only intensifies militant anti- Western attitudes in Islamic circles". Vitaly Naumkin, "International Security and the Forces of Nationalism" *Adelphi Paper*, (IISS, London), No. 266, Winter 1991/92, p. 37.

140. The Islamic movements in the Arab world are not only directed against their own despotic regimes but also against the West because of the latter's support to the former. And one of the most important characteristics of the new Islamic movements is that these movements are not being led by traditional Mullahs but by Western educated dynamic modern youths. West's failure to support Islamic democratic movements in the Arab World will further antagonise and frustrate Muslims all over the world.

Since the end of the World War- II fundamental changes, have taken place in Third World societies. Now to deal with the new and complex realities the West has to change its traditional views and perceptions. The following chapter, briefly reviews the "New Thinking" proposed and developed by former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev and its relevance and importance for the New World Order.

VI. "NEW THINKING" AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

"New Thinking" proposed and developed by the former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was not only a blueprint for radical reform and changes in Soviet foreign policy, but also a philosophical vision for changes in foreign policy behaviors and attitudes of all states. Some of the ideas and visions of "New Thinking" are still relevant and important to the Third World Countries for the following reasons.

(i) Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader who recognised the Third World as a separate distinct entity with heterogeneous characteristics, divergent sizes, conflicting interests and contradictory values and images. In his first interview as the Secretary of the CPSU with *Pravda* editor in April 1985, Gorbachev described the world with "full of complex problems" and recognised that "outside the two opposite social systems — capitalism and socialism- there are dozens of new states with different histories, traditions and interests."¹⁴¹ In his Vladivostok speech of July 1986, Gorbachev acknowledged that "every country has its own social and political system with all the thinkable tinages, its traditions, achievements and difficulties, its mode of life, and its beliefs and convictions and prejudices, its own spiritual and material values".¹⁴² "New Thinking" also recognised the uneven nature of growth and development in the Third World countries, As Gorbachev wrote,

Many countries are becoming modern industrialised states, and several are growing into great powers. On the other hand, poverty, inhuman living conditions, illiteracy and ignorance, malnutrition and hunger, alarming child mortality and epidemic remain common features of life for the two and half billion people.¹⁴³

141. *The New Times*, (Moscow), No. 16. 1985, p. 4.

142. Gorbachev's speech at Vladivostok on July 28, 1986, *Strategic Digest*, September 1986, p. 1735

143. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, op. cit. p. 157.

The collapse of communism, emergence of newly independent states in Eastern Europe and ethnic and tribal conflicts all over the world prove that powers and forces of nationalism, ethnicity, religion and tribalism in Third World countries are much more powerful and dominant than those of ideology and class interests. "New Thinking" also recognised that there might exist conflict and contradiction between world capitalist system and Third World countries but "these contradictions and conflicts do not imply that the developing countries are not contributing to the development of world capitalism, and that they are simply waiting to be turned toward socialism".¹⁴⁴ In fact, in "Perestroika" and "New Thinking" Gorbachev reassessed some of the foundations of Marxist-Leninist thoughts about national liberation movements in Third World countries and world revolutionary process.

"New Thinking" not only raised the issues and problems of Third World countries, but also recognised the dynamics of global changes and their contradictory and conflicting characteristics. In Gorbachev's words,

It is a world of fundamental social shifts, of an all-embracing scientific and technological revolution, of worsening global problems - problems concerning ecology, natural resources etc. and of radical changes in information technology. This is a world in which unheard-of possibilities for development and progress lie side by side with abject poverty, backwardness and medievalism. It is a world in which there are vast fields of tensions.¹⁴⁵

"New Thinking" denounced the old ideological dogma of dividing the world into two antagonistic camps with no scope for reconciliation. "Ideological differences" as Gorbachev wrote, "should not be transferred to the sphere of interstate relations, nor should foreign policy be subordinate to them, for ideologies may be poles apart, whereas the interest of survival and prevention of War stand universal and supreme."¹⁴⁶ Fundamental

144. Rachik M. Avakov; "The New Thinking and Problem of Studying the Developing Countries", *New Soviet Voices on Foreign and Economic Policy*, edited by Steve Hirsch, (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. Washington D. C.) 1989, p. 545.

145. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, (New, Updated Edition, Perennial Library, Harper & Row Publishers, New York), 1988, p. 121.

