


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THE FALLACY OF FRAGILE STATES INDICES: IS THERE A 'FRAGILITY TRAP'?

Mohammad Zahidul Islam Khan




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Number 25, January 2017

THE FALLACY OF FRAGILE STATES INDICES: IS THERE A 'FRAGILITY TRAP'?

Mohammad Zahidul Islam Khan

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The idea of this project first came to my mind while taking the 'fragile states security development nexus' course at the University of Bradford, United Kingdom in 2012. Knowing more about different fragility indices that are often cited in the media reinforced my intention to express my thoughts in the form of a monograph. However, making of the project was only made possible and honed through my Graduate School International Student PhD scholarship at the University of Reading in 2014. To that end, Bangladesh Air Force's consent to pursue my PhD was an important facilitator for undertaking this research and I remain deeply grateful to my beloved Air Force for the encouragement.

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ABSTRACT

The concept of state fragility remains elusive despite being in widespread use since early 1990's and expressed by a growing trend of indexing sovereign states according to their performances. Different fragility indices with varied orientations have emerged shaping our perceptions about states populating the international system. Dominated by domestic drivers of fragility, these indices have played an important role to universalize the under theorized concept of state fragility. The conceptual ambiguity and the underlying narrative surrounding these indices demand a critical look at the real world issue of state fragility and ask: What do these indices actually tell us about the future trajectories of 'fragile states'? How long will it take for these states to come out of 'fragility' or are they doomed in a 'fragility trap'? And if so, is there a more valid analytical framework to investigate and understand state fragility?

The paper frames the issue from an 'outside-in' perspective taking a '*longue duree*' view of fragile states problematique, incorporating their episodic history and conjunctures of economic cycles. Thus, the paper first traces the emergence of fragile states as a product of the ebb and flow of international dynamics. It highlights how the episodic history of colonial legacy, egalitarian international system, Cold War and the era of global war on terrorism, together with the capitalist economic system of the industrial era played a decisive role in creating and sustaining states that are now considered as fragile. Second, the paper exposes the fallacy of state fragility indices by revealing the 'fragility trap'. It critically examines four oft-cited state fragility indices (i.e. Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Country Indicator for Foreign Policy Fragility Index, Fragile State Index, and World Governance Indicator's Political Stability and Absence of Violence Index) to identify inadequacies in their conceptualization and operationalizing of state fragility. Using the fragility scores of 197 countries from these indices, the paper estimates the duration these states would take to emerge out of fragility. The result reveals that, within the conceptual boundaries of the four indices, 23–34 per cent states will require over 100 years to reach the 'top'/'sustainable' status while a staggering 43–53 per cent states will take more than 50 years to reach the same threshold and emerge out of fragility if they continue to maintain their historic trajectories of progress. The findings tend to confirm the existence of 'fragility trap'.

Finally, the paper introduces the Centre-Periphery model as an alternative framework to investigate and explain the fragile state problematique. It views the world consisting of Centre and Peripheral states, where fragility is concentrated mostly in the latter; each nation in turn has its own centre and periphery. The nature of interaction (i.e. harmonious vs conflictual) between and within the Centre and Peripheral state remains the crucial determinant of state fragility. The paper hypothesizes the propensity of state fragility with four possible variants of interactions within and between the Centre and Peripheral states. The paper contends that, conceptualizing state only as a functional entity devoid of historicity, power relations and strategic significance can obscure our understanding on state fragility. It concludes that a convergence of interests and goals between the developed Centre and the developing Peripheral states is essential to effectively address state fragility and ensure a good life for the 'bottom billions' living in fragile situations. Failing to do that would make the phenomenon of fragile state a rather inevitable feature of the international system.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 *The Context and the Puzzle*

The concept of “state fragility/weakness”¹ remains elusive despite being in widespread use since the early 1990’s and expressed by a growing trend of indexing sovereign states according to their performance. Different fragility indices with varied orientations have emerged shaping our thoughts and perceptions about countries that populate the international system. The emergence of fragile states in the international system coincides with what Joel Migdal terms the ‘world historical moments’ – a condition where the exogenous political conditions favours concentrating social control leading to the creation of new states.² Two such historic moments, the decolonization process by the end of World War II (WWII) and the breakdown of the former Soviet Union resulted in the creation of over 150 independent states. However, not all these states share a similar trajectory. Notwithstanding a very few exceptions, the newly independent states that are closer to the global Centre of Western industrialized countries demonstrated a faster trajectory and better consolidation of statehood compared to the states that are located in the global peripheries. Investigating the reasons why some of the post-colonial peripheral states ‘fail’ while others ‘succeed’, researchers have used various analytical models focusing on state-society relations, capacity of the state in delivering core services, the unique (in)security dilemma of weak states etc., culminating in the current practice of summary measurements of state’s performance through different state fragility indices. There are at least 12 such indices developed under the sponsorship of government, business, academia or non-profit organizations. The major ones include: Germany’s Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI), Fund for Peace’s Fragile (previously failed) State Index (FSI), Carleton University’s Country Indicator for Foreign Policy Fragility Index (CIFP), World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating, World Governance Indicator (WGI), George Mason University’s State Fragility Index (SFI), Brookings Institute’s Index of State Weakness in Developing World (ISW). These indices have played an important role in the universal spread of the nascent concept of the fragile state.

¹ The term ‘state fragility’ and ‘state weakness’ is used interchangeably in this paper as it coexists with conceptually similar notions like ‘weak/failing/failed/collapsed’ state - all of which may be defined as different stages along the fragility spectrum. See, Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World*, Washington DC, USA: The Brookings Institution, 2008, p. 25; and Javier Fabra Mata and Sebastian Ziaja, “Users’ Guide on Measuring Fragility”, available at <http://www.gsdr.org/document-library/users-guide-on-measuring-fragility/>, accessed on 08 September 2015, p. 7.

² Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 271.

While such indices are a welcome addition to the social science literature, the conceptual ambiguity and the underlying narrative surrounding these indices demand a critical look at the real world issue of state weakness.³ Despite the terminological promiscuity and the associated claim of conceptual laxity surrounding the term 'fragile states', such states continue to exist in the international system – defined in various terms. Prior to the concept of 'fragile/failed/failing/collapsed states' that entered the global political lexicon in the early 1990s and the summary measurement architecture that now dominates the literature, states were broadly categorized by the academia along the spectrum of development (developed/developing/underdeveloped), socio-political and security alliance (first world/ second world/third world), modernity (pre modern/modern/postmodern) etc. The only category introduced and recognized by the United Nations (UN) since 1968 is the category of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) based on the economic criteria. This, however, evolved over time and detailed methods are now in place for the inclusion and gradation from the LDC status.

