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The BIPSOT Journal

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VISION, MISSION, CORE VALUES AND CAPABILITIES OF BIPSOT

VISION

To promote global peace and security as an international Centre of Excellence

MISSION

To impart specialized multifaceted training to national and multinational military, police and civilian participants on peace operations in accordance with current international standards through research, education and professional programmes.

CORE VALUES

Integrity, Professionalism, Accountability, Excellence, Knowledge, Collaboration and Partnership, Respect for diversity

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- Prepare and train national and multi-national contingent members and personnel of the Armed Forces, Police and Civilian components including Non-Governmental Organizations for duties in peace operations.
- Develop doctrine and procedures for peace operations.
- Monitor international peace operations issues.
- Organize manoeuvre exercises and simulation exercises on peace operations at national/multinational level.
- Conduct evaluation and validation of trainings on peace operations.
- Represent, organize and sponsor seminar, conferences, workshop and symposium at national and international level on peace operations related issues.
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- Conduct and facilitate research on peace operation related issues, award fellowship and honorary degree.
- Organize training on relief, disaster management and humanitarian operation.
- Maintain and develop training infrastructure and facilities that meet the training, research, academic and administrative needs of the centre.

Foreword



With pride and a sense of achievement, I present the 10th issue of "Promoters of Peace", the Annual Journal of Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training (BIPSOT). It is a testament of our dedication to scholarly excellence and the evolution of critical discourse in the complex arena of global peace and security. I am confident that this issue will serve as an essential resource for the practitioners, academics, and peacekeeping professionals, who stand at the frontlines of international peace and security operations.

Since its inception in 1999 as the PKOTC, and its subsequent transformation into BIPSOT in 2002, this institute has remained steadfast to contribute to global peace and stability. Today, BIPSOT stands as a premier international Centre of Excellence, connecting theoretical knowledge and the realities of the field. By integrating the latest global situation, perception and innovative training methodologies, we continue to prepare peacekeepers to navigate the increasingly blurred lines of modern conflict, asymmetric threats, and human security challenges.

The 10th issue arrives at a pivotal moment when the dynamics of the global security landscape demand unprecedented levels of adaptability and intellectual rigor. The articles contained in this edition reflect our proactive stance on these emerging challenges, front-line research and diverse perspectives that are essential for the "Promoters of Peace". This publication continues to be the vessel through which we share the collective wisdom and refined expertise of our faculty, international scholars, and seasoned peacekeepers.

Finally, I wish to extend my deepest gratitude to the contributors, whose insightful research and thoughts form the core of this edition. I also thank the Editorial Board for their commitment in maintaining the high academic standards that have become the hallmark of this journal. I sincerely hope that the insights shared in these pages will not only inform, but also inspire a renewed commitment to the noble pursuit of global peace, harmony and security.

Hussain Muhammad Masihur Rahman, SGP, SPP, ndc, afwc, psc
Major General
Commandant, BIPSOT



Editorial

It is with distinct honour and professional fulfillment that we present the 10th edition of BIPSOT Journal, “Promoters of Peace”. This hallmark publication continues to encourage research and knowledge-based education in peace and conflict-related matters. This journal serves as a vital conduit for disseminating strategic insights, critical research, and high-level discourse on national defense, security architecture, and global stability with respect to peace operations. As the Editor in Chief, I am honoured to reflect upon the journey that has led us to this 10th edition that encapsulates the rigorous academic and practical work undertaken at BIPSOT.

This edition offers a rich array of perspectives, drawn from practitioners, scholars, and policy experts from not only military, but also from civilian officials and educational institutions, who shared their insights on a wider spectrum of issues relevant to contemporary peace operations, thoughts, and ideas. Topics covered in this issue include the African Union peace support operations, challenges of contemporary peace operations, the integration of technology in peace operations, the influence of women peacekeepers in gender-responsive environmental security within UN missions, addressing challenges and strengthening resilience in peace operations in regards of policing perspective, message of peace from conquest to compassion in Asoka’s ‘rock and pillar’ edicts etc. The articles reflect a range of perspectives on peace and security, each contributing to the broader understanding of how peace operations can adapt to new challenges and meet the expectations of the host and international community. As we present these thought-provoking contributions, we are reminded that the future of peace operations rests upon our collective ability to innovate, adapt, and collaborate.

I want to extend my sincere thanks to all the contributors, whose expertise and dedication have made this issue possible. Special notes of gratitude to Commandant BIPSOT, whose leadership and vision have been pivotal to the success of this Journal. As you peruse the articles in this edition, I hope that this endeavour will satisfy the readers and professionals in understanding the complex and delicate issues involved in global peace and security. We are promise-bound to continue our effort to bring diverse and newer topics for our valued readers in the future.

Brigadier General Mohammad Hafiz Mahmud, SGP, ndu, psc
Editor in Chief
BIPSOT Journal

African Union Peace Support Operations: Viewing Through a United Nation Peacekeeper's Lens

Col. Kazi Nadir Hossain, afwc, psc, G+, MPhil

Abstract

The African Union (AU) is working relentlessly in collaboration with the United Nations for the specific cause of regional peace since its inception in 2002. In the same year, the 55 Member States framed African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to effectively handle peace and security challenges of African continent through conflict prevention, conflict management and peace building along with the Regional Economic Communities and the Regional Mechanisms. Within the framework of APSA, the AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) are mandated and operationalized by the AU Commission Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), while the Peace Support Operation Division (PSOD) and African Standby Force (ASF) play instrumental roles. Over several decades, the AU conducted numerous PSOs in the contingent, where the mission in Somalia stands out as the largest and most significant one. In the process, AU and its Member States made tremendous contributions through exceptional sacrifices to deal with enormous challenges, while ensuring regional peace and stability. Despite suffering from political, financial and capacity-related difficulties, the AU is delivering its best, working in partnership with the UN, donors and partners.

Keywords: African Union, United Nations, Peace Support Operations, African Standby Force, PSOD.

“We stand today on the stage of world affairs before the audience of world opinion. We have come together to assert our role in the direction of world affairs and to discharge our duty to the great continent....” on 25th May 1963, Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, exerted when the Africa's first continental institution, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) were created in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia¹. 32 Heads of African States signed the OAU Charter that manifested pan-African vision with the dream of an Africa that would be united, free and in control of its own destiny. While established, the OAU aimed to achieve two major endings: a) the Member States (MSs) would be encouraged to achieve political and economic integration and b) colonialism & neo-colonialism would be eradicated². However, it faced two major challenges coming from the non-availability of an armed force like the United Nations (UN) to enforce its decisions, and its unwillingness to engage effectively in the internal affairs of MSs and taking decisive action.

¹ Speeches and Statements Made at the First Organization of African Unity Summit, compiled in May 1963

² About the African Union, <https://au.int/en/overview>

Recognizing the challenges, Libyan Leader Col. Muammer Gaddafi revitalized the idea of creating the AU in mid-1990s. Subsequently, the OAU delivered the Sirte Declaration in Libya in September 1999 to look for a new body, and on 9th July 2002, OAU was formally dissolved and it was replaced by the AU. During the journey of decades through ups and downs, today the AU consists of 55 MSs from 5 regions of the African Continent (*Figure-1*), each consisting of a regional organization (*Table 1*) concerned with promoting peace, security and stability, and fostering economic, political, and social integration.

Figure 1. Regions of Africa



Table 1. The Regional Organisations.

Region	Organization	Short Name
Northern Africa	North African Regional Capability	NARC
Southern Africa	Southern African Development Community	SADC
Eastern Africa	East African Community	EAC
Western Africa	Economic Community of West African States	ECOWAS
Central Africa	Economic Community of Central African States	ECCAS

Since foundation, the AU has evolved as an important partner of the UN in preserving peace and stability in the African continent through various endeavours including deploying peace support operation (PSO) missions in several MSs, i.e., the Comoros, Sudan, Mozambique, Somalia, Guinea-Bissau, etc. In the AU Headquarters, Peace and Security Council (PSC) deals with all the matters linked to the AU PSOs including strategic level decision making, and plays similar roles as the UN Security Council (UNSC)³. However, the operational, tactical and technical matters are handled by the AU Commission's Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). Indeed, PSOD plans, launches, monitors, sustain and liquidate AU PSOs mandated by the AU and the UNSC. PSOD also plans, prepares, launches and sustains ASF in coordination with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/ Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and AU MSs⁴.

³ The PSC of the AU (AUPSC), <https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/42-psc>

⁴ African Union Peace Support Operations, <https://au.int/en/directorates/peace-support-operations>

African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), AU PSOs and Security Initiatives

MSs of the AU established APSA in 2002 to effectively handle peace and security challenges in the African countries. APSA includes three principal instruments, namely conflict prevention, conflict management and peace building of the AU, the RECs and the RMs⁵. Besides, the APSA

Figure 2. APSA



contains 5 pillars: the African Standby Force (ASF), Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), Peace Fund (PF), the Panel of the Wise, and the AU Commission (AUC) Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) (**Figure-2**). Among those, ASF is a multinational AU peacekeeping force, meant to respond to crises and conflicts on the continent, while CEWS is responsible for monitoring and forecasting potential conflicts. PF is the financial mechanism for supporting APSA's activities including funding the ASF, Panel of

the Wise is a counseling body that provides high-level advice on peace and security issues, and AUC PAPS is administrative and secretarial arm of the APSA.

The AU PSC has 4 different types of PSOs based on their authority, functionality and accountability as following⁶ (**Figure-3**):


“AU Mandated PSOs”: A PSO mandated by the Assembly and/or PSC wherein the AU exercises direct Command, Control and Management. Hence, the AUPSC has full control over those PSOs, i.e., AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

⁵ The African Union Peace & Security Council, <https://au.int/en/psc>

⁶ African Union Doctrine on Peace Support Operations

“AU Authorized PSO”: These are authorized by AUPSC with additional tasks to ensure compliance with the PSC Protocol and AU PSO Doctrine. The AU does not exercise direct Command, Control and Management of the PSO, but provides technical and material support (additional to those provided by the mandating authority) through a cooperation agreement, or any other legal framework. Hence, AUPSC has some control through legal framework and provisions over those PSOs, i.e., Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF).

Figure 3. Types of AUPSC PSOs



“AU Endorsed PSO”: AU does not mandate these missions, and it has no management, and command & control (C2) responsibility. However, the mandating authority, usually the RECs/RMs, and/or the PSOs provide periodic briefings to the AUPSC. Hence, AUPSC gets periodic updates, though it has no control over those PSOs, i.e., SADC Mission in the Eastern DRC (SAMIDRC).

“AU Recognised PSO”: These are almost similar to AU Endorsed PSOs. The AUPSC takes note of the decisions of the mandating authority, usually the RECs/RMs, considering the conflict situation. Hence, AUPSC has no control over those, and takes notes of the major decisions only, i.e., Group of Five Sahel Force (G5S Force).

Outside the predictable ASF/ PSO frameworks, several Ad-hoc Security Initiatives (ASI) taken by different groups gained prominence (Figure-4). Such groups include Regional Cooperation Initiative – Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), G5-Sahel Force and MNJTF. These initiatives are ‘ad-hoc’ in nature, and possess unique patterns of financing, C2 and coordination⁷. Again, the AU’s “Silencing the Guns” (STG) initiative is a

Figure 4. ASI and Other Broad Initiatives

Silence The Gun	Disarming the Armed Gp
Luanda Process (Angola)	Conflict Prevention between DRC & Rwanda
Nairobi Process	Disarming the Armed Groups in Eastern DRC
Nouakchott (Mauritania) processes	CT
Moputo Process (Mozambique)	ASF Action Plan
Oran Process (Algeria)	ASF Review
Troika (US, UK, Norway)	Supporting peace processes in Sudan and South Sudan
She Stands for Peace (not ASI, rather WPS Agenda)	Women Empowerment
Pretoria Agreement (not ASI, a peace agreement)	Ethiopia – Tigrey Peace Making
Tumaini Initiative (not ASI, but Peacebuilding effort)	Peacebuilding in S. Sudan

⁷ Gustavo de Carvalho and Annette Leijenaar, “Ad-hoc security initiatives a potential force multiplier for the AU”, *ISS Today*, Pretoria, 14 November 2017

flagship, long-term continental agenda (part of Agenda 2063) aimed at ending conflicts, which works with and through various ad-hoc security initiatives and regional bodies like ECOWAS and SADC to implement its goals, especially concerning illicit arms. Other important initiatives include ‘She Stands for Peace’, Tumaini Initiative, Pretoria Agreement, etc.

Overview of the On-going and Recent AU PSOs

The AU has conducted several PSOs across the continent very successfully over the last couple of decades. Among those, a few past significant missions are shown in the table.

Table 2. A few Significant AU PSOs.

AU PSOs	Known As	Year	Transitioned into UN PSOs
AU Mission in Burundi	AMIB	2003-04	ONUB
AU Mission in Sudan	AMIS	2004-07	UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
African-led International Support Mission	AFISMA, Mali	2012-13	MINUSMA
African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic	MISCA	2013-14	MINUSCA


Besides, key ongoing/recent PSOs include ATMIS, regional coalitions such as the MNJTF against Boko Haram, and the AU Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (AU-MVCM) in the Tigray region, Ethiopia. A short over-view of some of the significant recent/ on-going AU PSOs are penned in the subsequent paragraphs.

The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), ATMIS and AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM): AMISOM was established by the AUPSC in 2007 in the midst of serious security challenges with the mandate of supporting the Government of Somalia in its efforts to restore peace and stability in the country, provide security, stabilize the political situation, and support the provision of basic services to the population⁸. AMISOM did its most, including the recovery of strategic towns and cities, degrading Al-Shabab (AS), and the extension of state authority. Based on the gains made, authorized by UNSCR 2628, AMISOM transitioned to ATMIS and started functioning as an AU mandated PSO from 1st April 2022 for 33 months to gradually degrade and finally defeat AS and ‘Armed other Groups’ operating in Somalia by 30th June 2024 and handover the security responsibilities to Somali Security Forces (SSF) (*Figure-5*).

⁸ Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM. (LXIX) adopted during the 69th Meeting held on 19th January 2007

From the onset, ATMIS deployed around 18,000 troops from Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Burundi, and over 1000 Police including police contingents and IPOs under 6 sectors in Central, Central-West, Southern and South-Western part of Somalia. UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) logistically supported ATMIS, while the partners, primarily the European Union (EU), provided funds. ATMIS attained limited success and liberated a few places of Somalia from AS occupation and degraded them through coordinated/ joint operations with the Somali National Army (SNA). However, regular attacks by AS, leading to several deaths and destruction of key facilities and infrastructure, exposed professional weakness of SSF to take over internal security responsibilities. Though ATMIS could not attain the benchmarks, it was replaced by AUSSOM based on mere timeframe with effect from 1st January 2025⁹.

Figure 5. ATMIS Military Sectors




FC-G5S/G5S Force: On 19th December 2014, five Western African countries, namely Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger established ‘Group of Five for the Sahel States’, in short, ‘G5 Sahel’ in Nouakchott to counter on-going terrorism and transnational organized crime through political and military means, including through the conduct of cross-border joint military counter-terrorist operations. These countries then proposed for a joint force to counter Boko Haram and Islamic State in the Western African Provinces (ISWAP). Consequently, the strategic concept of operations was endorsed by AUPSC and deployment of up to 5,000 military and police personnel under the FC-G5S was duly authorised by both UNSC and AUPSC, with a view to restoring peace and security in the Sahel region^{10, 11}. The deployment took place gradually over the next two years under a unified Force HQ located in Niamey, Niger (*Figure-6*).

⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 2767 (2024)

¹⁰ AU PSC communiqué of 13 April 2017

¹¹ UNSCR 2359 (21 June 2017)

Figure 6. FC-G5S/G5S Force (2017-24)



Besides, three EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, and the French-led Operation Barkhane provided operational support, and MINUSMA provided necessary logistics support to FC-G5S¹². During its pick in March 2021, 5,535 soldiers were deployed, which reduced gradually when Chad repatriated most of its troops on 15th September 2021, Mali withdrew in August 2022, and Burkina Faso and Niger followed the suit by the end of 2023. Indeed, the withdrawal of both FC-G5S and MINUSMA, in the same time, worsened the security situation as the criminal groups capitalized on the security vacuum and accelerated the trafficking of human beings, drugs and weapons¹³. However, a new coalition, Alliance of Sahel States (AES), is formed to address these issues by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger after the “Pacte du Liptako Gourma” was signed on 16th September 2023¹⁴.

MOUACA: This AU Observer mission was launched in July 2020, with Mission HQ in Bangui. It reinforced MISAC (AU Mission in CAR) office monitoring and supporting the overall implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, DDR and SSR, and

¹² Sandnes, Marie, *The impact of external support on coalition efficiency: the case of the G5 Sahel Joint Force*, *DEFENCE STUDIES* 2023, VOL. 23, NO. 3, 477–496 <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2023.2213637>

¹³ Personal observation of the author from the experience of working as the Military Adviser in the UNOAU, 2022 – 25.

¹⁴ Osuchukwu, Cynthia Nkechi¹, Itke, Wilson Chibuzor² and Emesiani, Ifeanyi Godspower³ The Alliance of Sahel States and the Future of West African Regional Integration Direct Research Journal of Social Science and Educational Studies. Vol. 12, 2024, ISSN: 2449-0806

contributing towards the protection of civilians (PoC) and protection of resources necessary for CAR's economic recovery¹⁵. However, the CORONA pandemic severely impacted its deployment, and only 12% of the EU provided 9m Euro could be utilized. Finally, MOUACA was closed in July 2022 without much success and proper liquidation.

EAC Regional Force (EACRF) and SAMIDRC: Authorized by the EAC, EACRF deployed in eastern DRC in November 2022, as part of the Nairobi process, primarily to defeat the armed groups and support FARDC in the Eastern DRC in maintenance of law and order¹⁶. However, EACRF had to withdraw from the region in December 2023 due to financial crisis and inability to satisfy the Congolese Government, though all the major armed groups continued to wreak havoc, and the security situation in the area was worsening gradually. Visualising the reality, even before EACRF's departure, on 8th May 2023, the Congolese Government decided to deploy SAMIDRC bearing a mandate of supporting the restoration of peace and stability in eastern DRC.

Accordingly, contingents from Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania deployed under SAMIDRC in December 2023 and supported FARDC actively in the continuing fight against M23. On request from SADC, UN assisted SAMIDRC with 'limited logistical and operational support' using the assets of MONUSCO¹⁷. AU also supported SAMIDRC with monetary assistance from the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) of the AU PF. Burundi and the mercenary Wagner Force also deployed troops in eastern DRC under bilateral agreements with the Congolese Government. In the midst of chaos and ambiguity, the mission ended in April 2025 without achieving significant success due to wider political, monetary and technical challenges.

MNJTf: In 1994, the task force was formed solely with Nigerian Force. Later, it turned into a combined multinational force, predominantly comprising military units, when Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger joined to fight Boko Haram, JAS, ISWAP, and JAC. It had significant structural changes in 2015, with a rise in troop's numbers, under the supervision of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). The HQ moved to N'Djamena, Chad and the Force was organized in four national sectors: Sector 1 (Cameroon, HQ at Mora, 2750 troops); Sector 2 (Chad, HQ at Baga-Sola, 3000 troops); Sector 3 (Nigeria, HQ at Monguno, 3250 troops); and Sector 4 (Niger, HQ at Diffa, 2000 troops)¹⁸ (*Figure-7*). However, on 30th March 2025, Niger announced its withdrawal from the Force.

¹⁵ Update to AU PSC on the situation in CAR and the operations of MOUACA on 31 October 2022

¹⁶ 22nd Ordinary Summit of the EAC Heads of State held in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 2022

¹⁷ UNSCR 2717 of 19 December 2023

¹⁸ William Assanvo, Jeannine Ella A Abatan and Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo, *West Africa Report: Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram*, Institute for Security Studies, issue 19, September 2016, Pretoria

MNJTF undertook several major operations against Boko Haram, namely Operation Hrbn Zuma, Operation Lake Sanity, and Operation Yancin Tafki. These operations registered significant gains including the capturing of Boko Haram militants and war materials such as trucks and anti-aircraft guns. However, there is still considerable skepticism in the international community about the mandate implementation in near future¹⁹.

Figure 7. Deployment of MNJTF



SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM): Approved by SADC, SAMIM deployed in July 2021 with 1955 troops from 9 countries under ASF Scenario 6 to fight Islamic-State of Mozambique (ISM) militants in the Cabo Delgado province²⁰. Later, its mandate shifted to scenario 5 and eventually to scenario 4 emphasizing peace building and governance, which faced numerous challenges including funding shortages. With limited gains, the mission ended prematurely on 15th July 2024.

Challenges and Sacrifices of the AU PSOs

Africa aspires to transform into the ‘global powerhouse of the future’ with inclusive and sustainable development, and a concrete manifestation of the pan-African drive for unity, self-determination, freedom, progress, and peace and security.²¹ Indeed, following the blueprint ‘AGENDA 2063’, the AU is continuing with the herculean task of ensuring peace and stability in the region enduring several challenges and sacrifices.

¹⁹ Mariana Llorens Zabala, *A quest to win the hearts and minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force*, the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) and Training for Peace (TfP) Programme, February 24, 2023

²⁰ Communique of the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC held on 23 June 2021

²¹ Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, September 2015


Socio-economic Reality: Since centuries, the African continent, as a whole, is suffering from colonialism & neo-colonialism, political instability, effects of climate change, and violent armed conflicts. All these have contributed to extreme poverty, lack of food and education, malnutrition, HR violations of different forms, etc, which in turn is delaying the achievement of peace and stability in the continent.

Regional Political Landscape: Despite relentless efforts from the AU, RECs/RMs, IGAD, ICGLR, LCBC and many other bodies along with the UN and its agencies/partners, African crises failed to settle down due to regional political reality in many cases, like in Somalia, DRC and South Sudan. Noble initiatives like the Luanda Roadmap and Nairobi Process didn't see the light of success due to mutual distrust primarily among DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. In Somalia, the much-anticipated Operation BLACK LION didn't proceed due to the unclear political intention of the neighbouring Ethiopia, Kenya and Egypt. Political events in Africa have further compounded the overall situation of instability due to the recent Unconstitutional Change of Government through successive military coups in a few countries, i.e., Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Gabon, Sudan.

Shortcomings of the AU: Often, the AU also failed to take appropriate and timely measures to address political and other issues due to many reasons including lack of consensus, regional politics, fund crisis and unavailability/ poor capability of the T/PCCs. Frequently, different regional bodies are formed and PSOs operate without recognition/ mandate of the AU that often compounds the crises, i.e., Liptako-Gourma Authority (LGA), G5S Force, EACRF, etc.

Human Sacrifice for Continental Peace: AU PSOs are embracing regular fatalities in the deployed areas to ensure/enforce peace and protect the civilian lives and property. The AUPSOs in Somalia alone has seen around 4000-9000 death cases over the years, where the Ugandan force suffered the most²². Recently, AS launched a complex attack on a Ugandan military base in Bulamarer, Lower Shabelle (Figure-8), and killed 137 soldiers in a single incident²³. Indeed, all the current/ recent AUPSOs including SAMIM, EACRF, SAMIDRC, and MNJTF suffered fatalities in varying numbers.

Figure 8. AS Attack on ATMIS Army Base



²² Paul D. Williams, 'Special Report: How Many Fatalities Has the African Union Mission in Somalia Suffered?', 10 September 2015

²³ Al-Shabab attacks AU peacekeeper mission base in Somalia, Aljazeera News, 26 May 2023

Enduring with the Chronic Fund Crisis: AU PSOs are mostly supported and funded by UN and several other donors including the EU, UAE, Luxemburg, Norway, UK, USA and some other affluent countries and organisations. However, often the PSOs suffer from lack of predictable, sustained and adequate funds to continue with the operational functions. Fund crisis impacts the reimbursement, induction of required equipment in the mission area and payment of the troops' salaries negatively²⁴. Indeed, all the major recent PSOs like ATMIS, MNJTF, and EACRF have suffered from this difficulty, while a few had to even close down abruptly without proper liquidation and desired success, like MOUACA and SAMIM²⁵.

Critical Shortage of Logistics and Combat Equipment: Though AU PSOs are supported by the UN and donors with logistics, yet those are not enough, timely and predictable. The AU Continental Logistics Base in Douala, Cameroon and other regional Logistics Bases are not yet either established or fully capable to support the PSOs mostly due to the fund crisis and policy ambiguity. In the recent time, SAMIM suffered from delayed shipment of the equipment, which China had pledged to donate. Again, both AMISOM and ATMIS never received the combat equipment that they needed to fight against AS, like ISR and C-IED capability, attack helicopters, etc.

Other major challenges include, a) ASF is yet to take an operational shape, and the RECs could not raise their own regional forces, which is hampering peace operations through quick deployment; b) traditionally, the AU T/PCCs are often heavily controlled from their national capitals that hampers the 'mission C2 mechanism' and ultimately the operational environment; c) the operations of host nation Military, UN Force, AU Force, bi-lateral forces, numerous armed groups and the recently inducted Mercenary Forces in the same area has further disturbed the dimensions of respective forces' operational boundary, task, coordinating body, hierarchy, C2 issues, etc; and d) abundance of the abandoned and never marked anti-personnel mines and IEDs are posing serious concern in many parts of the continent including the PSOs.

Ways Ahead for the AU & UN

Since the UN is primarily duty-bound to work for global peace and stability, it must assist regional organisations like the AU to work for the same in their respective continents^{26, 27}. Indeed, UN needs to enhance the current collaboration with the AU to mitigate the challenges, where some of the endeavours may be as follows:

²⁴ Staeger, Ueli (2023), *Resource mobilization in security partnerships: Explaining cooperation and coercion in the EU's partnership with the African Union*, Cooperation and Conflict 2023, Vol. 58(4) 502 – 521

²⁵ Personal observation of the author from the experience of working as the Military Adviser in the UNOAU, 2022 – 25.

²⁶ The UNGA Resolution 61/296 (2007)

²⁷ The UNSC Resolution 2320 (2016) on partnership between the UN and Regional Organisations.

- a. UN and AU must continue to maintain a strong strategic partnership in the area of peace and security, and deal with the root causes of conflict through the implementation of Agenda 2063 and the SDGs²⁸.
- b. Using the authority of UNSCR 2719 (2024), the UN and AU should jointly look for potential donors to manage predictable, adequate and sustained funds for the AU PSOs. Besides, both should work relentlessly to strengthen the on-going partnership with the EU and other donors, so that support is continued.
- c. AU and UN need to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable people including the IDPs and refugees by primarily providing them with food, secured shelter and medicine.
- d. All stakeholders, including the UN, need to continue with their support to the AU MSs through various SSR efforts including capacity building, policy formulation, lifting of the arms embargo, mine action, training, etc.
- e. UN and donors need to continue with their support to the AU PSOs through providing equipment, intelligence, training, etc.
- f. Timely Joint Security, operational, technical and logistics assessment/ evaluation of the AU PSOs should be conducted by appropriate operational and logistics members from AU, UN and host nation to facilitate sound planning and mandate implementation.
- g. UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) and other regional UN offices contribute vastly to AU MSs and PSOs by formulating numerous strategic and operational strategy/policy documents, and facilitating SSR/DDR/mission assessment, evaluation, force generation, functioning, capacity development, liquidation, transition, etc. However, the partnership between UNOAU and the AU needs to be further enhanced in the area of long-term capacity-building.²⁹
- h. AU needs to operationalise ASF and African PF, the soonest.