146. *Ibid*, p. 129.

right of every state to choose its own path of social and economic development without any interference from other state was recognised by "New Thinking". Gorbachev also warned that "Nations cannot and should not pattern their life either after the United States or the Soviet Union, and political postitions should be devoid of ideological intolerance."¹⁴⁷

"New Thinking" not only raised the issues and Problems of contemporary politics, but also provided guidelines for their peaceful resolutions. It also emphasised the need for strict respect for independence and equality of Third World states, and offered full support for restructuring international economic relations on a just basis with a view to overcoming economic underdevelopment and resolving pressing problems.¹⁴⁸

Since the mid 1980s the Soviet Union suffered from severe economic and social crises and became more and more dependent on Western aid and support, and as a result she was neither capable nor willing to materialise the ideas and principles raised in "New Thinking." But it does not mean that those ideas are dead or have lost credibility. Despite the disintegration of the USSR and uncertainty and chaos in the Commonwealth of Independent States, "New Thinking" ushered new hopes and aspirations for many Third World countries. Many Third World leaders welcomed Gorbachev's proposals for reforms and restructuring of international political and economic relations and insisted on their implementations.

(ii) By abandoning traditional notions and views "New Thinking" brought qualitatively new visions and perceptions of security. It denounced the use of force and domination in interstate relations, and declared,

Security is indivisible. It is either equal security for all or none at all. The only solid foundation for security is the recognition of the interests of all peoples and countries and of their equality in international affairs. The security of each nation should be coupled with the security for all members of the world community.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷. *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁸. Georgi Shakhnazarov, President of the Soviet Political Science Association raised these points in an article, "The CPSU Program and the Future of Mankind" published in *The New Times*. (Moscow), No. 47, 1985, p. 4.

¹⁴⁹. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, *op. cit.* P. 128.

Security was understood in a comprehensive way and defined in collective term. Instead of pursuing the policy of maximization of national interests unilaterally, "New Thinking" proposed, "to consider the problem on a global scale, to seek a way to solve it on a basis of balanced interests and to find organizational forms for its solutions in the framework of world community".¹⁵⁰

It is often contested that neither the West nor the Soviet Union understood the root causes and internal dynamics of regional conflicts in Third World countries. Gorbachev tried to conceptualise the root causes of regional conflicts when he wrote, "Regional conflicts arise on local soil as a consequence of internal or regional conflicts which are spawned by the colonial past, new social processes, or recurrences of predatory policy, or by all three."¹⁵¹ As for solutions to the conflicts in turbulent spots, he proposed for "collective quests for ways of defusing conflict situations" in those areas.¹⁵² Regional security arrangement was also recognised as a viable mechanism for conflict resolutions in the Third World countries. In May, 1985 during Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Moscow Gorbachev proposed for "a common, comprehensive approach to the problem of security in Asia" by pooling of the efforts by Asian countries. He also called for an "all-Asian forum for an exchange of opinions and a joint search for constructive solutions".¹⁵³

In the post-Gulf War era, some leaders and analysts are suggesting to build security systems in the Gulf region or other parts of the world on the model of European security arrangements. But as early as July, 1986 Gorbachev proposed for an Asian security system, "in the mould of the Helsinki conference, to be attended by all countries" of the Indian Ocean region.¹⁵⁴ Security dimensions of Third World countries, particularly the

150. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

151. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

152. Report by Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU at the 27th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, February 15, 1986. *The New Times*, (Moscow), No. 9, 1986, p. 38.

153. "Speech at the Kremlin Dinner in Honour of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of the Republic of India, May 21, 1985", Mikhail Gorbachev, *Selected Speeches and Articles*, (Progress Publishers, Moscow), 1985, pp. 109-110.

154. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, "Soviet Policy Towards Asia", *Socialism, Peace and Democracy: Writings, Speeches and Reports*, London, Atlantic Highlands, 1987, p. 54.

LDCs, have changed overtime. Most of the Third World countries believe that poverty, underdevelopment, disease, malnutrition, illiteracy, overpopulation and natural disasters pose more serious threats to their security than external aggressions. Growing environmental concerns are also posing serious threats to their security.¹⁵⁵ No security system for the Third World can be viable without attending those basic problems.

(iii) Unlike the proposed New World Order, "New Thinking" raised economic issues and concerns of Third World countries. Gorbachev described the Third World debt problem as "a time bomb" and proposed for wide-ranging reforms in international economic relations. In his speech at the 27th Congress of the CPSU he proposed for a just settlement of international debt problem, establishment of a new international economic order and reduction of military budgets for the good of the world community.¹⁵⁶ He not only supported the demands of Third World countries for a New International Economic Order, but also warned about the consequences of its failures. In his speech at the UN General Assembly in December, 1988, Gorbachev outlined his policy of international economic reforms. He expressed Soviet Union's preparedness to institute a lengthy moratorium of upto 100 years on debt servicing by the LDCs, proposed to limit debt servicing payments by the developing countries depending on their economic conditions, grant them long period of deferral in the repayment of their debt, reduce debts owed to commercial banks and form a specialised international agency that would repurchase debts at a discount. He also proposed for "demilitarization of international relations" and "transition from the economy of armaments to an economy of disarmament".¹⁵⁷

Gorbachev's proposals reflected many long-term demands and aspirations of Third World countries. It appears that even in the absence of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, some of his ideas and proposals can be a good basis for meaningful North-South negotiations.