Indeed, generalizing states along some defined conceptual boundaries is not novel; weak/fragile states have persistently existed in the international system. Although the inability to agree on consistent criteria to define state fragility might contribute to overload the concept with multiple meanings making it deeply ambiguous, it has not eliminated the reality of state weakness. Thus, this paper is not about the utility of the concept of state fragility and whether or not a state can be regarded as 'fragile'. The paper is about emphasizing the (i) underlying historical process and nature of interaction between the global and local factors through which some states have arrived at fragility and (ii) critically examining the oft-quoted multidimensional composite state fragility indices to reveal how realistic they are in projecting the future trajectories of these states. Taking a long view, this paper investigates the context and reasons leading to the emergence of fragile states and empirically reveal what do these state fragility indices tell us about the future trajectories of fragile states. How long will it take for these states to come out of fragility or are they doomed in a 'fragility trap' – defined as state stagnation? And if so, is there a more valid analytical framework to investigate and understand state fragility? The paper suggests that state fragility is to be understood and analyzed as a 'historical totality' analogous to the notion of *longue durée* – the world system analysis

³ For example, Francisco Sanín argues that state fragility indices uses "hazy notions to portray as if they were genuine solutions to definitional problems and interacts with a political economy of knowledge." While Sebastian Ziaja reports that "there is a group of "holistic" fragility indices which are of little use for investigating the causes and consequences of fragility." Francisco Gutierrez Sanín, "The Quandaries of Coding and Ranking: Evaluating Poor State Performance Indexes", available at <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28483/1/WP58.2.pdf/>, accessed on 08 September 2015; and Sebastian Ziaja, "What Do Fragility Indices Measure? Assessing Measurement Procedures and Statistical Proximity", available at <https://www.die-gdi.de/en/others-publications/article/what-do-fragility-indices-measure-assessing-measurement-procedures-and-statistical-proximity/>, accessed on 08 September 2015.

that focuses on the all-but-permanent or slowly evolving structures. The paper argues that conceptualizing state only as a functional entity devoid of historicity, external power relations, geo-political and strategic environment etc. provides a partial view of state fragility. Thus, the current quantitative measures used for assessing state fragility need to sufficiently include the external drivers of fragility as these would hold greater explanatory power.

1.2 *Structure of the Paper*

Considering state formation as a historical process, this paper takes an 'outside-in' approach for investigating and understanding state fragility. The underlying aim of this paper is not to discredit the narratives espoused by different fragility indices but to frame the issue of state fragility in a broader context. The paper, first, traces the context and conditions contributing to the emergence of fragile states in the international market of states; second, it reveals the fragility trap implicit to the current measurement techniques of states fragility; third, it suggest an alternative framework of analysis to better understand and explain state fragility. The paper takes a view of the world system as consisting of 'Centre' and 'Periphery' of states, where fragility is concentrated mostly in the latter. Each nation in turn has its own centre and periphery.⁴ Thus, by challenging and revealing the fragility trap inherent in the current qualitative measurement technique of state fragility, this paper argues that the 'Hobbesian Periphery' is closely intertwined to the 'Lockean Core' and any assessment of measuring state fragility that discounts the externalities is futile and incomplete. Excluding the introduction and the conclusion, the monograph contains five chapters. A brief description of each chapter is given below:

- **Chapter II** traces the emergence of fragile states in the 'world market of states' as a product of the ebb and flow of international dynamics dating back to the colonial era. Explaining the historic turn of events, it highlights how (a) the colonial legacy, (b) the egalitarian practice of respecting state sovereignty and desire for self-determination, (c) detente during the Cold War; and finally (d) the discourse of Global War on Terrorism (GWOt) contributed to the emergence and prominence of the fragile states.
- **Chapter III** discusses the current measurement architecture taking into account four most often cited fragility indices, namely BTI, CIPF, FSI and the Political Stability and Absence of Violence dimensions of WGI that closely proxies state fragility. It critically examines how

⁴ See for details, "Centre-Periphery model", available at <http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/centre-periphery-model>, accessed on 10 October 2015. For a working analysis of the Centre and Periphery framework, see Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1971, pp. 81-117.

these four major indices define and operationalize state fragility to produce the overall composite state fragility index and outlines their inadequacies and limitations.

- **Chapter IV** answers the core question by empirically demonstrating how such inadequacies of these indices (as outlined in chapter III) implicitly suggest the existence of a 'fragility trap' – defined as state stagnation. Using the fragility scores of different states from the four indices, the paper estimates the time these fragile states would take to reach the level of a strong/stable state and emerge out of fragility. The result reveals that, within the conceptual boundaries of these four indices, it will take hundreds of years for many states to come out of fragility – essentially proving the existence of a 'fragility trap'.
- **Chapter V** suggests an alternative analytical framework to investigate and understand state fragility based on the Centre-Periphery model. It offers four propositions about the propensity of state fragility based on the nature of interactions between and within the centre and peripheral nations. The paper concludes that a convergence of interest and goals between the developed 'Centre' and the fragile 'Peripheral' states is essential to effectively address the problem of state fragility. Failing to do that would make the phenomenon of 'fragile states' a rather inevitable feature of the international system.

1.3 Methodology

The research is broadly synthetic in approach drawing heavily on the relevant literature on state fragility in general and fragility indices in particular. It is essentially a mixed method approach as it integrates the analytics and the empirics drawing data on related issues like: 'state death', entry and exit of states into the international system from 1860-2011,⁵ incidence of military coup from 1950-2015,⁶ degree of political terror from 1976-2015 (from Political Terror Scale) and four state fragility indices (BTI, CIPP, FSI, and WGI (PS & AV)). The research (chapter IV) leverages from the work by Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews on 'capability traps'.⁷ In this chapter, their quantitative method

⁵ Data on entry and exit of states to the international system is from Correlates of War (COW), "State System Membership List, v2011" available at <http://correlatesofwar.org/>, accessed on 10 November 2015; 'State death' data from Brandon Valeriano and John V. Benthuyssen, "When States Die: Geographic and Territorial Pathways to State Death", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 7, 2012, pp. 1165-1189 and Tanisha M. Fazal, "State death in the International System", *International Organization*, Vol. 58, 2004, pp. 318-320.

⁶ Jonathon M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2011, pp. 249-259. Data set available at http://www.uky.edu/~clthyne2/coup_data/powell_thyne_coups_final.txt/, accessed on 25 June 2015.

⁷ Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock, and Matt Andrews, "Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of Persistent

has been employed to calculate the number of years each state will take to emerge out of fragility using the data from four fragility indices as mentioned above. However, the method applied in this chapter differs from Prichett *et.al* in a number of ways. First, this project involves all 181 states that are common in at least two or more indices and takes into account the overall fragility score as opposed to their focus on three indicators of bureaucratic functionality involving 95 countries. Second, it applies the simple annual growth rate instead of compound annual growth rate to obtain the most optimistic estimate of a country's pace of progresses. Third, the calculation is followed by regression analysis to demonstrate the validity and reliability of the method. More details on these issues are discussed in chapter IV.

Finally, in so far this research succeeds in offering a 'long view' of the emergence of fragile states as a product of 'historical totality' (in chapter II) and the corresponding formulation of the analytical model based on centre-periphery (in chapter V) reflecting the structure associated with the regularities of 'societies of states' in the international system, also makes the approach of this research closer to the notion of *longue durée* – the world system analysis espoused by Fernand Braudel that focuses on the all-but-permanent or slowly evolving structures.⁸ Central to the Braudelian understanding of the *longue durée* is the notion that 'time' is not just a simple chronological parameter but a 'social construct.' The plurality of social time, as Braudel categorized on the scale of *durée* (i.e. duration) includes: the short term of event or 'episodic history', generally focusing on the political dimension (for example the democracy is a more recent political invention); the medium term or conjunctures, often associated with the economic cycle (for example capitalist economic system of the industrial era) and the long term or *longue durée* of structures, associated with the regularities of social life that is often imperceptible. It does not, however, imply that *longue durée* is eternal and therefore ahistorical; it rather insists on the multiplicity of social time and an emphasis on 'structural time'. Viewed this way, the 'story' of the fragile state indices can be relegated as a 'snapshot' of 'fragility' anchored in the capacity and functionality and of the states in a particular space and time. The clear priority of this research on the long term evolution of historical and socio-political structures in which states are embedded and their all important role in making and re-making of the fragile states thus closely resembles a Braudelian approach rooted in the notion of *longue durée*.