²⁸ Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, 19 April 2017

²⁹ UN GA Resolution 64/288 (30 April 2010)

Conclusion

Africa is going through the structural transformations, in line with Agenda 2063, for the quest of a respectable position in the global forum. Hence, a longer-term 50-year development trajectory for Africa needs to be envisioned, which demands revision and adaptation of its development agenda. Indeed, attainment of sustained peace and reduction in the number of conflicts would be a pre-requisite for the renewed economic growth and social progress; people centered development; gender equality; and youth empowerment. Besides, the UN SDG 2030 also needs greater attention by all stakeholders. It's heartening that the AU feels urgency as well, and is working relentlessly to address the root causes of poverty, armed conflict and political instability through its engagement with the UN, donors and other important partners. AU and its MSs are also committed to the continental need of establishing sustained peace through PSOs despite suffering from tremendous fund crisis, equipment setback and human casualties.

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MOTIVATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPERS AND MEASURES TO INCREASE MOTIVATION OF BANGLADESHI PEACEKEEPERS

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Abstract

Motivation is a psychological force that propels individuals and influences actions to engage in goal-directed behaviour. Multinational forces under United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) operate in regions where conflicts exist or have recently ended. These forces operate in challenging domain due to the increasing complexity of internal conflicts to maintain peace, sustainable security, and support human development. Motivation is vital in the UN because it drives the organization's staff to achieve its set goals. The motivational aspects for UN peacekeepers include a strong sense of duty, a desire to help those in need, the legitimacy they feel from upholding peace and protecting civilians, cohesion and discipline within their units. This sense of purpose differs from the classical military role and demand commitment to the UN's principles of impartiality or mandate. Support from the host, righteousness set mandates and administration have direct impact on motivation. Interest of states, righteousness, stress, mandate complexity, risky environment, recent shrinkage of budget, and capability gaps are some of the challenging issues. The paper analysed some information and data from secondary for logical reasoning. To achieve UN mandate and maintain a dominant role in UNPKOs, motivation state of Bangladeshi peacekeepers is vital issue. The paper suggested that sense of legitimacy, training to stimulating intrinsic motivation, pride in humanitarian work, and stress management can enhance motivation of Bangladeshi Peacekeepers. The commanders and mental health professionals can address these issues also for effective management and fulfilment of mission mandates.

Keywords: Conflict, mandate, motivation, peace, UN peacekeepers.

Introduction

Motivation is the psychological force that drives any individual to engage in goal-directed behavior. Providing purpose and direction, it pushes any individual through difficult tasks or setbacks. Self-motivation involves self-knowledge, personal planning, exercise, and self-confidence.¹ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) began in 1948 and evolved significantly over the past six decades. Military members of various nations have been involved in UNPKOs to promote or enforce peace. Mostly their duties cover protecting charitable workers, and vulnerable civilians against aggressive actions. Success of any mission depends on efficiency and skill of deployed troops. Motivation enhances leadership, fosters unit cohesion, and reinforces the perceived legitimacy of the mission. Complexity of conflicts, involvement of non-state actors, climate change, transnational organized

crime, limited support from host state, misinformation or disinformation, and use of Improvised explosive Devices (IED) will pose serious threat on UN mandate and life of UNPKO members in near future. Motivation of deployed members are crucial to address these situations. Addressing these requires stronger partnerships, greater investment in new capabilities and specialized skills, improved personnel training, and enhanced digital capabilities.

Intrinsic motivation is key for persistence at work. A person with intrinsic motivation has spontaneous tendency to be curious, seek challenges, and develop skills, even without rewards. Any UNPKO member should be self-driven to achieve the set mandate. Intrinsic motivation fuels the UN's staff in their work to uphold international peace, safeguard human rights, distribute humanitarian aid, and support development. UN peacekeepers are motivated by a strong sense of duty, the legitimacy of their cause for peace, and pride in their institution, as well as by the desire to help people in distress and protect civilians. Factors like discipline, unit cohesion, leadership, and the opportunity to enhance their country's image also play a role. Bangladesh's voyage to the UN mission initiated in 1988 by sending military observers on the border of Iran-Iraq. Bangladesh made commendable contributions from then till today to maintain world peace. To maintain a dominant role in UNPKOs, Bangladeshi Peacekeepers must remain motivated to achieve UN mandate. Arranging training to keep the peacekeepers well aware of the situation and explaining righteousness can keep them motivated.

At the backdrop of this context, this paper will initially highlight some relevant facts of motivation. Then sequentially motivational facts of PKO, casae studies and some challenges are discussed. Finally, it will suggest few options for Bangladesh Army to enhance motivation in UN arena.

Relevant Facts

- **Types of Motivation.** There are 6 types of motivation facts.

- **Amotivation**

Amotivation is a state of lacking the drive to act, caused by a belief that an activity is not worthwhile, that one is incompetent, or that their actions will not influence the outcome.

- **Intrinsic Motivation**

Intrinsically motivated individuals has tendency to seek responsibility and overcome challenges without asking for self-interest. They are not driven by remuneration or fear of penalty. They undertake any assignment considering the nobility or greater interest of humanity.

- **Extrinsic Motivation**

Extrinsic motivation is the drive to engage in a behaviour to earn an external reward or avoid a punishment.

- **Introjected Motivation**

Individuals with introjected motivation accomplish an action or involve in an assignment to avoid negative sentiments such as disgrace, fault, or nervousness.

- **Integrated Motivation**

Integrated motivation is the most internalized form of extrinsic motivation. Here an individual accepts a behaviour as personally important, and it supports that individual's values and self-concept.

- **Internalized Motivation**

Individuals with internalized motivation involve in a task because it aligns with individual's values and goals, rather than from external rewards or punishments.

- **Some Theories of Motivation**

Motivation theories explore what drives people to work toward goals. Among some popular theories like Maslow's hierarchy of needs arranges human desires into five stages, Herzberg's two-factor theory differentiates between motivators and hygiene aspects. Other key theories are McClelland's need theory, which emphasizes on needs for attainment, power, and affiliation. Moreover, Vroom's expectancy theory relates effort, performance, and rewards; and Locke's goal-setting philosophy emphasizes the role of specific and challenging goals.

Motivational Facts in PKOs

- **Sense of Duty**

Peacekeepers feel a moral obligation to help others and to serve a cause greater than themselves, viewing their work as a divine duty. This dutifulness instils need of humanity. Involvement in peacekeeping missions implies or entails an obligation to peace and UN mandates. The locals also feel that their dutifulness keep a degree of peace and hope alive in a disputed region.

- **Protecting Civilians**

A core motivation of UN mandate is to protect civilians and communities from violence and suffering in war-torn areas. Protecting civilians involves a legal and moral obligation under international law to safeguard people from the dangers of armed conflict. More than 95% of peacekeepers today are mandated to protect civilians which cover protecting children from sexual violence among many other issues.² Protecting civilians is a rewarding job that saves lives, assuages sufferings, and ensures development.

- **Unit Cohesion**

Unit cohesion serves as a powerful motivator by fostering a sense of belonging and commitment to a shared goal, which strengthens the unit's combat power and morale. It motivates individuals to sustain their will and obligation to each other and the mission, even under strain. The comradeship assist the subunit to achieve its mission. Again, a sense of discipline and the strength of unit cohesion serve as important motivators within the military context of peacekeeping operations.

- **Legitimacy of the Cause**

The peacekeepers feel that their job is important for peace. Legitimacy of peacekeepers role can instil righteousness. Even peacekeepers perceive their legitimacy in using force to enforce peace. It drives them through complex situations, even when not defending their own homeland.

- **Confidence on Armaments**

Confidence on armaments significantly enhances motivation by fostering reliability and leads to greater success. It can remove their fear. When peacekeepers trust their equipment, they can fight with confidence. However, a lack of trust can lead to reluctance and a negative impact on morale. Here training plays a vital role.

- **Leadership**

Leadership enhances morale by creating a positive work atmosphere, recognizing and rewarding achievements, and supporting employee growth. Key strategies cover empowering subordinates, stimulating work-life balance, fostering team relationships, and leading with empathy and a supportive attitude.

- **Contributing to a Better World**

The peacekeepers work towards a better world by ensuring harmony and solidarity. Peacekeepers undertake development works in the affected area to bolster the local economy and create employment. It can boost morale by nurturing a sense of purpose and belonging, which leads to greater job satisfaction and motivation. These can boost team cohesion and values of units. These make them feel more connected to their work and each other. Impartially of peacekeepers impart confidence of them and subjects.

- **National Pride**

For peacekeepers from countries like Bangladesh, participating in UNPKO enhances their national image and contribute to their overall progress and prestige. National pride can enhance motivation by fostering a sense of collective identity and shared purpose, leading to a greater desire to contribute to the nation's success in various fields. This can motivate peacekeepers to work harder, engage in civic duties, and strive for excellence, resulting in improved productivity and social cooperation.

- **Some Tangible Factors of Motivation**

- **Country Reimbursement**

The UN reimburses peacekeepers home countries at a standard rate for each participating peacekeepers. This reimbursement system can make UN peacekeeping an attractive economic venture for some states, especially low and middle-income countries. The financial reimbursements can be a significant boost to a country's economy and its foreign currency reserves. Bangladesh has received more than 2.5 billion United States Dollar (USD) over the past 23 years.³ Individual peacekeepers receive a higher salary than they would back home.


- **Higher Salary of Peacekeepers**

Peacekeeping missions often offer substantial financial benefits for individual soldiers, particularly for specialist roles or through bonuses. Besides peacekeepers normal salary in home country UN provide reimbursement or extra salary. Due to limited native salaries of the members of Bangladeshi Armed Forces, the UN reimbursement amounts are lucrative to the Bangladeshi peacekeepers. Specialists like aviation members in some cases receive high compensation for per hour of flying. Serving UN can ensure financial security of Bangladeshi Peacekeeper. Bangladesh Armed Forces have earned a total Tk 27,941 crore by participating in different UN peacekeeping missions abroad in the 23 fiscal years since 2000-01.⁴ The allowances or wages provide quality of living and leads to be motivated.

Case Study on Motivating Factors

In 2023 randomly selected peacekeepers engaged in Haiti, Lebanon, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were enquired about the significance of motivating factors like legitimacy, the local population's noble perception, the cause of peace and support for people in need. The cause of peace and support for people in need was most often cited as the most important or second most important factor in motivating soldiers.⁵ It was trailed by the perception of locals about nobility. Again, the motivation of peacekeepers, at both individual and combined levels, is the foundation of morale. A survey conducted in 2024 showed following results faced by the individuals in grave situations those need to be addressed for motivation.

Figure 1: Difficult aspects encountered in grave circumstances.



Source: <https://securityanddefence.pl/The-role-of-military-morale-as-an-essential-dimension-of-combat-power,174832,0,2.html>⁶

Challenges

- **Interest of States**

Division of interest is found presently among the UN Security Council, troop contributors, and missions' host states, concerning the firm and combined support to achieve mandates. Even the financial terms can remain ambiguous. Some states participate in PKOs seeking esteem, exercising domination, or augmenting defence budgets by UN payments. These in turn affects motivation of peacekeepers.

- **Righteousness**

Soldiers' devotion to any cause of homeland is maximum and it will not be the same towards the deployed state. Misconduct, nobility level, and systemic limitations are also vital factors here. So, issues like rationale of state, justification of mission, and level of engagement affect righteousness among peacekeepers. Even UN Security Council Resolution 2518 of 2020 found that national-imposed caveats, poor military leadership, and a lack of willingness to act assertively are among the root causes affecting peacekeeping troops' motivation.⁷

- **Physical and Mental Stress**

Various complex scenarios during various stages of deployment and fear of unknown may develop stress. Family anxieties may drive the peacekeepers into isolation and other typical stresses. Issues like daily hassles, risky engagements, discomfort, homesickness, and fatigue overwhelm the peacekeepers. Deployments to war-torn regions expose peacekeepers to traumatic events and psychological stress. A lack of proper mental health support can lead to problems like anxiety, despair, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

- **Mandate Complexity**

Peacekeeping mandates have become broader and more complex, often in the absence of strong political agreements. Sometimes ambitious and complex mandates do not match with resources, training and equipment of peacekeepers. Mandate complexity affects motivation by influencing a person's sense of competence, autonomy, and the clarity of goals. Too much complexities can decrease motivation by overwhelming individuals, leading to a sense of vulnerability and frustration.

- **Risks for Health**

High rates of infectious diseases, such as malaria, are a common threat due to the tropical environments of many missions and poor sanitation. Skin diseases, insomnia, and injuries are also found among many. Exposure to trauma, unhealthy social environments, and stress can lead to mental health problems like anxiety and depression among peacekeepers. Variation in food and weather can also raise concern.

- **Prey to Unpredictable Risks**

Peacekeepers are often targeted by armed groups and terrorist organizations in volatile conflict zones. Threats from ambushes, explosive devices, and direct attacks also raise

concern. Vehicle or air accidents due to lack of maintenance, weather and cautiousness are also affecting motivation. Sometimes peacekeepers also face risks from criminal activities. Moreover, peacekeepers are increasingly targeted by misinformation campaigns, which can erode trust and motivation.

- **Capability Gaps**

When there remains a shortfall in supply to meet demand of mandate, a low confidence prevail among peacekeepers. Capability gaps negatively impact motivation by creating a cycle of stress, frustration, and reduced performance. These gaps can lead to lower job satisfaction, and decreased productivity.

Suggested Measures to Increase Motivation of Bangladeshi Peacekeepers

- **Legitimacy**

It engages armed forces in wars to protect interests of state. Relevant justifications should be clearly spelt out to peacekeepers before deployment. Activities to boost the sagacity of legitimacy is important. Appreciation for the cause of peace and harmony with needy people can stimulate motivation. Moreover, addressing misconduct and sexual exploitation cases are vital for upholding the mission's legitimacy.

- **Training**

In pre deployment training, attention must be given to the conditions that make the use of force in UNPKOs legitimate, such as legality, consent, and the protection of vulnerable populations. Setting clear goals, providing growth opportunities, and fostering a supportive culture can enhance motivation. The preparation level must be tested periodically. The training package can also include lead roles by leaders, effective communication, adaptation to changing environment or weather, decentralised command, and decision making.

- **Stimulating Intrinsic Motivation**

Intrinsic motivation can be enhanced by fostering autonomy, providing achievable challenges, and developing belongingness. Purpose, and meaning of deeds must match the views of individuals. Providing positive work environment empowerment, support by the institution and recognising initiative can also develop intrinsic motivation.

- **Pride in Humanitarian Work**

Vision of UN for a peaceful world is a powerful source of motivation for peacekeepers. Empathy towards vulnerable foreign nationals reinforces motivations. Moreover, from religious point of view issues like saving lives, alleviating sufferings, and upholding human dignity amid crises are rewarding activities. Moreover, cultivating a cosmopolitan approach like universal concern for the welfare of others can strengthen a peacekeeper's empathy for helpless populations.

- **Stress Management**

Focus on healthy habits, mind-set shifts, and effective time management can be some effective means. Supportive attitudes of family towards peacekeepers can be very vital. Stress management helps employees feel more confident and motivated, boosts engagement, increases job satisfaction, and reduces absenteeism.

- **Organisational Factors**

All the stakeholders should work in harmony to achieve a common goal for the sake of humanity. Clear and effective direction of leaders can instil confidence and motivation among followers. Mission mandates must be achievable and not ambiguous.

Conclusion

Motivation leads to increased engagement, heightened performance, improved persistence, deeper learning, and positive wellbeing. Numerous famous motivation theories explore what drives people to work toward goals. Human needs, power, empathy and affiliation are some general components. For UN peacekeepers, motivation stems from a complex mix of organisational ideals, individual beliefs, and tangible support from their country. The UN's mission provides a moral and legitimate framework for peacekeepers. The daily reality of often dangerous and mundane tasks requires a combination of duty, training, leadership, and a sense of making a real difference. There are numerous different causes that shape the decisions of peacekeepers to participate in peacekeeping missions. The soldiers need some intrinsic and extrinsic driving forces to join the peacekeeping force. Protecting civilians involves a legal and moral obligation under international law. Besides, unit cohesion and legitimacy of their role serves as motivational tool. Confidence on armaments, leadership, contribution for humanity, national pride, and monetary benefits are some other motivational facts in PKOs.

UN Security Council resolution 2518 of 2020 found that national imposed caveats, poor military leadership, and absence of preparedness to act assertively are among the root causes affecting

peacekeepers motivation. Some other notable challenging factors are righteousness, physical and mental stress, mandate complexity, unpredictable risks, budget reduction, and capability gaps. Morale endurance of individual, effective leadership, and conducive environment are must to address these challenges. Legitimacy, training, Stimulating Intrinsic Motivation, taking pride in humanitarian work, and stress management can increase the motivation of peacekeepers. Training package can include lead roles by leaders, effective communication, adaptation to changing environment or weather, decentralised command, and decision making to enhance motivation of Bangladeshi Peacekeepers. Peacekeepers motivation must be consistent enough to survive the long absence from family and odd situation. Nobility feeling in humanitarian work, adaptation to adverse weather, exposure to multinational environment, and feeling of competence can lead to a new perspective of life. For maintaining a dominant role in UNPKOs, Bangladeshi Peacekeepers must remain motivated to achieve mandate of UN missions.

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EVOLVING CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY PEACE OPERATIONS: STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES AND RESPONSE OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH

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Abstract

The landscape of contemporary United Nations (UN) peace operations has become increasingly complex. Expanding mandates, rising asymmetric threats and declining political consensus now intersect with shrinking budgets and troop cuts. In October 2025, the UN announced that almost one-quarter of peacekeepers across nine missions would be repatriated because of financial shortfalls and uncertainty over future funding from major donors, notably the United States. This decision reflects a systemic imbalance between expectations and resources in global peace operations. The article analyses these emerging challenges and their implications for mandate execution, force protection, and institutional credibility. It explores how resource contraction, political fragmentation and hybrid conflict environments affect mission effectiveness. The second part examines Bangladesh's adaptive strategies as one of the top troop-contributing countries. The study concludes with strategic recommendations for Bangladesh to maintain leadership in the Blue Helmet community through diplomacy, capability development, and cost-efficient mission readiness.

Keywords: Peace Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping, Bangladesh Armed Forces, Strategic Adaptation, Global Security.

Introduction

Peace operations have remained as one of the United Nations' (UN) most visible instruments for maintaining international peace and security since 1948. From the deployment of the first UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East to recent missions such as MINUSMA and UNMISS, peacekeeping has evolved from static observation to multidimensional engagement integrating military, police and civilian components. Modern operational environment is far more volatile. Most missions are now deployed in intra-state conflicts characterised by political fragility, terrorism, and humanitarian crises.¹ The UN faces unprecedented strain as host-nation consent erodes and the mandates grow increasingly ambitious.²

UN officials confirmed in early October 2025 that approximately 15% of global peacekeeping troops, police and civilian staff would be downsized in the coming months due to lack of funds.³

¹ Jean-Pierre Lacroix, "Peacekeeping: Current Challenges Explained," UN LOPS Interview, 2023.


² Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), "Old and New Challenges in UN Peacekeeping," Research Report, 2023.

³ The Business Standard, 'Fund shortfall forces major cuts to UN peacekeeping missions,' 19 October 2025.

This budget cut not only threatens operational sustainability but also forces a recalibration of priorities. Various UN Missions in Africa, such as MONUSCO, UNMISS and UNISFA are likely to be affected. The budget cut highlights the structural fragility of UN peacekeeping financing, heavily reliant on assessed contributions and voluntary payments. Over the last decade, the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) of UN HQ has faced demands for greater efficiency, accountability and rapid deployment. Yet its missions continue to operate under divergent political expectations from the Security Council’s permanent members. The resulting inconsistency has created ‘crisis of relevance,’ where peace operations struggle to reconcile tactical realities with strategic intent.⁴

Bangladesh, being a committed member of the UN since 1974, stands at a critical juncture in this evolution. As one of the largest troop-contributing countries (TCC), Bangladesh’s reputation rests on professionalism, discipline and impartiality. Over 200,000 Bangladeshi personnel have served in 55 missions worldwide. However, the new era of peace operations demands adaptation to fiscal pressure, technological modernisation and hybrid threats. This paper at first traces the evolution of global peace operations and outlines their contemporary realities. Then after, the major operational, political and fiscal challenges undermining mission effectiveness are identified. Finally, the paper analyses Bangladesh’s role, achievements and vulnerabilities as a leading TCC, followed by policy recommendations and strategic pathways for adaptation.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework – Interplay of Global Challenges in Peace Operations



Source: Author’s Conceptual Synthesis Based on Content Analysis

⁴ Trends Research and Advisory, “Assessing Past UN Peacekeeping: Lessons for Future Missions,” 2024.

Global Operational Landscape: Evolution and Contemporary Realities

United Nations (UN) peace operations have evolved through several distinct phases. From 1948 to 1988 the first period manifested traditional peacekeeping which was primarily designed to monitor ceasefires and buffer zones in different conflict zones.⁵ These peacekeeping missions were lightly armed and authorised under Chapter VI of UN Charter. The second phase of the peace operations emerged after the cold war era. During this period, the intra-state conflicts replaced the inter-state wars, and the peacekeeping missions became multidimensional, integrating political, humanitarian and security elements. Peacekeeping missions like UNTAG in Namibia and ONUSAL in El Salvador marked a significant turn towards the nation-building and electoral support.⁶ The third and present period is characterised by robust peacekeeping, hybrid peace missions and emphasised protection of civilians. Recent peace operations under Chapter VII, such as MINUSMA, MONUSCO and UNMISS illustrate how peacekeepers now face asymmetric warfare and violent extremism.⁷ The expansion of mandates without proportional resources has transformed peace operations from monitoring to conflict management under fire.

Table 1: Historical Evolution of UN Peace Operations

Phase	Period	Core Characteristic	Typical Missions	Legal Basis
I Traditional	1948 - 1988	Ceasefire monitoring, buffer deployment	UNTSO, UNEF I, UNDOF	Chapter VI
II Multidimensional	1989 - 2000	State-building, DDR, electoral supervision	UNTAG, ONUSAL, UNAMIR	Chapter VI / VII
III Robust / Hybrid	2001 - Present	POC, stabilisation, counter-asymmetric threats	MONUSCO, MINUSMA, UNMISS	Chapter VII

Source: Author's Compilation Based on Content Analysis

Present Global Context

The post-COVID decade has witnessed simultaneous crises: armed conflict, climate stress and economic fragility, that have strained both TCCs and donor nations. There are currently fifteen UN peace operations worldwide with about 68,000 uniformed personnel and 17,000 civilian staff. Africa hosts more than 75 percent of these deployments.⁸ Table 2 illustrates the regional distribution of ongoing missions.

⁵ UN Peacekeeping Factsheet, Department of Peace Operations, New York (2023).

⁶ Eide, E. & Brahimi, L., The Future of Peacekeeping: New Models and Capabilities, UN Policy Paper (2021).

⁷ Modern Diplomacy, Challenges Faced by UN Peacekeepers, 2024.

⁸ Trends Research and Advisory, Assessing Past UN Peacekeeping, 2024.

Table 2: Geographic Distribution of UN Peace Operations (2024)

Continent/Area	Approximate Percentage of UNPO
Africa	75%
Middle East	17%
Europe/Asia/Pacific	8%

Source: UN Peacekeeping Factsheet, 2024

Peace operations now confront overlapping mandates: stabilisation, counter-terrorism support, climate resilience and protection of civilians. The multiplicity of objectives often creates confusion in the chain of command and diffuses accountability. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, recently noted that missions are ‘being asked to do more with less amid declining trust and widening divisions.’ This observation underscores the tension between expectations and feasibility, a dilemma at the heart of the present peacekeeping model. The cumulative effect has been mission fatigue, uneven performance, and growing scepticism from both host states and donor governments.⁹

Emerging Operational Realities

Shift from Inter-State to Intra-State Conflicts. Contemporary missions operate mainly within collapsed or fragile states where political institutions are contested. This has made consent fluid and volatile.¹⁰ Peacekeepers face direct confrontation with armed groups, militias, and violent extremists rather than state armies.

Rise of Asymmetric and Hybrid Threats. Various miscreant groups affiliate in the Sahel employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs), drones and cyber propaganda. Due to their lack of adequate counter-IED or intelligence knowledge and capability, UN peacekeepers have suffered casualties in different missions.¹¹ MINUSMA recorded more than 300 attacks against peacekeepers in 2023.

Challenges in Technological Era. Several technological tools like digital surveillance, social media exploitation, misinformation and disinformation campaigns target both peacekeepers and locals of any specific area. Though technology offers number of tools for situational awareness, it also presents vulnerabilities in data protection and operational confidentiality for the peacekeepers deployed on ground.

⁹ The UN Security Council Report, Briefing on UN Peace Operations, July 2025.

¹⁰ DIIS, Old and New Challenges in the UN Peacekeeping Missions, 2023.

¹¹ UN Cruz Report, Improving Security of Peacekeepers, 2017.

Lack of Political Harmony. Sometimes, divisions within the UN Security Council hinder the timely renewal of UN mission mandates. This delay has made several peace missions like MONUSCO, MINURSO stagnate.¹² The closure of MINUSMA in 2023 has demonstrated how non-consent of host country can suddenly terminate a long-standing UN peacekeeping mission.

Budget Cut for UN Missions. Expected budgetary contributions from number of key donors of UN peacekeeping missions were not received by the UN in recent years. Thereby, in 2025, UN had to plan to repatriate 25% of global peacekeepers due to extreme fund crisis.

Rise of Regional and Ad Hoc Coalitions. African and multinational arrangements (e.g., ECOWAS, AU Mission in Somalia) increasingly complement or substitute UN deployments. Though this is well accepted in the region, this concept poses questions of interoperability and neutral mandate implementation.

Table 3: Comparison of UN and Regional Peace Operations

Parameter	UN Missions	Regional / Hybrid Missions
Legal Authority	UN Security Council Mandate	Regional Charters / Bilateral MOUs
Funding Source	Assessed Contributions (193 Members)	Voluntary or Regional Donors
Average Force Size	5,000 - 12,000	1,500 - 8,000
Accountability	UNDPO & General Assembly	Regional Bodies / Host State
Typical Examples	MONUSCO, UNMISS	AMISOM, MNJTF, G5 Sahel

Source: Author's Compilation from UN and AU Reports

Declining Trust and Local Perception. Misinformation and unmet expectations have generated public frustration in many host countries. Incidents of protests against UN missions in Mali, DR Congo and Haiti demonstrate a shrinking trust deficit between local communities and peacekeepers.¹³

Gender Representation and Cultural Sensitivity. Despite number of efforts, women constitute less than 10% of deployed military peacekeepers. Shortfalls like cultural barriers, operational isolation and limited leadership opportunities affect both community engagement and mission legitimacy.¹⁴

¹² Bures, O., "Wanted: A Mid-Range Theory of Peacekeeping," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2007).

¹³ UN News Service, "Protests against Peacekeepers in DRC Leave Fatalities," 31 July 2022.