155. For details see, Shaukat Hassan, "Environmental Issues and Security in South Asia", *Adelphi Papers*, No. 262, (IISS, London), Autumn 1991.

156. Gorbachev's Report at the 27th Congress of the CPSU, *op. cit.* p. 40.

157. Gorbachev's Speech at the UN General Assembly on December 7, 1988, *The New York Times*, December 8, 1988, p. A16

(iv) "New Thinking" also raised new issues and concerns, such as environment, in international relations. In *Perestroika* Gorbachev expressed concern about the aggravation of the critical condition of environment, proposed for conservation of "the air basins and the oceans", emphasised the need for "rational utilization of our planet's resources as the property of all mankind" and urged for "joint work in exploring outer space and the world ocean" for the benefit of humanity.¹⁵⁸ In his UN General Assembly speech Gorbachev also proposed for establishing, "an international space laboratory or manned orbital station, designed exclusively for monitoring the state of environment".¹⁵⁹ As environmental issues and concerns are becoming dominating factors in global politics, some of the ideas and suggestions regarding those issues, offered in "New Thinking" may get renewed importance and validity.

(v) Finally, and most importantly "New Thinking" denounced traditional notions and perceptions of international politics and economy, and brought new visions and perspectives for its reform and changes. During his visit to India in November, 1986 Gorbachev outlined his new vision of a nuclear free world when he said,

In the nuclear age, humanity must evolve a new mode of political thought, a new concept of the world that would provide credible guarantees for humanity's survival. People want to live in a safer and a more just world. Humanity deserves a better fate than being a hostage to nuclear terror and despair. It is necessary to change the existing world situation and to build a nuclear-weapon free world, free of violence and hatred, fear and suspicion.¹⁶⁰

One of the great contributions of "New Thinking" is to bring new language, new understanding, new visions and perceptions in international politics. "New Thinking" not only raised vital issues and concerns of the current debate in international politics and economy, but at the same time emphasised the importance of peaceful resolution of the same. So as

158. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, *op. cit.* p. 123.

159. Gorbachev's Speech at the UN General Assembly on December 7, 1988. *op. cit.* Since 1987 the Soviet Union was actively involved in global environmental and ecological issues.

160. "A Nuclear Free and Non-violent World", Declaration of the Indian and Soviet Heads of State, Delhi, 27 November 1986, *Socialism, Peace and Democracy*, *op. cit.* p. 81.

mentioned earlier, some of the ideas raised and suggestions offered in "New Thinking" may be helpful in building a just and viable world order. And this view is shared by many analysts and observers. For example, Gerald Ruge thinks that "To bring a new world order we need to create a kind of "new thinking" that is, to renew the term introduced by President Gorbachev.....We must, however, equip ourselves with new thinking if we want to solve new problems."¹⁶¹ Most of the issues and ideas raised in "New Thinking" were actually the demands of Third World countries, but neither the West nor the former Soviet Union paid any attention to them. Those issues are still in the agenda, and in the post-Cold War era with the absence of the USSR the Third World countries hope that the West will genuinely come forward to support their demands and work hard for their speedy solution.

VII. THE THIRD WORLD AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Despite the end of the Cold War, social and economic problems and miseries of Third World countries are far from over, rather, in many cases, their conditions have deteriorated. The slogan of "structural adjustment" of the 1980s has not only ended in failure, but left ruinous effects for many Third World countries. Today most of the Third World countries are suffering from chronic underdevelopment inherited by colonial past, unstable domestic market and competitive and protectionist world market. Moreover, growing nationalism, religious, ethnic, tribal and linguistic conflicts and unrests have crippled many Third World societies. Nonetheless, with the end of long and bitter Cold War the developing countries are optimistic about the future of a more fair and equitable world system. But the proposed New World Order failed to reflect those hopes and aspirations and left the Third World countries bitter and frustrated. The New World Order, as it stands now, does not respond to the needs of the Third World countries mainly because of the following reasons.