Implementation Failure", Centre for Global Development Working Paper, 2010, pp. 13-18.

⁸ For a brief description of Braudel's *longue duree* perspective, see, Richard E. Lee (ed.), *The Longue Duree and World-Systems Analysis*, New York: State University of New York Press, Albany, 2012, pp. 1-9. For the relevance of *longue duree* perspective to analyse state fragility, see Jean-Germain Gros, "Failed States in Theoretical, Historical, and Policy Perspectives", in Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Stefan Malthaner and Andrea Kirschner (eds.), *Control of Violence: Historical and International Perspectives on Violence in Modern Societies*, New York: Springer, 2011, pp. 535-561.

CHAPTER II

EMERGENCE OF FRAGILE STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

2.1 *Emergence of Fragile States: Multiple Pathways*

The aim of this chapter is to portray the fragile state phenomenon as a 'historic totality' by tracing the birth and journey of the states that are now categorized as fragile. Several 'episodic history' of the international system coincides with the induction of the new states into the society of states. Such historic moments have also contributed to the 'death' of many states in the process. From an 'outside in' perspective, the different hues of the contraction and expansion of European colonizers, followed by the two World Wars and historic creation of the UN, consolidation of the socialist world system under the Soviet Union paralleled by a capitalist Western system based on market expansion during the Cold War and the more recent phenomenon of GWOt have all contributed towards the emergence and proliferation of the fragile state concept. Externally, each of these events can be linked to the shaping and reshaping of world map; internally, these events also contributed to the strengthening or weakening of the state-society relations that determine the future trajectory of many of these new states. This chapter briefly unfolds the historic account of state formation and the continued relevance of the external politico-security conditions and link the same to the debates of state fragility.


The concept of 'state weakness' reflects the idea of the state as a living social entity that can be 'strong/powerful', 'weak/fragile' or even 'collapse/die'. If one accepts the Realists' notion of anarchy as the central organizing concept of the international relations, one would expect the 'weak and fragile states' to be natural 'predatory targets' which will eventually be conquered or annexed by stronger states. Indeed, history is full of the corpses of 'failed' and 'dead' states. Exploring the strategic environment of buffer states, Tanisha Fazal empirically demonstrates that these states are significantly more likely to 'die' compared to non-buffer states.⁹ Adding to these findings, Valeriano and Benthuyssen argue that states are at a greater risk of 'death' when they become involved in territorial disputes that raise the stakes of conflict.¹⁰ Correlates of War (COW), one of the most frequently used datasets in many empirical studies, also captures 'state death' as 'ending year of state tenure' in their 'State System Membership List'. Between 1816-1992, there were 48 'state deaths' (defined as foreign conquest, occupation or annexation, with the loss of policy control), of which 35 succumbed to violent 'state death'.¹¹

⁹ Tanisha M. Fazal, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

¹⁰ Valeriano and Benthuyssen, *op. cit.*, p. 1165.

¹¹ However, COW dataset differs from Fazal's account with respect to the status of Peru in 1880 and Kuwait in 1990. Contrary to COW, Fazal accounts the Chilean victory over Peru in the battle of Arica in 1880 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as 'state death'. See Tanisha M. Fazal, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

Figure 1: Entry and Exit of States in International System: 1860-2016



Source: Author's calculation from COW (2011) and Fazal (2004).

Figure 1 charts the entry and exit of states in the international system on a 20 year scale covering the period from 1860 to 2016. It is evident that the entry of new states in the international system was fairly meagre until the end of WWII, except between 1901-1920 when 22 new states entered the international system. The decolonization process following the end of WWII together with the creation of UN marked the first significant influx of independent states in the international system raising the initial number of 51 states in 1880 to 112 by the end of 1960. The year 1960 alone saw the birth of 17 countries in Africa (mostly French colonies).¹² Within 40 years (1941-1980) 109 new states entered the international system while there were only 31 new states entering the system in the previous 40 years. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War in 1980 contributed to the second wave of entry of new states adding more 41 states by 2000 and finally rising to 195 states till the end of 2016.


However, at the same time there has been a dramatic decline in 'state death'. Within a period of eight decades prior to 1940, a total of 35 states exited the international system while only 13 states 'died' in the same time span after 1940.¹³ This sharp decline of 'state death' was accompanied by a significant increase in fragile states pervading the international system. This raises a basic question: why is there a decline in 'state death' and an increase in 'fragile states'? And, is the current international order more destined to produce fragile states?

¹² Countries included are 1. Benin (Dahomey) 2. Burkina Faso 3. Cameroon 4. Central African Republic 5. Chad 6. Congo 7. Cote d'Ivoire 8. Democratic Republic of the Congo 9. Gabon 10. Madagascar 11. Mali 12. Mauritania 13. Niger 14. Nigeria 15. Senegal 16. Somalia 17. Togo.

¹³ For the incidences of the 'dead' states, see Table 1, in Tanisha M. Fazal, *op. cit.*, p. 320. Mentionable that many of these states later revived to become 'strong and stable' like Germany and Japan while others like Soviet Union and Yugoslavia disintegrated into a number of new states.

2.2 Fragile States: A By-product of Egalitarian International Order?

The main reason for the dramatic decline of 'state death' and the first major wave of new states entering the international system is often attributed to the creation of the 'sovereignty regime' and emphasis on 'self-determination' by the major powers following the end of WWII and the revival of the UN establishment.¹⁴ Such international norms based upon the premise that all UN members enjoyed equal status was buttressed by an international environment of cooperation, democratization and globalization. Consequently, it greatly reduced the likelihood of major wars of conquest and annexation. Thus the war of conquest no longer threatened the existence of 'weak states' and inter-state conflict declined in general with a corresponding increase of internal conflicts as evident from Figure 2.



Source: Author's compilation from UCDP/PRIYO Armed conflict data.¹⁵

Secondly, after WWII, the emphasis on self-determination by the international community resulted in freeing many states from the shackles of colonization with the expectation that they would govern themselves better. Indeed the idea that "states could fail – that they could simply become unable to function as independent entities – was anathema to the *raison d'être* of decolonization, and offensive to the notion of self-determination."¹⁶ As a result, the international system is now populated by many

¹⁴ According to the UN Charter, each state is juridically equal, enjoy the rights inherent in full sovereignty; the personality of the state is respected, as well as its territorial integrity and political independence and comply faithfully with its international duties and obligations.

¹⁵ UCDP defines extra 'systemic armed conflict' as conflicts that occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory, 'interstate armed conflict' is between two or more states, 'internal armed conflict' occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states and 'internationalized internal armed conflict' is defined as those between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides. See, UCDP/PRIYO Armed Conflict Dataset and Codebook, available at <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/>, accessed on 11 June 2016.

¹⁶ As Helman and Ratner argued, "during the decolonization, self-determination was given more emphasis over long term survivability". See, Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States", *Foreign*

'quasi-states' with negative sovereignty.¹⁷ Such quasi-states enjoy legal equality in the international system but have deep empirical inequality lacking the capacity to support themselves without outside assistance, or to contribute to the international order. Under the twin pillars of self-determination and the sovereignty regime guaranteed by the international system, 'state weakness' has ceased to be a threat to sovereignty¹⁸ as states no longer fear 'death'. Instead it has become a reason for relying on international assistance and in some cases serves as an incentive for the ruling regime to consolidate its power, survivability and self-aggrandisement instead of the development of a strong state-society relationship. Thus, the fragile states are both the creation and responsibility of an egalitarian and benevolent international system.