¹⁴ BIPSOT Journal, 9th Issue (2024), "Executing Gender Mainstreaming in UN Peace Operations," pp. 29–34.

Table 4: Gender Composition in UN Peace Operations

Component	Male	Female	% Female
Military	58,000	5,700	9.0 %
Police	6,200	1,100	15.1 %
Civilians	10,200	6,600	39.3 %

Source: UN Gender Parity Strategy Update

The cumulative outcome of these developments is a global peacekeeping system at crossroads. Mandates continue to expand, but resources, legitimacy and consent have contracted. This divergence explains the growing debate on whether peacekeeping should be reformed, regionalised, or re-imagined through lighter, technology-enabled models.

Evolving Challenges in Contemporary UN Peace Operations

Peace operations confront a number of interlinked challenges in recent days. These challenges test their legitimacy and operational effectiveness on ground. Every challenge underlines the another and creates a cycle of overstretched mandates, fund crisis and eroding political trust. Subsequent subsections will highlight the significant concerns shaping peace operations in present days.

The Mandate–Resource Gap. Modern peace operations have moved far beyond their traditional roles of truce supervision and buffer deployment. These are now tasked with complex objectives: protection of civilians, counter-terrorism support, governance assistance, humanitarian relief and post-conflict reconstruction.¹⁵ These mandates require intelligence networks, logistics and high-end technology that many UN missions lack. A serious imbalance between ambition and capability has emerged. In October 2025, the UN confirmed that approximately 15 percent of peacekeepers and police would be repatriated because of financial constraints. Following table shows the continuing budget contraction. Delayed reimbursement to TCCs and reduced operational logistics now affect morale and readiness. The gap between mandate and means is therefore both financial and psychological.

Table 5: Decline in UN Peacekeeping Budget (2015 – 2024)

Fiscal Year	Budget (USD Billion)	% Change from 2015
2015 - 16	8.7	-
2018 - 19	6.8	-22 %
2020 - 21	5.8	-33 %
2023 - 24	5.2	-40 %
2024 - 25 (proj.)	≈ 4.9	-43 %

Source: UN Budget Division Report

¹⁵ United Nations, Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) Fact Sheet Challenges, New York (2023).

Asymmetric and Hybrid Threats. UN peacekeepers increasingly face non-state actors using insurgent and terrorist tactics. Widespread use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), armed drones and ambushes has transformed the UN peace operations area to battlefield.¹⁶ Before its closure, in 2023, MINUSMA alone reported more than 300 attacks on UN convoys and bases. Hybrid threats including the physical violence, misinformation and disinformation etc further complicate the peace operations on ground. Media propaganda depicts peacekeeping personnel as partisan forces, eroding the trust of the locals and exposing them to possible mob violence regularly.

Political Fragmentation and Erosion of Consent. Peacekeeping rests on consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence. These principles are now under strain.¹⁷ Host nations often blame UN peace missions of interference, while factions refuse to cooperate. Recent closure of MINUSMA and local protests against MONUSCO reflect this crisis of consent. At the same time, mandate renewals and decisions of fundings are often delayed due to the divisions among permanent members of the UN Security Council. Such division of the key decision makers displays the broader weakening of multilateralism and impedes unified decision and strategic direction.

Dilemmas in Protection of Civilians (POC). Protecting civilians is the moral centre of UN peacekeeping yet remains its hardest task. Missions must act decisively without crossing into combat operations. Limited troop density, vast terrain, and poor intelligence restrict their ability to respond. In Mali and the Central African Republic, missions were criticised both for excessive caution and for collateral damage.

Technological and Capacity Gaps. Digital transformation remains uneven. Only a few UN Mission contingents possess modern C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) systems.¹⁸ A few UN peacekeeping contingents still rely on manual reporting and obsolete communication. Cyber threats are growing. In 2023, two peacekeeping missions experienced unauthorised access to mission databases. Training in cyber-security and digital literacy is therefore a strategic necessity, not a luxury.

Gender Representation and Human Factors. Participation of female strengthen operational legitimacy and community engagement, yet they form less than 10% of uniformed peacekeepers. Despite Bangladesh's notable progress in deploying female officers and troops, many UN missions still lack adequate facilities and mentoring structures. Prolonged deployments and exposure to violence create psychological strain. This kind of human dimension issues need to be addressed to maintain high operational morale.

¹⁶ Cruz, C., Improving Security of UN Peacekeepers, UN HQ (2017).

¹⁷ Brahimi Panel Report, Comprehensive Review of Peace Operations, UN (2000).

¹⁸ UN Digital Transformation Strategy for Peace Operations, 2023.

Fiscal Retrenchment and Donor Fatigue. The funding crisis is both numerical and political. A few major donors now shoulder most assessed contributions, giving them leverage over mission priorities.¹⁹ Fiscal caution in those capitals directly affects troop rotation, logistics, and welfare. Sustainable alternatives, such as regional cost-sharing or blended financing are being discussed but not yet institutionalised.

Table 6: Interlocking Challenges in Contemporary Peace Operations

Dimension	Principal Issue	Operational Effect
Mandate	Over-expansion	Diluted focus, mission fatigue
Security	Asymmetric attacks	High casualties, defensive posture
Politics	Fragmented consent	Reduced legitimacy
Technology	Unequal capacity	Situational blindness
Finance	Donor fatigue	Force reduction
Human	Stress and low morale	Decline in performance

Source: Compiled by Author from UN DPO and Open Sources

The convergence of these problems marks a critical juncture for global peacekeeping. UN missions are under simultaneous pressure of *resources*, *relevance*, and *reputation*. Bangladesh, being one of the top TCC, needs to implement adaptive training, innovative logistics and effective diplomacy to preserve leadership in the evolving peacekeeping landscape.

Strategic Imperatives for Effective Peace Operations

The cumulative challenges described earlier reveal that UN peace operations must reform to remain relevant, credible, and sustainable. Strategic change is required in four key domains: *political realism*, *partnership building*, *technological innovation* and *personnel development*. Each domain influences the success of missions and shapes the response options for Bangladesh as a leading troop-contributing country.


Political Realism and Mandate Rationalisation. First imperative for effective peace operations is to match ambition with achievable outcomes. Many mandates are drafted in New York but implemented in fragile states with little infrastructure.²⁰ Unrealistic expectations, such as stabilising entire regions with limited forces erode credibility. The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) urged the Security Council to authorise ‘clear, focused and sequenced’ mandates rather than open-ended lists of tasks. Peace operations must also be linked to a viable political process.

¹⁹ Trends Research and Advisory, Assessing Past UN Peacekeeping, 2024.

²⁰ United Nations, High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report, New York (2015).

Strengthening Partnerships and Regional Cooperation. Cooperation is another imperative for effective UN peace operations. Regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS now assume greater responsibility for initial stabilisation efforts. UN needs to formalise burden sharing measures with these organisations and develop an effective funding mechanisms for regional peace missions. Partnerships should extend beyond countries and include civil society, humanitarian agencies and local government and non-government organisations. Commitment with regional agencies in Africa and Asia is likely to diversify deployments and enhance effective peacebuilding diplomacy for Bangladesh. Figure 2 summarises the emerging cooperative framework.

Figure 2: Integrated Partnership Model in Modern Peace Operations



Source: Author's Adaptation from UN–AU Framework on Enhanced Partnership

Leveraging Technology and Peacekeeping Intelligence. Third imperative concern is innovation. Digital tools now shape the tempo of operations on ground. Real-time situational awareness through unmanned aerial systems, satellite imagery and integrated data networks can reduce risks to peacekeepers.²¹ UN has introduced *Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy* and *Digital Transformation Strategy* to promote data-driven decisions. Bangladesh has already partnered with the Netherlands to host the *United Nations Military Peacekeeping Intelligence (UNMPKI) Course* at Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training (BIPSOT), an initiative that aligns with this global shift.²² Table 7 shows how selected technologies enhance mission effectiveness.

²¹ United Nations, Digital Transformation Strategy for Peace Operations, 2023.

²² BIPSOT Journal, 9th Issue (2024): “Netherlands–BIPSOT Collaboration: A Time-Worthy Partnership in Peacekeeping Intelligence Training.”

Table 7: Emerging Technologies in Peace Operations

Capability	Operational Function	Strategic Impact
UAVs / Drones	Area surveillance, convoy escort	Early warning, reduced ambushes
C4ISR Networks	Real-time command and control	Faster decision-making
GIS Mapping	Terrain and population data	Improved planning accuracy
Data Analytics	Pattern recognition	Predictive security management

Source: UN Digital Transformation Strategy, 2023

Enhancing Safety, Training, and Welfare. Peacekeepers remain the human centre of operations. The *Cruz Report* (2017) concluded that inadequate training and poor situational awareness caused most fatalities.²³ Regular mission-specific pre-deployment exercises such as Computer Assisted Exercises (CAX) and field simulations are now indispensable. BIPSOT's *UNPOST* system represents a model of such innovation. Attention must also shift to mental resilience. Continuous counselling, decompression programmes, and family-support mechanisms strengthen morale. Ensuring gender-responsive facilities encourages broader participation by female officers and staff. Welfare is not a luxury, it is an operational multiplier that enhances focus, discipline, and ethical conduct.

Financial and Administrative Reforms. Finally, peace operations require predictable and transparent funding. Excessive reliance on a few donor countries makes the UN peace missions vulnerable to political fluctuations.²⁴ Varied funding sources combining assessed contributions, voluntary monetary funds and regional co-funding may spread risk. Simplified procurement procedures, digital audit trails and timely reimbursements would restore trust between the UN Secretariat and TCCs. Bangladesh, with its record of efficiency, can advocate such reforms through the Fifth Committee and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping.

Bangladesh's Role, Achievements and Emerging Challenges

Bangladesh has established itself as a cornerstone of UN peace operations. Since 1988, more than 200,000 Bangladeshi personnel have served in 55 UN Peacekeeping missions across Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Bangladeshi peacekeeping contingents are well reputed for their high standard of professionalism, discipline and cultural sensitivity. These attributes have positioned Bangladesh not only as one of the largest TCC, but also as a trusted voice for reform within the peacekeeping system.

²³ Cruz, C., *Improving Security of UN Peacekeepers*, UN HQ (2017).

²⁴ Security Council Report, *Briefing on UN Peace Operations*, July 2025.

Bangladesh in UN Peacekeeping: A Global Profile. Bangladesh’s journey began with the deployment of military observers to UNIMOG in Iraq–Iran. Over the decades, its participation expanded to include infantry battalions, engineers, aviation units, medical teams, and police contingents.²⁵ Table 8 highlights the present strength of Bangladeshi deployments in 2025.

Table 8: State of Bangladeshi Peacekeepers (31 August 2025)

Experts on Mission	SOs	Troops	Formed Police Unit	Individual Police	Total
52	116	5,293	198	37	5,696

Source: UN Peacekeeping Website (<https://peacekeeping.un.org>)

Bangladesh’s consistent performance in the UN peace operations has earned global respect. It received multiple UN medals and Force Commander’s Commendations for operational excellence and community outreach throughout various missions.²⁶ Its peacekeepers have also contributed to local development, building roads, bridges, schools and health facilities in various fragile states across the globe.

Strategic Strengths. Bangladesh has got an added advantage of its human capital and organisational readiness. Pre-deployment training at the *BIPSOT* ensures mission-specific preparation, cultural awareness and gender sensitivity. BIPSOT has evolved into a regional hub of excellence recognised by the UN and partner nations. The country’s civil–military synergy allows coherent national support for peacekeeping. The Armed Forces Division (AFD), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Mission to the UN coordinate policies on deployment, rotation and strategic communication. Another distinctive strength is Bangladesh’s commitment to gender equity. Female peacekeeping personal work as staff officers in headquarters, military observers and community outreach specialists. More than 370 Bangladeshi female peacekeepers were deployed in 2024, and reinforced Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda.

²⁵ UN Department of Peace Operations, Contributors to Peacekeeping Operations – Country Summary, 2025.

²⁶ BIPSOT Journal, 8th Issue (2023): “Bangladeshi Peacekeepers in the Desert of Mali Amidst COVID-19.”

Table 9: Selected Strengths of Bangladesh in Peacekeeping

Domain	Core Strength	Impact on Mission
Training	BIPSOT-certified integrated curriculum	Operational readiness, interoperability
Leadership	Experienced commanders and staff officers	Trust from UN HQ and field missions
Discipline	High compliance with UN Code of Conduct	Enhanced reputation
Gender Balance	Increasing female participation	Community confidence
Engineering Capacity	Rapid infrastructure support	Visibility and mandate fulfilment

Source: Author's Analysis from BIPSOT and UN DPO Data

Key Challenges for Bangladesh. Despite its success in UN peace operations, Bangladesh faces several emerging constraints shaped by the global environment:

Budget Reduction and Reimbursement Delays. UN decision to repatriate one-quarter of peacekeepers has financial implications.²⁷ Delayed reimbursements for troop budget and contingent-owned equipment (COE) place strain on national logistics.

Technology and Interoperability Gap. Bangladeshi peacekeeping contingents deployed on ground still rely on age-old command system while peace missions are increasingly depending on digital platforms. Thereby, Bangladeshi peacekeepers need enhanced training in geospatial analytics, UAV surveillance and data fusion to cope with the evolving peacekeeping operations demands.

Inadequate Presence in Strategic Leadership Roles. Although Bangladesh provides large troop numbers in UN peace operations, its representation in senior UN posts, such as Force Commander, SRSG or DPO divisions remains modest. Effective and timely diplomatic lobbying and nomination of qualified candidates of Bangladesh may address this imbalance.

Language and Cultural Barriers. UN peacekeeping missions in Francophone Africa expect proficiency in French. While language training of Bangladeshi peacekeepers has improved, further organisational emphasis would strengthen field effectiveness.

Emotional Resistance and Wellbeing. Extended deployments of the peacekeepers in difficult terrain and hardened environments create mental stress. Inclusive welfare packages, decompression counselling, and family-support networks are increasingly important.²⁸

²⁷ Reuters, "UN to Cut a Quarter of Peacekeepers in Nine Missions," 8 October 2024.

²⁸ UN DPO, Well-Being and Mental Health in Peace Operations, 2023.

Opportunities and Strategic Responses. Bangladesh can convert above challenges into opportunities through policy innovation and institutional responsiveness. Bangladesh's continued success will depend on strategic foresight. By combining professionalism with innovation, it can preserve its position as a global leader in peacekeeping and a credible advocate for reform under the Blue Helmet. Following paragraphs highlights the scopes those Bangladesh may exploit in subsequent days.

Diplomacy and Policy Advocacy. Efficient and active participation in the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and Fifth Committee (Budget) enables Bangladesh to influence policy on mandate design, resource allocation and reimbursement.²⁹

Training Innovation. BIPSOT should expand simulation-based learning through the *UNPOST* system and integrate artificial intelligence for risk analysis. Partnerships with technologically advanced nations could modernise curricula.

Regional and Bilateral Cooperation. Various joint exercises like Tiger Lightning with the United States and cooperations with Netherlands in peace operations intelligence portrays Bangladesh's effective adaptability. These joint efforts enhance interoperability and global acceptability.³⁰

Growing Gender Leadership. Based on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) framework, Bangladesh needs to increase the female representation in higher command and staff appointments. This will strengthen its moral and operational leadership within UN system.

Strengthening Research and Doctrine Development. BIPSOT's research cell can contribute analytical inputs to UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) policy forums, ensuring that field experience from Bangladeshi contingents informs global best practice.

²⁹ UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), 2024.

³⁰ BIPSOT Journal, 9th Issue (2024): "Exercise Tiger Lightning 2024 – Strengthening Bilateral Cooperation."

Figure 3: Strategic Pathways for Bangladesh in Future Peace Operations



Source: Author's Conceptual Synthesis Based on Content Analysis

Ways Forward for Bangladesh

Bangladesh stands at a crossroads. Global peace operations are transforming under the pressure of fiscal constraints, political fragmentation, and asymmetric threats. To preserve its leadership role, Bangladesh must combine innovation with diplomacy. The following measures outline a comprehensive pathway for sustaining relevance and effectiveness in future UN peace operations.

Recommendations

Effective Adaptation and Doctrinal Modernisation. Bangladesh should modify its national peacekeeping policy to align with emerging UN priorities such as the *Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P+)* agenda.³¹ These policies and doctrines need to integrate hybrid threat response, data-driven intelligence and community engagement activities. An annual strategic review involving the AFD, MoFA and BIPSOT could ensure coherence between training, diplomacy and deployment policy.

Operational Capability Enhancement. Contemporary UN peace missions need speed, flexibility and interoperability. Therefore, Bangladesh may establish a *Rapid Deployment Task*

³¹ United Nations, Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P+): Progress Report, New York (2024).

Group composed of pre-trained troops, engineers and medical teams ready for immediate UN deployment at any corner of the world. Investment in air mobility, satellite communication and advanced logistics will also strengthen Bangladesh's self-sustainment and reduce reliance on host-nation support.

Enhancing Digital Transformation. Effective integration of technological tools will define the future UN peace operations. Bangladesh should gradually integrate C4ISR tools, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and UAV based surveillance in pre-deployment training. Partnership with friendly foreign countries will facilitate technology transfer and knowledge sharing.

Economic Diplomacy and Reimbursement Reform. Bangladesh, as one of the top TCC, should continue to raise the issue of delayed reimbursement through the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly. A joint platform of major TCCs (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Rwanda, and Nepal) could collectively advocate predictable funding and transparent COE assessment procedures.³² This approach would protect the interests of developing TCCs that provide most of the manpower but receive limited financial leverage.

Expanding Peacebuilding and Policy Engagement. Peacekeeping must increasingly connect with peacebuilding. Bangladesh can enhance its post-conflict engagement through development projects, election monitoring, and institution-building missions. Officers having civil-military expertise and experience may be employed in the UN Peacebuilding Commission and Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs in UN HQ. It will enhance the diplomatic footprint of Bangladesh in the peace operations field.

Gender Leadership and Human Security Focus. Bangladesh should sustain its role as a champion of gender inclusion. BIPSOT may create a *Women Peacekeepers' Leadership Programme* to prepare female officers for operational command and staff positions. Emphasising human security, community trust, and conflict-sensitive outreach will further enhance Bangladesh's global image as a people-centric peacekeeping nation.

Organisational Innovation and Training Reform. BIPSOT is the key peacekeeping institution not only within Bangladesh but also within the region. Following steps may be taken/continued to enhance its global reputation:

- **Tech-Enabled Training Module:** Integration of computer assisted exercises (CAX), virtual reality, Artificial Intelligence driven threat simulations into all training modules will definitely enhance the capability of peacekeepers of Bangladesh.

³² UN General Assembly, Fifth Committee Deliberations on Peacekeeping Budgets, 2024.

- **Research and Policy Interface:** Bangladesh should strengthen BIPSOT's Research and Development Cell to publish policy briefs for UN DPO and think-tanks.
- **Regional Training Collaboration:** Bangladesh may formalise partnerships with regional centres such as KAIPTC (Ghana) and EASF (Kenya) to exchange curricula and instructors.
- **Post-Mission Evaluation Cell:** A debriefing cell should be established to capture lessons from returning contingents for continuous institutional learning.³³

Strategic Vision. Bangladesh's future contribution should move from *quantitative leadership* to *qualitative influence*. This transformation requires following guiding principles:

- **Professional Excellence:** Maintain discipline, innovation and operational integrity as core values.
- **Diplomatic Engagement:** Use peace operations as an instrument of strategic communication to promote Bangladesh's soft power.³⁴
- **Self-Reliance.** Bangladesh needs to develop mission self-sufficiency in logistics, engineering and medical services to reduce external dependency and render more for the global peace.

Reputation of Bangladesh in the UN peace operations has been built on high standard of discipline, professionalism, courage and empathy. The coming decade will test these qualities against a backdrop of uncertainty and reform. By embracing innovation and policy foresight, Bangladesh can transform challenges into opportunity maintaining its legacy as the 'Voice for the Global South.'

Conclusions

The evolution of the UN peace operations reflects both achievement and anxiety. From the early observation missions of the late 1940s to the complex multidimensional deployments of the present era, peacekeeping has remained a vital instrument of collective security. Yet UN peace operations now face a crisis of purpose, resources and legitimacy. Global context is changing. Asymmetric threats, diminishing political consensus, opposing from the locals and expanding mandates have redefined the limits of objectives of the peacekeepers. Recent repatriation decision

³³ BIPSOT Journal, 8th Issue (2023): "Institutional Learning from Returning Peacekeepers."

³⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh Foreign Policy and Global Peace Operations, 2023.

of 25% UN peacekeepers underlines the growing economic fragility.³⁵ The expanding gap between political ambition and operational capability compromises not only the peace mission's effectiveness but also the credibility of the UN. Bangladesh. As the one of the largest troop-contributing country, Bangladesh has demonstrated an unbroken record of professionalism, discipline and commitment to global peace. Its soldiers, engineers and medical teams have worked with courage in some of the most dangerous environments from the deserts of Mali to the jungles of Congo.

Maintaining the leading position in UN peacekeeping operations requires effective adaptation. The future of peace operations will depend less on numbers and more on quality, technology, and strategic foresight. Bangladesh must, therefore, transform its peacekeeping posture along three lines. Primarily, innovation and modernisation through integration of digital systems, modern simulation and hybrid threat readiness to enhance operational capability. Furthermore, policy and diplomacy through active advocacy within the UN to ensure transparency in funding, clarity of mandates and equitable representation in various higher decision-making positions. Finally, human-centred leadership through sustained emphasis on welfare, mental resilience and gender inclusivity among peacekeepers. The reputation of Bangladesh in UN peace operations has been earned through sacrifice, high standard of discipline and integrity. The coming decade will demand an even deeper fusion of professionalism, adaptability, and strategic vision. If these imperatives are pursued consistently, Bangladesh will continue to serve as both a shield of global peace and a model for developing nations aspiring to contribute responsibly to the world's collective security.

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³⁵ Reuters, "UN to Cut a Quarter of Peacekeepers in Nine Missions," 8 October 2024.

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Unveiling Strategic Intelligence of UNPOL: Addressing Challenges and Strengthening Resilience in Peace Operations

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Abstract

The United Nations Police (UNPOL) plays a vital role in maintaining peace and security in conflict related areas worldwide. In the dynamic landscape of twenty-first century, peacekeeping challenges including but not limited to political instability, strategic intelligence capabilities of UNPOL are increasingly crucial. Accordingly, this study aims to uncover UNPOL's strategic intelligence operations and assess their effectiveness in addressing peacekeeping challenges. Through a comprehensive literature review and analysis of case studies, supported by interviews with UNPOL personnel and experts, the study reveals pivotal role of UNPOL proactively identifying threats, adapting operational strategies, and strengthening coordinations among stakeholders. As such, bolstering the efficacy of peacekeeping efforts, integrating strategic intelligence into operations and community enhancing resilience can enable them to withstand and recuperate from disruptions. However, it is paramount in UNPOL's mission to address contemporary peacekeeping challenges and fortify conflict-affected regions' capacity for sustainable peace and security. Consequently, continued investment in capacity-building initiatives is essential for UNPOL's effectiveness in twenty-first-century peacekeeping process.

Keywords: United Nations Police (UNPOL), Strategic Intelligence, Peacekeeping Challenges, Resilience Building, Peacekeeping Operations.

Introduction

The police of the United Nations (UNPOL) is an important pillar of the peacekeeping due to its responsibility to ensure law and order in the dangerous locations. Speaking of peacekeeping and resilience, UNPOL encounter different contemporary challenges, which require application of strategic intelligence. As research shows, UN peacekeeping forces have been able to manage the conflicts and restore peace within a number of places (Sarjoon and Yusoff, 2019). Nevertheless, the assaults on peacekeepers, multifaceted instructions, and competing political desires are not the only problems that these missions face (Nordin et al., 2022). Based on this, the restraints on peace and security of war torn countries remain a concern to the world. New and challenging problems peculiar to UNPOL missions are the result of the tremendous alterations in peacekeeping that occurred in the twenty-first century. Moreover, protection mechanism has become more effective,

and the work to increase safety has been effective in the long term due to the perceivable decrease in the fatality rate of UN personnel. This is all in line with the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in 2015: missions must possess better data management and analysis capability to protect people and civilians (UN, 2017). Thus, the policy can be characterized as a need to ensure that every person is safer and more secure, as information about the situation and decision-making processes are improved.

In line with this, research has established that peaceoperations can be useful in minimizing the number of civilian killings and ensuring peace. Research has indicated that the greater the number of UN military and police sent to conflicts, the less violence will be meted out against civilians who have war-related issues and also the environment will be safer. Moreover, it has been found that in cases where the UN peacekeeping operations are provided with the right and straightforward mandates, they could significantly minimize the rate and scale of significant conflicts as well as save lives (Hegre et al. 2019). Some of the issues that peacekeeping operations have been exposed to over the recent years include crime, terrorism, political turmoil, and humanitarian disasters (Della et al. 2016). These existing daunting issues have been further aggravated by the emergence of non-state actors and increasingly global nature of conflicts (UN, 2008). In order to navigate these complex security environments appropriately, there is now a need to have UNPOL strategic intelligence services.

In addition, the concept of strategic intelligence, including the collection, analysis, and distribution of data to make decisions, has become a critical tool of peacekeeping efforts (Freriks, 2022). Following the past disasters, including the Srebrenica massacre, the United Nations has begun incorporating the gathering, and analysis of intelligence in peacekeeping operations (Carnegie and Carson, 2017). Although its expenditure is growing, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations cannot carry out the strategic information analysis, which is why more efficient intelligence measures are required.

In the end, the presence of obstacles does not eliminate the opportunities of growth and persistence of the peacekeeping deployments even though they have their challenges. There should be more studies and attention to provide peacekeepers with mental health before and after their deployments (Shigemura et al., 2016). With the shifting international order, UN peacekeeping missions might have to employ a principled adaptive method in order to adjust and not to lose their objectives. Moreover, it is essential to solve operational issues at present since the gap in confidence between peacekeeping missions is present (Coning, 2023). The needs of addressing the challenges that UNPOL encounters in the twenty-first century are strategic intelligence, cultural competence, the development of resilience, mental health assistance, and flexibility. Only in this way it will be possible to conduct peacekeeping operations in an efficient and sustainable way.

Literature Review

In the academic debate on the subject of peacekeeping and the United Nations Police (UNPOL), the evolution of strategies which have been used in the course of these actions is emphasized in a progressive manner. Since the beginning of peacekeeping operations, these operations have experienced significant changes whereby their focus has changed to encompass a wider range of roles and duties of ensuring civilian safety, peace-making, and institution-building as opposed to ceasefire monitoring and observation. Considering the emergence of transnational threats, complex security situations, intrastate conflicts and transnational threats, UNPOL has put more focus on capacity-building programs, rule of law programs and community-oriented policing to mitigate the causes of conflict and promote sustainable peace (Manuela, 2019).

Besides, the UN has to establish a legally and morally viable operation structure to regulate the intelligence operations to address these predicaments. This strategy must create openness and focus on human intelligence. An accurate authority structure and a safe mechanism of passing information could enhance peacekeeping intelligence. According to Ruggeri et al. (2012), intelligence resources could assist UNPOL cope with the current peacekeeping environment by establishing goals and disseminating the information to the executive leadership of the mission.

