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REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD : MANAGING THE ACCELERATION OF HISTORY*

Introduction

In the West, throughout much of the 1970s and early 1980s, debate on problems of stability and security in the Third World was dominated by the dogmas, sentiments and policies of the 'globalists' and the 'regionalists'. In the 1990s and beyond, these categories are likely to lose whatever meaning they may have had. The ideological and political competition between the superpowers, while still alive, is less likely to be seen by either as truly determinant of 'global outcomes'. The increasing autonomy of local actors (whether states or insurgent groups) and their appreciation of their own local influence will create facts, situations, contexts which will complicate the assessments of outsiders. The speed of locally determined change, coupled with the change of global trends (political, economic, even climactic) will make strategic assessment daunting. With the acceleration of history, will come a decline in the manageability of most ensuing conflicts.

In the past, globalists believed in the inevitability of superpower compitition in the developing world for influence, resources and

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ideological satisfaction. They viewed existing or prospective conflicts as susceptible to external, usually superpower manipulation. People like Henry Kissinger argued that the East-West balance in the European continent needed to be defended as well as improved upon outside it, and that it would be invidious to the Western position in Europe for the Soviet Union and its allies to gain footholds in faraway places. This was so even if in and of themselves, these areas could not pretend to strategic significance. Zbigniew Brzezinski drew attention to the reality of such linkages and to the eccentricities of this global competition when he made the famous remark that the SALT 1 treaty had been buried in the sands of the Ogaden. Third World leaders whose non-alignment discourse and idealism tended to find its practical compliment in more cynical and hardly more discreet alliances with one or the other superpower tended only to confirm the view of the globalists that if the game were not widely played it might be dramatically lost.

The regionalists, usually area specialists and representatives of many (though not all) European chanceries, increasingly drew attention to the local sources of regional conflict and their intractability. Ethnic rivalries, clan politics, longstanding territorial disputes, and competitions between local powers were seen as primary causes of conflict. These were merely complicated by the interventions, direct or through proxies, of superpowers giving vent to their larger struggle for power and international prestige. The regionalists tended to favour economic rather than military solution. They even argued, sometimes in paradoxical fashion, that superpower withdrawals could lead to the cessation of local instability, whose fires had not only been stoked, but occasionally ignited through superpower manipulations of otherwise quiescent local disputes. The protestation of countless Third World leaders that the meddling of outside powers in their own affairs had given rise to unnecessary local strife, confused debates between those who felt the need to emphasise the larger geopolitical context of regional conflict, and those who gave pre-eminence to its local roots.

The intensified discussion between the superpowers in the late 1980s on regional conflict, and the increase of international pressure for the end of particular wars, contributed to the various 'peace-breakouts' of 1988 and 1989, Afghanistan, the Gulf, and Southern Africa. The 'debate' between the globalists and the regionalists has, however, been rendered sterile by two facts. First, that these and many other areas in the Third World are still affected by important conflicts and struggles for power. Second, that the domestic, regional and more 'global' features of Third World instability are generally accepted as so evidently complex as to defy neat classification. If the superpowers and other outside forces are beginning to make less fanciful calculations about the relative 'strategic' importance of certain states or regions in the Third World, the intricacy of insecurity in the developing world demands more comprehensive attention. This is so because many Third World states are at a loss as to how to meet the variety of security challenges they face, yet appeal to outside powers for assistance ; because the classic instruments of external security promotion, be they military or economic aid, are so often found ill-suited to particular situations or are badly applied ; because the methods employed by Third World states to advance their own security are equally often unrelated to the primary perils they face ; because the number and range of threats to Third World security has become more impressive ; and because the consequences of their mis-management, by local or outside forces, may so often be uncontainable.

Thus, in a still insecure world, the calculations of the super-powers are recognised to have only modest impact on the prospects for Third World security, while the capacities of local leaders and states to manage regional stability has not improved even though Third World desires for independence and autonomy in local security management remain pronounced. Those who study insecurity in the developing world are compelled, while giving due regard to the large geo-political, military, and macro-

economic forces that might play on the security of these states to assess the ranges of local issues which render the domestic manageability of stability and security so difficult, and, *ex hypothesi*, their exploitation by outside powers virtually uncontrollable. Amongst such factors, the dogmas, political prejudices, and idiosyncrasies of local leaderships are often central. Bad policies, create insecurity : a malevolent effect of inflexible or merely poor management is to increase vulnerabilities to external pressures. Such pressures from the outside can also accelerate the forces of domestic change. No general theory of developing country security can be promulgated, but it is clear that the *linkages* between the various components of security, or contributors to insecurity, needs to be appreciated. Regional security in the developing world is about the management of diverse but accumulating demands and pressures.

It is not just that security in the developing world depends so immediately on non-military factors. This is evidently the case in Europe and North America as well and has been recognised ever since the US saw that its security interests would be advanced by the Marshall plan. What is vitally important is that regional security in so many areas is determined by the *external* effects of policies implemented to attenuate *domestic* problems and by the *domestic consequences* of the *external reactions* to locally inspired change. Much is made of global interdependence, but regional interdependencies, of a cultural, economic, political or military kind are sufficiently powerful that the internal politics of states are of transnational significance. Thus in the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and Central America, policies pursued by governments to deal with ethnic disputes, environmental questions, secessionist movements, nationalist revival groups, economic depression, *become* security problems for others and inspire reactions which are not always pacific or neutral. This has not traditionally been the case over the last forty years in North America, Europe, Japan and Australasia.

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The developoments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1988 and 1989, however, suggest that the developed world will not be spared the security challenges initially of a non-military nature—which derive from managing internal strife and the collapse of previously robust, if unjust, political structures. Indeed one of the features of politics in the political East may be that they will resemble some of the classic problems of the South (debt, ethnic and nationalist troubles, pressures for emigration, unmanageable domestic desires for accelerated domestic change, the collapse of state ideologies) ; and in consequence, the nature of West-East relations may well begin to imitate the previous concerns of North-South politics.