2.3 Fragile States: A By-Product of Colonial Legacy?

Taking a *longue durée* view, the emergence of weak and fragile states can also be explained as a by-product of the not-so-benevolent "dynamics of global dominance" by the European colonizers. According to this view, the 'episodic history' of the colonial and post-colonial era can be merged and construed as a single episode of historic capitalism. While the colonial era was a march of 'commodity frontiers' often by coercive forces, the post-colonial era can be characterized as a 'march for expanding market frontier' - both underpinned by their relationship with wealth accumulation. Construed this way, the rise and fall of the empire and the corresponding fluctuation of the periodized account of making and remaking of state, appears a continuous process of unfolding - the 'decline' of one event means the 'expansion' in another. Both David Abernethy and Jean-Germain Gros links the history of fragile states outlining the waves of state-based European expansions in 1492-1776 and 1848-1914 and the contractions that followed in 1776-1848 and 1914-1991.¹⁹ Merging the colonial and post-colonial world system in one thread, Gros in his analysis of fragile state, demonstrates that the imperialism of reason d'état (i.e. the colonial world system) and imperialism of capitalism (the post-colonial world system) is underpinned by the single motive of 'expansion' - the former focused on territorial expansion to gain access to resources and the latter is about the expansion of capital through invoking the idea of free market. Thus, the end of the 'episodic history' of the 'imperialism of the

Policy, No. 89, Winter, 1992-1993, p. 4.

¹⁷ Weak states are also referred as enjoying 'juridical sovereignty' while lacking 'empirical sovereignty'. See, E. H. Jackson, *Quasi States: Sovereignty International Relation and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 21-26.

¹⁸ At its core, 'sovereignty' implies the possession of absolute authority of the state over monopoly of the use of force within its territorial boundary. Although various supranational organizations, international regimes like Responsibility to Protect (R2P), human rights convention challenges the notion of sovereignty, yet the status of nation-states has not received declining significance as it offers the 'strategic space' where many global processes take place. See, Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 9-22.

¹⁹ This time frame is premised on the assumption that the imperialism of *raison d'état* ended following the demise of former Soviet Union in 1991 and not during the decolonization of 1950s. It implies that the 'contraction phase' of European colonizers ends in 1991. See, Jean-Germain Gros, *op. cit.*, p. 553.

reason d'état' is inherently linked with the rise of 'imperialism of capitalism' as both share the same structure of methods for wealth accumulation. If one takes the view that the global system of nation-states is the most important innovation and legacy of the empires and the colonial legacy, one has to accept the notion that the fragile states are the debris of this process of transformation. The dialectical relationship between these two forms of imperialism and their resulting friction has had a lasting territorial and societal impact on the future trajectories of many states.

However, the future trajectory of the post-colonial states was also influenced by the success or failure of their political leadership and their choice of the system of governance. For example, Jawaharlal Nehru in India remained committed to a Westminster style democracy while Kwame Nkrumah's actions and affiliations with socialism and Marxism ended with a military coup in Ghana in 1966. Notwithstanding the fact that the trajectory of post-colonial states was shaped by many other factors, including the preferences of new political leadership, the legacy of colonialism and imperial borders continues to confront many states with territorial disputes and pose a challenge to better social integration thus contributing towards fragility.²⁰ The decision by the colonial powers to arbitrarily and often untenably lump different societies and territories together fragmented previously unified societies into separate states in many parts of the world. Adding to the problem of colonial border legacies has been the doctrine of a 'territorial integrity norm' backed by the international community, which makes the settling of border issues, through force or other means, more difficult.²¹

More importantly, it is perhaps the *continued* disharmony of the goals and interests pursued by the colony and the colonizers that has had a lasting impact on state formation in a post-colonial era. At the *structural level*, colonial states were 'inorganic' - a 'Peripheral' entity serving the needs of the 'Centre'.²² The natives were 'subjects' of the metropolitan power and not citizens. As a result, most institutions and the laws crafted by the Centre for the 'natives' were aimed at supporting the colonial project. For example, the indigo cultivation introduced in British India (Bengal) was solely for the European market. Both the colonial law and the administration favoured the planters who coerced the peasants into cultivating indigo instead of much needed food grains and then denied them a fair price for their produce.²³ Such a

²⁰ Jean Germain Gros also cites political elites as an important 'micro level' player, *Ibid.*, pp. 544 - 545. Also see, David Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance European Overseas Empire 1415-1980*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 363-387.

²¹ However, some post-colonial states could amicably resolve the arbitrary border demarcations. In June 2015, Bangladesh and India implemented the Land Boundary Agreement-1974 resolving the anomalies created by the Radcliff's demarcation during the partition of India creating 50,000 stateless people living in tiny enclaves inside each other's country. However, most African countries border still remains as defined by their colonial powers. See, "India, Bangladesh Sign Historic Land Boundary Agreement", available at <http://in.reuters.com/article/bangladesh-india-land-treaty-idINKBN00M0IV20150606/>, accessed on 16 December 2015.

²² Johan Galtung, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-84.

²³ For example, the land revenue system compelled the peasants to take loan on high interests from the

clear disharmony of interests between the Centre and the Periphery and its continued legacy, deterred, if not dwarfed, the potential growth of state-building in many post-colonial states.

At the *individual level*, the practice of treating the ‘natives’ as ‘second class citizens’ had a long term impact on the psyche of the colonized. Frantz Fanon illustrates this in his classic book, *Black Skin White Masks* as he writes: “The black schoolboy in the Antilles, who in his lessons is forever talking about ‘our ancestors, the Gauls,’ identifies himself with the explorer, the bringer of civilization, the white man who carries truth to savages — an all-white truth. There is identification; that is, the young Negro subjectively adopts a white man’s attitude.”²⁴ This psychological subjugation makes the ‘black man’ want to be like the ‘white man’ and is rooted in the black man’s belief in the “unarguable superiority of the white man, and all his (i.e. black man’s) efforts are aimed at achieving a white existence.”

In the context of British India, consider the phrases in this appeal made on the 14 April 1860 by Sisir Kumar Ghosh, the editor of the Weekly *Hindoo Patriot* and an active sympathiser of the peasants during the Indigo Revolt in British India: “Rise, Rise, Ye countrymen with supplicating hands, fall prostrate before the governor, catch his feet, and do not let him go, unless he has granted your requests.”²⁵ Suggesting such demeaning measures to achieve their legitimate demand from the colonizer reflects a master-slave relationship that continued within the bureaucratic and political elites of ‘fragile states’ in the post-colonial setting, and hindered the service delivery capacity of the state to the public. Indeed, the human capital of the colony - including not only health and education, but also intangible factors such as self-esteem, national pride, and entrepreneurship - was directly affected by colonization to the extent that even after decolonization it was difficult for some post-colonial states to jump start above the critical threshold to overcome state fragility.²⁶

Yet, some post-colonial states like Singapore and South Korea clearly succeeded and from a regional perspective, Africa has a greater concentration of ‘fragile states’ than Asia or Latin America. How can these differences in the trajectories of the various efforts to build viable post-colonial states be explained?

indigo planters for survival while the new regulation in 1830 granted the planters a free hand to continue oppressing the peasants. See, Sanjay Ghildiyal, “Moral Economy and the Indigo Movement,” *Economic & Political Weekly*, 20 February, 2010, Vol. XLV, No 8, pp. 64-71.

²⁴ Frantz Fanon was born in the Antilles and most of his observation is rooted there. See, Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (*Peau Noire, Masques Blancs*), 1952, translated by C. Lam Markmann, United Kingdom: Pluto Press, 2008, pp. 114 and 178.