In addition, the networked governance, complex adaptive systems, and intelligence policing are the foundations of peacekeeping strategic intelligence. These models demonstrate the extent in which many factors influence the modern conflicts and the need to have flexible approaches to peacekeeping that incorporate intelligence analysis of community engagement and crime prevention. According to Bode and Karlsrud (2018), networked governance solutions require different players to cooperate and share knowledge in resolving complex security problems. Notwithstanding increased intelligence awareness in the context of peacekeeping, the UNPOL continues to experience an ethical concern such as the right to data protection and privacy rights in conflict zones (Nomikos, 2022).

Also, there are numerous measures by which UN peacekeeping missions are assessed. Stojek and Tir (2014) identified the capacity to avert civil warfare, adherence to liberal peacekeeping principles, and good intelligence system. The situation awareness, decision-making, and civilian and military safety are improved through information collection and incorporation in the peacekeeping operations (Duursma& Gledhill, 2019). UNPOL should be transparent and comprehensive in its intelligence to operate in the dynamic security context and solve the underlying causes of conflicts (Ruggeri et al., 2012). According to Bode and Karlsrud (2018), networked governance and intelligence policing may ensure that peacekeeping is more flexible to security threats.

Lastly, there are the UNPOL and peacekeeping intellectual issues that focus on the intelligence systems of the contemporary peacekeeping missions. To deal with the challenges and make war-

torn countries attain the long-term peace, UNPOL needs to create open operational systems, enforce ethics, and rely on people-centered intelligence. The combination of intelligence policing and networked governance theories would be useful in generating effective and timely peacekeeping strategies. UNPOL has to be available, cooperative, and considerate of human rights to be successful in the deployments of present-day peacekeeping though the intelligence is collected.

Research Design and Methodology

In order to explore strategic intelligence practice of UNPOL to meet the challenges of peace keeping and enhancing resilience in the twenty first century, we used secondary analysis to conduct this study. Certain secondary data that was related to the research were examined.

Data Collection

The primary data sources used in the course of this study were existing literature, reports, and documents concerning UNPOL, peacekeeping methods and application of intelligence in solving conflicts. To identify scholarly articles, policy papers, and official publications, comprehensive literature analysis was conducted in academic database, institutional repositories, and other organizational websites that contained the necessary information. Moreover, the facts concerning the peacekeeping activities, the strategic intelligence processes and case studies were collected, through the examination of reports of the United Nations, specialized bodies and nongovernmental organizations.

Data Analysis

Thematic analysis of the data collected was performed to determine the important themes, patterns, and trends of the strategic intelligence practices of UNPOL and how it affects peaceoperations. The main goal of the analysis was to obtain the information about the strategic use of intelligence by UNPOL, the way it was integrated into the decision-making process, and what implications it had on the effectiveness of the missions and strengthening of the resilience. Case studies and examples were analyzed to provide empirical evidence and serve as an example of strategic intelligence application in different peacekeeping situations.

Validity and Reliability

The high degree of methodological procedures that were applied to determine dependability and validity of the secondary analysis comprised the triangulation of data of different sources. The selected literature and documents were evaluated properly to determine their reliability, applicability, and accuracy. Additional steps were undertaken to reduce bias and strengthen results credibility such as cross-referencing as well as information validation.

Ethical Considerations

The ethical implications of the research process were taken into account through responsible use of already available data and taking care of confidential information. The original authors and sources were referred to, by properly applying the proper rules of attribution and citation. Moreover, ethical guidelines and principles of academic integrity were taken care of in order to ensure that the research was conducted ethically.

Limitations

This secondary analysis, despite such careful efforts to maintain rigour and accuracy, is in a way vulnerable to certain drawbacks. The possible drawbacks include the existing biases and viewpoints which could be observed in the selected literature and documents, and the likelihood of data gaps or incompatibilities. Moreover, the presence of the relevant sources and their accessibility and availability might limit the scope of the analysis.

Overall, it can be stated that a critical analysis of the strategic intelligence activities and its implications to peace operations and resilience building in the twenty-first century was facilitated by using secondary analysis. Using systematic data collection and analysis, this study was mainly aimed at generating meaningful results and come up with an academic contribution to the field of peace and security.

Result and Discussion

The current study is indispensable towards understanding strategic intelligence activity of UNPOL and assessing its effectiveness in overcoming peacekeeping challenges and enhancing resilience in the 21st century. Data have been analyzed using at least five of them, which was enough to make the study complete. All the themes play a vital and significant role. These themes include UNPOL in the International Peace and Security, Strategic Intelligence of UNPOL, Addressing Peacekeeping Challenges, Strengthening Resilience, Challenges and Future Directions.

UNPOL in International peace and security

The United Nations Police (UNPOL) is an important institution in the sphere of world peace and security, especially in countries influenced by conflict (Silva, 2019). The challenges UNPOL faces in protecting civilians in complex, violent scenarios underscore the organization's responsibility to maintain stability and protect the lives of vulnerable individuals. The UNSC assists in ending crises and enhancing peace, although it finds it difficult to convert violent reactions into stability. The UNSC should prevent and solve conflicts in order to avert the occurrence of civil wars, particularly self-determination wars (Beardsley et al. 2015). The UN

Security Council gets involved with parties and alters their objectives to prevent crises from turning into civil conflicts.

More so, relying on the mechanisms of intelligence-gathering which include liaison networks, information-sharing platforms, and analytical units, UNPOL can collect and assess a large volume of data sources, including technical surveillance, human intelligence, and open-source information (Manuela, 2019). As a result, by using the synthesis of information and evaluation of the context, UNPOL will be able to develop the comprehensive threat assessment, define areas they need to intervene in as a priority, and coordinate the measures of other peace keeping elements, authorities in the host country, and other international partners (By creating a balance between the intelligence focus and strategic goals, UNPOL ensures that the resources are distributed in the most efficient way, the operations are conducted with accuracy, and the risks are well managed (United Nations, 2008).

Moreover, the UNPOL is an instrument that cannot be ignored in the process of fostering peace and security in the world, through its active involvement in community policing, conflict resolution, and justice reform efforts. The role of UNPOL is now more than ever in the process of creating peaceful, inclusive, and resilient societies in the era of protracted and more complicated conflicts (Obuobi & Patrick, 2024). With the help of joint forces, creative and an unquenchable commitment to its purpose, UNPOL is ever gaining ground towards achieving long-term peace and security on an international scale.

Strategic Intelligence and UNPOL

The law enforcement in modern society is based on intelligence-led policing that utilizes data analysis to minimize crime (Summers & Rossmo, 2019). Intelligence analysis assists police in crime prevention, the destruction of criminal cells, and the enhancement of the safety of citizens. The strategic information assists UNPOL to enhance peacekeeping, safety of civilians and security (Rostami & Mondani, 2015). UNPOL employs strategic intelligence so as to identify dangers, track criminal networks, and formulate specific peace and security plans in conflict-related states.

Also, the UNPOL is able to synthesize and contextualize information to formulate detailed threat analyses, priority areas of intervention, and coordinate the response with the other peacekeeping elements, the host country authorities and international collaborators (Obuobi, 2024). UNPOL also applies strategic information in operational planning in order to enhance mission effectiveness. By aligning the intelligence priorities with the strategic goals, UNPOL guarantees efficient allocation of resources, precise operations, and risks. The impact of the peacekeeping police to the postwar violence makes them vital to the stability and security of the areas of conflict (Bara,

2020). The study of UN police operations can help policymakers better comprehend the role of peacekeeping troops in a post-conflict situation and enhance peacebuilding.

UNPOL in International Peace and Security

The United Nations Police (UNPOL) plays a crucial role in international peace and security, particularly in conflict-affected regions (Silva, 2019). The difficulties UNPOL confronts in safeguarding civilians in complex and violent situations emphasize the organization's duty in maintaining stability and protecting vulnerable people. The UNSC helps resolve crises and promote peace, but it struggles to turn violent responses into long-term stability. To avoid civil wars, especially self-determination wars, the UNSC must prevent and resolve conflicts (Beardsley et al. 2015). The UN Security Council interacts with parties and changes their goals to avoid crises from becoming civil conflicts.

Moreover, employing intelligence-gathering mechanisms such as liaison networks, information-sharing platforms, and analytical units, UNPOL amasses and evaluates an extensive array of data sources, including technical surveillance, human intelligence, and open-source information (Manuela, 2019). Through the process of synthesizing and contextualizing this information, UNPOL can formulate all-encompassing threat assessments, identify areas that require intervention as priorities, and coordinate responses alongside other peacekeeping components, authorities in the host country, and international partners (Obuobi & Patrick, 2024). In addition, to optimize the efficacy of missions, UNPOL incorporates strategic intelligence into its operational planning workflow. Through the establishment of congruence between intelligence priorities and strategic objectives, UNPOL guarantees the optimal allocation of resources, the execution of precise operations, and the effective management of risks (United Nations, 2008).

Furthermore, by actively participating in community policing, conflict resolution, and justice reform initiatives, UNPOL contributes to endeavors aimed at constructing societies that are resilient, inclusive, and accountable. Undertaking peacekeeping, post-conflict recovery, and conflict prevention, the UNPOL is an indispensable instrument in promoting global security and tranquillity. Through the observance of impartiality, neutrality, and human rights, UNPOL actively participates in the development of societies that are peaceful, inclusive, and resilient (Obuobi & Patrick, 2024). In an era of protracted and increasingly complex conflicts, UNPOL's role in fostering stability and constructing peace is more vital than ever. Employing cooperative efforts, inventive approaches, and an unwavering dedication to its objective, UNPOL consistently advances substantially in the direction of attaining enduring peace and security on an international level.

Strategic Intelligence and UNPOL

Modern law enforcement relies on intelligence-led policing, which uses data analysis to reduce crime effectively (Summers & Rossmo, 2019). Intelligence analysis helps police prevent crime, dismantle criminal networks, and improve public safety. Strategic information helps UNPOL improve peacekeeping, civilian safety, and security (Rostami & Mondani, 2015). UNPOL uses strategic intelligence to detect hazards, investigate criminal networks, and design targeted peace and security strategies in conflict-affected countries.

Additionally, UNPOL can synthesize and contextualize information to create comprehensive threat assessments, prioritize intervention areas, and coordinate responses with other peacekeeping components, host country authorities, and international partners (Obuobi, 2024). UNPOL also uses strategic information in operational planning to improve mission effectiveness. UNPOL ensures efficient resource allocation, accurate operations, and risk management by aligning intelligence priorities with strategic goals. Peacekeeping police are crucial to conflict-affected areas' stability and security due to their influence on postwar violence (Bara, 2020). Policymakers may better understand peacekeeping troops in post-conflict contexts and improve peacebuilding by examining UN police activities.

Table 1. *The Role of Strategic Intelligence in UNPOL*

Aspect	Description	Strategic Intelligence Issues	References
Definition and Significance	Strategic intelligence in peacekeeping involves gathering and evaluating information to enhance decision-making and situational awareness. It helps identify threats, assess risks, and proactively respond, providing UNPOL with critical insights to effectively anticipate and mitigate risks.	Lack of interoperability among intelligence systems, information overload, ensuring data accuracy and reliability	(Obuobi, 2024; United Nations, 2008)
Utilization by UNPOL	To assess risks, identify new issues, and modify tactics, UNPOL employs strategic intelligence. To create thorough threat assessments and coordinate responses with partners and peacekeeping components, UNPOL gathers and analyzes data from a variety of sources using tools like liaison networks and analytical units.	Balancing intelligence sharing with confidentiality concerns, cultural and language barriers in information exchange, maintaining trust with local informants	(Manuela, 2019)

Aspect	Description	Strategic Intelligence Issues	References
Integration into Operational Planning	Operational planning that incorporates strategic intelligence guarantees precise operations, optimal resource allocation, strategic objective alignment, and effective risk management. To address security concerns and foster local confidence, UNPOL uses intelligence-led police techniques that include capacity-building and community engagement.	Ensuring intelligence relevance to mission objectives, adapting to rapidly changing security environments, resource constraints in intelligence gathering and analysis	(United Nations, 2008)
Impact on Mission Achievements	The accomplishment of UNPOL's mandate has been greatly augmented by the application of strategic intelligence. It has aided in deterring violence, stopping illegal activity, and safeguarding people. Efforts to disband armed factions, curb illicit trade, and rehabilitate former combatants are also aided by strategic intelligence.	Managing information overload, ensuring timely dissemination of intelligence, addressing biases in intelligence analysis	(Obuobi, 2024;Manuela, 2019)
Source: Adapted by Author, 2024			

Thus, the introduction of strategic intelligence into the work of UNPOL has been a great success, which brought tangible benefits to the success of the missions and their effective overall efficiency. The examples of successful situations when UNPOL has prevented violent incidents, stopped criminal activities, and protected civilian populations can be found in the context of peacekeeping operations in the post-war areas and on the premises of the conflict (Obuobi,2024).To illustrate this, the use of intelligence capabilities has enabled UNPOL to support the efforts aimed at disarming armed groups, combating criminal activities, and successfully reintegrating former combatants into the social fabric (Manuela, 2019).

Meeting the Peacekeeping Challenges

UNPL is encountering numerous obstacles to its ability to maintain peace and security in the warring regions. UNPOL is supposed to deal with challenges that peacekeepers experience when reintegrating into society after deployment (Heinecken& Wilén, 2019). Challenges of coming back home, rejoining the family, and lack of military support might impose a serious impact on mental health of peacekeepers. This could hinder their future performance in their mission.

Alongside classical threats such as armed conflict and political instability, there exist new ones, such as terrorism, organized crime, and humanitarian crisis (Dellaet al., 2016).

In order to effectively address these issues, UNPOL relies on tactical intelligence to predict possible threats, calculate risks involved, and develop proactive response. Besides, through its intelligence operations, UNPOL is able to coordinate its efforts with host country authorities, other peacekeeping elements, detect the unstable areas, and set intervention priorities (Obuobi, 2024). In addition, through the application of community-oriented policing, UNPOL will be actively involved in the creation of the trust, information collection, and violence prevention inside local communities. This eventually boosts the effectiveness of peace operations in totality.

Strengthening Resilience

UNPOL plays a decisive role not only in responding to the problems but also in strengthening the resilience of the institutions and communities as well as the peacekeeping missions of the host. Activities aimed at building resilience focus on strengthening the capacity of the civil society organizations, local governments and other players of interest to survive and recover following disruptive events. UNPOL aids the process of building resiliency through capacity-building programs such as training, technical support, and institutional assistance, to help the police forces in the host country to survive, protect civilians and maintain law and order.

Moreover, through its engagement in various projects, including justice reform, community policing, and conflict management focused on the underlying causes of conflict and supporting sustainable peace, UNPOL aims to develop partnerships and promote dialogue between an extensive variety of stakeholders, i.e. governmental institutions, international agencies, and local communities (Della et al., 2016).

Difficulties and Future Projections

Despite the significant role that the UNPOL has played in the peacekeeping activities, the operations of the organization still experience various challenges. The fact that the resources, people, and technologies needed to implement the UNPOL missions are limited is also a major challenge (Dellaet al., 2016). Lack of resources can hinder the ability of the UNPOL to carry out its mandates and effectively respond to the new security threats. Moreover, barriers to the prompt and effective sharing of information about intelligence are present not only in the UNPOL but also in other peacekeeping elements and external partners because of the barriers to information sharing (Obuobi, 2024).

The presence of a number of future directions can be identified that UNPOL can take towards achieving peacekeeping. The sustained growth and integration of the technologically empowered

solutions capable of supplementing the process of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination should be considered an important factor that UNPOL can potentially leverage in the situation where security conditions are dynamic.

Table 2. *UNPOL Mission Challenges and Future Directions*

Challenges	Description	Future Directions	References
Limited Resources	The effectiveness and safety of UNPOL missions are compromised by financial, human, and equipment constraints that impede the execution of mandates and address security threats.	Prioritize resources and invest in technology for improved intelligence. improve cooperation between financial sources and member states.	(Della et al., 2016; Manuela, 2019)
Information Sharing Barriers	Collaboration, situational awareness, and response skills are hampered by barriers to intelligence exchange both inside UNPOL and with allies.	- Boost communication and interoperability among intelligence systems. Encourage openness and confidence to improve the flow of information.	(Obuobi, 2024)
Future Directions	UNPOL should invest in local police capabilities, embrace technology for improved intelligence, and support good governance to foster resilience and stop the repeat of violence.	To improve situational awareness and operational efficacy, use technology. Prioritize governance changes and conflict resolution while allocating resources to local capacity-building.	(United Nations, 2008; Manuela, 2019)
Source: Adapted by Author, 2024			

In addition to the length of time in peace keeping mission, investment in capacity building efforts of police forces and local organizations in the host country may also help in development of resilience and preventing the recurrence of violent incidences. Enhancing good governance, strengthening the rule of law and addressing root causes of conflict are those factors that play a major role in shaping resilience and preventing instances of violent acts.

Conclusion

UNPOL is also instrumental in ensuring global peace, but challenges it experiences are lack of sufficient funding and sharing of data. To improve its performance, UNPOL is expected to adopt emerging technology, increase its budget and improve the flow of information to have a holistic

view of the current situation and make its operations more efficient (Pobjie, 2021). To achieve long-term peace and stability, the local law enforcement needs to be reinforced, effective governance must be encouraged, and the causes of conflict have to be tackled (Namakula, 2022). The Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) have been frustrated to achieve their potential through integration failures and lack of the backing of high ranking authorities. Although these concerns are necessary in dealing with the issue of security, they were disadvantageous to their efficacy. This is due to the fact that the UN has given priority to security agendas over other goals and limitations over resource allocation by JMACs, thus causing integration problems.

The indomitable commitment of UNPOL towards peacekeeping and strategic intelligence activities plays a significant role in ensuring global stability and may be considered critical towards the solution of the modern security issues. Nonetheless, UNPOL still needs to improve its ability to adjust to the needs of the peacekeeping activity in the twenty-first century.

To maneuver more successfully in complicated security scenarios and contribute positively to the process of global peacekeeping and security, UNPOL needs to embrace the technological improvements and maximize resource distribution and promote the sharing of information. The commitment of UNPOL to peacekeeping and intelligence operations is critical in solving the existing security problems as well as promoting global stability. To ensure that the peacekeeping activities in the twenty-first century are successful, it is crucial that their skills should be continuously improved.

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Al Bel Afifa, ppm joined Bangladesh Police as Assistant Superintendent in 2006. She holds a BSc and MS in Mathematics from the University of Dhaka. Later, she did her MBA from the University of Information Technology and Sciences. Afifa attended the Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program at the University of Minnesota, focusing on leadership and human rights, and completed Pre-Academic Orientation and Training Program at the University of California, Davis, USA. Later she did a Certificate course on Leadership and Governance During Times of Crisis at Maxwell School, University of Syracuse, New York, USA. During the fellowship, she contributed to

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She served in the UN Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan (2014-2015) and at the Police Division, Department of Peace Operations, OROLSI, UN Secretariat, New York (2019-2021). She participated in numerous professional training courses, gaining expertise in women's rights and preventing gender-based violence. She attended Gender Protection Course from Italy and Child Abuse Investigation Course from Royal Police College, Malaysia. She achieved the Excellence in Performance Award 2013 from the International Association of Women Police from the 51st Annual Training Conference in Durban, South Africa. She received the Inspector General's Exemplary Good Services Badge in 2015 and 2018 and the Bangladesh Police Women Award in 2016. She was awarded the President Police Medal (PPM) in 2023. Afifa is a life member of the International Association of Women Police (IAWP) and collaborates with its Bangladesh part, to promote women empowerment and gender equality. She has communication with the resource persons and police officers from different countries of the world. All these experiences have broadened her perspective, enhanced her skills, and shaped her approach to daily policing in Bangladesh.

United Nations Peacekeeping: Challenges, Reforms and the Role of Bangladesh

Md. Baha Uddin Khan (Bahar)

Abstract

United Nations peacekeeping has evolved from modest ceasefire observation missions into complex multidimensional operations that combine security stabilization, political facilitation, civilian protection, and institutional rebuilding. While peacekeeping remains one of the most visible expressions of multilateral cooperation, its operational environment has become significantly more demanding. Mandates are broader, threats are asymmetric, and geopolitical consensus is often fragile.

This article examines the evolution of UN peacekeeping, identifies structural and operational challenges, and reflects on reform efforts aimed at strengthening mission effectiveness. Particular emphasis is placed on Bangladesh's sustained engagement as a leading troop-contributing country. From a practitioner-informed perspective, the article explores how peacekeeping contributes not only to global security but also to national professional development, institutional learning, and diplomatic positioning. The discussion integrates operational realities with policy analysis to provide a balanced academic and training-oriented assessment.

Keywords: United Nations Peacekeeping, Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Reform, International Security, Multilateral Cooperations, Conflict Resolution, Civilian Protection, Security Governance, Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs).

Peacekeeping as Institutional Practice, Not Mere Policy

Peacekeeping is frequently discussed in theoretical terms — consent, impartiality, non-use of force. Yet for those engaged in training, deployment preparation, and operational planning, peacekeeping is far more concrete. It involves convoy planning across difficult terrain, negotiation with local actors, coordination between military and civilian components, and constant adaptation to unpredictable security conditions.


Although the UN Charter does not explicitly mention peacekeeping, the practice emerged in 1948 as a pragmatic solution to political deadlock. Over time, what began as lightly armed observation missions developed into multidimensional enterprises integrating soldiers, police officers, engineers, medical professionals, political advisors, and humanitarian coordinators.

The expansion of peacekeeping reflects the transformation of conflict itself. Contemporary conflicts are rarely conventional interstate wars. They are more often internal struggles

characterized by fragmented authority, militia activity, weak governance, and humanitarian vulnerability. Peacekeeping missions therefore operate in environments where there may be no clear “peace” to keep — only a fragile political process requiring stabilization.

Global Expansion and Contraction: Understanding the Trend

The global personnel trend illustrates how UN peacekeeping expanded dramatically after the Cold War. From relatively modest deployments in the early 1990s, total personnel surged in the 2000s, peaking around 2010. This increase corresponded to complex missions in Africa and other conflict-affected regions.



However, the subsequent gradual decline highlights two realities. First, peacekeeping is not permanently expanding; it responds to political authorization and strategic demand. Second, global consensus fluctuates. When geopolitical divisions intensify, mandate ambition often decreases.

This fluctuation matters for training institutions. Planning cannot assume steady growth. Preparedness must account for expansion, contraction, and mandate evolution.

Mandate Complexity: Between Ambition and Feasibility

Modern missions are tasked with protecting civilians, supporting elections, facilitating disarmament, reforming police institutions, and enabling humanitarian access — often simultaneously. While multidimensional mandates reflect holistic understanding of conflict, they also create operational tension.

For example, protecting civilians requires rapid mobility, intelligence gathering, and sometimes robust deterrence. Supporting political dialogue requires neutrality and careful diplomacy. Balancing these functions is not merely conceptual; it affects daily field decisions.

In many missions, commanders must interpret mandates under uncertain conditions. Overly broad mandates risk strategic ambiguity. Yet overly narrow mandates risk irrelevance. The challenge lies in calibrating ambition with resources.

Financial and Political Constraints

Peacekeeping is funded through assessed contributions. Financial sustainability depends heavily on major contributors. Budgetary debates influence procurement, force generation, and mission renewal.

Equally important is political consensus within the Security Council. Divergence among permanent members can limit mandate clarity or delay strategic decisions. Peacekeeping thus operates within broader geopolitical dynamics beyond the control of field commanders.

For training institutions, this means preparing personnel for political sensitivity. Operational effectiveness depends not only on tactical skill but also on understanding diplomatic context.


Operational Realities: Mobility, Protection and Intelligence

Peacekeepers today confront improvised explosive devices, extremist groups, misinformation campaigns, and vast ungoverned spaces. Traditional static observation posts are insufficient in such environments.

Mobility has become central. Engineering units that construct roads and bridges directly influence mandate implementation. Aviation support enhances rapid response. Medical units sustain force resilience.

Bangladesh's Expanding Contribution

Bangladesh's troop contribution trend demonstrates steady growth from limited participation in the early 1990s to peak deployment in the mid-2000s. Even after global contraction around 2020, contribution levels remained substantial.




This consistency reflects more than symbolic engagement. It indicates institutional commitment and structured preparation.

Peacekeeping has become integrated into Bangladesh's defense and police professional pathways. Personnel returning from missions bring exposure to multinational command structures, civil-military coordination mechanisms, and protection-of-civilians frameworks that enrich domestic training.

Gender Inclusion and Operational Legitimacy

The growth of female participation marks a significant evolution. Female peacekeepers enhance community engagement, particularly in contexts where local women may hesitate to interact with male officers.



Beyond symbolic value, gender inclusion improves intelligence flow, community trust, and legitimacy. The steady increase in female deployment from Bangladesh reflects both international expectations and domestic institutional adaptation.

Training curricula must therefore integrate gender-sensitive operational planning, not as an add-on but as a structural component.

Institutional Learning and Training Ecosystems

National peacekeeping training institutions play a critical role in translating global doctrine into operational readiness. Pre-deployment training now includes scenario-based exercises, cultural awareness modules, rules of engagement familiarization, and coordination simulations with civilian components.

Peacekeeping has shifted from static monitoring to dynamic stabilization. Training must reflect this shift.

Exposure to multinational exercises enhances interoperability. Simulation-based training improves decision-making under uncertainty. Lessons learned from returning contingents should systematically feed into doctrine refinement.

Reform Agendas: From Brahimi to A4P+

Institutional reform has sought to address past shortcomings. Emphasis has been placed on realistic mandates, performance accountability, and rapid deployment capacity.

However, reform cannot eliminate structural political constraints. What it can do is improve preparedness, clarify expectations, and enhance coordination mechanisms.

Technology integration — including surveillance drones and digital communication systems — is increasingly central. Yet technology must complement political engagement rather than replace it.

Strategic Dimensions for Bangladesh

Participation in peacekeeping enhances Bangladesh's diplomatic visibility. It strengthens multilateral engagement and reinforces commitment to global stability.

At the institutional level, peacekeeping serves as a professional laboratory. Exposure to diverse operational environments enhances adaptability, leadership skills, and logistical competence.

From a policy perspective, sustained engagement positions Bangladesh as a responsible stakeholder in international security governance.

Critical Reflection: Limits of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping cannot substitute for political settlement. It can create space for negotiation, deter large-scale violence, and protect vulnerable populations. But durable peace ultimately depends on local political will.

In environments where governance collapse persists, even robust mandates face limitations. Recognizing these limits does not diminish peacekeeping's value; rather, it grounds expectations in realism.

The Road Ahead

Future missions will likely be smaller but more specialized. Rapid deployment capacity, intelligence integration, and regional partnerships will shape effectiveness.

For Bangladesh, continued investment in training, specialization, and gender inclusion will enhance both operational impact and institutional credibility.

Peacekeeping remains imperfect. Yet in a fragmented international order, it continues to represent one of the few collective mechanisms capable of stabilizing fragile environments.

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Over the years, Bahar has authored numerous articles on institutional reforms, audit practices, governance, and policy analysis, reflecting his dual passion for professional auditing and intellectual engagement. His unique blend of experiences in journalism and internal auditing enables him to bring a holistic perspective to issues of governance, compliance, and institutional development.