If international relations generally in the 1990s and the opening years of the 21st century will no longer be dominated by the shrill declarative and costly military competition between the 'forces' of communism and capitalism, it will no less certainly be dominated by the perpetuation of conflict by various means and to different ends between groups in the developing world, (as well as on the fringes of the USSR's European empire). A binary logic may no longer apply to global politics, but combustibility has not been eliminated because the importance of ideology is being dampened by the superpowers. It is equally too early to declare a victory of Western liberalism and that this has resulted in the 'end of history' and the gradual dying down of conflict.[1] Francis Fukuyama's elegant but too brave by half argument to this effect depends a great deal on his belief in the spread of the universal homogeneous state and the view that in the absence of large-scale conflict between large states

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1. Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History', in *The National Interest,* Summer 1989, pp. 3-18. See ripostes in the same issue as well as articles by Samuel P. Huntington, 'No Exit : The Errors of Endism' and Leon Wieseltier, 'Spoilers at the Party' in *The National Interest* Fall 1989 and Antony Hartley, 'On Not Ending History', *Encounter,* September-October 1989, 71-73.

caught in the grip of history, there will evolve a Common Marketization of world politics. Yet, while the liberal idea is strong and the most important point of reference for many societies, struggles born of a pre-liberal past, or a non-liberal present, fought in the context of a world moving too fast, mean that for most in the developing world history is alive and imprisoning, modernity both a goal and an object of derision, but an impossible challenge in any case. For so many in the developing world it is the fragility of state structures that allows for regional turmoil, the strength of rejectionist, nationalist and secessionist movements that threaten a reversal of the accomplishments, however modest, of historical processes, and the rise or revival of differing ideologies, be they religious, ethnic or even environmental which can cause dramatic change significant enough to challenge any local interpretation of 'endism'. The smaller and weaker of such states may equally be victims of larger local states. These have felt more free to develop ambitious goals of influence and suzerainty of their own.

The existence of such forces ensures that regional stability cannot be guaranteed by the astute implementation of policies by central bureaucracies, aided by outside great powers no longer in the pursuit of messianic goals. It is true that there may be greater superpower disinterest in the conflicts of other regions even if each will aspire regularly to present 'diplomatic solutions' in order to reinsure their status as powers with world interests. It is equally evident that primordial rivalries in regions outside the great alliance systems, coming into conflict or even combining with modernist values or aspirations (economic and military) will produce instability.

If an important phase of history is drawing to a close on East-West axis, the decline of 'the great ideological struggle' has meant for so many regions (including Eastern Europe of course) an increase in the local saliency of unsolved problems. The role

of the superpowers, the legacies of decolonisation, the challenge of a global economic order from which they feel estranged, these will still weigh on decisionmakers in the developing world. But nearly everywhere, *local* discontent, rivalries, tyrants and scapegoats are becoming more relevant.

The poorest regions of the developing world are condemned to tackle many of the complex issues of a modern world in which they lag ever more behind. This takes place, just as internal forces, sometimes because of the absence of external influences or pressure which might artificially contain or unite them (sometimes in any case), are threatening state structures or causing further divisions in society. The richer or larger states of the developing world in many cases have continued to add to the sophistication of their military holdings (conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons with delivery systems to match) and participate in their international community. This occurs, even though many of their own domestic orders show fissiparous tendencies which remain potentially explosive.

Managing pressing modern aspirations and economic challenges just as traditional, historically rooted are made on the state is the central crisis within the vastly different areas of the developing world. These states do not applaud the end of history, rather they must struggle with its acceleration. Time is not on the side of the bureaucrat in such circumstances, even if he is newly imbued with the renowned pragmatism of the Western 'liberal', and certainly if he is not.

Analysts of regional security in the 1980s must therefore see effects of the acceleration of history on the developing world. When the problems of the modern world are grafted on to the legacies of more fundamental dilemmas, solutions offered for one category may have dangerous repercussions on the other. Each of the looming problems shared by so many developing states discussed below - the crisis of central state power, the nature of

local insurgencies, economic pressures, environmental and physical calamities, the resilience of the military imperative in political relations, and the residual importance of links with outside powers - have become increasingly interrelated, but not as a consequence more susceptible to ordered management. The de-acceleration of history, the abstention from wider global affairs, a return to the past and isolationism, is not surprisingly the preferred 'option' of the most disaffected groups and states of the developing world. Though the superpowers may now be in a mood for co-operation (even collusion) in the Third World, that spirit may well be irrelevant to the sources of local strife. Now the superpowers have discovered the primacy of regional forces over their own, they may also, in common with other parts of the developed world, determine that the saliency for them of regional conflict is insignificant. In this evolving situation, to what extent can leaders in the developing world develop the tools of their own security management, and for what problems is international action and co-operation still relevant ?

Nature of State Power and Security Management

The most immediate and consistent challenge to leaders in the developing world is to strengthen and maintain the coherence of the state. Indeed, one of the qualities of developing countries is that they are still in the process of developing the state or at least widespread respect for its ultimate power over the people who live within its borders. The need to assert power often exacerbates the same internal differences and tensions for which centralised state power is thought necessary. It is a not unsurprising consequence of this effort of nation-building, which aims at establishing national pride, building the tools - often military of central control, and combating transnational influnces which might undermine this task, that a deterioration takes place in regional relations. Regional instability is all too often tied up with incomplete or changing processes of national state assertion.

Particularly in the newer states issued from decolonisation, personal rule is the preferred instrument of national integration. The well-known remark of former President Bourguiba of Tunisia—What state ? I am the state ?—aside from recalling the European origins of the association between the idea of state power and ruler, is indicative of the enduring role played by national liberators (and often their heirs) in the rule of the decolonised states. Even in states not formally colonised the importance of one man, or one sect in society remains key to central rule and is often the root cause of conflict. In Ethiopia, different nationalities were brought under the rule of an Amharic ruling class, to the evident detriment of other nationalities such as the Eritreans, Somalis, Oromos, Tigrayans and others. The dictatorship that succeeded Emperor Haile Selassie has not been more successful in solving this elemental problem - the task of 'Ethiopianisation' is still pursued.[2]

The connection between personal rule and ethnic domination exists in various parts of the developing world where political parties or groupings are often identified with clans or sects. The Ba'athist regimes in Syria and Iraq or the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, are obvious examples. In these circumstances regime security is often confused with state security ; attacks on the legitimacy of an individual ruler interpreted all too willingly as an attack on the state. To supplement the reality of ethnic domination in many states (or replace its perception) religion is sometimes used as an alternative form of integration. In President Zia-ul-Haq's Pakistan the move towards the establishment of an 'Islamic state' on Sunni lines was an attempt to ensure the legitimacy of the regime yet it caused problems for the Shia minority and created new avenues of dissent. But the fact that political parties emerged with an Islamic focus also meant that the Benazir Bhutto regime

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2. See P. Anyang' Nyong'o, 'Crises and Conflicts in the Upper Nile Valley : Implications for Conflict Resolution in Africa'. Paper prepared for research conference on 'Conflict Resolution in Africa', The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., October 15-18 1989, p. 14.

had to move carefully if it wished to dismantle elements of the Zia Islamic legacy[3]. Revolutionary Iran is of course the extreme case of a country where religion became part of the state doctrine and dissatisfied groups from Tunisia to Malaysia have argued that answers to their own problems in society can also be found in Islamic integration. The importance of traditinnal religious rulers in many areas is such that central forces, even in secular states, must take them into account. Thus, when the military government in Nigeria in November 1988 chose a new Sultan of Sokoto without the support of local king-makers, this resulted in serious rioting of the Muslims in the north and a challenge to the federal government[4].