²⁵ This example also reflects the ‘freedom of press’ that the colony was able to enjoy. Many of the intelligentsia (*bhadrak* as they were called) typically supportive of British rule, were able to voice their concern through their writings in the British India. See, Sanjay Ghildiyal, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

²⁶ For an account of economic effect of colonialism, see, Graziella Bertocchi, “Colonialism in the Theory of Growth,” available at http://morgana.unimore.it/bertocchi_graziella/papers/colonialweb.pdf/, accessed on 06 September 2015, pp. 15-17.

Firstly, the legacy of colonialism and the policy practices of the colonial powers, though broadly resembling a Centre and Periphery relationship, differed in many ways.²⁷ One strand of literature suggests that the British colonial legacy had a 'positive outcome' compared to the other colonisers. The British provided more adaptable legal institutions facilitating a market economy and a higher level of personal freedom. North argues that the successful adaptation of the set of rules left by the British into the United States (US) constitution was possible as they were consistent with the 'local norms of behaviour and enforcement characteristics'; but when some Latin American countries wanted to adopt a similar set of rules into their constitutions, they were 'wildly at variance' with existing property rights, which were primarily focused on the protection of the interests of the Madrid based merchants, as set out by their Spanish coloniser.

Secondly, the degree of fragility of post-colonial states depended upon the extent to which colonial practices trickled down through the structures and agencies of the new state and its ability to selectively absorb colonial practices. Countries that were prudent and capable of selective absorption, and could incorporate the viable colonial practices, could successfully close the state-society gap and move away from being an 'inorganic' polity to form a more stable state.²⁸

Thirdly, the strategic environment allowed some countries the time, space and resources to invest more in state-building compared to others. Indeed the differing exposure to the global security environment and economic realities was crucial as these newly independent states were thrown into a polarized world of superpower rivalry amidst an increasing trend of globalization, only to become a 'client' or 'allies' in their struggle for state-building in the Cold War era.

2.4 From 'Client' and 'Allies' to 'Fragile' and 'Failed': The Legacy of the Cold War

Under the polarized hegemonic 'support structure' during the Cold War, the Centre and Periphery model evolved creating new 'politically independent' centres and peripheries within the jurisdictions of the Peripheral states. The centre in each Centre was more concerned to have a supportive regime in the centre of the Peripheral states. The race for winning support of the regimes in these new centres by the superpowers meant that the citizens living in the periphery of the Peripheral states were less relevant.

²⁷ Literature highlighting the differences are vast. See, Alexander Lee and Kenneth A. Schultz, "Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon", *APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper*, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1903316/>, accessed on 10 November 2015; D. C. North, *Understanding the Process of Economic Change*, USA: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 16; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 59, No. 1, February 1994, pp. 1-22; and Shilpi Kapur and Sukkoo Kim, "British Colonial Institutions and Economic Development in India", *NBER Working Paper*, No. 12613, October 2006.

²⁸ Martin Doornbos, "Fragile States or Failing Models? Accounting for the Incidence of State Collapse", *FRIDE Seminar Paper*, 12 December 2005, Madrid, pp. 4-9, available at http://fride.org/download/WP19_FailedState_ENG_feb06.pdf/, accessed on 09 October 2016.

Despite the hope that the 'sovereignty regime' and new-found wealth in several Peripheral states would usher in a new era of development and state-building, many post-colonial Peripheral states were continually beset by political instability manifested through frequent changes in governments, in the constitution and in the interchangeability of political institutions,²⁹ often through violent means like *coups d'état*, contributing towards state fragility. Indeed, all four fragility indices that we examine later in this paper include the 'incidence of coup' as an indicator of state fragility. Yet not all regions had similar experience.

Figure 3 reflects the regional variation of the global incidences of *Coup d'état* - defined as "attempt to seize state power by any elite who is part of the state apparatus"³⁰ between 1950-2015 on a 10 year scale using the new data set compiled by Powell and Thyne. Consolidating 14 studies, Powell and Thyne records 473 incidences of coup in 94 countries between 1950-2015. Although there is an overall decline of coup, the chronological and geographical variations (see Figure 3) reflect that the Peripheral states were most affected by these coups soon after their entrance into the international system during the Cold War. Africa (42.3 per cent) and the Americas (30.9 per cent) have experiences the most coups, while Asia and the Middle East account for 13.1 per cent and 10.14 per cent coup attempts respectively. In contrast, Europe had the fewest (3.6 per cent) coup attempts. Within two decades of their entry into the world stage, newly created states experienced a total of about 200 coup incidents which had a lasting impact on state-building. While many of these coup attempts were driven by domestic politics, many more were orchestrated, supported or endorsed by Central powers as part of their hegemonic agendas.³¹ The new model of interaction between the centres in the Centre and the centres in the Periphery indirectly hindered state-building in a number of ways.


Figure 3

²⁹ Ali Riaz, *Unfolding State: The Transformation of Bangladesh*, Whitby, ON: De Sitter Publications, 2005, p. 23.

³⁰ Powell and Thyne do not limit it as an act of military only. See, Powell and Thyne, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

³¹ "Mapped: The 7 Governments the US Has Overthrown", *Foreign Policy*, 2013, available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/20/mapped-the-7-governments-the-u-s-has-overthrown/>, accessed on 26 September 2015 for seven successful confirmed cases of CIA involvement. Also see, H. E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Giacomo Chiozza, "ARCHIGOS: A Data Set on Leaders 1875–2004, Version 2.9" available at <http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/Archigos.2.9-August.pdf/>, accessed on 12 October 2015.

Figure 3: Global Incidences of Coup d'etat 1950-2015



Source: Author's compilation from the dataset of Powell and Thyne, *op. cit.*

Firstly, much like the colonial era, the disharmony of interest between the Centre and the Peripheral states continued to exist. The governments in the Centres were driven by their hegemonic interests to increase their spheres of influence while the ultimate motives of the regimes in the centre of the Periphery were to remain in power and self-aggrandisement. Indeed the history of nationalist movements and dynamic nationalist leadership in Peripheral states who were truly committed to the cause of nation-state building were brutally short and shallow. As Martin Doornbos observes, "the 'nationalist' movement in many African cases had actually not run very deeply."³²

Secondly, the new interaction model created parasitic domestic elites in the Peripheral states who survived, in most cases, on external legitimacy. The collective weight of the Centre was biased towards increasing the coercive power of the client regime in order to strengthen its security and survivability, as opposed to promoting liberal norms like democracy, human rights, freedom of the press etc. This allowed the regimes in the Peripheries to survive without taking any meaningful steps toward state consolidation or introducing good governance.

Thirdly, the discovery of substantial natural resources in many of these fragile states increased the value of the state as a target. With the prospect of future profits

³² Martin Doornbos, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

from these resources swelling both State and multinational companies' coffers, the State became vulnerable to internal and external actors. As many mineral resource rich fragile states received a high income from the profits of these resources they neglected to (sufficiently) tax their populations (an essential expression of the state's power) thereby insulating the ruling elites and increasing their dependence on external actors to prolong their regime. The feasibility of a rent-seeking, 'booty future' from such new found wealth, together with the global political economy and the self-financing nature of the 'new wars', made the prospect of realizing the benefits from rich extractable assets a modern day *'Midas myth'*³³ for most fragile states.³⁴

2.5 Fragile State in the Post-Cold War and Era of the GWoT

Although the notion of state weakness have remained germane in the political economy of international relations for decades, serious academic debate on this issue commenced in the early 1990's, coinciding with the second wave of entry of the newly independent states after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. With the broadening and deepening conceptualization of 'security', the focus of this period shifted towards development and 'fixing' fragile states.³⁵ The challenges to the theory and practice of 'development' resulted in exponential growth and influence of the international governmental and non-governmental organizations (IGO and NGO) affecting the centre and the peripheries of the Peripheral states. Although the NGO movement was conceived during the foundation of the UN, the true recognition, expansion and integration of this movement into the international system come about in early 1990s' and the number of international NGOs increased to 13,591 from the initial 2,865 of 1945 while the IGOs were 3,443.³⁶ Both the IGOs and NGOs introduced a new interaction relations and interaction structure with the Peripheral fragile states resulting mixed outcome on state-building.