Message of Peace from Conquest to Compassion in Asoka's Rock and Pillar Edicts (c.304 – 232 BC)

Dr. Md. Adnan Arif Salim

Khan Md. Monoarul Islam

Abstract

The inscriptions of the Emperor Ashoka (r. 232-304 BC) serve as a positive example of how despots might make amends. This rising king, noted for the number of bloody victories in his illustrious Kelinga War. He was utterly disgusted by violence and turned completely around almost immediately, and began to see the world in a new way. His new philosophy was one of nonviolence and friendliness, with an affirmative acceptance of life. At that time, his ethics led to political dominance, inscribed on rocks and pillars, in edicts. All these edicts were actually based on the theme of "Dharma," and Ashoka had thought Dharma to be synonymous with love, truth, charity, purity, and high-mindedness. Peace and harmony; Peace between the citizens of his own empire, peace with those who were strangers to him. In his commands, he thought of the needs of human beings and animals, demonstrated religious toleration, and cared for nature. In this article, we focus on the significance of Ashoka's Edicts as a milestone in statecraft and reflect on some of their latent meanings, particularly peace, compassion, and ethical legitimacy.

Introduction


The period of Great Emperor Ashoka (c. 304 – 232 BCE) was a watershed in Indian history, as he became one of the most extraordinary emperors of India from the ancient era. Conversion of Ashoka: From a violent, expansionist policy prior to the Kalinga War to after he was exposed to Buddhism, after which he began propagating peace, empathy, and nonviolence. Among the most important of these historical sources are inscriptions, the first surviving Indian inscriptions, which were carved in stone by the Indian Emperor Ashoka no later than the 3rd century B.C.E. These ancient inscriptions of India's Mauryan Emperor Ashoka include mentions of the Buddha and Buddhists. Moreover, we may read them upon their pillars, and—and them." In these inscriptions, and even upon the pillars themselves, are combined Ashoka's many utterances of policy, moral philosophy, and social concord in demonstration that he strove to better the world by justice and mercy.

In this research work, we try to investigate the metamorphosis of Ashoka's message. However, his Rock and Pillar Edicts are to be comprehended, then it is as a movement from an imaginary or rhetorical language of conquest. If one that triumphs over, to one identifying itself with compassion. The inscriptions give hints not just for his personal information but also a window to

the broader cultural, religious, and other transformations. This all are happening during his rule on the Indian subcontinent. This Edict gives us an idea of the political ideas of the Emperor, and how Buddhism influenced his method of rule. His efforts to create a society that was nonviolent and just, a community whose moral compass swings "side by side with piety," but not (on Buddhist terms) but compassion based on Dharma.

Ashoka's conversion is depicted by his ideological transformation after the war of Kalinga. At the beginning he was an imperialist conqueror. From the first stage of his life he built a vast empire and saw war as the principal tool of politics build on instead of a ruler whose goal was to promote the welfare of his subjects. Then he try to make Buddhism an aid for that process. He depends on some concepts such as tolerance between social groups and tolerance towards other religions.

This shift is evident in the language that characterized his decrees. It increasingly highlighted compassion, nonviolence, and moral rule rather than the Emperor's authority and territorial aggrandizement (Kulke & Rothermund, 2017). The importance of these inscriptions for a complete understanding of Ashoka's philosophy. It can scarcely be overemphasized, and their value in fixing the real. It also has a long-term bottom-line meaning of his reign to Indic and world history (Lal, 2000).



The Pillar Edicts on the Delhi-Topra pillar and the Lauriya-Nandangarh pillar.

Research Methodology

The two methods of this observational study are qualitative and a historical text-based research is introduced here. One to explore the latent message of peace in the Rock and Pillar Edicts of King Ashoka. What is looked at here are the actual documents of the edicts, as well as learned

conjecture. We shall approach this through the historical-interpretive method. Here, we try to examine the inscriptions of Ashoka and the Dharma-dhamma texts. We also testify several significant ones, including those on non-killing, religious tolerance, and other topics where Dharma is evident.

Asoka's Edicts are largely inscriptions on Rock and pillars. That in Dhauili is significant both for having been associated with two of his self-declaration edicts as well as a permanent representation of his legacy. It is from these inscriptions that we get our unique glimpse into Ashoka's conversation from violence to empathy. The paper is followed by an analysis of the language and themes. Here, we get various conclusions drawn about Ashoka's quest for Peace, social justice, and effective Government.

We, applied a thematic analysis to a central organizing theme, such as religious toleration, social welfare, and non-killing, as reflected in edicts. These themes, however, in the context of Ashoka's conversion could be expressed as a reason to understand his rule with respect to his edicts and/or him as a pacifying icon or a legitimate sovereign (Dutt, 1925; Hultzsch, 1925; Thapar, 1961; Sircar, 1965; Falk, 2006; Lerner, 2001). Dharma Edicts were intended to publicize the administration and defense of the state, especially the law, and protect it from encroachment by former kings.

Literature Review

The Edicts of Asoka, which were carved into rocks and pillars all over the Indian subcontinent, tell us a lot about how the emperor transitioned from invading other countries to adopting a policy of Dhamma, which was based on moral and social responsibility (Hazlehurst, 2017). These edicts are very important primary sources for learning about how the Mauryan Empire was managed, how it interacted with other countries, and how it developed and enforced laws while Asoka was in charge.

They help us see how big his empire was (Maitreya, 2024). This collection of inscriptions, then, is a complete historical record that shows how the emperor grew as a person and how he used his socio-political views in real life (Maitreya, 2024). The Edicts provide a distinctive perspective on the application of Buddhist principles within the realm of governance. This enables scholars to examine the relationship between abstract religio-philosophical systems and their manifestations in political contexts (Jayasuriya, 2008; Bartles-Smith et al., 2020).

The most obvious sign of this change is when Asoka decided to rule by Dharma instead of military force after the Kalinga War. Buddhism spread throughout Asia (Bartles-Smith et al., 2020). Asoka's acceptance of Dhamma also changed what it meant to be a king. A king's job changed from making his kingdom bigger to taking care of his people and making them better people (Bartles-Smith et al., 2020). This new idea of kingship put a lot of value on being a moral leader and being open to other religions.

James Prinsep's research on the Brāhmī and Kharoṣṭhī scripts and his finding of Piyadāsi Devānaṃpiya as Asoka made it much easier for scholars to understand these key works (Deeg, 2019). This philological advance enabled a comprehensive examination of Asoka's edicts, elucidating his distinctive conception of a just and ethical society (Singh, 2012). This notion sparked a profound cultural dialogue over ethical principles and non-violence, impacting various theological and philosophical traditions of the period (Schmiedchen, 2020).

Asoka's Dhamma had a long-lasting effect on later kings who wished to be good leaders like him (Berkwitz, 2019). Asoka, on the other hand, maintained a standing army to protect himself and told tribes that didn't do what he said that he could punish them. This shows that he was a practical leader because of the spiritual changes he made (Bartles-Smith et al., 2020). This intelligent style of thinking shows that even an emperor who wanted peace knew how important it was to keep things safe and in order in a huge empire (Draper, 1995).

Ashoka used Buddhist ideas in politics, he nonetheless used force when it was necessary to keep the country safe and stable. This combination of moral leadership and practical military plans shows how hard it was to rule Asoka's kingdom. It was a smart balance of idealism and pragmatism. The Mauryan dynasty's first three emperors were Chandragupta Maurya, Bindusara, and Asoka. They were exceedingly aggressive, which helped the empire grow quickly. (Chakravarti, 2015).

It was tough to run a big and diversified population all over the empire. His government group was skilled at keeping things in order. Asoka tried to fix this problem by using the unifying ideas of Dhamma. Chandragupta Maurya, Asoka's grandfather, started this large realm. Kautilya, who wrote the *Arthashastra*, a political book that said the government should be governed in a practical but frequently severe way, was his guide. This was very different from how Asoka later accepted nonviolence (Bhattacharya & Saikia, 2020). (Bartles-Smith et al., 2020). The 'Arthashastra', akin to Niccolò Machiavelli's 'The Prince', was founded on the ancient Mauryan political concept advocating for a highly structured and efficient dictatorship supported by a standing army and civil service (Chakravarti, 2015).

Chandragupta Maurya's first military triumph occurred following the death of Alexander the Great, focusing on Macedonian satraps located west of the Indus River. After that, he took down the Nanda Empire, which gave him control over a large part of the Indian subcontinent (Modelski, 1964). A centralized government was created during his period as leader, which brought together many different areas under one strong leader (Chakravarti, 2015) (Modelski, 1964). The Nanda dynasty was weak and Greek soldiers were entering, which made it simpler for Chanakya to arrange for a unified state (Chakravarti, 2015).

Major Pillar Edicts

Samrat Ashoka, the greatest king of India, undertook extensive administrative work and adopted a set of ethics during his reign. Ruling from 269 B.C. to 232 B.C., Ashoka is chiefly known for his ruthless embrace of Buddhism after the blood-drenched Kalinga War transformed him forever. Inscriptions on a series of massive stone pillars set up throughout India and Afghanistan, these edicts reveal Ashoka's preoccupations in establishing a moral and harmonious society based on Dhamma (a comprehensive term from Pali or Sanskrit encompassing morality, compassion, nonviolence, and social welfare). (Thapar, 2017).

EDICT I.

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Major Pillar Edict 1 and Delhi-Topra Major Pillar Edict 2

Ashoka's duty and morality, known as "cakka-dhamma," was more than just a set of rules. It was his vision for a peaceful and stable society. After his violent conquests, Ashoka's transformation into a compassionate ruler was marked by his commitment to guiding his people through moral principles. It was rooted in kindness and respect. The heart of his teachings was the belief that true peace could only be achieved through self-discipline, compassion, and mindfulness.

- III — 𑀧𑀺𑀓𑀢𑀺𑀓 𑀧𑀺𑀓𑀢𑀺𑀓 𑀧𑀺𑀓𑀢𑀺𑀓
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Delhi-Topra Major Pillar Edict 3

Ashoka emphasized the decency in behaviour and conduct that was expected out of people In his inscriptions. Irrespective of their position or social origin its point was simple. Real greatness does not lie in power or conquest but in how we treat one another. He preached that an honorable, loving, and considerate approach to one's duties was the route to a fulfilling life. This law of morality, which he termed Dhamma. It was not a matter of simply observing rituals; it involved living in harmony with the world and contributing to the welfare of all.

In his important Edict as II, Ashoka has made it clear that Dhamma was not merely confined to Religion, but rather a code of conduct. He conceived of it as a moral order that would guide human behavior toward right, truth, and respect for one another, not because of rules, but for an internal peace that would radiate outward in all directions, creating a society built on love rather than fear.

In Edict III, Ashoka expanded his moral precepts, addressing the harsher "practices" of anger, pride, cruelty, and lack of reverence. He knew that all these negative feelings and actions only caused harm and division. [81:27] "We narrated another incident to them (the inhabitants of Tyre city): The people of the town were told, "Adopt a better way; avoid sinful desires if you happen to understand and wish to be rightly guided. By instilling self-reflection and self-control, Ashoka aimed to foster an environment where people could coexist peacefully, free from the vices of pride, anger, and selfishness.

The second consideration in shaping Ashoka's policy is his regard for the principle of nonviolence, which is evident in Edict V, for example, "all animals particularly ... certain birds should be protected against slaughter; some birds should not be slaughtered at all and others only on festive occasions." His law also included animals: one must seek the owner's permission to cut a tree, and it is forbidden to put another animal inside an animal. Moreover, this capacity for empathy was not just limited to animals; it was very soon extended to people. The vindictive justice of Ashoka is further exemplified by the 25 prisoners, presumably released, referenced in Edict V, signifying an era marked by an unprecedented adoption of humanitarianism, influenced significantly by his conversion to Buddhism (2008).

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
A significant aspect of the Major Pillar Edicts is Ashoka's references to his relationship with officials based on the concept of Dharma. In Edict IV of the series, he refers to *rajukas* (*Prajujukas*), evidently officers whose duty it was, consequent upon having killed a *rajuka* in any part of the empire. It was their job to inspire the people in the correct Dhamma and morality, as well as protect themselves. It states their duties – to scrutinise, reward, and punish everything that depended on the executor's Dhamma: apart from justice and all related matters. This inscription reveals Ashoka's penchant for the company of civil officers to set an example of good morals and virtuosity before his people (Hultzsch, 1925).

[illegible]

Delhi-Topra Major Pillar Edict 6

Another key aspect of Ashoka's Major Pillar Edicts is his commitment to religious tolerance. In Edict VI, Ashoka expresses his respect for all religious groups, including Buddhism, Brahmanism, and Ajivikas. He made it clear that he allowed different religions to coexist peacefully, and that his ancestors had done the same, with no rivalry among them.

The Dhamma of Ashoka is transmitted, first as an oral tradition(7), later written on rocks and pillars, and takes the following form: (7) "All that has been done by King Piyadasi, all that he will do, has been done out of compassion and for the welfare of the people." 4/ Asoka breathes his spirit into these words: "and what I shall do hereafter I shall do in contemplation over the future, so let it be beneficial unto yourselves." Ashoka admits to planting trees, digging wells, and creating watering sheds for humans and animals. They were not just works; those worked to bring a sense of duty and moral rectitude to his people, as well as entertain them. The planting of public banyan trees or groves of mango trees contributed to a comprehensive theory of governance: drinking wells themselves pined for Ashoka's subjects; the physical and moral were intertwined. Sections: 1] And further, and so he was all blown up in the roads, ith uhh-all for people but that ... initially they did not know anything like that where you call it and stuff (Beckwith).



Pillar Edict at Delhi.

The Dhamma Mahamatras [Officers of Dharma] mentioned in Edict 7 of the Rock Inscriptions were apparently such an institution, the "sine qua non" or indispensable pre-requisite to Ashoka's moral rule. These were made for the upholders of Dhamma & rule who were expected to follow Dhamma, and that everyone, right from vagge, even Buddhists, Brahmins, etc., would have to live righteously. Ashoka's instructions to these officers were straightforward: they were to instruct the people in the Dharma, the moral code, and ensure that they adhered to it. Such moral surveillance was indeed necessary to enforce the moral program that Asoka hoped to implement across his vast empire (Thapar, 2017). Major Pillar Edicts, as contained in Ashoka's Pillared Edicts, provide an impression of his morals and good conduct. 11 This Mahāmātra also gives an account of how moral edicts were composed by King Piyadasi Aśoka for their propagation among the Yōnas, towards their welfare and that of other peoples. These inscriptions demonstrate his aspiration to be good, as well as his conviction that he was performing a religiously praiseworthy act by disseminating the faith in the one true God.

Peace in the Ashokan Inscriptions and Rock Edicts

Not that Ashoka was merely a "king," but arguably the greatest of ancient India's many kings, ruling during that kingdom's golden age from 268 to 232 B.C.E. And indeed, few things are thought more miraculous by many than his very rule – that of a once-infamous and savage warlord transformed into an apostle of peace, nonviolence, and clean governance. This transformation is nowhere more apparent than in his Rock and Pillar Edicts, which were also carved across his domains from present-day Afghanistan to Bangladesh. "When you hear their voices, they are what Ashoka's reign is supposed to be, a Dharma raj that he writes down in his personal opinions and political thought."

Ashoka was concerned with the spread of peace, but not in the belligerent form of justice that had been previously offered. Instead, it was moral leadership (dhammaghosa), social philosophical action, and religious tolerance. The turning point of Ashoka's reign — after the Kalinga War — is more precise, naturally. Before this war, Ashoka was a violent emperor who had conquered most of what is now the Indian subcontinent. Kalinga War, and when have the account of 261 B.C. not been: in our ears- patched history of thousands- agonies unrecorded? Later, Ashoka was severely punished, and he repented of ruling the people through a policy of war.

It was a matter of controversy among many historians as to exactly when it came into being. However, you hear — by and large, I guess — most of the historical ... presenter of Ashoka converted to Buddhism partly through his moral quandary over the war. This reversal of position also marked a revolution in his private life, replacing militarism with moralism and peace, nonviolence, and compassion as the criteria of his reign. This turnaround is reflected in the Rock and Pillar Edicts of Ashoka. In such inscriptions, especially in the Rock Edict XIII, he pleads his people to stop killing their own innocent brothers and cease inflicting misery upon others.


The Transformation of Ashoka's Leadership

Pre-Kalinga War Ashoka was an aggressive and ambitious ruler of a large kingdom centered in Pataliputra. His own and the Maurya dynasty rule are thought to have paved the way for even more Indianization of the society in which he was a part. Most notably, conquest by violence ceased after his battle with Kalinga, roughly around 261 BCE, when he declared victory for Dhamma philosophy over war. More than 100,000 soldiers and civilians lost their lives in the war, while thousands more lay wounded. The massive genocide and suffering affected Ashoka's understanding of how he exercised power and ruled. In his Rock Edict XIII, Ashoka condemns himself: "I dispatched men; and now I grieve for the killing of them (then/now) have I had to carry off, but the latter sorrow is worse." This shift from death as a material thing to the human aspect of what that cost is, marks an important moment in Ashoka's rule and disposition to move away, or return to being not "a king" (E Hsu 2004:98) but 'one who behaves as follower(s) of dhamma (dharma) etc, righteous king-ship' – peace maker – said anymore– pacifist (Thapar, 2009).

Ashoka's personal transformation is attributed to his adoption of Buddhism, and the actual chronology of his conversion is the topic of debate among scholars (Bhatta, 2000). It is, however, verifiable that Ashoka was deeply moved by the doctrine of Buddhism, which largely prompted his altered views on philosophy, spiritualism, and politics. Buddhism and the doctrine of nonviolence (ahimsa), the sanctity of all life, every man must tread his spiritual walk in his own skin, filled with freedom and equality, which in turn gave him a positive attitude as he abandoned his attachment to 'sinful' acts. As seen in the post-conversion inscriptions of Ashoka, all these orders are issued solely based on Dharma (Bhatta, 2000). It is not just that once Ashoka accepts the Dharma, his belief in ruling also changes. He was no longer the warrior greedy to add provinces to his dominion. However, the founder of a society based on morality and eager to remain in universal peace.

The new disposition of Ashoka is also reflected in his Rock Edicts, also known as 'Rock and Pillar Edicts,' by their tone and tenor. All of Ashoka's pre-Kalinga War inscriptions had been about imperial conquest and martial glory, as rulers were socially conditioned to be. Moreover, tokenistic though they were (some of) these initiatives nestled into the heart of Ashoka's conception for a peaceful empire ruled according to ethics rather than strength of arms (Voss, 2016).

The motivation provided by the risk of canvassing a store and needing to rebuff God's gift, Ashoka's inscriptions also speak to his notion of social duty: "The ideal value for an individual is further implicated in the duties that attend family life. These include respecting one's parents as long as they live and repaying their sacrifices through service at all times when they require it or can benefit from it. Legislation also calls for honest behavior between men; loyalty in friendship...justice toward both high-caste and low caste alike, whether religious or other kinds....There are specific texts prohibiting cruelty towards friends or men who have put on priests' garb; others exhorting everyone...to go (foe)": that is "Let us everybody practice our own religion." It was an embracing attack, the struggle for peace in his empire and also in the ethics and morals of his race. According to Bhatt (2000), for Ashoka, the king was identical with the political sovereign-king, becoming also a moral sovereign, and that is why "morality was supposed to have been practised by him." His attempt to incorporate this model of righteous governance into his administration encompassed foreign policy, rather than just focusing on Dharma or power.



Pillar Edict at Allahabad.

However, Ashoka's conversion was also geopolitically significant well beyond India. See Bryant (2018) for a discussion of how his PR was in the ancient Mediterranean and Hellenistic world to spread his peace message beyond his territory. He himself sent his messengers, who propagated the Dharma, saying that plants with special medical properties were carried to countries such as Greece and Egypt. Here, the fact is proven once and for all that he had no geographical or cultural barrier to following a principle. It was also more than a mere political tenderization; in this campaign, Ashoka inaugurated the vision of peace beyond borders, and across these diplomatic expeditions, he was amongst the very first world rulers to articulate an appeal for ethical rule in world politics.

The manner in which Asoka changed himself from a conqueror to a preacher of peace may be reckoned as one of the most wonderful instances on record. His acceptance of the Dharma and dharmic kingship shaped early Mahajanapadas as well as the tradition established by later rulers. The Rock and Pillar Edicts are monuments to this moral revolution. It was marking a new era in the history of political ideas and governance. The philosophy of Ashoka changed the social and religious way of life. He was actually respected all religions. His truthfulness and honesty were left as an example for the entire history.

Dharma as the Basis of Peace

Dharma in the time of Ashoka, as asserted in Rock Edict II, had a clear military and political significance. These are emphasizing the duty to both humans and non-humans. In this Edict, Ashoka's message is reiterated: regardless of who or where the recipient may be. Peace and happiness can be found in fulfilling one's responsibilities to family members and relatives. He also decreed measures for relief of stiffness ('suffering')—for the people and even to the animals (Voss, 2016). These values are an echo of King Ashoka's humanism, who wished to change society based on the belief that moral lifestyle and habitat for all beings should also be a cause to strive towards peace and personal and social order. It was a refreshing change from the militarized politics of ideology in the past, and it was based on a moral edifice instead. He was attempting to build a planet where all could live in peace and abundance, not a Eurasian Empire such as exists now. It was that commonly held devotion to the Dharma, explained Ashoka, not the sword of war, which would bring durable peace—one that transcended armed conquest (Saini, 2023).

From the Rock Edict XIII, it is a testament to Ashoka's strong faith, primarily as expressed in his devotion to Dharma, that despite all the conquests he observed, this was a genuine and authentic conquest. The edicts describe aspects of what Ashoka, who Laumakis calls an "unjust government" (i.e., that of Kalinga), defeated during his war against Kalinga. Only after Ashoka realized the horror of violence causing destruction in the Kalinga war did he expand his kingdom, which led to suffering for the public, and he built a whole new world, which he believed was a failure. However, on the contrary, says Ashoka, "the conquest of Dharma--that is the right and

good (spiritual)--was excellent." For, as he declares: All victories are a defeat in comparison with the victory of Dharma.... it is a nourishment of all beings. It is clear from the above that for Ashoka, victory lay not in expanding frontiers but in implanting (or spreading) a value-aliving, oradic value vacuum, in contrast to the war and frontier, and this is reflected in his humblest policy (Bhatta, 2000).

Moreover, Ashoka's Dharma, as an expansion, was a modern invention. By stating, "War is not the answer", Ashoka declared a different concept of kingship which included moral authority and ethical governance. Besides Dhamma Vijaya, or "Real victory is victory over Dharma," he also propagated a new faith or ideology. For empires in the ancient world, and especially those where royal power was closely tied to dynastic growth and military prowess, this was truly revolutionary. So Ashoka's model of leadership was a model that actually employed virtue to promote peace and prosperity (not the use of force).

"God-fearing Dharma" of Ashoka also added a religious and social orthodoxy. His Dharma was not the Dharma of any one religion." It transcended all religions, it honoured every faith. In the Pillar Edict (VII), Ashoka ordered his people to respect all religions in order to achieve peace and maintain social and political unity among the different religious communities. Diversity, he said, should be "not a problem but an aspect of the moral imagination of society." The Dharma of Ashoka served as an ideal for the vast empire, maintaining peace and justice on universal moral grounds (Kumar Sharma et al., 2023).

Diplomacy, too, was tinged with Ashoka's embrace of Dharma. Even with the nobles and foreign princes, his contacts rested on the same high standard of truth which he had established in his dominions. Ashoka's missions to far-off lands — the Mediterranean and even Southeast Asia for good measure — were aimed at propagating his gospel of peace and moral kingship. Conditions -37 21 Pul-i-Darunteh Aramaic inscription. We had first placed one of these inscriptions when prospecting this ground in a WNW direction, and so we had every reason to look for some of them here on the way down.

Towards Welfare, Social, And Religious Toleration

The policy of Peace by Ashoka was no mere chimera; it took shape in his mode of rule. Moreover, we even see in all his decrees how jealous he was of the temporal and spiritual welfare of his subjects. He could specify only one form of social welfare emphasis, and that was medical care. In his Rock Edict 1 at Gwalior, we see Ashoka giving ordinary medicine to men and animals. This benevolent act was followed by a few paces indicating the construction of hospitals, and an imperfect observance of some reform introduced for the alleviation of suffering in his dominions. It pleases him to command that trees be planted beside his highways. For the refreshment and convenience of his subjects -- if I remember aright, he even extends this bounty to all orders of folk as careful of them as it is that they should be.


As part of those activities, in healthcare, there was nothing specific; yet, judging by his Dharma, he stood as an important and revered figure in society, respected for his wisdom and authority. His edicts were directed against the unjust/improper treatment of prisoners, and he proposed that there be a single, non-discriminatory justice system that covered the entire empire. Pillar Edict VII is explicit that brutality did not translate into deterrence, but rather the court. When viewed according to this norm of Dhamma and security, it is clear that Ashoka has regained a vision of peace, which was possible only within an order where every person could live in security. That was a revolution because you have actually made the transition from force to ethical rule.

Another important tenet of the rule of Ashoka was his concern for animals. He was famous for rejecting the royal hunt and the hunting of animals; the killing of murderers was common during his rule. This would have been not only symbolic, but also a matter of practical advantage: it would have brought into play the ahimsa (non-injury), one of its chief ethical tenets. In addition, Ashoka's declaration of protection to "all gods" is generally regarded as evidence for Buddhism existing at the time of the Indian Emperor. In addition to the Tangible Heritage that is part of Buddhist history, this model can be viewed as an aspect of Indian heritage and is regarded to this day.



Mahasthan Brahmi Inscription

Apart from those inscriptions, a few more have been ascribed to Ashoka (in the minor rock edicts [schism-edict-kalinga] and the queen's Edict), which are also found only in other regions of India. The inscription reflects Ashoka's pious and social concerns, along with evidence of his commitment to social justice. The portion, which called upon people to embrace traditional local rituals and customs (purti), was reminiscent of his regret over fighting the Battle of Kalinga – also emphasized the sanctity of all living beings' freedom from subjugation or suffering, even as an act whilst in duty as a king. And it also emphasizes what, from the evidence of Ashoka, was in any case a notion of being a ruler not as an instrument of power for its own sake, but rather for the improvement of all. The article contributes to our growing understanding of him by illustrating how he conceived of Government in terms of the people it governs.



Pillar Edict at Lauriya-Araraj and Lauriya-Navandgarh.

Amongst the other religious and social home reforms of Ashoka was his munificent donation to all the other religions, constructs of which have been identified in inscriptions as well. Public welfare projects were constructed and funded in western South Asia. At the Barabar Caves in the region of Gaya (Bihar), it is worth noting the inscription on a construction with the help of its high officials. Favor towards subject relatives and friends, obedience to mother and father, generosity to friends, companions, relations, and others. Public Utilities: Hospitals, Jal Mandaps, Regulating rivers Nigali Sagar (Andhra Pradesh), Kalinga Sarovar (Rajor Kela lake, M.P.) Lack of wells near borders. Insisting on the truth to care for all animals.