The reality of power structures in many states in the developing world (particularly in Africa, Asia and the Middle East) is such that centralised control is a myth, a juridical fiction which must be maintained given the respect with which the state is held in the international community. Pre—modern tactics of control and influence must still be used to assure the continuity of power in the capital. In Afghanistan, the Najibullah regime has been offering local autonomy, weapons, money and titles to local leaders in the country, (such as Ismail's in Baghlan province) who can keep open communications to the cities.[5] Central state power is thus power reaffirmed by devolving power to trusted but still independent allies. The medieval rules of feudalism appear more relevant to current circumstances than more formal arrangements for de-centralisation. Where the central power is militarily strong, it can and often does deal with prospective opponents of the state, or state policy, through resettlement or forced migration. Thus

3. See Mahnaz Ispahani, Pakistan's Internal and External Security Environment', draft Adelphi Paper, 1989/90 typescript, p. 37.

4. See *Strategic Survey 1988. 1989*, Published by Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989, p. 183.

5. See Hamish Macdonald, 'Back to Feudalism', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 July 1989.

Iraq has attempted to create a 30 km wide security zone along the borders with Turkey, Syria and Iran clearing out Kurds to prevent them making common cause with their kin in neighbouring countries. Similarly, Brazil's *Calha Norte* policy has been directed towards moving native Indian population away from borders with Columbia and Peru in order to prevent illegal trade. Most Latin American countries (as well as many other Asian countries) do not experience the same degree of clash between state and nation as do African and Middle Eastern states, but as discussed below, they must still deal with alternative centres of power which can emerge in situations where the strength of state machinery remains low.

The need to take into account pre-state and native links within societies in the developing world can often impede the establishment of independent and efficient bureaucracies which can cope with the domestic demand for essential services. In many areas, bureaucracy where it exists is confused with government, whose official organs are simply used to maintain in power a single group. These naturally enough reflect the ideologies (often, as in the cases of Algeria and Vietnam of national liberation) which are held up as sources of the state. Pragmatic management of pressing social needs is not made easy by these structures.[6] There are of course cases in the developing world (Korea) where strong central government is mixed with a degree of bureaucratic efficiency. In those few circumstances where this is so, order may be treasured over distributive justice, but outside callers for greater democracy' must take into account potential disorganising effect of too rapid moves towards pluralism.

Despite these problems of state coherence, and management, the state is still *the* point of reference. This fact was graphically illustrated by the solemn meeting of the Lebanese parliament in Taif Saudi Arabia in October 1989, during which individuals from a state without an acknowledged single head, who no longer accurately represented the competing interests in Lebanese society, dis-

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6. Some of this is discussed in Yezid Sayigh, 'Security Problems of Developing States' draft Adelphi Paper manuscript, 1989, p. 27.

cussed the appropriate balance of confessional and other interests which must obtain in the country, at a time when large areas were under foreign occupation and control. Lebanon also offers many examples of the general thesis that much of the insecurity in the developing world derives from inadequacies of the state and of the tools used by leaders to force unity.[7]

Forms of Organised Insurgency and Civil Strife

Where the nature of central state power is weak or merely disrespected, feudal and provincial loyalties can be exploited by pressure groups, insurgents, rebels or terrorists. Their capacity to organise themselves and garner sufficient support to present a challenge to central power and draw down resources and energy otherwise required for state management usually depends on an identifiable ideology, ethnic support, and some sort of political programme, however vague. Groups that challenge the legilimacy of the state not only create trouble at home, they affect the calculations of other neighbouring powers and this can invite further conflict. While it is state power that is still the most respected by the international community, many leaders in the developing world may control the capital city but find that elsewhere their capacity to advance centrally dirceted policies is absent.

Among the more dangerous types of groups now operating are nationalist revivalist groups who seek a reversal of history, a retreat into a past that they have mythified for political purposes. Their aim is the eradication of the present in the hope that the future will more closely resemble a past. Two examples will suffice. The *Khmer Rouge* in Cambodia, recalling as do other Cambodian groups the greatness of Cambodia's past (the people who built Angkor), and operating under an ideology of liberation, but without a realistic policy for the modern world, have terrorised without

7. Lebanon's problems are surveyed in Hussein Sirriyeh. 'Lebanon : Dimensions of Conflict,' *Adelphi Papers* no 243, Autumn 1989, Published by Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

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constructing. When in power from 1975-1978 the *Khmer Rouge*, while extolling the virtues of traditionalism tried to rush forward at a dizzying pace, simultaneously seeking to increase rice and steel production. The Kampuchean Great Leap Forward, the establishment of a new myth of economic invincibility, failed miserably because of a policy of autogenocide and forced migration. Their ideology of geographical isolation, when combined with perpetual terror meant that the *Khmer Rouge* attempt to somersault history only meant that the country was virtually returned to the year zero.[8] Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia gave the lie to the *Khmer Rouge* proposition that Cambodia could live outside the real world, alone in its own world. With loyalty to it surrendered rather than won, the *Khmer Rouge* have been able to survive since thanks partly to external assistance from great and smaller powers alike. The *Janata Vimukti Peramuna* (JVP) or Peoples Liberation Front in Sri Lanka began to wage terror in 1987 when the goverment made peace overtures to Tamils wishing to establish an independent home land in the north and east. A Sinhalese nationalist movement, espousing anarchism and a romantic idealism of a village past, it has been able to draw its support from the unemployed and the disaffected, the castaways of failed economic policies. The fact that the Tamil rebellion drew in an Indian force presence, and that this in turn-helped to revivify Sinhalese nationalism points to the unfortunate links between domestic conflict and regional politics, as well as to the inadequacy of isolationist doctrines as a remedy from the ills of the modern world.

Both these groups, and there are other ones who operate on similar premises claim national mandates for power or influence. Countless groups fight for 'aboriginal' or indigenist' rights, arguing the primacy of primordial over state ties and the inadequacy of central government policies towards 'native' peoples. The Marxist/

8. See Karl D. Jackson, 'The Ideology of Total Revolution', in Karl D. Jackson (ed), *Cambodia 1975-1978 : Rendezvous with Death*, Princeton, 1989, esp. pp. 58-66.

Maoist group *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path in Peru) has terrorised the Peruvian countryside, but also increassingly the cities, pressing its case fuller recognition of the Indian identity. Its struggle against the white elite in Lima, where it has been consistently successful in cutting water and electricity supplies, has been largely a campaign of a few radicals who have been able to co-opt disaffected Indians to their cause. The movement has recently made common cause with narcotraffickers operating in the country. Such groups as *Sendero* awaken ancient fears, and directly challange the existing leaderships rights over the whole state. They also make life difficult for the groups on whose behalf they claim to act. Numerous other examples exist of organised ethnic or regionally based organisations who, in seeking recognition of native identities also intensify ethnic rivalries. The National Democratic Front in Burma ('uniting' Karens, Arakanese, Mons, Karennis, Shans, Kaehins, Palaungs, Pa-Os and Was) fights the Burmese government, but its constituent member, some of whom participate actively in drug production and trade, also fight among each other and end up by disturbing whatever normal peasant life might otherwise exist. John Garang's Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) in Sudan argues that unequal treatment of the south by central authorities in Khartoum is only a symbol of a basic Sudanese problem of how to integrate various groups towards a common purpose. His own operations in the south nevertheless demonstrate that the native population whose interests he claims to represent can be the unfortunate victims of armed rebellion against the north. Governments responding to such ethnically based struggles (in the cases cited as well as others) rarely display moderation and a sympathy for the root causes of discontent. Too often, because of the strategic insignificance of the country concerned, the most awful massacres are ignored by the international community. Such was the case in 1988 in Burundi, where the national army, composed almost entirely of Tutsis killed thousands of Hutus (the majority ethnic group) and created a huge refugee crisis in neighbouring Burundi to which 60,000 survivors fled.