161. Gerald Ruge, "The World We Live In", *International Affairs*, (Moscow, September, No. 9, 1991, p. 122.

(i) Demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) has been a long powerful rallying cry for the Third World countries, but the West rejected the idea without offering any viable alternative. On the other hand, the gap between rich and poor has inexorably widened. The hopes for an overall economic growth, rising standard of living and transfer of technology and resources in the post-Cold War era have been shattered. Meanwhile, the developing countries have become the "prisoner to a system where external markets, terms of trade and interest rates greatly influence their fate and remain outside their control".¹⁶² Many Third World countries believe that a new world order must include their genuine demand. But at the same time they are frustrated with the fact that the New World Order has no economic agenda.¹⁶³ The absence of economic issues in the New World Order also shocks many experts and academicians in the developed countries. Louis Emmerij, President of the Development Centre at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is, "deeply concerned about the absence of economic elements in the discourse of the so-called new world order".¹⁶⁴

Already there are serious concerns among Third World countries that their interests are being ignored by the West which is predominantly occupied with Eastern Europe and newly emerged states in place of the former Soviet Union.¹⁶⁵ With the completion of European integration and North American free trade deal the world market may be more protectionist and trade is likely to be controlled by several trading blocs. Third World countries are generally concerned that this may be detrimental to their interest.

162. Statement by Bangladesh Foreign Minister at the Eighteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Riyadh, March 14, 1989, *Bangladesh Documents*, January-March 1989, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka), p. 156.

163. This point was made clear by Professor Alan Henrikson, an influential member of the Fletcher Round Table Conference on New World Order during his talk at Carleton University on January 8, 1992.

164. *The Development Hotline*, Issue No. 4, 1991, p. 3

165. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has already made \$12 billion available to help Eastern Europe. Only Germany has spent \$35 billion on aid to Eastern Europe. At the same time aid to Third World countries has declined. With new commitments to Eastern Europe, the US has cut aid to Latin America by almost one-third. Canada has cut \$3.7 billion from projected aid spending since 1989. German aid to developing countries has been slashed by a third in the last decade. For details, see Christopher Neal, "Peace dividend should help Third World", *The Ottawa Citizen*, February 4, 1992.

These countries, particularly the LDCs, need immediate help and support from the industrialised North for their social and economic development. Aid is no more a question of charity, rather a necessary precondition for global development. As one Canadian international development expert put it, "even though there are other issues of concern.....we can't ignore the danger that a growing gap between rich and poor presents to us. It's not a charity issue any more, it is a matter of global survival".¹⁶⁶

During the Cold War period aid was primarily given for political, ideological and strategic reasons. With the demise of communism and disintegration of the USSR the purpose of foreign aid should be changed and reformed accordingly, so that aid can meaningfully help the receiving countries in their social and economic emancipation. Third World countries should try to find ways and means for becoming "more self-reliant" while Western donors should show "less self-interest" in helping the poorer nations.¹⁶⁷ Despite the declining trend, many Third World leaders still believe that the West can meaningfully help their countries. As one Central American leader put it, if the West can spend billions of dollars for the Gulf War, "they can not just forget about Central America which can pull itself out of underdevelopment on what was spent in the Gulf in one week".¹⁶⁸

(ii) Collective security arrangement offered in the New World Order does not also cater to needs of the Third World countries. According to the provisions of the New World Order, developing countries and regional organizations are supposed to cater to the security needs and requirements of the West and provide base facilities to the US forces for maintaining international peace and security. As Elliot Richardson outlines, "By agreement with a given regional organization.... major military units of the United States....could be explicitly committed, in a back-up mode, to the defense of an unstable region".¹⁶⁹ Developing countries view this new move

166. Tim Brodhead, Executive Director of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, made these comments during his interview with *The Ottawa Citizen*, March 17, 1992.

167. John Stackhouse "Aid donors regrouping in light of failures" *The Globe and Mail*, April 4, 1992.

168. "Central American growth depends on North American markets", *The Development Hotline*, Issue No. 4/1991, p. 6

169. Quoted by Alan Henrikson, *op. cit.* p. 22.

as a re-emergence of US military doctrines of the 1950s, and are concerned about the US role and motive in the post-cold War world. Many observers view the Gulf War not only as an emergence of "Pax Americana", but also an effort by the Western military-industrial complex to expand and test weaponry. In fact, the Third World countries do not require a new version of regional security arrangements of the 1950s, rather they need more aid, investment, transfer of technology and more cooperation with the West in broad socio-economic, political, cultural and environmental fields.