³³ According to Greek Mythology, Midas, the King of Lydia, swelled at first with pride when he found he could transform everything he touched to gold; but when he beheld his food grow rigid and his drink harden into golden ice then he understood that this gift was a bane and in his loathing for gold cursed his prayer. The term is also used by T. Lynn Karl, "The Perils of the Petro-state: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 53, No. 1. 1999, pp. 31-45.

³⁴ Literature on 'resource curse' is vast. See for example, Paul Collier, V. L. Elliott., H. Hegre, A. Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, N. Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap Civil War and Development Policy*, A World Bank Policy Research Report, Oxford University Press, 2003; Michael Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases", *International Organization*, Vol. 58, Winter 2004, pp. 35-67; and Karl, T. Lynn, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

³⁵ For example, Helman and Ratner, who are credited to have first coined the term 'failed state' suggested three models of guardianship by the UN to 'save' the 'failed states' in the influential *Foreign Policy* magazine which included: governance assistance, delegation of governmental authority and a more radical direct UN trusteeship. See, Helman and Ratner, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-17. Also see, Ashraf Ghani and C. Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States a Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; pp.169-198 and Robert I Rotberg, (ed.), *When States Fail, Causes and Consequences*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, pp.31-36.

³⁶ For an account of the increasing number of NGOs in consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council, see, Carolyn Stephenson, "Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)", available at <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/role-ngo/>, accessed on 02 October 2015.

By the 1990's, NGOs became the second largest source of development assistance.³⁷ Most work by the NGOs is targeted toward the periphery of the Peripheral states. The 'low cost and high impact' mantra of the NGOs meant that they could reach the poor communities in peripheries having few basic resources or infrastructure and where government services are limited or ineffective. NGOs were also able to promote local participation in the design and implementation of public programmes by building self-confidence and strengthening the organizational capability among low-income people. They were frequently referred in the UN resolutions and some even began to meet informally with members of the UN Security Council to coordinate actions in emergency situations. Interestingly, many such NGOs originated in the Peripheral states, like BRAC – world's largest developmental NGO with its headquarter in Bangladesh and the Grameen Bank – the pioneering micro credit NGO, that allowed them to establish closer ties to on-the-ground realities in the Peripheral states.


On the other hand, the IGOs like World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) preferred working through the state mechanism at the centre of the Periphery states to implement their 'developmental' and 'economic liberalization' projects like Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), poverty reduction etc.³⁸ The first feature of SAPs was the switch in production from what local people eat, wear or use towards goods that can be sold in the industrialized countries. Such a shift from import substitution to export production resulted in fragile states exporting similar/same primary commodities that triggered a 'price war' and a decline of world market prices for their commodities. Between 1980 and 1992, 'developing' countries lost 52 per cent of their export income due to deteriorating prices.³⁹ SAP also entailed monetizing the economy, severe reductions in government spending and employment, higher interest rates, currency devaluation, lower real wages, sale of government enterprises, reduced tariffs and liberalization of foreign investment regulations. The underlying aim was to move countries away from self-directed models of national development that focus on the domestic market and towards outward-looking development models that stress the importance of 'complete' integration into the dominant global structures.

37 "Report of the Secretary-General: Arrangements and Practices for the Interaction of Non-governmental Organizations in All Activities of the UN System," available at: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/53/plenary/a53-170.htm/>, accessed on 04 October 2015.

38 The negative effects of SAP is recognized in many WB country report including that on Nepal. It states, "The Bank should not call for reform without good knowledge of the measures needed ... conditionality was ambiguous because reforms were called for before problems in the financial and irrigation sectors were fully understood", available at <http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/5992D15BFBBCB41E852567F5005D8D57/>, accessed on 15 November 2016.


39 E. Toussaint and D. Comanne, "Globalization and Debt", p. 12; S. George, "World Bank and IMF at Century's End", p. 22; C. Bournay, "Third-World Debt Today," p. 51. All available in Notebooks for Study and Research 24/25, 1995, <http://www.iire.org/en/resources/notebooks-for-study-and-research.html/>, accessed on 11 September 2015. Also see, F. E. Ogbimi, "Structural Adjustment is the Wrong Policy", available at <http://web.mit.edu/africantech/www/articles/PlanningAdjust.html/>, accessed on 11 September 2015.

Figure 4: Pathways to Fragility: Shift from Import Substitution to Export Production Programme of SAP



Source: Author's compilation.

Figure 5: Pathways to Fragility: Monetizing Economies, Deregulation Programme of SAP



Source: Author's compilation.

Interestingly, Centre nations like US routinely began conditioning its aid agreements on acceptance of SAP as prescribed by the WB/IMF. Such external pressure coupled with the debt crisis reaching its peak in 1982, compelled many peripheral developing state to implement SAP often ending up in stagnation and disastrous consequences. The pathways to fragility for many of these states are depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 5. Indeed 25 out of the 38 fragile states in the 2009 Failed State Index had implemented some sort of WB and IMF imposed SAP. The new interaction structure between the Centre and the Periphery paradoxically demonstrated that failure in development is not only an option, but an 'attractive and sustained option' for most Peripheral states.⁴⁰

The fragile state discourse gathered further steam following the events of 11 September only to 'bringing back the state' as a central player contrasting the previous era. The era of GWoT reinforced the importance of state and offered a reductionist framework to the fragile state problematique focused on security dimension. It also

⁴⁰ Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

consistently labelled these states as the 'greatest threat' to the security of the states in the Centre and was frequently mentioning in the national security strategy papers of many Western states.⁴¹ Despite contradictory findings in several empirical researches, linking terrorism with the endemic poverty, poor economic growth and 'ungoverned territory' in fragile states became 'conventional wisdom'.⁴² According to Global Terrorism Index (GTI), after 9/11, global terrorism remained below the late 1970s trend, only to increase significantly after the US invasion of Iraq.⁴³ More so, the majority of the victims of terrorism are the fragile and conflict affected countries. In the West, more people die from the road accidents and not from the premeditated terrorist attack.⁴⁴ The index also reports no significant correlation of terrorism with important drivers of fragility like poverty, governance, business environment, equitable distribution of resources etc. Focusing on the economic dimension several other research also reports that the relation between poverty and terrorism is mixed, but indicative;⁴⁵ and "wealthy countries are more likely to suffer terrorist attacks and that economic performance is not a statistically significant predictor of which countries terrorists emerge from."⁴⁶ If all the evidences show that terrorism is a threat but not a threat to the extent as it is suggested, then why is it so pronounced and what impact does this have on the fragile states?