In an ultimate challenge to central state power, many groups seek to secede and establish states of their own, playing on an ideology of self-determination which can find easy support amongst citizens of provinces or remote areas who are victims of uneven state development or of the success of a particular ethnic group with a firm grip on the central organs of power. The strength of any ethnic group with powerful camplaints against the central power, or indeed which is itself in power, be supplemented (as in the case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, various groups in the Lebanon, Islamic fighters in Afghanistan) by their links with outside powers sympathetic to their cause and willing to offer support.. Given an international atmosphere in which the direct military involvement of the superpowers is not regularly anticipated, the tendency of groups within developing country states to call in local regional power support, and for such powers positively to respond, could rise.

Organized rebellion against state authorities by ethnic groups, secessionist movements or drug lords acting in collaboration or through terrorists shows no sign of subsiding. Numerous states are bound openly to exploit the existence of rebel entities to advance their own external ambitions. Sometimes such groups are virtually created and almost entirely sustained by external powers, as in the cases of Iranian support for *Hizbollah* activists in the Lebanon, or South Africa's links with *Renamo* in Mozambique. In other cases the links are less direct and the objects of support more evidently autonomous as in the examples provided by Ethiopian support for the SPLA in Sudan, and for the Somali National Movement (SNM) in Somalia, or the putative assistance provided by Pakistan to Sikh extremists in India or Indian help (often denied) to Sind separatists in Pakistan. Such links, which tend to be more subtle than overt and heavily military assistance (such as China's aid to the *Khmer Rouge*) are no less complicating for regional security since they touch the core of central state control over the population. Leaders in the Third World whose

'nation-building' tasks are incomplete feel particulary threatened by such activity.

While there are many instances of differing ethnic groups throughout the developing world living peacefully cheek by jowl, sensitivity to the consequences of traditional differences and the rivalries these inspire, can intensify in periods of economic hardship. A decline in economic fortunes can give rise to ethnic tensions which would otherwise remain latent; states which are ethnically homogenous arguably have a longer lead time to manage economic problems before these result in organised rebellion by coherent groups. Naturally, spontaneous riots with economic motivations (North Africa, Venezuela), as well as the cry for an improved political situation (China, Chile) can occur where the ethnic factor is not a determinant. But the existence of well-defined ethnic groups able to develop a case of oppression can not only accelerate the chances of opposition but contribute to the possibillity of it being sustained especially in instances where the central power has in the past been weakened by the structural divisions of society.

Increasingly, in Pakistan, Burma, Columbia, Panama, Peru and elsewhere, organised challenge to authority with a debilitating effect on state structures has derived from the activities of narcotraffickers. These are able to operate transnationally and to use their vast wealth to acquire levels of armaments which often rival those held and maintained by the states in which they mainly operate. The drug challenge, thus organized, is an assault on public order and the rule of law. In Columbia, drug leaders have penetrated and control mojor sections of the government and the judiciary ; in Panama they have become the government. Burmese drug lords are linked with ethnic groups long struggling to emancipate themselves from a Burmese majority they perceive as domineering and arrogant. In many countries the drug dealers are more organised than the state military apparatus or such private corporations which may exist. Their power not only affects the safety of the

population and distracts government attention from the tasks of development, but tarnishes the image of the state in international and particularly American eyes. Foreign policy towards such states becomes dominated by the phenomenon of drugs, often retarding decisions on economic assistance. While Western governments realize that compensatory economic aid must be granted as an element of any war on local drug production and eventual distribution, focus on the drug issue risks distorting the perception of overall security problems in producing, distributing or 'facilitating' countries.

A key set of concerns (themselves so often relevant to the drug problem) revolves around competition for scarce resources and the management of economic opportunities and vulnerabilities. Dependence on single exports, the distractions imposed by debt management, and difficult access to certain resources necessary either for agricultural or industrial growth directly impinge on developing country security.

Economic and Resource Pressures

There are many states, inadequately grouped under the too largely embracing term of Third World, whose economic development has proceeded well, in some cases spectacularly. The four dragons in Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) as well as the oil-rich states of the Gulf, cannot properly be said to have security problems which derive from economic woes. The acceleration of their economic history has if anything helped to harness the more powerful and dynamic forces in society in the service of national growth rather than mischief, and helped to check forces of dissent by catering for their basic needs. For many other states, their own bad management or the poverty of their natural resources has meant that they are losing or have already lost control of their economic futures. World markets move too fast for them, free trade where it exists is too liberal, foreign penetration often perceived as too pervasive. Their attempts to protect themselves from

pressures of this kind often only complicate things further : exchange controls, protectionism and restrictions on the movement of populations can harm prospects for needed investment or technical know-how. In the case of the poorest lesser developed countries, such reaction to perceived vulnerability and penetrability so often lead to further isolation and development.

For those countries rich enough to have been able to garner credit in the 1970s, the consequences of their debt-overstretch are now being felt. While many were able to service their debts when interest rates were low and exports continued to grow in the late 1970s, the world recession of 1980 - 1982 meant that money became expensive and external markets shrank.[9] For countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, debt management and its attendant problems have become a major feature of foreign policy. Their own decisions to suspend, or their intimations about defaulting debt repayments, naturally affect the availability of new capital. In the worst cases, the level of government deficits, the inability of authorities to raise further revenues from taxes and the monetarisation of debt (printing money, issuing certificates against gold reserves) create the conditions for hyperinflation, with all the attendant risks in terms of political stability. Brazilians are in the habit of referring to their situation as analogous to the afflictions of Weimer Germany debt is seen as the equivalent of reparations payments—and the political implications of such financial entrapment are depicted as severe. The fact that capital flight from many of the heavily indebted countries is very high, amounting by some estimates to more than half their foreign debt, only compounds existing problems. The movement of capital outside the country creates foreign exchange crises which in turn accelerates the flight of capital and rise of inflation. The speed of such financial developments and the vicious circles it creates makes policy planning near impossible. Still, optimists feel those countries which engage in reforms (income restraint, trade liberalisation) stand a chance to improve growth

9. Clive Crook, Poor Man's Burden : A Survey of The Third World', *The Economist*, 23-29 September 1989, p. 51.

rates and thus encourage the possibility both of new lending and a return of departed capital. The stakes for these large debtors and their lenders are, however, high and the structure of the relationship between borrowers and their government and private lenders basically unhealthy. Quick fix solutions to the debt problem (debt for equity, debt for nature) can deeply affect a country's sense of sovereignty and hence perceptions of security. The debt problem and the feeling of helplessness which it encourages generally help to create circumstances in which other de-stabilizing elements can operate.