The Gulf War might have helped to narrow the gap between East and West, but it certainly widened gaps between North and South. In the post-Gulf War period, there is a widespread, though vaguely defined, assumption among the LDCs that they have been forgotten, and from now on the West will adopt a policy of "divide and rule" and only attend the issues and problems of rich and more powerful Third World nations. Moreover, in the absence of security imperatives on the part of the Western countries, as it was in the 1950s, the bargaining positions of the developing countries are much weaker and fragile than before. As Lawrence Freedman observes,

If the absence of a profound strategic imperative is the hallmark of the new order, then there will be little incentives to take on new security commitments in any serious form Those states making most progress on their own will inevitably develop the most valuable relations with the West.¹⁷⁰

(iii) The role and functions of regional organizations assigned in the New World Order are also problematic. As mentioned earlier, one of the objectives of the New World Order is to involve regional organizations in the Third World into a collective security arrangement designed by the US and supervised by the UN. There are also proposals to authorise the UN Security Council to utilize regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority, to form inter-regional security arrangement and to authorise the UN Military Staff Committee to establish regional sub-committees. The purpose of these proposals is to build "working security relationships" of the United States with the regional organizations and to use them for the interests of Western countries.

170. Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World", *Foreign Affairs, America and the World* 1991/92, p. 37.

Most of the regional organizations work as platforms for regional development and help the nation-building process of member states through multilateral cooperation. Formation of regional organizations in the Third World was a frustrating experience because of mutual hatreds, distrusts, animosities and rivalries. Almost all regional organizations are economic and socio-cultural in nature and very cautiously avoid disputed and controversial issues in their common deliberations. Even some regions did not have any form of regional organization system until recently. For example, South Asia was not able to form any kind of regional system until the early 1980s because of conflicts, mutual mistrusts and bilateral disputes. When South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was eventually formed in 1985, the member countries, however, agreed to deal only with selective issues in socio-economic and cultural fields on consensus basis. Nonetheless, the organization faced numerous challenges which often threatened its activities and normal functioning. Now to ask the SAARC to deal with military-security issues of South Asia will definitely jeopardize the process of cooperation.

Moreover, in almost every region there is one or more major powers who always try to dominate the activities of regional organization, and the smaller and weaker members are always in doubts and suspicions about the designs of their big neighbours. If the regional organizations are assigned to deal with political and security issues it will only increase power and influence of regional heavyweights, which eventually may pose threat to the very idea of regionalism.

(iv) As mentioned earlier, Third World countries are also concerned about the US role and motive in the post-Cold War era. There is a common feeling shared by most of the Third World countries that in the absence of a balance of power they have lost their strategic importance to the West, and even the patron-client relationship has changed. Now the new patrons may not provide help or services for strategic reasons but ask to pay for it which most of the Third World countries cannot afford to. The US will now interfere and intervene only those issues and areas where the

US interests are directly involved, leaving most of the national conflicts to the dynamics of this respective regions which in all likelihood is likely to serve the interest of bigger national powers.

(v) Another serious flaw of the proposed New World Order is that it does not include such serious global problems as poverty, epidemic, famine and environmental issues. In early 1991 the UNICEF noted that millions of people face death in Sudan, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Liberia and Malawi for the lack of relief in time. According to reports, last year in Latin America 4,000 people died of cholera, and in 1990, 914,000 Latin American and Caribbean children died before they reached the age of five. The principal cause for child mortality was acute diarrhoea.¹⁷¹ Third World countries do not have necessary material resources and technological know-how to deal with these problems. Any new world order must include mechanism for dealing with these problems of human tragedies. The 1992 summit of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro only partially addressed some of these problems. The West, so far, has failed to deliver anything substantive to the Third World countries. The success or failure of the New World Order will be judged by the developing countries to a great extent on its ability to address these problems.

It will be difficult, if not impossible, for the US to sell its perception of world order when she is all along insensitive to the ideas and demands of the South for a more fair and equitable international economic order. In the Gulf War the US emerged as the unchallenged superpower with the capability of influencing world events, but it hardly helped to restore faith and confidence of Third World countries about the West. There is a consensus among the Third World countries that they have been the victims of Western rhetorics and double standards, and Western views, attitudes and perceptions and broadly viewed not as rational, but as arrogant and selfish.

171. James Brooke, "Scare value of cholera may save lives", *The Ottawa Citizen*, March 8, 1992. p. 37. The Director General of WHO also warned that "If Cambodia cannot get enough drugs and support for the improvement of health care and training there may be a tragedy". There are also reports that some 270 million people, most of them in Africa, have malaria and between 1 million and 2 million die of the disease each year. *The Ottawa Citizen*, March 17, 1992.