There are two plausible answers to this puzzle. First, it is not necessary that the terrorist groups should comprise of poorest people to make the connection between underdevelopment and such types of violence. The fact that violent extremist groups utilize the condition of poverty as a motivation for their cause qualifies as the causal link. More so, terrorist groups are complex entity and there are different levels of operatives involving people from poor and rich, educated and uneducated background. However, this explanation implies that the best tool to fight terrorism is to focus on the economic development that can drain out the support base for the terrorists to operate or gain sympathy. In reality, however, the reductionist

⁴¹ Mohammad Zahidul Islam Khan, "Do the Weak and Collapsed States Pose a Challenge to the Realist Worldview", *BLISS Journal*, Vol. 35, No. 2, April 2014, pp.166-179.

⁴² Stewart Patrick, "Failed States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 9, 2007, pp. 644-662; Stewart Patrick, "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2006, pp. 27-53.

⁴³ Measured in terms of total number of terrorist attacks and fatalities. See, Global Terrorism Index (GTI), "Capturing the Impact of Terrorism in Last Decade", New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012.

⁴⁴ S. Rogers, "Mortality Statistics: Every Cause of Death in England and Wales", available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/oct/28/mortality-statistics-causes-death-england-wales-2010#data/>, accessed on 15 April 2016.

⁴⁵ Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "The Political Economy of Terrorism: A Selective Overview of Recent Work", available at <http://home.uchicago.edu/~bde/PDF/pe-terror.pdf/>, accessed on 27 November 2015, p. 2; Alan B. Krueger and David Laitin, "Kto Kogo? A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism", in Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza, (eds.), *Terrorism, Economic Development and Political Openness*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 148-173; Alberto Abadie, "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism", *American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)*, Vol. 96, No. 2, 2006, pp. 50-56; S. Brock Blomberg *et al.*, "Economic Conditions and Terrorism", *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2004, pp. 463-478; and Kostas Drakos and Andreas Gofas, "In Search of the Average Transnational Terrorist Attack Venue", *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2006, pp. 73-93.

⁴⁶ B. Krueger and David Laitin, *op. cit.*, p.149.

interpretations offered by the proponents of GWOt have compelled governments to allocate more resources in security sectors. Such a trend severely limits the efforts to address the core issues by draining out the much needed resources and funding for development sector to overcome state fragility.

However, perhaps a more plausible answer lies in the view that, terrorism is not a *real* threat but a *necessary* threat. It allows the process of 'othering'- persisting in various *avatars* and reinforced by the hegemonic desire of the great powers to shape the international system. This view allows us to interpret the discourse of GWOt as a macro securitization efforts by the West in general and the US in particular. Indeed, as Barry Buzan contends that the event of 9/11 "solved the threat deficit problem for the US." The explicit 'long war' framing of the GWOt is an attempt to "world-organizing macro securitization" by the US. He cites the immediate invocation of Article 5 by the NATO following the 9/11 attack as an endorsement to legitimize the GWOt securitization and argues that the GWOt played strongly to the long-established propensity in US foreign policy to frame American interests as universal principles.⁴⁷ The adoption of antiterrorism laws similar to Patriot Act of the US by many countries including the fragile states reflects a tacit legitimating of this macro-securitization process triggering substantial shift in security definitions and priorities in many countries. The process of 'othering' under the rubric of GWOt has also emboldened regime in power of the fragile states allowing them more 'strategic space' for coercion and political oppression to remain in power. The effect of the macro-securitization in the domestic context has transformed into 'othering' the political opponent by labelling them as 'terrorists'. In the name of national security and forging a stable national identity, regimes in fragile states have utilized this necessary threat of terrorism to command loyalty from its people and at the same time gain legitimacy from the external actors by collaborating in the global counterterrorism efforts. Indeed, the political arrangements of cooperation between the states under the macro-securitization process of the GWOt resembles a form of 'global governance' but with a mistaken focus on military means contributing very little to address the underlying causes of state fragility.


In sum, the current policy options following the GWOt reflect an inherent short-termism. It reduces the phenomenon of state fragility to state's capacity to employ coercive forces, institutional stability, bureaucratic functioning etc. and undermines the complexity of the socio-political system in the Peripheral states and their real need of 'freedom from want'. In search of a workable and standardized policy response to the 'threats' originating from the 'fragile states', the reductionist framework ignores the contextual complexities like parallel economies, social solidarity structures, community, economic and cultural biases and how they influence entities that are outside the state perimeter such as non-state actors, sub-national political entities and informal economies.⁴⁸ It tends to overlook the externalities of state

⁴⁷ Barry Buzan, "Will the 'Global War on Terrorism' be the New Cold War?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 6, 2006, pp. 1101-1118.

⁴⁸ P. Bilgin and A. D. Morton, "From 'Rogue' to 'Failed' States? The Fallacy of Short-Termism", *Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2004, pp. 69-180; R. E. Brooks, "Failed States, or the State as Failure?" *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 72, No. 4, 2005, pp. 1159-1196; R. Batley R and C. McLoughlin, "Engagement with Non-state Service Providers in Fragile States: Reconciling State-building and Service Delivery", *Development Policy Review*, Vol. 28, No. 2010, pp.131-154; L. Andersen, "Fragile States on the International Agenda", in Lars Engberg-Pedersen, Louise

fragility in an increasingly globalized world and the defining importance of strategic environment in consolidating state. At the heart of the state building lies a cohesive state-society relation. Most peripheral post-colonial states have consistently shown poor human rights record, high level of political oppression resulting in poor state-society relationship. This is evident from a comparison of the political terror scale⁴⁹ (PTS) score between a set of 18 European states that entered into the international system during and following the collapse of the former Soviet Union (second wave) in 1991⁵⁰ with the post-colonial Africa states that gained their independence in 1960 (the first wave).⁵¹ Despite its limitation, PTS provides an idea as to how the state-society relationship is severed through the actions of the states. Figure 6 projects the percentage change in the PTS scores⁵² of the two sets of states as mentioned above.

Figure 6: Comparison of Percentage Change in PTS Score of Post-colonial Africa States and Post Cold War European States



Source: Author's compilation from PTS datasets 1976-2015.

Andersen, Finn Stepputat and Dietrich Jung (eds.), "Fragile Situations: Background Papers", Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS) Report, Copenhagen: Vesterkopi AS, 2008, pp. 7-19.

⁴⁹ PTS focuses on state behaviour and measures the levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a particular year based on a scale of 1-5. See, Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke and Daniel Arnon, "The Political Terror Scale 1976-2015", available at <http://www.politicalterror scale.org/>, accessed on 14 April 2016.

⁵⁰ The 2nd wave states include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

⁵¹ The 1st wave states include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, DRC, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

⁵² PTS data is available since 1976. Percentage change = {(ending year score – beginning year score)/beginning year score}*100. The oldest available data for a country is used for 'beginning year score' while the 'ending year score' is of 2015. For data, see <http://politicalterror scale.org/Data/>, accessed on 22 November 2016.

It is evident that despite their early entry to the world system, most of the post-colonial African states are well above the average score line and continue to experience a higher level of political terror (up to 300 per cent increase in case of Congo). However, despite their late entry to the international system, the newly independent European states (with the exception of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia and Slovakia) have a better record (i.e. decreasing percentage in PTS). The centrality of 'strategic environment' is evident from the fact that many of these newly independent second wave of states located in Europe experience a differential impact and were better able to manage their state-society relationship in a much shorter span of time compared to the post-colonial African states. Countries like Kosovo, Croatia, Azerbaijan, Georgia with high level of political terror at their birth were able to stabilize in a relatively shorter period leveraging this 'strategic space' in Europe. In contrast, most African state (with the exception of Togo, Benin and Chad) have continued sliding backward into more violence and in some cases civil war.