The richer debtor countries have the luxury at least of knowing that their problems are so important that they are sure of international attention at the highest level. The poorer countries attract the interest of international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, European Commission), but less often concentrated attention of Western leaders. An exception to this were those poorer African countries which were able to benefit from President Francois Mitterand's decision in 1989 to wipe off their debt. The fact that some key 'medium - rich' countries (with commensurately higher obligations) like Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Gabon and the Congo were excluded from this dispensation, showed the limits of such munificence. Most of the francophone African countries in Africa also find themselves in an exceptional situation in that their membership of the Franc Zone has tended to protect them from the ravages of hyper-inflation that has affected so many other developing states. But there the exceptionalism ends. The poorer African states all have in common that where they have exports these are usually single, and of primary materials. Their vulnerability to world market prices is nearly total. Mechanisms such as STABEX or SYSMIN developed by the European Community to guarantee levels of revenue to these countries have helped, but have not been able to change the nature of the problem.

The poorest African states have a problem of mere survival. The economics of survival is a basic security challenge, but less often one

that can create ordered attacks on the political order by those who suffer most. Those countries in Asia or Latin America who are above the survival threshold have the disadvantage that their peoples are able to develop aspirations which need to be met. The domestic management of such aspirations (now more clearly a feature too in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), is delicate given that economic ambitions mix with ethnic rivalries or politically charged relations between the poorer and richer regions in any given country. Government economic policies, whether driven by programmes drafted and possibly imposed on states by the international financial institutions, or entirely self - generated, too often carry the risk of inducing disaffection and conflict. A feature of developing states is that economic management has implications for political order, a problem less evident in the developed world, where political stability creates a backdrop which allows for long term planning.

Often national security concerns will affect the scope and timing of econmic development plans. Central government policies might focus on particular geographic areas where the infusion of capital is thought necessary for reasons of stability as much as simple reasons of economy. Spread over time, such policies can create conditions of uneven development (particularly when the priorities of colonial times have been carried over into independence), with the result that fissiparous tendencies in the body politic might be exacerbated. Pakistan's own ethnic problems have been often thus affected: the favourite treatment given to the richer Punjab especially by military regimes has contributed to the establishment of ethnically based movements in Sind and Baluchistan. In Syria, the Sunni majority has noted to its dissatisfaction the degree of development assistance given to the Alawite dominated Latakia region under Assad's regime.[10] In general, the need to make development more even, often by centrally directed policies of land distribution, rarely proceeds at a pace sufficient to slow down

10. See Valerie Yorke, *Domestic Politics and Regional Security : Jordan, Syria and Israel : The End of an Era?* Published for the International Institute for Strategic Studies by Gower Press, Aldershot. 1988, p 114.

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regionally based discontent. Few governments are able speedily to
to implement such plans as may exist : the difficulties encountered by
Filipino governments since the early 1970s and the government of
Zimbabwe since the early 1980s are typical. A too leisurely approach
to the dismantlement of feudal structures simply accelerates dissent.
Certainly the availability as well as the distribution of land has been
one of the principal root causes of opposition to central state power
in Central America. The competition for scarce agricultural resources
is as much a source of conflict as the more glorified competition for
oil or strategic mineral wealth.

In the future, strategic analysis will have to take more note of such
problems. Specifically, the competition for water resources is likely
to increase in importance, not least because water has become a cen-
tral problem in that area of the world where arguably the political and
military friction is greatest. In the Middle East, where the intra-Arab
and Arab-Israeli political and military rivalries continue to be intense,
the water issue not only affects, but in some instances determines
strategic calculations. Problems in this area provide a good indica-
tion of the complexity of resource issues. The pressure to exploit
agricultural lands, particularly in the face of accelerating population
growth, means that water is bound to become a more obvious element
in regional relations. Since sources of water cross boundaries there
can be few water exploitation policies whose effects are neutral on
neighbours. For example, construction of the Ataturk Dam in the
Turkish section of the Euphrates river could affect the downstream
exploitation of water by the Iraqis and the Syrians. Tripartite nego-
tiations over this problem have not always been satisfactory. Since
1982, Israel has diverted water from the Litani river crossing southern
Lebanon (though the cost-effectiveness of this is now questioned),
thus reducing the amount of water available to Lebanese farmers.
Israeli dependence on water from the Golan Heights and the West
Bank remains high. While the water tables in the West Bank are
declining and Palestinian population increasing Israeli authorities
have allowed Palestinians in the territories to consume only at 1967

levels. Egypt depends on the Nile for some 95% of its water resources, but water flow to Egypt is dependent on consumption in Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia. In the last 18 months Egyptian interest in Nile Valley regional co-operation has increased with the growing realization of the impact of such vulnerability. If Egypt were to insist on a strategy of food self-sufficiency its water problem would be aggravated and as a likely consequence its relations with Ethiopia whose co-operation on water management issues has been inconsistent, would decline.[11] Rich countries, like Saudi Arabia have the luxury of experimenting with techniques such as water desalination, but as a rule co-operation is the key to water management, and the enduring conflicts in the region only ensure that the water issue will be an increasingly aggravating problem, not least in the case of the Arab-Israeli dispute when a peace process begins to take shape.[12]

To the extent that economic and financial questions affect civil order and international strategic calculations, they naturally gain in importance. The fact that in so many parts of the developing world economic futures are determined by the successful management of natural resources, points to the significance of sound environmental policies for strategic stability. The natural or induced decay or destruction of the resources on which economic stability rests, or around which international attention focuses, can therefore intensify existing conflict and create the conditions for new rivalries.

Environmental and Physical Decay

The acceleration of 'environmental history' is a matter of global significance and of general comment. Its importance in the lesser developed parts of the world lies in the fact that the link between

11. I draw this conclusion implicitly from the discussion in Tony Allen, 'Water in the Arab Middle East : The Nile. Changing Expectations and Priorities', *Arab Affairs*, Winter 1988-1989, no. 8, pp. 50, 51.
12. See for an expanded treatment of some of these problems. Rami Musallam, 'Water : The Middle East Problem of the 1990s', *Gulf Report*, London, February 1989, pp. 3-18,

the state of the environment and economic pressures is particularly strong. These states and their peoples depend on a healthy environment for their own well-being and it is often in the developing world that the forces of physical decay are most relentlessly at work. Yet economic imperatives often drive leaders or their peoples to an accelerated depletion of natural resources. Governments as frequently incapable simultaneously of dealing with the debt and environment traps and this results not only in increased tensions with neighbours on whom the effects of nationally driven environment unfriendly policies are often felt, but also on friends and allies in the developed world who now put increasing pressure on Third World leaders to adopt round environment policies. Environment issues have become international security problems both within the 'South' and between the North and South.