The proposed New World Order does not address the concerns of the Third World countries, but at the same time their options are also limited. In the post-Cold War era, Third World countries will have to find ways and means and evolve mechanisms to solve regional conflicts as well as domestic ethnic, religious and linguistic issues by their own means without depending on external powers. The perception of becoming "like the North" has to be abandoned. The Third World countries require their own platform for peace, disarmament and global cooperation in the matters of trade, technology, debt and environment. Unless there is any progress in South-South cooperation there cannot be any hope for North-South negotiation.

Third World countries also need to develop their own mechanism for arms control without depending on major powers. While the most heavily armed nations (the major powers) have already somehow developed a consensus and mechanism not to use arms among themselves, it is the poor and least developed countries who are still vulnerable to armed conflicts. The developing countries should initiate meaningful dialogue for confidence-building measures among themselves particularly within such Third World organizations as the Non-aligned Movement and the Group of 77. Despite reasonable grounds for frustrations, the Third World countries should contribute to the strengthening of the UN, try to maximise its use and involvement in dealing with regional and international issues. The following chapter will briefly analyse the possible role of the United Nations in the post -Cold War period.

VIII. THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Demands for more active role and wider participation of the United Nations either in solving regional conflicts or in attending global social, economic and cultural issues were a long-standing demand of the developing countries. With the reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, those countries also joined the Third World in their demand for giving more role

and authority to the world body. Even some developed countries, including Canada, Australia and France, were in favour of a strong and active United Nations. The superpowers, however, instead of using the UN, preferred to act unilaterally to pursue their political and military-strategic goals and objectives. Although the UN was used as a platform for collective actions during the Gulf crisis, the credibility of the UN as a forum for truly multilateral diplomacy remained doubtful. As observed earlier, it was widely accused that in the Gulf War the US "Manipulated" the UN in the most "visible and blatant manner" for its own strategic interests.¹⁷² In fact, the role played by the UN during the Gulf crisis raised both hopes and frustration.

In the post-Cold War era, there seems to be a general consensus on the issue of restructuring the UN. There are numerous proposals and suggestions for restructuring the World body and redefining its role in future conflicts. In the light of the experience of the Gulf crisis, the United Nations Association in Canada suggested the creation of a sanction assessment mechanism to assist the Security Council before authorizing any use of force.¹⁷³ There are also proposals for allocating more authority to the Secretary General of the UN. Many analysts believe that the UN was formed to meet the challenges of the post-World War-II situation when there were only about 50 states (now there are 175 members) and it cannot handle the demands and needs of present times. There are wide-ranging proposals for reforms of both the General Assembly and the Security Council. Some are in favour of reorganizing the General Assembly in the lines of the ILO (selective agenda setting) or the European Council (forming various working committees), while others believe that the current structure of the Security Council does not reflect global consensus, and suggest the expansion by increasing the number of permanent members. The problem is how to ensure representation of the vast and divergent Third World countries into the UN decision-making process. K. Subrahmanyam

172. *The Development Hotline*, (Society for International Development, Italy), No. 4, 1991. p.17.

173. *The Ploughshares Monitor*, June 1991, pp. 16-17.

thinks that the fate of a New World Order must not be decided by the Permanent Members alone but it should involve Japan, Germany and major Third World countries, like India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Brazil and Nigeria.¹⁷⁴ Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali is in favour of increasing the number of the Permanent Members of the Security Council from 5 to 10 by incorporating Japan, Germany, India, Brazil and Nigeria.¹⁷⁵ However, the existing Permanent Members of the UN Security Council seem to be not interested to expand the elite club, at least for the time being.

Any reform of the UN will have to reflect proper representation of Third World countries. Some Third World countries are not satisfied with the current proposals of restructuring the UN, and there are widespread doubts that in the absence of the USSR, right or wrong, just or unjust will simply be defined in terms of Western interests, primarily of the US, which are often biased and may not be compatible with the interest of the developing countries. In the post-Cold War period the Third World countries expect that the UN will emerge as a meaningful global organization to attend to their long standing demands and concerns.

There seems to be a growing consensus on the issue of collective security under the UN auspices. Many UN members, including most of the Third World countries, China and former Soviet states, are in favour of creating peacekeeping forces under the supervision of the UN Military Staff Committee (MSC). To avoid command and control problems, there are suggestions that the operational control of the MSC may be moved to the Secretary General. According to the participants of the Fletcher Roundtable Conference, the UN forces might consist of three components; (a) reserved forces composed of predesignated national units, (b) a smaller rapid-response military force capable of moving quickly when conflicts erupt, and (c) a permanent peacekeeping force patterned on present UN peace keeping forces. According to their suggestions, the UN forces (250,000 to 500,000) will come from five major powers while other members will provide funds