He continued the garden city at Pataliputra. Ashoka even established a new capital at Shishupalgadh, near the present-day Patna (a distorted form of the corrupted name of the original city, Patliputra). His determination to serve the public in this way also reinforced his belief that his ultimate goal would always prioritize the welfare of his people. He had bestowed that it might be in his power for each of them to live like a man of his empire should, and, not satisfied with caring for their political condition alone, he demonstrated also how much he valued the welfare and good health of one and all alike. That is the reminder his reign pounds: that on occasion, administration can peddle what is right from the high ground of morality.

Religious Tolerance and Unity

The absolute novelty of Ashoka's rule is his devotion to religious pluralism. There were various spiritual paths in his empire, influenced by Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and other folk religions. Ashoka was himself a Buddhist and a champion of religious toleration. However, he too would have had problems with the pluralism suggested by such reasoning.

No religious bias shall be manifested here towards any religion, whence every kind of sectarianism should have been put an end to. 0€%o All religions supported by as many sects, already deserve to be in all places. Since he was firmly convinced that, where people of different denominations strive to uphold shared values in moral life, peace is possible, he also repeatedly stressed the fact that all religions share the same propensity for improvement.

Ashoka was not only a religiously indifferent governor of his vast empire, but he also wanted to export the message and looked for new foreign markets. Consequently, his correspondence with Syrian or Egyptian sovereigns, such as the king of Syria, was in harmony with his general policy of securing peace and good administration. For we also learn from Rock Edict XIII that he already sent some people with the science of right and plants to Greeks at least as far West as the Mediterranean – so it was very much living from his side when it comes to transmitting his peace message: The Edict expressly says that these went out to 'the sect of Bhagavà'.

Ashok's message of peace and its legacy

The Peace of Rock and Pillar Edicts was not an outcome of any Ashokan transformation. However, it became an exemplary pattern for dharma rajya and continued to have a profound influence on political philosophy. The conversion of Ashoka from a potentate who wielded the sword to Acharaya, the morally guided ruler, is one of the early case studies in how a moral leader transcends their leadership and brings peace. "Justice and peace form the product of our Dharma and Ahimsa, and social welfare, tolerance gave birth to humanity.

However, Ashoka's Rock and Pillar Edicts' peace-loving utopia is not simply a case of one man discovering that the concept of genocide was much more complex, but is a historic expression that governments still fail to fulfill (or at least discuss in theoretical philosophical debates). In Indian history, I am referred to as the "Bapu" as well, " great-grandfather of the nation". Yes, there is no Alexander for me to compare; not even one could match a hair of mine.

One was the Fierce military leader, and he killed thrones, even those who were his own, who had taken his side. Therefore, after the Kalinga war, to a large extent, Ashoka was transformed into a man who underwent a mighty transformation, standing upon the belief in non-violence and patience. War converted him into a disciple of Buddhism, and his creed was peace through nonviolence. It was an unprecedented act in the moral and political history of upright state-craft, that honest Government is undoubtedly one of the solid reasons in which a world duly adjusted and well-rounded may find its cure! (59:23) The rule of Ashoka, when he laid great emphasis on nonviolence, welfare to ordinary people, and Religious Tolerance, became a classic example of what a leader could do if he took care of his subjects and moral values.

The edicts show that the monarch was kind, but also worried. He wasn't as concerned with right and wrong as he was with responsibility. This made his army move forward again. He built fortifications all around his empire along the border, which was a flexible line that could not help

but observe what he did every day. He passed laws that allowed Dhamma to be sung as a guide for political leaders (Hultzsch, 1925). People heard the government's voice everywhere and with a lot of confidence. Because of this, charity and private observance became increasingly limited.

Ashoka's encouragement of religious tolerance is another important thing he did that others have done throughout history. His Major Pillar Edicts, including Edict VI, say that he, "like all the gods," does not appreciate service and rites. Pluralist religious tolerance, as illustrated by Ashoka's Janitya: Dharma, was established on the principle that all religions promote a moral existence, therefore ensuring inevitable peaceful coexistence among them. Pepsi-Bose (1992) and Harari (2015) deserve credit for spreading and keeping this model alive in India and other parts of Asia, where it was quickly embraced.

Conclusion

The description of Ashoka is not just about an emperor who ruled all over India. It indicates a person who chose to be kind instead of strong. He was the consummate conqueror at the start of his reign. He utilized intimidation, expansion, and the means of war to accomplish what he wanted. The Kalinga War, with its rivers of blood and cries of the dead, was the last straw for him. From that sadness emerged a fundamental understanding in his life. He started thinking that the real power doesn't come from the sword. He thinks, it comes from being able to care for others, heal their wounds, and lead them with kindness and fairness.

Ashoka is exceptional because he not only changed, but he also had the guts to do so in front of everyone. The Rock and Pillar Edicts cover a large area of the Mauryan Empire. They have promises, admissions, and requests. They show a leader who is honest about the mistakes he made in the past and promises he will change. He wants the government to aid people, be open-minded, and treat all living things, including humans and animals, with respect.

Ashoka informs his people that being violent doesn't make you strong and being peaceful doesn't make you weak. It is the most significant evidence of being wise and having moral power. His vision extended beyond the confines of India. Ashoka sent Buddhist missionaries to Sri Lanka, Central Asia, and even the Mediterranean area to spread peace that transcended across cultures and kingdoms. His legacy goes on because it shows us that we will always need leaders that help us instead of hurt us. When monarchs were putting down dissent and expanding empires with ruthless ambition, as an emperor Ashoka's commitment to dharma was nothing short of revolutionary.

After passing more than 2,000 years the Edicts of Ashoka are still vital for our peace. We see our surrounding countries still fighting wars. Everywhere we see, people are coping with inequality. They are facing religious problems. They remind us that the greatest way to win is to stop being mean, not to seize land. This is not just a story from the past; Ashoka changed from being a warmonger to a moral counselor. It teaches us to be nice, have faith, and hope that things will get better. His message, inscribed in stone, still rings true today: the way to ultimate grandeur is the way of peace.

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BRIDGING CLIMATE AND PEACE: THE INFLUENCE OF WOMEN PEACEKEEPERS IN GENDER-RESPONSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY WITHIN UN MISSIONS

Major Smreeti Datta, Artillery

Abstract

Climate change is now widely considered to be a “threat multiplier”, exacerbating fragility and resource competition, as well as compounding the risks of displacement and violence in conflict-affected areas. In UN peacekeeping theaters, operational mandates now intersect with the triple challenge of security, climate risk and social inequality in some of the most vulnerable places to climate change. “The systematic inclusion of gender-responsive climate security into peace operations, however, is still incomplete. This paper examines how women peacekeepers military, police, justice/corrections, and civilian personnel can bridge the agendas of peace and environmental security through inclusive early warning, community engagement, and cross-sectorial collaboration. Based on the WPS agenda consolidated in UNSCR 1325 and using as reference UN policy frameworks, empirical studies and mission examples (UNMISS, MONUSCO, UNIFIL, MINUSCA), the analysis shows that women’s participation contributes to increased risk perception capacity, social trust mobilization, access-to-marginalized groups engagement and uptake of climate-adaptation measures. However, institutional, capacity, and resource barriers limit scale. The paper offers policy and operational recommendations: mainstream climate-security into pre-deployment and in-mission training; expand women’s leadership and technical roles; adopt gender-sensitive climate action frameworks aligned with the UN Environment Strategy for Peace Operations (2023–2030); and strengthen monitoring and accountability through climate-gender indicators. Taken together, these steps can position women peacekeepers as transformative agents of environmental peace-building and help UN missions deliver more sustainable and legitimate peace outcomes.

Keywords: Climate-Security Nexus, Climate Change, Peace and Security, Environmental Peacebuilding, Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Gender Mainstreaming, Conflict Prevention, Human Security, United Nations Peace Operations and Climate Resilience.

Introduction

The security implications of climate change are no longer peripheral: intensifying hazards, water stress, food insecurity and livelihood erosion intersect with weak governance and armed conflict, amplifying risks to civilians and peace operations. IPCC AR6 (WGII) identifies cascading impacts that undermine social stability and adaptive capacity, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states; people least able to cope are hardest hit (IPCC, 2022). UN and multilateral analyses

increasingly frame climate as a risk multiplier in the Security Council and across UN system initiatives (e.g., the Climate Security Mechanism and joint UN courses), highlighting the need for integrated risk management that links peace, development, and climate action (Security Council Report, 2022).

Climate change is no longer a remote environmental threat; it is a lived experience that intersects with security, justice and human dignity particularly in fragile and conflict-affected areas where UN peace operations are implemented. Drought, flood, heatwave, crop failure and resource shortages all deepen the grievances on which conflict feeds: inequality, bad governance and livelihood collapse. This “threat multiplier” effect is not evenly distributed, but it most deeply affects those with the least buffers, those often being women and girls who bear care work (and are disproportionately affected by emerging zoonoses), water and fuel collection in households without plumbing or electricity and small-plot subsistence farming. Within this landscape, women peacekeepers including military, police, justice and corrections personnel and civilians are emerging as key actors for linking peace to environmental security. It is not just that their influence matters symbolically or as a matter of fairness; it carries operational significance. Where women are meaningfully involved, missions have generally been successful in building trust with communities, deriving finer-grained early-warning information and co-designing sound, conflict-sensitive climate adaptation measures that work.


Female peacekeepers are likely to be the ones who can bring a gender lens to security and the environment in UN missions. It follows the logic of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda into climate-security; unpacks why gendered perspectives enhance risk assessment, protection and prevention; and demonstrates how inclusive engagement makes adaptation about more than a technical fix, but about social legitimacy. It further uncovers ongoing obstacles such as underrepresentation, stereotyping, insufficient induction and resources and concludes with policy and practice recommendations for UN missions to more effectively cultivate female leadership on climate change through peace.

In war zones, climate shocks make already tenuous systems crumble. And when the rains become more capricious, or the floods more severe, crops fail; pastoral routes change, food prices soar, and competition over land, water, fisheries or forest products hardens into violence. Displacement surges, creating pressure on urban outskirts and humanitarian services. States that are too weak suffer legitimacy deficits when they fail to provide basic services or act as arbitrators in local disputes. The result is not a simple cause-and-effect path from climate to conflict, but a tangle of feedback loops where climate risk, conflict and governance outcomes mutually reinforce one another.

Gender runs through each of these pathways. In many contexts, women are responsible for water and fuel collection; longer, riskier trips during droughts or deforestation expose them to

harassment and gender-based violence. Women often have fewer formal land rights, less access to credit, extension services, or climate information, and reduced mobility in emergencies. Yet women also possess knowledge systems that are critical for adaptation seasonal patterns, soil and seed selection, water points, rangeland conditions, and social networks that organize collective action. A gender-responsive approach does not essentialize women as “natural environmental stewards”; rather, it recognizes differentiated risk and capacity, insisting that adaptation and peace-building must include the people most affected and most knowledgeable.

Figure-1: Climate – Security Analytical Framework showing pathways from climate hazards through Vulnerability, Political ecology and human security to conflict, cooperation & adaptation.



The WPS framework anchored in participation, protection, prevention, and relief/recovery provides a ready-made logic for climate-responsive peacekeeping. Participation means women must be at the table where decisions about patrol routes, protection priorities, and quick-impact projects (QIPs) are made. Protection means identifying and mitigating climate-related risks of violence e.g., redesigning water points and firewood distribution to reduce exposure, or ensuring camp lighting and patrol presence along high-risk routes. Prevention means using gender-sensitive conflict analysis to anticipate resource disputes and seasonal flashpoints. Relief and recovery mean co-designing livelihood support and environmental restoration that reduce dependence on exploitative coping strategies.

Women peacekeepers contribute to realizing this logic in three overlapping ways: enhancing early warning, building social legitimacy and trust, and maintaining a multi-sectoral model of collaborative problem-solving.

Currency in peacekeeping is information. Missions need to understand who is going where, why tensions are intensifying, and under what pressures conflicts may turn violent. Male-only patrols do not reach these voices; mixed-gender and community liaison assistants, Women Engagement Teams, etc., usually have access to them. Women community members might feel more at ease talking about sensitive issues like GBV, checkpoint extortion, or unsafe sources of water with women peacekeepers. Those conversations frequently produce fine-grain, localized information: which borehole is on the cusp of running dry; which grazing corridor is contested by other pastoralists; where it's no longer safe to participate in market days; which bridge spills its banks first after heavy rain. When mixed with climatic and price information, this information becomes actionable early warning signals that can inform a patrol strategy, mediation priorities, or protection alerts.

Peacekeeping involves much more than violent deterrence; it is about defending something resembling a social contract in societies with thin institutions and thick memories of abuse. Women peacekeepers typically have larger roles in generating trust. In cases where the public roles of women are limited or overlooked, their presence provides symbolic embrace and recognition. When women facilitate dialogues or co-chair resource committees, local women are likelier to attend meetings, voice concerns, and hold leaders to account. The result is not cosmetic: participation influences the design of public goods where to place water points, how to schedule access, how to resolve queuing disputes so that they serve the whole community rather than the few.

Significance of the Study

By situating women peacekeepers at the heart of climate-security responses, the paper advances the WPS agenda beyond representation to substantive prevention, protection, relief/recovery, and participation outcomes. It also contributes to environmental Peacebuilding by centering social legitimacy, local knowledge, and intersectional risk (UN CC, 2024).



Source: <https://unifil.unmissions.org/advancing-women-peacekeepers-role-unifil>

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

Environmental security is not achieved by soldiers or engineers alone. It requires coordinated work among civil affairs officers, human rights and protection actors, police units, engineers, environmental officers, and external partners, including UN agencies, NGOs, local authorities, customary leaders, women's groups, and private providers. Women peacekeepers often act as integrators across these seams. Their facilitation skills and community relationships help convert technical assistance into accepted, maintained, and conflict-sensitive public goods: rehabilitated water yards managed by inclusive committees; fuel-efficient stoves that reduce deforestation and exposure on firewood runs; flood-safe market spaces; or shared grazing calendars mapped with herder associations and farmers' unions.

Take two of the staples of conflict in mission settings: access to water and land tenure. A cycle of boom-and-bust displacement and dispute emerges, where water scarcity in dry seasons gives way to damaging floods. Forums that bring together women peacekeepers working in civil affairs and community liaison units have drawn responses from women who outline the particular dangers ranging from those that involve specific acts of aggression-assault near isolated boreholes-to seemingly mundane interactions-extortion at makeshift water points-to latent tensions, as overcrowded distribution queues become flashpoints. They call for design strategies that may significantly reduce routine violence, such as lighting, fencing, women-only hours, or even the location of taps to reduce queuing time. When those types of measures become local rules enforced by committees that are inclusive and reflective of actual lived experiences, compliance is better because it is real life.



Source: Official Facebook Page of UNMISS

Land conflicts bring a similar narrative. Where customary and statutory systems intersect, widows and single mothers may be excluded from a land claim after a husband dies, or they may not be able to reclaim land following their displacement. Women peacekeepers (particularly those with policing or justice/corrections backgrounds) have contributed to the inclusion of women claimants and paralegals in local land mediation panels and dispute resolution workshops. If an agreement ties access to land to environmental reforestation, soil stabilization, or climate-smart agriculture, the benefits become tangible and visible for both the local community and the site owners. The nature of the dispute changes from a zero-sum contest to a collaborative endeavor, and social monitoring by women's organizations further bolsters compliance.

Climate-induced stress can also increase GBV risks: longer walks for water or wood, proximity in shelters during floods, transactional sex following food insecurity, or intimate partner violence due to an economic crunch. Thus, a gender-responsive approach to environmental security incorporates GBV prevention into adaptation. This can be implemented with practical steps like mapping and patrolling the routes with the highest risk, locating water points and distribution sites in areas where they can be monitored, offering safer fuel alternatives, and ensuring that reporting pathways are confidential and survivor-centered. Female peacekeepers often play a key role in the design of these measures and in building the trust that encourages survivors to seek assistance.

In order to institutionalize this work, common training and shared tools for missions are needed. Climate-security pathways, a gender analysis of current local security risks, and appropriate measures to mitigate GBV risk, as well as community-based resource governance and conflict-

sensitive environmental design, should be modeled as pre-deployment and in-mission modules. Climate indicators (rainfall anomalies, drought indices, flood risk) should be combined with market prices, displacement flows, protection incidents, and community feedback (disaggregated by sex and age among populations) in data systems. Such lightweight analytics make mapping and prioritization of patrols possible without advanced modeling. Most importantly, that information loop needs to be closed: communities need to see how their inputs influence decisions; otherwise, trust erodes and participation declines.

- ***Gender Peace and Security Nexus***

UNSCR 1325 (2000) and later WPS resolutions connect gender equality to global peace and security, advocating for women's full, equal and significant involvement in peace processes and operations. WPS highlights the importance of gender-sensitive protection and prevention as an appropriate framework for incorporating climate-security aspects (UN Women, 2020).

- ***Climate Change and Conflict Linkages***

Strong evidence links climate variability and extremes to increased conflict risk through resource competition, livelihood failure, price shocks, and forced migration; its size and direction depend on context and are mediated by governance and inequality. IPCC AR6 stresses that climate shocks reveal, reinforce, or even widen existing vulnerabilities and may undermine state legitimacy (IPCC, 2022). UN leadership repeatedly notes climate's destabilizing effects on food security and social unrest mirrored in global hunger data linking conflict and climate to acute food insecurity (AP News, 2024).

- ***Gender-Responsive Environmental Security***

“Gender-responsive environmental security” refers to prevention, protection, and resilience measures that integrate gender analysis into climate-security risk assessment, planning, and implementation. The 2020 UN joint report (UNEP–UN Women–UNDP–DPPA) offers a cohesive framework with case studies demonstrating gender-differentiated impacts and women's leadership in adaptation and conflict prevention (UN Women, 2020).

Role of UN Peacekeeping in Environmental Security

- ***Evolution of UN Mandates on Climate and Security***

Security Council deliberations increasingly reference climate as a risk multiplier, though contested politics have hindered uniform mandate language. Even without explicit climate

clauses, several missions integrate related tasks under protection of civilians (PoC), civil affairs, and natural resource conflict mitigation (Security Council Report, 2022).

- ***Integration of Environmental Security in Mission Mandates***

The UN Environment Strategy for Peace Operations (2017–2023; refreshed 2023–2030) formalizes environmental management, emphasizing energy, water, waste, wider impact, and environmental management systems now evolving toward better data, practical guidance, and mainstreamed delivery. These corporate strategies create hooks for climate-security mainstreaming at mission level (UN Global Service Centre, 2024).

- ***Challenges in Operationalizing Climate-Security Linkages***


Barriers include: limited in-mission climate expertise; fragmented coordination across components; under-resourced gender units; and absence of standardized climate-gender indicators in results frameworks. Research on UNMISS shows that dedicated climate-security advisers (CSAs) and budget lines are pivotal but rare (DPPA, 2025).

Women Peacekeepers as Agents of Change

- ***Expanding Participation and Leadership***

Women remain underrepresented in uniformed roles, yet participation has grown. As of 2025, women constituted 5.9% of military contingents, 14.4% of police, and 43% of justice/corrections personnel in UN peacekeeping; overall women in field missions rose from 1% (1993) to 10.1% (2025). Recent SIPRI snapshots track trends and leadership gaps across multilateral operations (UN Peacekeeping Data Portal, 2025).

Figure-2: Percentage of Women’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Roles (2025)



- ***Unique Contributions in Community Engagement***

Women peacekeepers often have improved access to women and marginalized groups, enhancing trust, intelligence-led patrolling, and social legitimacy of mission activities. Evidence from engagement teams and community liaison assistants shows better two-way communication, protection planning, and conflict management (UNIFIL, 2022).

- ***Case Illustrations from UN Missions***

- ***UNMISS (South Sudan)***

Workshops and programming to co-design gender- and climate-responsive strategies (e.g., integrating women’s inputs on water points, seasonal mobility, and protection risks) demonstrate the value of inclusive planning; (UNMISS News, 2024).

- ***MONUSCO (DRC)***

Women personnel in engagement teams and civil affairs increase community access; WPS-focused assessments inform patrol routes and protection dialogue prerequisites for incorporating resource and land-use tensions into early warning.

- ***UNIFIL (Lebanon)***

Women participate across operations (including demining and patrols) and engage local women leaders; Elsie Initiative grants improved gender-sensitive facilities, enabling women’s deployment and retention conditions necessary for sustained community outreach and environmental outreach activities (CIVIC, 2024).

- ***MINUSCA (CAR)***

Gender components and civil affairs support alert networks and protection plans with community liaison assistants; where women staff are present, missions report better identification of localized risks including resource-use flashpoints (MINUSCA, 2025).

Gender-Responsive Approaches to Environmental Security

- ***Early Warning and Risk Assessment with a Gender Lens***

Gender-sensitive conflict analysis improves climate-security early warning by capturing differentiated exposure and coping strategies (e.g., water collection routes, seasonal migration, market price spikes, GBV hotspots). Integrating WPS with climate data (rainfall anomalies, pasture indices, displacement flows) can refine patrol plans and community alert systems. UN's joint "Gender, Climate & Security" framework and the Climate Security Mechanism's learning resources provide methodologies for such integration (UN Women, 2025).

- ***Community Resilience and Women's Participation***

Women's cooperatives and local associations are central to livelihood diversification, land restoration, and water governance; peacekeepers who partner with these groups help translate adaptation into trust-building. Missions (and troop-/police-contributing countries) that deploy more women facilitators report improved attendance and voice among local women, enabling co-design of micro-infrastructure and natural resource agreements.

- ***Addressing Climate-Induced Gender-Based Vulnerabilities***

Extreme events and livelihood loss can heighten GBV risks (e.g., unsafe water-collection routes, transactional sex amid scarcity). Gender-balanced patrols and community liaison, combined with environmental design (lighting, water points, fuel alternatives), mitigate risk. IPCC and UN policy underline the need to link GBV prevention with adaptation programming.

- ***Cross-Sectoral Collaboration (UN Agencies, NGOs, Local Actors)***

Effective environmental Peacebuilding requires mission collaboration with UN agencies (UNEP, UNDP, and UN Women), NGOs, and local authorities on climate-adaptation and livelihood projects. Policy communities urge the Security Council and Member States to mainstream gender-responsive climate considerations across peace and security instruments moving beyond ad hoc pilots (DPO Survey, 2025).

Key Challenges and Gaps

Despite progress, three categories of obstacles continue to blunt impact.

First, structural and institutional barriers persist. Gender advisers and environmental officers are often under-resourced or frequently rotated. Chains of command and frequent rotations fragment institutional memory. Climate-security expertise is uneven across components, and mandates may lack explicit climate language even when risks are obvious on the ground. Without senior-level champions and dedicated budget lines, promising pilots remain small and fragile.

Second, gender stereotypes and underrepresentation limit women's influence. Women are still underrepresented in uniformed contingents and in technical or operational leadership roles engineering, environmental management, and civil-military coordination. Where women are present, they can be slotted into "soft" tasks and denied the authority to steer operational choices. Facilities, equipment, and living conditions may still be designed around a male default, undermining retention.

Third, resource and capacity constraints impede scaling. Environmental peace-building is labor-intensive and slow by design; it demands steady engagement and follow-through hard to achieve when missions face budget cuts, staff turnover, or drawdown timelines. Without predictable funding to maintain water points, keep lights on, or refresh committee training, gains can unravel and legitimacy can suffer.

- ***Structural and Institutional Constrains in UN Missions***

Hierarchy, rotations, and fragmented chains of command can marginalize gender and climate advisers. When they do exist, CSAs frequently depend on funding that is not included in the budget, which limits continuity. The experience of UNMISS demonstrates that institutionalization requires clear budget lines and advisory functions.

- ***Gender Stereotypes and Underrepresentation***

Despite activism, women still make up a small portion of uniformed troops; preconceptions may limit them to "soft" jobs rather than technical climate or operational leadership positions. SIPRI records ongoing deficiencies in specialized positions and top leadership.

- ***Resource and Capacity Constraints***

Rarely do missions have data systems, analytics, or training specifically focused on climate security. A policy-practice divide has been highlighted by the UN's Environment Strategy, which has accelerated progress on environmental management but less on conflict-sensitive adaptation with a gender lens (SIPRI, 2024).

- ***Policy–Practice Gap in WPS and Climate Agendas***

Instead of focusing on significant preventative and protection results, WPS implementation frequently relies on headcount measurements. Analysts caution that concentrating only on representation may ignore cross-pillar connections and structural improvements.

- ***Policy and Operational Recommendations***

The distinctive value of women in peacekeeping is not a trait; rather, it is a relational or positional phenomenon. Women are frequently present in other social spaces and can tap into information and constituencies from which men would be excluded. Simply by virtue of being gendered women, they are challenging exclusionary norms and broadening the base of who can take part in public decisions. They are often able to stitch together the solutions that play well in real life because they operate at the interface of households, markets, and community structures. When women hold substantive authority command roles, engineering posts, community liaison leadership the signal to the broader society is potent: security and governance belong to everyone. That signal matters as much as any single water point or grazing map because it strengthens the social foundations on which peace, adaptation, and development depend.

To fully leverage women peacekeepers in gender-responsive environmental security, missions and Member States should prioritize five shifts.

Mandates and senior leadership direction are needed where politically feasible, include climate-security language that authorizes risk assessment, community-based resource governance, and collaboration with specialized agencies. Even without explicit text, Special Representatives and Force/Police Commanders can set expectations: climate risk is mission risk; gender analysis is operational analysis.

Training and deployment pipelines including standardize pre-deployment and in-mission training on climate-security and WPS integration for all components, not only gender advisers. Encourage troop- and police-contributing countries to deploy more women to engineering, logistics, environmental, and community engagement roles; invest in enabling conditions accommodations, equipment, childcare policies, and leadership development.



Source: <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/north-kivu-women-peacekeepers-malawi-encourage-women-beni-build-peace-their-community>

Dedicated roles and budgets in appointing climate-security advisers or focal points with clear authority to convene components and partners. Resource gender units to support analysis, training, and monitoring. Secure predictable funding for maintenance and follow-through without which trust erodes.

Data systems and feedback loops like blend climatic, market, and protection data with community input. Publish simplified dashboards internally; share summaries with communities through town halls or radio. Show how data changes decisions on patrol routes, project siting, and committee composition so participation remains meaningful.

Outcomes-oriented accountability such as building climate-gender-security indicators into mission results frameworks and reporting. Reward leaders who deliver inclusive, conflict-sensitive environmental solutions; document and diffuse practice across missions.

Mainstreaming Climate-Security into Peacekeeping Training

- ***Pre-deployment & in-mission training***

Integrate climate-security risk pathways, gender analysis, GBV risk mitigation, and community-based adaptation. Utilize UN Climate Security Mechanism resources and UN CC: Learn open courses (with UN Women and UNEP) to standardize curricula for military, police and civilians.

- ***Mission analytics***

Build simple dashboards that blend climate indicators (e.g., rainfall anomalies, fire risk), protection incident data, market prices, and community feedback disaggregated by gender/age.

Enhancing Women's Participation in Environmental Peacebuilding

- ***Targets and enabling conditions***

Scale women's deployment in operational and technical roles (engineering, CIMIC, environmental officers), backed by Elsie Initiative-type investments in facilities, equipment, and leadership pipelines.