Many environmental problems in the South are caused directly or indirectly by policies pursued in the North, others are home-grown. In some areas, environmental dilemmas can less easily be blamed on government policies. The advance of the desert in Sahelian Africa which has severely affected agricultural and grazing capacities just as have the locust swarms in North Africa are environmental problems generally not consequences of the policies pursued by the suffering country. However, deforestation in the forest zones of sub-Saharan Africa certainly interacts with desertification in the arid and semi-arid zones.[13] Much European economic assistance to these areas is eaten up by the need to combat environmental challenges, thus affecting the proportion of assistance which can go to other development projects. The soil erosions in such countries as Haiti, Guatemala and India do owe their origins to overgrazing or poorly managed irrigation. These causes are themselves the result of desperate attempts by impoverished peoples to improve their lot in the short term and without some reversal of environmental destruction, their poverty and the political instability to which this can give

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13. Chris Simson, 'The Battle of the Greens', *West Africa*, 9-15 October 1989, p. 1676.

rise, will continue. In the case of Haiti, it has even been argued that reforestation is the key to its security and political order.[14]

The deforestation of the Amazon has wide reaching (and much argued) effects on the global climate, but also has damaged farming southeast of the rain forest, a fact which has contributed to Brazil's recent decision to co-operate more with outsiders on Amazon management. Differing perceptions of the scope and the urgency of the environmental consequences of Brazil's fiscally encouraged tree-felling has provoked tensions between Brazil and the West, but also encouraged new thinking on how best to provide technical and other aid to the Brazilian government. Whatever the source of environmental strife or its impact on extra-regional relations, the impact on local security can be major. Soil erosion and loss of tree cover can force people to leave their normal living areas. Environmental refugees, no less than political and economic ones, can have desta-bilizing effects on receiving areas. Moreover, nature rarely respects borders, so deforestation in one country can cause floods in another, thus potentially aggravating regional stability. Aside from the long term effects of deforestation or the emission of chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) on the environment and climate there are thus short term and intensifying problems of environmental trends or catastrophes with marked strategic implications.

The conflicting and various problems in South Asia offer good examples of such links. Deforestation in Nepal has led to local landslides which in turn has resulted in the migration of Nepalese to the flat lands bordering India. As a consequence there has been a heightened competition for scarce resources between these new 'immigrants' and the local people, whose different ethnic background has helped to provoke tensions. The Indo-Nepalese trade war, set off in part by the regulation of Indian entry to the country which was feared to exacerbate ethnic tensions, has only encouraged further

14. See Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining Security' in *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1989, vol 68, no. 2, p. 166, 168.

tree-felling in order to meet rising fuel needs. The resultant top-soil erosion has directly contributed to flooding in Bangladesh. This has served to displace some of the local Bengalis from their homes, most of whom have moved to the Chittagong Hill tracts, populated by non-Bengali tribal minorities, resulting in charges by the local population that the central government has sought to subvert their cultural and linguistic purity. Local insurgents have turned to India for military assistance, thus directly exacerbating bilateral relations. Attempts to manage water resources in the region to attenuate some of these problems have been stymied by the different strategic calculations of each country. Bangladesh would like to have barriers constructed in Nepal to slow flooding but also to help store water which could be used in the winter season when Bangladesh normally suffers drought. India fears that collaboration between Bangladesh, Nepal (and therefore also China) on water resources would be harmful to its interests. The Indian counter-proposal that a canal be constructed to divert waters from the Brahmaputra river (flowing from China to Bangladesh via India's northeastern territories) to augment water flow to Bangladesh in the dry season, runs up against the concern that this would displace more Bangladeshis and destroy badly needed agricultural lands[15]. All these problems perhaps pale beside the concern that as a result of the CFC-inspired greenhouse effect, the rise of the oceans will entirely submerge the Maldives. While much analysis of South Asian security has focused on the local nuclear rivalries and the nature of political-military links with outside powers it seems evident that the implications of the environmental domino effect have pressing strategic consequences.

In other areas, the dominos are perhaps not so closely stacked but the link between existing conflicts and their economic/environmental implications should not be ignored. For example, in May 1989 the Thai government offered to mediate between the Burmese government and rebels operating on the Thai-Burmese border.

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15. I am grateful to Shaukat Hassan of Dhaka University for pointing out to me some of these linkages.

Thailand had previously seen such entities as the Karen National Union (KNU) as providing a useful buffer, keeping the Burmese army at bay and preventing illegal cross-border trade. A Burmese offer of logging concessions to Thailand meant that Thai companies wished to see safe access to Burmese timber areas which could only be brought about by clearing rebels from the border, itself only possible as part of a peace package.[16] No negotiations ensued, but the offer was symbolic of how economic decisions (with environmental consequences) could drive strategic decisions. Indeed Thailand's Golden Land (*Suwanaphume*) strategy to create more efficient economic co-operation amongst the Indochinese countries spurred numerous peace initiatives during 1988-1989, but some of her neighbours fear that Thailand's recent depletion of her own natural resources (marine and forest) would mean that its own external economic ambitions would be environment unfriendly. In Central America, the economic causes of conflict are primary, but there have also been environmental implications of attempts to satisfy economic concerns given the fact that the exploitation of natural resources is the principal source of income throughout the region. In most countries, poor farmers have been driven out of their arable land by cattle grazers and have begun to cut down hillside forests in search of more land. In El Salvador, where virtually the whole of the forest has been cut down, most rebels come from families deprived of arable land. While Nicaragua has moved to deal with the land distribution question – so fundamental to conflict generally in the region – it may be that resettlement plans, particularly on the eastern frontier, will have environmental side effects which would pose security problems in the future.[17]

16. Bertil Lintner, 'Crossed Signals', *Far Estern Economic Review*, 15 June 1989, p. 27.

17. For a discussion of these issues see Gregory Wirick, 'Environment and Security: The Case of Central America', in *Peace and Security*, Canadian Institute for international Peace and Security, Summer 1989, Vol, 4, no. 2, pp. 2-3.

Thus, the capacities of leaders in the developing world to take into account the security implications of economic programmes with environmental consequences is bound to become an element of good government. The economic effects of environmental destruction, internal migrations of peoples in search of better situations, the problems raised by environmental refugees, are all issues which will not only occupy places in domestic agendas, but will become integral to the good management of regional international relations. States whose domestic economic/environmental policies are developed without concern for their external implications, may well risk conflict with neighbours which could include a military dimension.