174. K. Subrahmanyam, *op. cit.*

175. *The Ottawa Citizen*, February 7, 1992.

and base facilities. The UN forces might be under the control of the MSC and the position of the Commander-in-Chief might be rotated. It was also suggested to create "regional subcommittees" of the MSC to maintain linkage between regional and global organizations.¹⁷⁶ But the US seems to be not interested in reactivating the MSC because such a mechanism would limit her leadership role.¹⁷⁷

The creation of a strong UN force by involving the Permanent Members only may not be a good solution, because it will further alienate the Third World countries and will eventually create more suspicions about the real objective of the West. Moreover, a UN peace-keeping force consisting of the US and Russian troops may not be acceptable to many countries because of their controversial roles in the past. As for a strong UN force the Third World countries may not be interested nor capable to share the cost of maintaining it. The creation and maintenance of a strong UN force, will require huge financial resources, and to meet those costs the UN will have to cut budget for development assistances (already in shortage) drastically which will seriously affect the developing countries.

The UN has certainly made some success in the post-Gulf War period, particularly in releasing Western hostages from Lebanon, maintaining peace in Iraqi-Kuwaiti border and deploying peace-keeping forces in Yugoslavia and Kampuchea. But in major international issues of war and peace, so far the UN has not been able to play a meaningful role, despite the end of the Cold War and high expectation from the world community.

With the decision to send 14,000 troops to Yugoslavia and 22,000 troops to Kampuchea, the UN is becoming more and more involved in peacekeeping operations. There are already serious problems of financing of the peacekeeping operations.¹⁷⁸ Some member countries with long

176. The Fletcher Roundtable Conference on "Defining a New World Order" *op. cit.* pp. 18-19.

177. *The Ottawa Citizen*, February 9, 1992. There is also no reference to collective security through the UN in the Pentagon Strategy Plan (mentioned earlier), rather it concludes that "the world order is ultimately backed by the US" and "the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated" For details see, Patrick Tyler, *op. cit.* p. 14.

178. As of January 31, 1991 out of 166 members only 15 members met their financial obligations both current and past. The accumulated unpaid tab for peacekeeping operation is about \$400 million. The costs for current peacekeeping operations are about \$700 million which may double in the next year. Dave Todd. "Who will pay the price for the UN peacekeeping?" *The Ottawa Citizen*, February 9, 1992.

tradition of peacekeeping roles, including Canada, have been warning that their continuous participation should not be taken as granted. The UN should take more active role in negotiating and making peace rather than trying to keep it when there is no peace at all. The UN should take such successive steps as regular survey of the situation in potential crisis areas, early detection of a dangerous worsening of the situation, emergency measures, preventive diplomacy, measure to establish and maintain peace and stability and to send UN peace forces to remove threats to peace and security.¹⁷⁹ Third World countries for their part are not interested in UN military involvements worldwide, rather they want to see more and more UN involvements in development activities and peaceful mediations of local and regional conflicts.

With the escalating famines and epidemics breaking out in many parts of the world and refugee problems becoming more serious and acute day by day, the UN will have to be involved more and more in relief operations and humanitarian efforts than peacekeeping. As for the continuing conflicts in various parts of the world, the need of the hour is to take more precautionary measures, to address the root causes of conflicts and not to allow them to escalate into a dangerous situation. But whatever policies are adopted, there must be a common standard applicable to all irrespective of economic, political, social and ideological differences. Otherwise the world body, which is already being widely criticised for its rhetorics and double standards, will never be able to establish its confidence and credibility. Already there are serious accusations that the UN was formed in the name of the whole mankind but failed to fulfil its missions to attend social and economic problems because of the unwillingness on the part of great powers to cooperate.

The current problems of the UN are not so much with its political or administrative structure, rather with the notions, attitudes and behaviours of major powers towards it. Historically, the UN was used by the superpowers

179. Sergei Lavrov, "The Seven-Plus-One Plus the UN". *International Affairs*, (Moscow), No. 10, 1991, p.16.

for their respective interests and benefits, and in the process not only the Third World nations but also many Western countries lost confidence in the world body. Now in the post-Cold War, post-Gulf and post-Soviet era an opportunity has been created for the UN to re-establish its credibility as a true international organization. The UN will have to take initiatives which will result in confidence-building among the member-states and help to clarify conditions conducive to the adoption of corresponding changes in the Charter in keeping with the latest requirements of international cooperation and the internal social and economic development of all countries.¹⁸⁰

IX. CONCLUSION

No power succeeded in building a viable and permanent world order, although attempts were made by various states at different times of history. Some orders were more stable, peaceful and lasted longer (the Westphalian system), while others were unstable and short-lived (the League of Nations). World Orders were designed and built by great powers either with the purpose of preserving their existing positions or creating new control and domination over others. 'World Orders' could neither maintain nor guarantee international peace and security nor solve the existing global issues and problems. The balance of power between the two power blocs established in the post-world War-II period could avoid major wars, but proxy wars at regional levels continued which caused severe damages and brought immeasurable sufferings and miseries to the Third World peoples.