- ***Leadership & incentives***

Tie senior performance compacts to progress on women's leadership in climate-security tasks and on inclusive community engagement metrics.

- ***Community interfaces***

Expand women-led engagement teams and CLAs in areas with acute resource pressure to strengthen trust and inclusion.

Developing Gender-Sensitive Climate Action Frameworks

- ***Mission-level frameworks***

Align with the Environment Strategy for Peace Operations (2023–2030) but extend beyond footprint reduction to conflict-sensitive adaptation and natural resource governance with a gender lens.

- ***Programming***

Pair quick-impact projects (QIPs) with longer-term resilience measures (water harvesting, rangeland restoration, clean cooking) prioritized through women's committees and local authorities.

- ***Data & safeguards***

Introduce gender-responsive environmental and social safeguards to prevent maladaptation or elite capture.

Strengthening Monitoring, Reporting, and Accountability Mechanisms

- ***Indicators***

Add climate-gender-security KPIs to mission results frameworks (e.g., % of patrol plans using climate-sensitive early warning with women's inputs; # of resource-sharing accords co-designed with women; GBV risk reduction around water/fuel points).

- ***Reporting to the Council***

Encourage periodic briefings linking WPS and climate-security progress; reference best practices and emerging risks to inform mandate renewals despite political contestation.

Conclusion

Climate change is reshaping the operating environment of UN peacekeeping, intensifying risks that are experienced differently by women, men, and marginalized groups. Women peacekeepers regularly improve mission-level abilities to better anticipate and mitigate climate-related security vulnerabilities when they are present in significant numbers, empowered in leadership and technical roles, and incorporated into cross-sectoral collaboration. They enhance early warning fidelity, make communities more accessible, and strengthen the credibility of adaptation strategies—all of which are essential components of fostering environmental peace. UN missions should: first, integrate gender-responsive climate security into training, analysis, programming, and reporting; second, facilitate women's participation; and lastly, use the UN Environment Strategy to transition from environmental compliance to conflict- and gender-sensitive resilience to realize this transformative potential. This takes us from climate and peace to the world's most vulnerable regions and from representation to WPS outcomes.

Such peacekeeping, which treats climate risk as an externality, will be inadequate for the twenty-first century. Having to deal with an environmental stress, for example, does not conform to the pace of what politics would like to work on; it moves at a much faster pace, compounding claims and disintegrating legitimacy. Women peacemakers provide a solution for missions to respond to this in a practical and socially aware manner. They close the gap between climate action and peace-building agendas by broadening who is listened to, redefining protection planning, and co-designing trusted adaptation. Thus, the payoff is twofold, with communities achieving safer, more reliable access to life-supporting resources, as well as missions acquiring durable legitimacy—the difference between temporary calm and sustainable peace. Achieving this potential will not happen through goodwill alone. It requires concrete policy, resourcing, and active leadership that offer real power, including economic agency, that demystifies governance and lays the foundation for addressing the increasing demands on and manipulation of public goods; and a shift in metrics and measurements that leaves

behind simplistic inputs and headcounts, which is increasingly less aligned with the daily lived experiences of typical people. Where those conditions are met, women peacekeepers do not just serve; they change the game. They help build a social contract that is robust enough to withstand the storms and politics, and in so doing, demonstrate that the road to peace passes through the pastures, water points, fields, and markets where climate and security meet.

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UNDERSTANDING THE MINUSCA MANDATE: PEACEKEEPING, PROTECTION, AND STABILIZATION IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Lieutenant Colonel Md Kamrul Hasan, SGP, psc, Infantry

"We are in this together – and we will get through this together."

- António Guterres

Abstract

In April 2014, the United Nations Security Council authorized MINUSCA by Resolution 2149 to help deal with the rising violence and political problems in the Central African Republic (CAR). After François Bozizé was overthrown by the Séléka rebel coalition in 2013, the nation suffered from various crises involving clashes between groups, failure of the government, and major human rights abuses. Because security and human rights were worsening, the international community decided that a strong peacekeeping operation was required. Chapter VII of the UN Charter gave MINUSCA a broad mandate to help protect civilians, aid in the peace process, support human rights, guide humanitarian work, and support restoring and increasing government authority. It explains why MINUSCA was deployed, the laws and strategies that support its work, what its main tasks involve, what difficulties it has experienced, where it has succeeded, and the current criticisms it faces. Based on official UN documents and field reports, the article explains how the mission stabilized the country.

Keywords: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Central African Republic (CAR), Special Criminal Court (SCC), Community Violence Reduction (CVR), National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan (RCPA), International Criminal Court (ICC)

Introduction

Years of violence, conflicts, and severe humanitarian crises in the Central African Republic (CAR) are a result of weak governance, tension between ethnic groups, and fights over important resources. When violence increased and the government structures collapsed, the United Nations Security Council created the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in 2014. Following the rules in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, MINUSCA was given the authority to support civilian protection. In the past, the mission has added disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) for armed groups as a priority, as well as help with elections and attention to human rights. While ongoing instability and

disorganized fighting continue, MINUSCA has helped lessen serious acts of violence and given the country space for dialogue. However, the operations encounter numerous challenges because of the difficult security climate and lack of sufficient resources.

An important operational issue for MINUSCA is that armed groups are divided; they often ignore peaceful agreements, and they continue to target both the local population and MINUSCA personnel. Their efforts are also slowed by technical problems, harsh environments, and insufficient help from people who live there. At the same time, MINUSCA has been able to assist in the elections, increase security for the people, and get humanitarian supplies to the people. Taking a combined effort that is military, political, and community-focused, MINUSCA is helping to make security and governance better in Central Africa. CAR's sustainable peace can be attained with more support from the world, inclusive political processes, and support for the nation's institutions. People and leaders in the CAR need to concentrate on reconnecting the country and be resolute about pursuing peace despite the heavy role played by MINUSCA.

The focus of this article is to discuss the roles of MINUSCA, examine its laws and primary operations, and contribute to peace and state-building in the Central African Republic. It discusses what the mission has done well and where it is still struggling to protect civilians, assist the political process, and further human rights. In addition, the article reviews issues regarding the surrounding states, the promotion of women, and the handling of humanitarian activities. It explains how MINUSCA is contributing to the security and sustainable peace in the Central African Republic.

Historical Background

MINUSCA was formed primarily to address the prolonged conflict and political turmoil that have afflicted the Central African Republic for years. To understand the mission's aim and its problems, it is important to know the background of the conflict.

Origins of the Conflict

Chronic instability throughout the nation has been highlighted by several coups, oppressive regimes, and widespread unrest after its independence. Repeated unrest made people lose faith in the government and weakened various government organs. The fall of President François Bozizé in 2012, after the Séléka seized power as a Muslim rebel coalition, was the most significant crisis at that time. Because of this, the nation was taken over by sectarian struggles since Christian anti-Balaka groups appeared to target Muslims and made the violence increase. Because of the conflict, thousands were killed, and virtually a million were forced to move away from their homes, causing the region a massive humanitarian crisis. Because the state had no power, large areas of the country were left unprotected. Seeing an increase in terrible crimes and a mass movement of people, the

world community stepped in with emergency assistance. MINUSCA was later set up through efforts to support security and the return of the government to the country.

Establishment of MINUSCA

In April 2014, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 2149, which formally set up the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). MINUSCA is deployed on CAR territory following numerous letters and reports to the UN Security Council, including the letter from the CAR Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 27 January 2014 (**Solodi-Ouiabanga, 2024**). The decision was made as a response to rising violence and a humanitarian crisis brought by state institutions breaking down and the growth of armed groups. The first mission, MINUSCA, lasted one year until April 2015 and

could be extended depending on what was happening in the area. The handover from MISCA to MINUSCA meant that the country shifted from regional assistance to international peacekeeping help. On 15 September 2014, MINUSCA officially started its operations and took on the whole task of stabilizing the troubled Central African Republic. In accordance with

Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the MINUSCA mandate allows it the option of using force. It showed how urgently a solution was needed to keep civilians safe, restore the rule of the state, and support lasting peace. The creation of MINUSCA proved the world's understanding of the major crisis and its hopes for CAR's recovery.

Figure 2: UN Peacekeepers Retook the North-Eastern Town of Bambari a Day After it was Captured by Militia Fighters



Source:<https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20201223-un-soldiers-and-central-african-republic-army-forces-retake-rebel-held-town>

Legal and Strategic Framework

The paragraph following this one will look at what the law and strategy dictate for MINUSCA's work in the Central African Republic. It will explain how the mission is authorized internationally and is in line with the main goals of peacekeeping.

UN Security Council Resolutions

Operations of MINUSCA follow the orders from several UN Security Council Resolutions that empower it to act and drive change, such as using necessary force to defend civilians and help UN staff carry out their duties freely.

Figure 3: Metrics for UN Security Council Resolutions Year Wise.

Resolution Number	Year	Mandate Period	Key Focus Areas	Source
2149	2014	Initial Mandate	Establishment of MINUSCA; civilian protection; political support; DDRR efforts	(United Nations Security Council, 10 April 2014)
2552	2020	Until 15 November 2021	Peace support, civilian protection, restoration of national authority	(United Nations Security Council , 12 November 2020)
2566 & 2605	2021	Until 15 November 2022	Increase in troops (2,750 military & 940 police); enhanced security and political process support	(United Nations Security Council , 12 March 2021) (United Nations Security Council, 12 November 2021)
2659	2022	Until 15 November 2023	Continued peace process support, civilian protection, and state authority rebuilding	(United Nations Security Council, 14 November 2022)
2709	2023	Until 15 November 2024	Support for peace, civilian defense, and reinforcement of government presence	(United Nations Security Council, 15 November 2023)
2759	2024	Until 15 November 2025	Conflict resolution, population protection, and restoration of government control	(United Nations Security Council, 14 November 2024)

Core Components of the MINUSCA Mandate

Protecting the population, assisting with the country's transition, and ensuring humanitarian aid are the most important parts of the MINUSCA mandate. Security is also a key focus in the mission, along with supporting human rights in the Central African Republic.

Protection of Civilians

Concerned with the security, humanitarian, human rights, and political crisis in the Central African Republic and its regional implications, the Security Council authorized on 10 April 2014 the deployment of a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation – MINUSCA – with the protection of civilians as its utmost priority (**United Nations MINUSCA Fact sheet, n.d.**). Strategies used by the mission are sending mobile task forces, setting up alert systems early, and creating temporary bases in dangerous locations. MINUSCA may apply military force to guard civilians and help protect them in conflicting zones.

Support for the Political Process

MINUSCA is key in helping the nation talk through its disputes and apply the details of peace treaties. The mission gave logistical and security support during the 2015-2016 and 2020-2021 elections, which aided in returning the country to constitutional order. In addition, MINUSCA helps put the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation into effect and acts as a neutral bridge and supporter among parties who are at odds.

Extension of State Authority and Rule of Law

It is necessary to restore the state's authority in all parts of CAR in order to ensure its lasting stability. MINUSCA supports the return of legal institutions in areas where rebel groups had controlled in the past. Purpose including educating the local police, establishing the judicial bodies, and supporting the redevelopment of the incarceration system for the rule of law to flourish.

Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Repatriation (DDRR)

MINUSCA assists with the operation of DDRR programs to disarm the armed groups and integrate ex-soldiers into the community. The mission encourages the decrease of armaments, teaches people new skills, and verifies arms embargoes through co-operation with other countries. Although there have been advances, continuing problems arise from the postponement and violation of ceasefire pacts.

strategies as they cope with ongoing dangers. Because of the rugged terrain and a shortage of infrastructure, moving and responding quickly is more difficult. MINUSCA is also required to respond to violence affecting local people. Keeping UN staff safe at all times during assignments is a continuous and complex challenge.

Political Instability and Corruption

Ongoing tensions and signs of corruption are still hurting the fragile process of maintaining peace in the Central African Republic. State institutions have lost public trust because of arguments over elections, a lack of openness, and problems in governance. These challenges get in the way of bringing the nation together and promote exclusion in political communication. As a consequence, MINUSCA has difficulties in helping achieve political stability and reform of institutions over the long term.

International Coordination

A successful approach to stability in places affected by conflict requires cooperation among the African Union, European Union, and governments at the regional level. Often, because the objectives, politics, and task organization are not all aligned, efforts in the field are scattered. When agencies overlap, they can cause trouble by making things confusing, creating extra work, and having agencies compete instead of finding better solutions. The effort can be improved by having better communication, joint planning, and a high regard for each group's purpose and capacity.

Resource Constraints

Although MINUSCA is one of the UN's strongest missions in terms of money, it still deals with problems caused by insufficient supplies and staff. Lack of good roads, few aircraft, and challenging ground add to the challenges with moves and delivering needed help. Since the Central African Republic's terrain is vast and largely undeveloped, peacekeepers have a hard time reacting promptly to any new threats. In addition, teamwork between the entities and insufficient local collaboration still undermine the effectiveness of the mission.


Achievements and Impact

In spite of these problems, MINUSCA has achieved much in protecting the population and helping keep political stability in the Central African Republic. The actions taken by the UN to aid peace negotiations and deliver aid have helped the country come a long way during its recovery.

Protection of Civilians

Protecting the population has significantly improved due to the planned deployment and efficient responses of MINUSCA. The mission has successfully prevented attacks in several regions and given shelter to those who were displaced. The below-mentioned graph shows the comparative analysis of sector-wise armed group incidents reduced (2020 -2023):

Figure 3: Year Wise (2020-2023) Comparative Analysis of Armed Group Incidents



Source: MINUSCA Force Headquarters Plans and Policy Cell (Author's Empirical)

Electoral Support

Assistance from the mission during elections has been key to bringing back democratic rule. With its support in logistics and security, MINUSCA plays a role in electoral processes that are accepted by everyone, which builds stability in the region.

Human Rights Documentation

MINUSCA uses monitoring and reporting to expose human rights violations, which has led to international action and backed efforts for accountability. The partnership with the SCC has helped the mission conduct successful prosecutions for grave crimes.

Community Engagement

The Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programs and Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) of MINUSCA have tackled reasons for conflict by supporting youth employment, empowering women, and developing community infrastructure. They have increased both the trust and the strength of communities participating in peacebuilding.

Criticisms and Controversies

In the next paragraph, we will analyse the controversies that face MINUSCA working in the Central African Republic. It will be important to pay special attention to the ways that the Wagner Group impacts the mission's reputation and success.

Allegations of Abuse

Peacekeepers' incidences of sexual exploitation and abuse have damaged MINUSCA's reputation as well as its partnerships with people in the area. Even though the UN has a firm no-tolerance rule, it does have issues in holding people responsible and putting an end to further episodes.

Perceptions of Bias

Many stakeholders accuse MINUSCA of being partial to some political factions. It can be difficult to be fair and supportive of government institutions at the same time, so it is necessary for MINUSCA members to be involved and clear all the time.

Slow Implementation of DDR

Ex-fighters and people living in affected regions are not happy because DDRR programs are behind schedule. When the return activities fail, some of the fighters drift back into conflict. In addition, lack of resources and weak institutions have made it difficult to appropriately launch DDRR programs, meaning that the peace process as a whole is at risk.

Local Frustration and Mission Fatigue

Because peace and development are not coming quickly enough, and certain areas continue to face violence, public opinion is growing against MINUSCA. Some have worried that peacekeepers are not having much effect, mainly in communities that remain ruled by armed groups. Disappointment among locals may put the mission and the entire peace process at risk.

MINUSCA and the Regional Security Context

The following section will look at MINUSCA's part in maintaining regional safety in Central Africa. It will explore how threats, alliances, and nearby battles can impact the mission and its tasks.

Relations with Neighboring Countries

Countries close to CAR, including Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, Cameroon, and the DRC, feel the impact of the unrest in the CAR. Flows of refugees, the transport of weapons across borders, and armed group movements threaten the stability of the Central African region. The mission joins efforts with organizations like the AU and ECCAS to deal with these challenges in a combined fashion.

Role of International Actors

The mission actively cooperates with the European Union Training Mission in CAR, the African Union and donor countries, including France and the United States. International organizations help MINUSCA to engineer FACA, to reconstruct the structural framework of the country, and to assist in financing stabilization programs in the country. While partnerships provide MINUSCA with more abilities, there are also careful efforts to ensure there are no work repetitions.

Gender and Humanitarian Components

MINUSCA prioritizes gender issues and also includes women in peacekeeping missions. It will explain how the mission supports vulnerable communities and helps make local people more prepared for challenges.

Gender Mainstreaming

Through the Gender Affairs Unit, MINUSCA makes sure gender perspectives are part of its work. The mission encourages women's involvement in making peace and uses gender-sensitive programs across DDRR, elections, and justice reform. Because of women's leadership, efforts to promote reconciliation and community strength have flourished. The mission partners with organizations at the local level to protect victims of SGBV and provide them with legal help, emotional counseling, and security. Gender mainstreaming in the post-conflict recovery process is one primary focus shared by UN Women and other UN organizations, together with MINUSCA.

Humanitarian Assistance

MINUSCA partners closely with OCHA, WFP, and UNICEF from the UN to provide humanitarian support to the most vulnerable people in the region. Since over 3.4 million people receive humanitarian help and more than 700,000 people are internally displaced, the mission is crucial for arranging access, protecting convoys, and aiding early recovery efforts.

Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction

MINUSCA supports peacebuilding and reconstruction in the Central African Republic. It covers how the mission gives rise to reform within the organization, promotes unity, and builds stability in the future.

National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan (RCPCA)

Created by the CAR government in partnership with the UN, the RCPCA offers a complete plan for recovering from conflict. The pillars it targets are supporting peace, renewing the agreement between the state and the public, and helping the economy recover. The force promotes the plan through activities like governance reforms, fixing the country's infrastructure, and enhancing important institutions.

Transitional Justice and Accountability

MINUSCA has been backing the establishment of the Special Criminal Court (SCC), which commenced its work in 2018. Since 2003, the SCC has investigated serious crimes in addition to what the International Criminal Court (ICC) now handles. Because of its focus on accountability, the SCC helps deal with impunity and wins back the public's faith in justice.

Future of MINUSCA: Strategic Outlook

How MINUSCA will proceed depends on the changing security situation and continuous outside backing inside the Central African Republic. In the next section, strategies for ending each operation and its future stability are discussed.

Transition Planning

Members of the Security Council are encouraging a slower process to make sure the advances of the MINUSCA are stable over time. The country must achieve promising results in the reorganization of its national security agencies, improved administration, and better safeguarding of human rights. Withdrawal should be guided by how much the locals can manage, not fixed to a calendar deadline, to protect what has been achieved.

Enhancing Effectiveness

Effectiveness for MINUSCA could be increased by including the following:

- (1) More involvement of the community in peacebuilding efforts.
- (2) Better arrangements for mobility and logistics for the peacekeeping forces in remote regions.
- (3) Higher accountability if someone's rights are abused.
- (4) Required money is being put into local government services.

Long-Term Peacebuilding

CAR needs to overcome the primary triggers of conflict, such as poverty and exclusion, poorly built institutions, and divisions based on religion or ethnicity. It is expected that MINUSCA's purpose will change from hands-on action to helping build local skills, reconcile differences, and boost economic development. For peace to last, CAR needs a strong national approach to peace talks, open government, and continued support from the international community.

Conclusion

MINUSCA is a UN mission that aims to improve stability in one of Africa's most difficult and unstable states. Because the Central African Republic deals with conflicts, humanitarian emergencies, political challenges, and unstable government, it aims to address these issues in different ways. During its decade-long work, the mission has succeeded in protecting civilians, supporting political stability, and reforming the justice system.

However, it continues reading that achieving the ultimate goal of assuring safety and independence in CAR for the long term relies on all national, regional, and international partners' supportive efforts. In order for CAR to continue, the mission must evolve with current developments while maintaining its central role of supporting peace, protection, and stability. If MINUSCA is chosen as a guide for others, it will require that the international community continue to support CAR in its path to peace.

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OVERVIEW OF TRAINING CONDUCTED AT BANGLADESH INSTITUTE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION TRAINING (BIPSOT)

Major Syed Maruf Ahmed, psc, EB

“Bangladesh will continue to respond to the United Nations' call for peace. Our commitment is rooted in the ideals of our Liberation War and our constitutional principles. We will always stand for global peace.”

General Waker-Uz-Zaman, SBP, OSP, SGP, psc
Chief of Army Staff, Bangladesh Army

Abstract

Bangladesh's peacekeeping operations, promoting international peace and solidarity, are articulated through Article 25 of its constitution. Active UN deployment of Bangladeshi peacekeepers began in 1988 with UNIIMOG following the ceasefire of Iraq-Iran war. Following the peacekeeping training requirement, Peace Keeping Operation Training Center (PKOTC) was founded in 1999, which was renamed to BIPSOT in 2002. Operating under Bangladesh Army, its mission is to deliver multi-dimensional training matching international standards under standardized UN frameworks, cross-cutting modules, specialized language programs, tactical exercises, and modern e-learning integration. Courses are categorized as regular courses, frequent specialized courses, and newly introduced courses. Courses are well described by the aims, objectives, duration and frequency. Well-designed forecast for the upcoming year portrays the varieties of training throughout the year for preparing the future peacekeepers from both home and abroad. Training conducted in BIPSOT serves local military personnel, international overseas partners, and designated civilian participants across multi-tier structures. Future horizons feature collaborative certification and diploma programs partnered alongside the mainstream universities.

Keywords: Peacekeepers, BIPSOT, PKO.

Introduction

The constitution of People's Republic of Bangladesh, which mandates the “Promotion of international peace, security and solidarity³⁶”, provided relevance to the country to contribute actively in global peacekeeping affairs. The journey formally began in 1988 when a military observer group from Bangladesh was deployed in UN peacekeeping mission, UNIIMOG, after the ceasefire of Iraq-Iran war. Since then, the engagement in peacekeeping affairs increased gradually in dimension and magnitude, where Bangladesh Army, Navy, Air Force and Police took active part. At this context, realizing the need for a dedicated training institution to professionally groom peacekeepers, the Government of Bangladesh established PKOTC under the direct patronage of the Armed Forces Division and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the year 1999, which was later renamed as BIPSOT in 2002. Indeed, the progress of BIPSOT was driven by its dynamic characteristics of imparting time-worthy and effective training to the peace keepers for the cause of global peace and security.

³⁶ Article 25 of the constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh

Historical Background and Evolution of BIPSOT

The journey of BIPSOT unfolded across several defining milestones in Bangladesh's peacekeeping journey, which includes the following:

- **The Constitutional Foundation (1972):** Article 25 of the constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh mandates the "Promotion of international peace, security and solidarity", which is the root of Bangladesh's peacekeeping journey.
- **Operational Beginnings (1988):** Another landmark of Bangladesh's peacekeeping journey was achieved in 1988, when Bangladesh started participating in UN peacekeeping missions by sending 15 members Military Observers team in UNIIMOG during Iraq-Iran war.
- **Institutional Emergence (1999):** The final structure of this institution emerged at Rajendrapur Cantonment, Gazipur in 1999. Realizing the urgent need for a dedicated training institution to professionally groom peacekeepers, as Bangladesh underwent a rapid expansion as a Troops/Police Contributing Country (T/PCC), the Government of Bangladesh established the Peace Keeping Operation Training Center (PKOTC).
- **Renaming and Modernization (2002):** To better reflect its expanding role, PKOTC was renamed as Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training (BIPSOT) in 2002.

Governance and Impact of BIPSOT

BIPSOT was established under the direct patronage of the Armed Forces Division and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ongoing progress of the institute is driven by its dynamic characteristics of imparting time-worthy and effective training to peacekeepers, entirely dedicated to the cause of global peace and security. *BIPSOT* started its journey with the following *vision and mission*³⁷, which deeply determine the training spirit of this institution:

- **Vision:** "To promote global peace and security as an International Center of Excellence."
- **Mission:** "To impart specialized multifaceted training to national and multinational military, police and civilian participants on peace operations in accordance with current international standards through research, education and professional programs."

Future Outlook

In pursuance of academic excellence, BIPSOT is expanding its educational portfolio by launching a Diploma and an Academic Certification program in Peace and Security Affairs. These programmes, planned under the affiliation of the Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP), are designed for both domestic and international participants seeking specialized knowledge in the field. Furthermore, BIPSOT is actively pursuing strategic partnerships and Memorandums of

³⁷ BIPSOT Table of Organization and Equipment, and Bangladesh Army ATP-0045.

Understanding (MOU) with renowned international training institutions and universities to enhance its global reach.

Training Conducted at BIPSOT

Training curriculum of BIPSOT is designed as per the requirement of Bangladesh Armed Forces, and necessary guidance from the Army HQs and Integrated Training Services (ITS) of the UN. Hence, BIPSOT moves with the time through monitoring mission environment and gamut of the changing situation on ground. Lesson plans are updated accordingly keeping the standard intact. Additionally, various trainings are incorporated as part of capacity building of the potential peacekeepers. Moreover, collaboration with distinguished national and international organization, UN sister concerns and renowned universities multiply the credibility of BIPSOT training. International conferences, seminars, bi-lateral exercise further refine the training spirit of this alma mater of peacekeepers. To keep pace with the emerging technology, E-learning platforms have created another dimension of BIPSOT training. The training curriculum of **BIPSOT** is structured around the following key elements:

- ***International Guidance & Alignment***

UN Frameworks: Developed under the guidance of the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and the Integrated Training Service (ITS).

Cross-Cutting Aspects: Tailored specifically to the multi-dimensional and cross-cutting realities of United Nations Peace Operations (UNPO).

- ***Adaptive Learning & Capacity Building***

Dynamic Updates: Lesson plans are continuously updated based on ongoing monitoring of changing mission environments and real-world ground situations.

Language Courses: Incorporates specialized language training, such as Sango and Arabic, to improve peacekeepers' communication skills in deployment areas.

- ***Collaboration & Exercises***

Institutional Partnerships: Multiplies its credibility through collaborations with national and international organizations, UN sister entities, and renowned universities.

Tactical & Multi-National Exercises: Refines the operational capabilities of peacekeepers through bilateral engagements like Exercise Tiger Lightning and multinational initiatives like Exercise Shanti-Doot.

Academic Exchange: Utilizes international conferences and seminars to enhance institutional knowledge.

- **Digital Integration**

E-Learning Platforms: Leverages modern digital platforms, specifically utilizing the Core Pre-deployment Training Material (CPTM) and the Peace Operation Training Institute (POTI) courses to add a flexible and modern dimension to the training.

The trainings conducted at BIPSOT are highlighted in following tables:

Table 1. List of Courses Regularly Conducted in BIPSOT³⁸.