The Resilience of the Military Imperative

While the sources of instability are rooted in the history of state structures, the exacerbating effect of economic and environmental factors and the complexity of regional relationships, they are naturally aggravated by the persistence of the military solution as the ultimate option of state leaders and their internal or external opponents. Even the poorest states in the developing world have, through their arms acquisition programmes, entered with vigour the modern world. Ethiopia, by some measures the poorest country in Africa, with some 316,000 men at arms, has the continent's largest standing army. Three of the other poorest African countries, Sudan, Chad, and Mozabique have nevertheless sought to maintain the ability to conduct armed conflict. In these and other poor countries of the Third World affected by insurgencies, war has become politics by other means; government the management of conflict.

Richer states have sought to make great leaps forwards for reasons of prestige, regional rivalry, and external markets in their ability to produce and export arms. Brazil's medium-tech arms industry has made that country a leading actor in the South-South arms trade.

More states appear close to crossing the nuclear threshold. They are doing so, in South Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, in circumstances in which it is not clear that robust mutual deterrence structures can be developed simultaneously with the rise in possession which would make nuclear inventories stabilising factors. The proliferation of chemical weapons and their actual use during the Iran-Iraq war points to difficulty with which the appearance of new types of weapons in conflict areas can be accommodated within deterrence frameworks. The spread of ballistic and cruise missile delivery systems indicates a growing capacity for over the horizon combat which can heighten regional perceptions of threat and raise the possibilities of pre-emption.

This general interstate proliferation of armaments and their delivery systems, which complicates both the prospects for arms control and for conflict management is coupled to a dynamic of intra-state armaments diffusion which hightens the internal opportunities for armed conflict. The sophisticated small arms trade is such that guerrilla groups throughout the world are able to garner for themselves quite impressive inventories. The permeability of borders means that states close to conflict zones will find that arms circulate uncomfortably freely : the war in Afghanistan has meant that in Pakistan, arms are easily available for the use of various groups. In such situations the state loses one of its usual major attributes: monopoly control over armed force. The capacity of those who oppose state policies to translate this into armed opposition is becoming more pronounced. Where semi-feudal political structures are married to the diffuse possession of arms, the chances of conflict being instigated is all the higher. This factor only increases the need for outside assistance and arms suppliers, just as it raises the level of tensions that can produce conflict.

In this context of accelerating abilities to wage war, research on how wars are begun, continued, terminated, but then re-started is as relevant as ever. The consequences of regional conflict for

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friction in neighbouring areas : the destabilising effect of refugee and exile populations, and the disruption of normal trading pattrens, among other results, are themselves often the causes of further dissent and rivalry. In these complicated conditions, in which the prospects of civil and interstate war seem still high, the contributions outside powers might make to conflict promotion or to conflict management appear ambiguous. Regional powers like India may more often, though not necessarily successfully, pursue policing tasks because conflict in neighbouring countries is related to domestic security. But in a world in which strategic calculations are unlikely to be made primarily on ideological grounds, the greater powers will shy away from engagement.

To compensate for insufficient military power to deal with internal or external threats, states in the developing world have traditionally borrowed power from the outside. The superpowers have usually responded positively to such requests largely because of the nature of their own rivalry, while other Western powers (particularly France, who effectively offers a security guarantee to most of francophone Africa) have for reasons of prestige, or a desire to keep arms markets, sustained some external security relationships. Yet alliances are constraining and it is reasonable to ask what their importance will be in an evidently more fluid international system, and equally, what influence outside power can have on conflict which may remain intense but, in the developing world at least, carry reduced geopolitical significance.

The Resort to Outside Power and Regional Security Management

The speed and nature of current events has begun to militate against the creation of new strategic alliances between strong outside powers and regional actors in search of security guarantees. The Soviet Union is drawing down its commitments in recognition that its security depends on a better management of scarce resources, and the US may distance itself from some allies in the developing world since the perceived need to compete with the Soviet Union will

decline. The Soviet Union will still see itself as responsible to governments it has supported (Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Angola) just as the US will sustain commitments to those whose basic existence or geopolitical position depends heavily on such support (Israel, Egypt, Pakistan). States in the developing world may still call on outside powers to perform security tasks on a 'contractual basis' as Kuwait did during the Iran-Iraq war, but the North-South dimension of strategic/military alliances is probably entering a period of secular decline. Where outside great powers retain a genuine wish to promote the conditions of security, and in circumstances where states in certain regions require development assistance, an interdependence of interests exists which creates the basis for collaborative activity. More narrowly, when outside powers still require regional markets for arms sales and local states with money to spend desire to buy arms, security relationships will be established and maintained. Such relationships, as in the past, will have their political consequences. Local states will wish to secure assistance without risking external control of policies or unwelcome responses from neighbours, just as outsiders will wish to guard against the cynical use of assistance given and be prepared for its impetuous dismissal. Agreements will be struck, but these will not be the foundations of new alliances or North-South blocs.

It does not follow from this that regional security organisations or alliances will gain a pre-eminent role in managing regional stability. Such organisations seem to have proliferated in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America during the 1980s. But in the peace break-outs of the 1980s, no regional organisation played a primary role. In South-West Asia, the Gulf, and Southern Africa, deals were struck because local actors wished this and outside powers facilitated compromise. The UN, not a regional organisation, was the bureaucratic instrument of choice to help shape and bless these efforts. The creation and maintenance of new structures will have political significance, but it is not to these organisations that regional actors will happily delegate the right

or capacity to manage conflict. Alliances may redefine problems,
or make conflict more difficult amongst the members, but will not
replace the pursuit of national interests by powerful local states
or their proxies.

Recent developments in the 'Arab world' illustrate these points
best. The Gulf Co-operation Council did not craft the policy which
led to the deployment of Western navies in the Gulf—Kuwait did—
and was certainly divided about its possible consequences. The
existence of the organisation did not help to facilitate Western
developments; the US and European states negotiated access rights
on a bilateral basis. The organisation was brought into being as
a result of the Iran-Iraq war and broadly its members supported Iraq
during the war. Yet Iraqi intimations about joining the organisation
of the Arab Co-operation Council (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen)
comprising states 'left out' by other regional arrangements. The
political and economic logic for this organisation is not self-evident,
but its existence certainly shapes the details of intra-Arab politics.
Similarly, the establishment of the Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA:
Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia and Libya) in February 1989,
was made possible by Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement. Through
its goal of political and economic integration for the region, it
dampened the saliency for regional relations of the *Polisario* struggle
for the Western Sahara. Its existence raises the political costs of
major disputes between the member states, since so much capital
has been invested in the ideology of integration. It is arguable
that Libya's behaviour at the May 1989 Casablanca conference,
at which Col. Gadaffi effectively agreed to the PLO programme
subscribed to by other Arab states present may not have been
possible were it not for his new agreement with his Maghreb neigh-
bours. Yet while this, like other regional alliances, may impose
marginal constraints on the activities of radical powers, it will not
be able to prevent radical activity when this becomes defined as a
necessary state aim.