The collapse of communism and end of the Cold War have created new opportunities for building a new world order based on justice and equality. On the other hand, civil wars, escalation of ethnic, religious and tribal conflicts worldwide, tensions and uncertainties in the former Soviet Republics and Eastern Europe as a result of disintegration of the USSR, lack of progress in resolving major regional issues and conflicts, refugee problems, proliferation of nuclear arms, escalation of arms race, environmental degradation and trade wars among major economic centres have shattered the earlier hopes and aspirations.

180. Milan Sahovic, "Where are the United Nations Going? *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), Volume XLII, January 5, 1991, p. 23.

There is a broad consensus that with the demise of communism and disintegration of the Soviet Union a new situation, with new challenges and uncertainties, has emerged which is much more complex and unstable than the old one, but at the same time which has created enormous opportunities and brought new hopes and aspirations for international peace and security. Today the international community is in a transitional stage, and the present situation may continue for quite sometime before the emergence of any new order. In the current situation there appears to be two options for a world order: collective security under the umbrella of the UN with the participation of all nations, or one superpower controlling the UN and acting as a world policeman to enforcing security.¹⁸¹ The logical and viable choice should be for the first one but ironically the US appears to have preferred the second one.

There is no agreement on what should be the components of a new world order. But the emerging consensus is that it must be qualitatively different from the old one and should include such important issues as economy, environment and other socio-political and moral issues faced by the humanity. Even there are demands that a new world order should include such issues as moral and spiritual values. "At a minimum the new world order should reduce the distance between political rhetoric and reality, replace confrontation with cooperation and substitute UN collective action for US (or Soviet) unilateralism"¹⁸² The principles of peaceful coexistence which recognise the equality of all states rich or poor, strong or weak, small or big, should serve as a philosophical basis for the New World Order.¹⁸³ A New World Order must be based on justice, peace, democracy, human rights and environmental security applicable to all. It must also address such problems as global warming, pollution, resource depletion, drugs, refugees and aids. "A New World Order can only gain acceptance if it is based on human vision, not military force; on consistency, not double standards; and on justice, not selective morality".¹⁸⁴

181. Jan Pronk, "New World Order or New World Policeman?" *South Letter*, June. 1991, p. 16.

182. Jack Mendelsohn, "Rhetoric V. Reality" *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, June 1991, p. 34.

183. Dou Hui, *op. cit.* p. 25.

184. Khalil Barhoum, *op. cit.* p. 22.

A World Order cannot be or should not be understood only in terms of military power and security considerations. It should not be confined to preventing outright aggression but also has to deal with underlying causes of armed conflicts, economic inequalities and ideological, cultural and ethnic conflicts and rivalries as well as human rights violation.

A New World Order will also have to address economic issues, particularly the needs and demands of the LDCs. In fact, considering the global economic issues and problems and its critical importance, initiatives should be taken towards building a new economic order, rather than a political and military one. A New World Order will also have to secure a minimum standard of living for every citizen of the world, because "in an era of global communications, the division of humanity between a privileged quarter and a deprived three quarters can no longer be sustained."¹⁸⁵ Given the resources we have and technological advancement that has been made, it is neither difficult nor impossible to eliminate the worst poverty of the world.¹⁸⁶

In the post-cold War, post-Soviet and post-Gulf War era a new situation has been created, and to deal with new issues and challenges we must be equipped with new visions and perceptions, because, what Abraham Lincoln said in his address to the Congress of the United States on December 1, 1862, is still valid,

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.¹⁸⁷

185. Bernard Wood, Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and a strong supporter of Bush's new world order, also considers economic issues as important factors for a new world order. For details of Dr Wood's views see, "The Gulf Crisis and Future of World Order", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Volume 20, No 5, April 1991, p. 24.

186. Participants of a meeting of the World Order Models Project held in New Delhi in 1968 debated the importance of economy in any world order and came with interesting suggestions. For details see, *Economics and World Order; From the 1970s to the 1990s*, edited by Jagdish N. Bhagwati, (The Macmillan Company, Collier-MacMillan Limited, London), 1972.

187. Quoted by Hans Kohn, *World Order in Historical Perspective*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press), 1942, p. xiv.