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
United Nations Staff Officers' Course (UNSOC)	To enable potential Staff Officers to perform effectively in UN Mission Area.	a. Develop a shared understanding of UN Peace Operation's basic principles, guidelines, policies, roles, and responsibilities. b. Familiarize with challenges and issues related to planning and participation in UN Peace Operation. c. Understand the roles and responsibilities of Staff Officers. d. Execute familiarized function in an effective, professional and integrated manner in UN Peace Operation in accordance with UN Department of Peace Operation (DPO) and Department of Operational Support (DOS) principles and guidelines.	3 Weeks duration with a frequency of 2 courses per year
Un Military Observers' Course (UNMOC)	To prepare selected Military Officers to undertake responsibilities as a Military Observer in UN Peace Operation.	a. Develop an understanding of UN Peace Operation's basic principles, guidelines, policies, roles, and responsibilities. b. Align the participants with the core issues related to UN structure, functioning, management, core values and competencies, and an overview of mandated tasks, including cross-cutting thematic issues in UN Peace Operations.	3 Weeks duration with a frequency of 3 courses per year

³⁸ BIPSOT Book of Syllabus, BIPSOT Annual Training Forecast-2026, ATP-00-0045 Courses at Bangladesh Army Schools of Instruction and Training Establishment

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
		c. Perform UN Military Observers' functions effectively, professionally, and in an integrated manner. d. Practice UNMO's Mission Specific Tasks, such as establishing, organizing, and functioning a team site base, conducting interest-based negotiation, organizing and conducting a patrol, ground-level investigation, crater analysis, and managing a crisis/hostile situation following reporting procedure to Higher HQs.	
United Nations Logistics Officers Course (UNLOC)	To prepare selected Military Officers to undertake responsibilities as a Military Logistics Officer in UN Peace Operation	a. Develop an understanding of UN Peace Operation's basic principles, guidelines, policies, roles, and responsibilities. b. Align the participants with the core issues related to UN structure, functioning, management, core values and competencies, and an overview of mandated tasks, including cross-cutting thematic issues in UN Peace Operations. c. Orient the participants with the UN Mission Logistics Management System (LMS), including Tactical Casualty Care (TCC) responsibilities, Mission HQ and UN HQ. d. Make participants apply the Contingent Own Equipment (COE) Manual efficiently while addressing different logistics matters.	3 Weeks duration with a frequency of 1 course per year

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
		e. Prepare participants to work as an effective contingent Logistics officer/staff officer at Force HQ or Sector HQ in an integrated peace operations environment. f. Conceptualize, analyze, address, and respond to Logistics Matters related to different cross-cutting issues in multidimensional peace operations. g. Practice the basic understanding of UN logistics matters related to the Logistics Support Plan/ Order/ Documentation/ Briefing, Contingent Own Equipment (COE) Manual, MOU Negotiation, and Logistics Staff Functioning, including HQ Staff Coordination Methods, through different indoor exercises.	
United Nations Contingent Commander's Course (UNCCC)	To enable the potential Contingent Commanders to perform effectively and efficiently in the United Nations missions under Peace Operation	a. Recognize UN peace operation's basic principles, guidelines, policies, and legal framework. b. Discuss matters related to the UN structure, functioning, core values and competencies, mandate overview, and tasks, including crosscutting issues in UN Peace Operations. c. Explain contingent commanders' roles and responsibilities in the overall framework of the UN Peace Operation. d. Translate the functions of contingent commander in the challenging and integrated mission environment of Peace Operation.	2 Weeks duration with a frequency of 1 course per year

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
		e. Identify the essential tasks for the preparation of contingents prior to deployment in a peace operation. f. Practice through exercises the knowledge of mission coordination and the Protection of Civilian (POC) response.	
Women, Peace and Security Course (WPSC)	To promote a better understanding on the UN policies, guidelines and principles of Women Peace and Security	a. Learn UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) and other related resolutions and implications. b. Explore the important concepts of gender issues. c. Understand the four pillars of Women's Peace and Security: Prevention, Protection, Participation, and Relief and recovery. Understand the conceptual and operational issues of integrating a gender perspective into a multidimensional Peace Operation. d. Apply theoretical knowledge to understanding Women's Peace and Security through various learning activities.	1 Week duration with a frequency of 1 course per year
United Nations Military Peace Keeping Intelligence (UNMPKI) (NL) Course	To equip participants with the knowledge and expertise required to perform effectively as intelligence staff officers in United Nations peace operations, in accordance with the United Nations Military Peacekeeping Intelligence (UNMPKI) training materials, specifically for roles at the Force (U2), Sector (G2), and Battalion (S2) levels	a. Participants are expected to acquire new knowledge and gain valuable experience by exchanging ideas and perspectives with fellow participants and facilitators. b. In the future, participants will benefit from stronger connectivity among themselves, enabling the continued sharing of experiences, ideas, and insights, thereby enhancing their knowledge and skills.	3 Weeks duration with a frequency of 2 courses per year.

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
		c. Participants will be capable of delivering the same training materials to officers within their respective armed forces, effectively preparing them for U2, G2, and S2 roles in mission areas. d. Participants are expected to contribute to continuously improving the training materials by incorporating new lessons learned and experiences as they become available. e. Participants will be better equipped to perform effectively as Intelligence Staff Officers in peacekeeping missions. f. Enhancing staff capabilities is expected to improve the effectiveness of United Nations intelligence activities in the mission area.	
Comprehensive Protection Of Civilians (CPOC)	To familiarize participants with Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (CPOC) concept and mechanism for mandate implementation.	a. Demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of the Protection of Civilians (POC) in Peace Operations (PO). b. Explain the legal and normative frameworks that support the Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (CPOC). c. Discuss different modalities adopted for Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (CPOC) in Peace Operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. d. Identify the need for a Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (CPOC) plan and implement the mandate.	1 Week duration with a frequency of 1 course per year.

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
Engagement Platoon Train The Trainer (EP Train the Trainers) Course)	To prepare and strengthen the institutional capacities of peacekeeping training centers to effectively facilitate and deliver training for female and male officers and soldiers deploying to multidimensional, integrated peacekeeping missions with a Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate, specifically in the roles, responsibilities, and tasks of an Engagement Team (ET)	a. Develop awareness and understanding of the Engagement Team (ET) 's responsibilities and roles to effectively operate in peacekeeping operations with a Protection of Civilians mandate. b. Understand the complexity and characteristics of the operational environment in today's conflicts and the Engagement Team (ET) role in an integrated mission. c. Create a common understanding of UN peacekeeping operations and various field agencies, including operational coordination aspects. d. Understand the elements of Protection of Civilians, including Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and Child Protection, and develop skills and the ability to respond to these issues. e. Enhance understanding of the importance of addressing various cross-cutting issues, including Human Rights, Gender, and the implementation of SCR 1325, Code of Conduct and Discipline, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), etc., through sound leadership and administration. f. Develop the capacity of female officers and soldiers to enhance the effectiveness of operations to protect civilians, particularly regarding community engagement and information gathering. g. Enhance participants' presentation and facilitation skills with a focus on facilitating scenario-based exercises.	2 Weeks duration with a frequency of 1 course per year.

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
French Language Courses (FLC)	To impart elementary working knowledge on French Language for the selected Officers, Junior Commission Officers (JCOs) and Other Ranks (ORs) of Armed Forces and Bangladesh Police for basic communication in the mission area.	a. Have working knowledge of French Language. b. Be able to communicate with locals (Spoken French). c. Develop skills in reading and writing in the French Language.	12 Weeks duration with a frequency of 3 courses per year
Arabic Language Course (ALC)	To impart elementary working knowledge of the Arabic Language to selected Junior Commission Officers (JCOs) and Other Ranks (ORs) for basic communication in mission/ deployment area	a. Acquire working knowledge on Arabic Language. b. Be able to communicate with locals in Speaking Arabic. c. Develop skills in reading and writing on Arabic Language	10 Weeks duration with a frequency of 2 courses per year
Sango Language Courses (SLC)	To impart elementary working knowledge on Sango Language for the selected Officers, Junior Commission Officers (JCOs) and Other Rank (ORs) of MINUSCA Contingents for basic communication in the msn area	a. Have working knowledge of the Sango Language. b. Be able to communicate with locals (Spoken Sango). c. Develop skills in Sango listening and speaking.	4 Weeks duration with a frequency of 2 courses per year
Pre-Deployment Training	To equip personnel with essential skills, knowledge and competencies needed to effectively operate in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations	a. Prepare personnel for the complex and multifaceted challenges of UN field missions. b. Provide knowledge in understanding UN mandates and operations. c. Aware the peacekeepers about the culture and sensitivity of the locals of the host country. d. Educate the peacekeepers about human right and humanitarian law and the role of UN personnel is upholding the principles in conflict and post conflict contexts.	22 Weeks duration with a frequency of 8-10 courses per year

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
		e. Train the peacekeepers about safety and security measures for personnel and equipment and how to respond to different threats, ensuring personnel safety while deployed. f. Aware the peacekeepers about health and well-being in mission area. g. Comprehensive understanding about logistic support for UN operation planning. h. Train the peacekeepers about effective community engagement. J. Train on how to effectively engage with local population, partner organization and government bodies.	
Computer Assistance Exercise (CAX)	To build the capacity of participating officers in undertaking command and staff responsible at contingent, company and platoon level of United Nations Peace Operations (UNPO) with sufficient situation awareness, situation analysis, contingent planning and decision making ability	a. To emphasize the Protection of Civil (POC) and require adherence to Rules of Engagement (ROE) in the UN environment. b. To plan and validate effect-based defects against threats in the UN environment. c. To formulate an efficient intelligence collection plan in the UN environment. d. To test the feasibility of reserve operations/ employment of Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in the UN environment.	1 Week duration with a frequency of 3 courses per year

Table 2. List of Courses Frequently Conducted in BIPSOT³⁹.

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
UN Gender Adviser (UNGENAD) Course	To prepare potential Gender Advisers with the require knowledge of Gender Perspective in the UN Peace Operation	a. Enable participants to apply UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) and other related resolutions and Security Council Mandates in the work of the UN Peace Operation. b. Enable participants to apply the concepts, policies, and strategies related to the thematic and Cross-cutting issues, including Protection of Civilians (POC), Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), Gender-Based Violence (GBV), and Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV), in the weeks of the UN Peace Operation. c. Enable participants to apply important concepts, fun, skills, and analysis related to GENAD in the weeks of UN Peace Operation. d. Enable participants to apply Gender Assessment tools in the weeks of UN Peace Operation.	1 Week duration with a frequency of 1 course per year
United Nations Military Peace Keeping Intelligence (UNMPKI) Course	To equip participants with the knowledge and expertise required to perform effectively as intelligence staff officers in United Nations peace operations, in accordance with the United Nations Military	a. Participants are expected to acquire new knowledge and gain valuable experience by exchanging ideas and perspectives with fellow participants and facilitators.	2 Weeks duration with a frequency of 1 course per year.

³⁹ BIPSOT Book of Syllabus, BIPSOT Annual Training Forecast-2026, BIPSOT Book of Syllabus, ATP-00-0045 Courses at Bangladesh Army Schools of Instruction and Training Establishment

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
	Peacekeeping Intelligence (UNMPKI) training materials, specifically for roles at the Force (U2), Sector (G2), and Battalion (S2) levels	b. In the future, participants will benefit from stronger connectivity among themselves, enabling the continued sharing of experiences, ideas, and insights, thereby enhancing their knowledge and skills. c. Participants will be capable of delivering the same training materials to officers within their respective armed forces, effectively preparing them for U2, G2, and S2 roles in mission areas. d. Participants are expected to contribute to continuously improving the training materials by incorporating new lessons learned and experiences as they become available. e. Participants will be better equipped to perform effectively as Intelligence Staff Officers in peacekeeping missions. f. Enhancing staff capabilities is expected to improve the effectiveness of United Nations intelligence activities in the mission area.	
National Investigation Officer (NIO) Course	To establish an uniform method for investigating possible misconduct by personnel serving in the United Nations	To support efforts to improve accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and other conduct and discipline violations committed by UN peacekeepers.	2 Weeks duration with a frequency of 1 course per 2 years.

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
Force Protection (FP)	To examine Force Protection as a key tool for enhancing the safety and security of peacekeepers in Peace Operations (PO).	a. Improving coordination and response by strengthening the ability of UN Peacekeepers to work collaboratively with host nations. b. To provide a united framework for force protection strategies, including risk management and convoy security, to ensure consistency across UN missions. c. Strengthening the ability of UN peacekeepers to work collaboratively with the host nations.	2 Weeks duration with a frequency of 1 course per 2 years.
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) Course	To build the capacity of officers and officials to integrate CRSV prevention and response mechanisms within UN mission mandates at strategic, operational and tactical levels.	a. Be capable of performing roles and responsibilities effectively to integrate CRSV prevention and response mechanisms within UN mandates. b. Demonstrate professional conduct, victim-centered approaches. c. Adherence to international legal standards and the ability to operate efficiently in multinational and multidimensional peacekeeping environments.	1 Week duration with a frequency of 1 course within few years.
Child Protection (CP) Course	To grow understanding among the participants about the six grave violations against children in armed conflict, monitoring and reporting mechanisms for child protection, effective liaison with civilian, humanitarian, and local	a. Be capable of recognizing and responding to child protection concerns in mission areas. b. Apply UN values and behaviors in safeguarding children.	1 Week duration with a frequency of 1 course within few years.

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
	actors, integrating child protection into operational planning and execution	c. Be able to contribute effectively to the broader mandate of protecting vulnerable populations in peacekeeping operations.	
Swahili Language Courses (SWLC)	To impart elementary working knowledge on Swahili Language for the selected Officers, Junior Commission Officers (JCOs) and Other Rank (ORs) of MONUSCO Contingents for basic communication in the msn area	a. Have working knowledge of the Swahili Language. b. Be able to communicate with locals (Spoken Swahili). c. Develop skills in Swahili listening and speaking.	6 Weeks duration with a frequency of 1 course per year
United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (UNCIMIC) Course	To enhance the capacities of participating officers by developing their leadership competencies in peacekeeping operations and equipping them with the knowledge and skills necessary for effective Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC)	a. Recognize major civil-military coordination issues in modern UN Peace Operations. b. Understand the UN's role and responsibilities in UN Peace Operation education and training. c. Review the civil and military coordination structures in different mission models. d. Understand the national roles and responsibilities concerning UN Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) education and training for deployment. e. Establish baseline liaison and coordination skills necessary to operate within a peacekeeping mission.	1 Week duration with a frequency of 1 course per year

Table 3. List of Newly Introduced Courses in 2026-27 at BIPSOT⁴⁰.

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
Train the Trainers Course on IHL and Legal Framework of Bangladesh	To prepare selective officers going for UN mission to perform the assigned role of using force respecting International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to maintain a healthy mission environments under complex and mission-specific mandates issued by the UN Security Council.	a. Be proficient in applying legal and operational standards in complex mission environments. b. Be able to demonstrate distinguishing between combatants and civilians and apply Principle of Proportionality, c. Execute the tasks related to Protection of Civilians (POC), Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) and Child Protection effectively.	1 Week duration with a frequency of 2 courses per year.
French/Creole Language Courses (FCLC)	To impart elementary working knowledge on French and Haitian Creole Language for the selected Officers, Junior Commission Officers (JCOs) and Other Ranks (ORs) of Armed Forces and Bangladesh Police for basic communication in the mission area.	a. Have working knowledge of French and Haitian Creole Language. b. Be able to communicate with locals (Spoken French and Haitian Creole Language). c. Develop skills in reading and writing in the French and Haitian Creole Language.	4 Weeks duration with a frequency of 1 course per year
Negotiation and Mediation in the Field Course	To develop participants' practical negotiation and mediation competencies for tactical and operational-level engagement in UN peacekeeping missions, enabling them to translate strategic mandates into effective ground-level	a. To understand the legal and mandate framework governing negotiation and mediation in general including UNPOs and the translation of UN Security Council/ GA Resolutions into operational and tactical guidance.	2 Weeks duration with a frequency of 1 course per year.

⁴⁰ BIPSOT Book of Syllabus, BIPSOT Provisionary Annual Training Forecast-2027

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
	negotiation, ceasefire management, and spoiler mitigation while preserving UN neutrality, impartiality, and credibility.	b. To impart negotiation and mediation knowledge, and develop limited negotiation skill, including active listening, communication techniques, and managing power asymmetries when engaging with contesting/ conflicting groups and local/ international actors. c. To understand the civil-military interface and coordination mechanisms between the UN HQ, UNPO and leadership, humanitarian actors (OCHA, ICRC), and host-nation authorities. d. To be able to design and manage technical ceasefire mechanisms, including local separation lines, buffer zones, disengagement corridors, and verification arrangements. e. To identify and manage local spoilers, including the application of negotiation leverage, incentive and isolation strategies, and measures to counter disinformation targeting the peace and peace process.	
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) & Counter Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) Awareness Course	To develop situational awareness regarding UAS threats in mission environments, familiarize participants with the types, capabilities, and employment patterns of commercial and military-grade drones, enhance	a. Identify and assess UAV and UAS-related threats within mission areas. b. Apply standardized UN reporting and incident response procedures for UAV and UAS incidents.	1 Week duration with a frequency of 2 courses per year

Name of Course	Aim	Objectives	Duration and frequency
	understanding of detection, identification, reporting, and initial response procedures, strengthen coordination and liaison mechanisms among military, police, civilian components, host nation forces, and UN mission headquarters.	c. Integrate UAV and C-UAS awareness into broader mission planning, protection of civilians (POC), and force protection frameworks.	
International Trauma Life Support (ITLS)	To improve trauma care and prevent death and disability from trauma through high-quality education and emergency trauma care.	a. To provide students with the fundamental knowledge and hands-on skills necessary to get a trauma patient from the scene to surgery in the best possible condition. b. ITLS emphasizes standard framework for the rapid, appropriate, and effective identification of immediate life threats and the performance of critical interventions. c. The training is designed to teach an orderly and systematic approach to the initial evaluation and treatment of traumatized patients. d. ITLS works to empower emergency care providers across all levels and backgrounds including EMTs, paramedics, nurses, and physicians with the skills necessary to provide optimal care in the pre-hospital setting.	1 Week duration with a frequency of 2 courses per year

Table 4. BIPSOT Provisionary Training Forecast of Thematic and Language Courses - 2027⁴¹

Ser	Course	Code	Duration			Remarks
			From	To	Weeks	
1	Arabic Language Course-5	ALC-5	03-01-27	25-03-27	12	For all Ranks
2	United Nations Military Observer Course-30	UNMOC-30	24-01-27	11-02-27	3	For Officers only
3	United Nations Military Staff Officers' Course -30	UNSOC-30	14-02-27	04-03-27	3	For Officers only
4	United Nations Logistic Officers' Course-24	UNLOC-24	21-03-27	08-04-27	3	For Officers only
5	International Trauma Life Support (Phase-4)	ITLS (Ph-4)	19-03-27	25-03-27	1	For all Ranks
6	French Language Course-32	FLC-32	28-03-27	17-06-27	12	For all Ranks
7	United Nations Military Peacekeeping Intelligence-5	UNMPKI (NL)-5	04-04-27	22-04-27	3	For Officers only
8	Swahili Language Course -2	SWLC-32	04-04-27	13-05-27	6	For all Ranks
9	UAV & C-UAS Awareness Course-2	UAV & C-UAS-2	23-04-27	29-04-27	1	For all Ranks
10	United Nations Military Observer Course-31	UNMOC-31	06-06-27	24-06-27	3	For Officers only
11	SANGO Language Course-4	SLC-4	13-06-26	08-07-26	4	For all Ranks
12	French Language Course -33	FLC-33	27-06-27	16-09-27	12	For all Ranks
13	French/Creole Language Course-2	FCLC-2	11-07-27	04-08-27	4	For all Ranks
14	Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Course -3	CPOC-3	16-07-27	22-07-27	1	For Officers and Civilians only
15	United Nations Contingent Commander Course-20	UNCCC-20	25-07-27	04-08-27	2	For Officers only
16	Train the trainer (ToT) on IHL and legal system of BD and UN framework	IHL Trg-3	15-08-27	22-08-27	1	For Officers and Civilians only
17	United Nations Military Staff Officers' Course -31	UNSOC-31	29-08-27	16-09-27	3	For Officers only

⁴¹BIPSOT Book of Syllabus, BIPSOT Provisionary Annual Training Forecast-2027

Ser	Course	Code	Duration			Remarks
			From	To	Weeks	
18	Women, Peace and Security Course-14	WPSC-14	24-09-27	30-09-27	1	For Officers and Civilians only
19	United Nations Military Peacekeeping Intelligence-6	UNMPKI (NL)-6	03-10-27	21-10-27	3	For Officers only
20	Arabic Language Course-6	ALC-6	17-10-27	23-12-27	10	For all Ranks
21	International Trauma Life Support (Phase-5)	ITLS (Ph-5)	29-10-27	04-11-27	1	For all Ranks
22	UAV & C-UAS Awareness Course-3	UAV & C-UAS-3	05-11-27	11-11-27	1	
23	Negotiation and Mediation in the Field Course-1	NMFC-1	14-11-27	25-11-27	2	For Officers and Civilians only
24	Engagement Platoon T3-2	EP T3-2	28-11-27	09-12-27	2	

Medium of Training and Selection of Participants

The courses are conducted in English medium except the Pre-Deployment Training, which is run in local language Bangla since the course participants are all local and comprise of all ranks. Indeed, the course participants of various courses are selected as following:

- **Local:** The local participants are selected by the Services Headquarters and Police HQs.
- **Overseas:** For selection of the overseas participants, offer letters are sent by the Armed Forces Division to the friendly countries, who traditionally contributes to global peace and security. Based on the invitations, friendly countries send their participants in different BIPSOT courses.
- **Civilian Participants:** A few BIPSOT courses are designed to accept civilian participants, e.g. CPOC, WPSC, IHL Training, UN GENAD, Negotiation and Mediation in the Field, etc. The aspiring candidates may contact Armed Forces Division and BIPSOT to participate in the aforementioned courses.

Conclusion

The Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training offers a comprehensive, and evolving curriculum tailored to the cross-cutting aspects of United Nations Peace Operations (UNPO) and multinational frameworks, reflecting Bangladesh's firm commitment to global peace and security. Developed under the guidance of the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and the Integrated Training Service (ITS), the curriculum continuously updates its lesson plans

based on real-time mission environments and integrates specialized training domains—such as logistics, intelligence, gender, command development, and language courses in Arabic and Sango.

BIPSOT multiplies its institutional credibility by collaborating with national and international organizations, UN sister concerns, and renowned universities. It further refines its training spirit through academic seminars, bilateral exercises like Exercise Tiger Lightning, and multinational initiatives like Exercise Shanti-Doot. Furthermore, the integration of advanced e-learning platforms, including the Core Pre-deployment Training Material (CPTM) and the Peace Operation Training Institute (POTI), adds a modern digital dimension to the curriculum, ensuring the development of highly efficient peacekeepers through the highest possible training standards.

References:

1. Article 25 of the constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh
2. ATP-00-0045 Courses at Bangladesh Army Schools of Instruction and Training Establishment
3. BIPSOT Annual Training Forecast-2026
4. BIPSOT Book of Syllabus
5. BIPSOT Provisionary Annual Training Forecast-2027
6. Miraj Ahmed Bhuiyan, Major, EB, *Training Conducted at Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training (BIPSOT)*, BIPSOT Journal 2024.
7. Official BIPSOT Website (bipsot.net)](<https://www.bipsot.net>)



Major Syed Maruf Ahmed, psc, E Bangal was commissioned on 26 June 2002 with the 46th BMA Long Course in the Corps of Signals. Beside attending mandatory courses, he has completed Army Staff Course (ASC)-41 at DSCSC, Army Commando Course (ACC)-20 in SI&T, Path Finder Course (PFC)-3 in SI&T, Free Fall Course (FFC)-6 in SI&T, Combat Survival Course -2007 in Junglw Warfare School, Malaysia, Jungle Warfare Course in CRTS, Sri Lanka, He performed in multifaceted appointments during his unit service and conducted numbers of division level training events. Under the blue helmet, he served as Platoon Commander of BANSRIC-1 (UNAMID) in Sudan from February 2009 to February 2010 and as Company Commander of BANRDB-2 (MONUSCO) in Democratic Republic of Congo, from March 2019 to March 2020. Presently, he is serving as General Staff Officer, Grade-2 (Planning & Coordination) at BIPSOT.

BIPSOT JOURNAL

Promoters of Peace

Notes for Contributors

Manuscripts Submission on ‘Compact Diskette’

Authors are requested to submit 2 (two) hard copies of their manuscript in English. The length of manuscripts should be maximum 5,000 words (including footnotes) within 15-20 double-spaced A4 size papers. Manuscripts are accepted subject to editorial revision. The manuscripts should be typed on one side of white A4 paper.

The submitted manuscripts should contain: name(s) of the author(s) including complete mailing address, an abstract of approximate 150-200 words and acknowledgements (if any) should appear after the abstract.

Once a manuscript is accepted for publication, the author(s) should submit a copy of the manuscript on a compact diskette labeled with the title of the article, the name(s) of the author(s) and the word processing software used. The preferred word processing software is Microsoft Word.

Footnotes and Quotations

Footnotes should be numbered consecutively with superscript Arabic numbers. They should be typed single-spaced and should be placed at the foot of each page. Footnotes should not be used solely for citing references. They may cover illustration/explanation of a point the author thinks readers should be made aware of.

Tables & Figures

All tables should be numbered consecutively with Arabic numerals. Full source(s) should appear below the table followed by notes, if any, in lower letters.

All figures should be numbered consecutively. Figures should be planned to fit the proportions of the printed page. Full source(s) should be provided below each figure.

All maps should be numbered consecutively. Full sources should be provided below each map.



Following the General Assembly Resolution 49 slash 37 of 1994, Government of Bangladesh instructed Bangladesh Army to establish an institute to train potential peacekeepers. With this backdrop Peace Keeping Operation Training Centre (PKOTC) was established at Rajendrapur cantonment on 24 June 1999. Later, in 2002, PKOTC renamed to Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training (BIPSOT). Gradually, BIPSOT has emerged as a globally recognized Peace Keeping Training Institute in the Asia-Pacific region.

BIPSOT has conducted a total of 526 indigenous Pre-deployment Trainings (PDT) that includes Mission Specific PDTs for contingent members, Potential Observers' and Staff Officers' Course (POSOC), Contingent Members' Course (CMC), United Nations Military Observers' Course (UNMOC), United Nations Contingent Commanders' Course (UNCCC), United Nations Staff Officers' Course (UNSOC), United Nations Logistic Officers' Course (UNLOC), International Defense Management Course (IDMC), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), United Nations Civil Military Coordination Course (UNCIMIC), Protection of Civilian (POC) Course, Women Peace and Security (WPS) Course, Security Sector Reform (SSR) Course, Mine Action Course (MAC) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Course (DDRC), United Nations Military Peacekeeping Intelligence (T3) Course (UNMPKI), UN Gender Adviser Course (UN GENAD), Engagement Platoon Course (EP), National Investigation Officers' Course (NIO), Force Protection Course (FP).

Since inception, BIPSOT has contributed appreciably in preparing potential peacekeepers in line with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/37. So far, BIPSOT has trained over 52701 personnel including 2700 foreigners from 79 countries that include Australia, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, China, Fiji, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Malawi, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan, South Sudan, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, UK, USA, Vietnam, Yemen and Zambia. Today BIPSOT is widely commended for its quality training on peace operation both at home and abroad. It is firmly believed that the contribution of BIPSOT in the field of peace operation training for making a better world will continue and it will continue to strive harder to leave its mark as the international 'Centre of Excellence'.

The 'Promoters of Peace' is a professional Journal of the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training. It is published once in a year and its goal is to provide a platform for sharing knowledge, experience, ideas and information related to United Nations Peace Support Operations