The greater prudence likely to be shown by outside powers with respect to regional conflict and the inability of regionally based organisations to determine outcomes or to force peace, means that local powers and actors will maintain an independence of will and capacity which will be singularly important. Some, like Syria, or in a different way India, will be able to wield with effect their regional power. The ambitions of potential or actual local hegemons will be whetted, and it will be some time before they feel that they cannot influence their immediate environment.

Yet most actors, no less than the great powers from outside, will be forced increasingly to take closely into account local complexities. Leaders in the developing world may seek to become more careful about their alliances with the superpowers but they may also feel the need to be more circumspect in declaring that regional problems derive from outside interference or structural assymmetries in the international system. The urgency of local problems will be too great. Often domestic problems will appear paramount. The riots in Algiers in October 1988 which helped to accelerate liberalizing reforms in Algeria were carried out by a young generation who could not conceive that their own problems were part of the legacy of colonialism. Their complaint was against the policies of local leaders; their revolution was determined by their interpretation of domestic inadequacies. Increasingly, one suspects, developing states will have to take into account the sentiments expressed by the historian Macaulay during the debate on the 1832 Great Reform Bill in England: 'Woe to the government which thinks that the steady and long continued movement of the public mind is to be stopped like a street riot.

States in the developing world not engaged nor immediately affected by violent conflict are likely increasingly to see their security in more modest and domestic terms. The new Argentine foreign minister declared in August 1989 that the Menem government did not pretend to lead groups or alignments, did not wish to be defined by any universal ideology and needed first to solve its own

international economic problems before defending broader interna-
tional causes.[18] Most other states, closer to major areas of conflict,
however, will not have the luxury to so freely determine national
lines of policy. In the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia and
Africa, the   ambitions of local powers, the   transnational   links
between opposition groups, and the interdependency of regional
relations constrain national choices. State leaders will be all too
aware of the ease with which apparently ritual government decisions
on   development, economic policy, the environment, external
relations can have explosive consequences. In actual areas of con-
flict, the momentum of domestic and regional actors will not easily
be slowed down by outside forces. The maintenance of control in
capital cities in Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Horn of Africa, Angola
and numerous other areas will not mean that the countrysides will
be free from regular and complex outbursts of violent conflict.

All this means that the relevance of superpower involvement to
regional conflict resolution is bound to vary tremendously. In key
strategic areas (like the Middle East), it is clear that both super-
powers need to be involved, even if asymmetrically, to ensure that
the right parties take part and that no one can spoil a possible
peace. The important initiatives must, however, still be locally
inspired as well as accepted, and neither superpower can impose a
peace. In less strategic areas (Horn of Africa) both superpowers
may well decide to loosen their links with the major state combat-
ants. In itself this is not likely to reduce the intensity of conflict
though it might affect the level of armaments used and would imply
that the international saliency of the conflict would also be lower.
In areas contiguous to the superpowers, it has been shown that
superpower withdrawals, or decline in aid can help facilitate a
peace process but not bring solutions. In Afghanistan, conflict has
remained high and the manoeuvres of regional actors (Saudi

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18.   Drawn from interview with Domingo Cavallo in 'Aproximaciones para
      retomar el dialogo con Gran Bretana' in *La Prensa*, August 1989.

Arabia, Iran) has complicated the prospects of resolution and made it difficult in the future, because of the new linkages created, for the superpowers positively to affect change. When regional politics intensify in the absence of superpower constraint, the resultant new complexities become daunting for prospective external manipulators of local problems. In Central America, the superpowers have stepped back, and the prospects for a regionally initiated solution have thus marginally improved. However, other issues (economic instability, drugs) will continue to engage the concern of the US, just as conflicts betweeen Islamic groups in Afghanistan challenge Soviet security interests. Superpowers will still be concerned by trouble in neighbouring areas, but may not have the instruments to create tranquility. Pressure by the Soviet Union on a key ally (Vietnam) to withdraw from Cambodia helped to engage a peace process in South-east Asia, but the interests of a local power (China) and the domestic taste for conflict, will mean that solutions to conflict in Indochina will not be forthcoming. It is likely also that the international community will again tolerate a high level of conflict to Combodia as long as its international aspects are diminished. As the civil war aspect of the conflict reasserts itself, the superpowers will become irrelevant.

There are thus some areas where superpower withdrawals can help a peace process, but not create peace, just as there are others where their involvement remains important to forging a peace process which continues to be elusive. Where the superpowers are unable or fear to tread, the Europeans will be no more willing or able to saunter in positively to affect change. The experience of imperialism and decolonisation has conditioned the Europeans against optimism about their capacity to manage dissent in outlying regions. In such circumstances, grabbing international attention will be the main challenge to beleaguered peoples in the developing world. Sadly, there are regions where conflict will persist, and even increase in intensity, without causing any international alarm. Iraq was successful in internationalising concern about its war

with Iran which the international community lived with for some time and this helped bring about a ceasfire. But this may be the exception that proves the rule that few combatants are able to so concentrate the minds of others on their conflicts. Equally depressing is that there are regions where particular conflicts may be solved because of outside power agility or indifference, but new issues and problems of local origin will ensure instability.

The ends of wars do no always, as European history records, create the conditions for peace. The international relations of the European continent today revolve around the effort, delayed for half a century, of creating continental peace with the overt consent of the peoples involved, a process which is bound to be volatile. Maintaining a European order, without refrigerating *the* post-war order, will be a huge task. In the developing world, the challenge of preserving order amid change and change amid order is all the more great.

Conclusion

The complexity of internal and international security in the developing world is growing. Analysts will not find in diplomatic cables and political demarches, in military deployments and armed interventions all the stuffings of regional security problems. Those wishing to analyze conflict and stability in the developing world will have to marry their knowledge of area studies with their appreciation of international relations, their perceptions of public policy problems with strategic assessment, their sensitivity to domestic political culture with an awareness of transnational environmental, economic and ethnic forces which can effect change. In approaching the security of a particular geographical region, it will be all the more necessary to take into account the linkages between the various contributors to stability and instability discussed above. The particular dynmics of each region is different as is the hierarchy of issues which affect stablility. But it is in addressing

that dynamic and assessing that hierarchy that an analyst can make a contribution to understanding regional security.

To be of interest to policy makers, such analysis must also distinguish between problems which can be solved only by the hands of local forces and those which have the sources of solution at least partly outside the region concerned. Nation building tasks, ethnic questions, ideologies which mobilize domestic forces, economic policies, resource management, military plans and expenditure, these may all appear issues initially in the hands of local policy makers, but they can all be affected by external forces. The human tragedy for Third World states is that these problems are cumulatative and interrelated. Thus, the cold accountancy of power and security which until recently was a satisfactory method of analyzing security relations in the European continent, is largely irrelevant in the majority of Third World cases. As history in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe accelerates, as their problems appear more daily analogous to those normally associated to those in the developing world outside, it is to be hoped that strategists who turn their attention to these areas, will begin asking the right questions.