Finally, the long view of the narrative of the GWOt, mutual vulnerability of the weak and strong, buttressed by international norms like Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and human security discourse allow us to visualize how the Hobbesian Periphery of the world system is linked with the Lockian Core. The Core's objective is to achieve 'freedom from fear' while the Periphery wants 'freedom from want'.⁵³ Externally, such dialectic tension between these two relegates the Peripheral fragile states as the West's 'external sovereign frontier' permitting greater regulatory and military intervention. Often such interventions are geared to providing a mixture of limited global poor relief, monitoring and policing with a view to preventing the Periphery re-exporting disorder rather than to the transformation of the conditions of the poor. Internally, leveraging a 'permitting' strategic environment many regimes in Peripheral 'fragile states' use the narrative of GWOt to suppress the political oppositions, dissenting voice at home to strengthen their regime security.

In sum, this chapter depicts the fragile state debate in its historic totality. It has outlined various pathways through which fragile states have emerged in the international system and continued to remain fragile. The chapter demonstrates that state-building - the highest form of 'human collective' is embedded in a global structure consisting of Centre and Periphery nations. The interaction between these two and the transnational exchanges that takes place through different IGOs, NGOs, non-state actors etc. can have a significant positive or pernicious impact on the strength, vulnerability and resilience of state. Capturing state fragility, thus requires accounting not only the domestic factors but also the global interdependencies. Unfortunately, many such global factors are often ignored in different oft-quoted fragility indices, which are examined next.

⁵³ Mohammad Zahidul Islam Khan, "Paradox of State Fragility: Exploring the Role of International Structures in the Context of Bangladesh", *BIPSS Monograph*, available at http://www.bipss.org.bd/images/pdf/monograph/monograph_200614.pdf, accessed on 22 November 2016.

CHAPTER III

STATE FRAGILITY INDICES

3.1 *Preamble*

The rapid transnational diffusion of the concept of 'fragile state' was largely made possible by different oft-quoted fragility indices. Such indices came handy particularly for the policy-makers, commentators and analysts as it provided quantified scores and rankings to each state based on its (perceived) overall fragility. The stated aim of these indices is to capture government responsibilities commonly considered as 'core functions' of statehood. States are assessed against a set of criteria that represents such core functions. The ranking and scores of the indices reveal as to which state is doing better compared to the others. A brief discussion on four fragility indices analyzed in this chapter is given below.

3.2 *Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)*⁵⁴

The BTI relies on qualitative expert survey by country experts on a scale of 1 (worst) to 10 (best) to index 129 developing and 'transitional states'⁵⁵ about how they are steering social change toward democracy and market economy. Successful 'transformation' is defined as a 'politically driven change' towards having a 'functioning administration structures', 'securing monopoly on the use of force', 'resource efficiency', 'building consensus' to materialize transformation goal and working reliably with external supporters and neighbours by the state. The final BTI ranking is the aggregate of 'Status Index' and 'Management Index'. Status Index focuses on a state's political and economic transformation while the Management Index reportedly assess the acumen with which decision-makers steer political processes towards democracy and market economy. Score for political transformation in Status Index is derived from the scores assigned by the country experts in response to 18 questions grouped under five criteria. For example, to measure a state's monopoly on the use of force, the question posed is: 'To what extent does the state's monopoly on the use of force cover the entire territory of the country?' Country experts assign a score (between 1-10) based on the degree and geographical extent to which the state is able to exercise the monopoly on the use of force. Similarly, the assessment of economic transformation is derived from 14 indicators based on seven criteria related to the

⁵⁴ "BTI 2014 Codebook for Country Assessments" and "BTI 2014 Methodology", available at <http://www.bti-project.org/bti-home/>, accessed on 15 September 2015.

⁵⁵ BTI excludes all OECD countries 'assuming' that reforms needed in these countries towards democracy and market economy would differ compared to those that are yet to achieve a fully consolidated democracy and market economy. However, number of countries surveyed has increased from 116 in 2003 to 129 in 2014 as it now includes countries with population over two million and seven countries are included as 'interesting' cases. *ibid.*, p. 125.

level of socioeconomic development, market, currency and price stability, property rights, welfare regime, economic performance and sustainability. The 'Management Index' focuses on five criteria: structural difficulties, steering capability, resource efficiency, ability to build consensus and international cooperation. These are derived through a total of 20 indicators out of which 3 are quantitative (i.e. GNI per capita in PPP terms, UN Education Index and average of BTI score on Stateness and Rule of Law criteria). In total, there are 52 indicators grouped under 17 criteria against which scores are assigned for each state to produce the overall ranking. Emphasizing the importance of core governmental functions, a state is classified as 'failed' when the arithmetic mean of the scores given for monopoly on the use of force and basic administration (under 'stateness' criteria of Status Index) is less than three. Only two countries (Central African Republic and Somalia) appear as 'failed' in 2014 BTI.

3.3 Country Indicator Foreign Policy (CIFP) Fragility Index⁵⁶

The CIFP fragility index employs a 'relative structural assessment' methodology to capture state fragility. It defines state fragility as "the extent to which the actual institutions, functions and processes of a state fail to accord with the strong image of a sovereign state, the one ratified in both state theory and international law."⁵⁷ According to CIFP, fragile states lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations and/or the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home and abroad. Failed states are characterized by conflict, humanitarian crises and economic collapse. Government authority, legitimacy and capacity no longer extend throughout the state but instead are limited either to specific regions or groups.

CIFP fragility index uses 84 indicators grouped into six clusters: Governance, Economics, Security and Crime, Human Development, Demography and Environment. The data is then reprocessed through the ALC (Authority, Legitimacy, and Capacity) framework, where any weaknesses in one or more of the ALC dimensions are considered to have an impact on the overall fragility of the state. For global ranking the best performing state receives a score of one, the worst a score of nine, and the rest are continuously distributed between worst and best values based on their relative performance. To account for the abrupt variations in data due to economic shocks, natural disasters and other externalities, a five year average is taken for global ranking score. Once all indicators have been indexed using this method, the results for a given country are then averaged in each subject cluster to produce the final scores for the country. According to CIFP, a score of 6.5 or higher reflects that a country is 'performing poorly' relative to other states. Such a score may be indicative of an

⁵⁶ David Carment, Stewart Prest and Samy Yagadeesen, *Security Development and the Fragile State: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Policy*, London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 84-112; and the "Failed and Fragile States" section of the CIFP website for data, methodology, indicator description and country rankings, available at <http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/ffs.htm/>, accessed on 19 September 2015.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

arbitrary and autocratic government, a history of non-transparent government, the presence of significant barriers to political participation, the absence of a consistently enforced legal framework or a poor human rights record. Conversely, a score between 1 to 3.5 indicates that a state is 'performing well' relative to others. Scores in the moderate 3.5 to 6.5 range indicate state's performance approaching the 'global mean'. According to CIPF 2012 index, 14 countries are 'performing well', 40 are 'performing poorly' and the remaining 144 are within the 'global average'.

3.4 *Fragile State Index (FSI)*⁵⁸

The widely cited fund for peace FSI defines 'fragile states' in terms of negative attributes such as: loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community. The Index is based on content analysis using its proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tools (CAST) software which reportedly distills millions of pieces of relevant information into an 'easily digestible and informative format' for 178 countries. To operationalize the concept, each state is apportioned a score on twelve key political, social and economic indicators based on the scale of 0 (best) - 10 (worst). Thus, a country's total score is out of 120 where a higher score indicates greater fragility. Out of twelve indicators, four (demographic pressure, refugees and internally displaced people, group grievance, and human flight and brain drain) appears under social dimension, two (uneven economic development, and poverty and economic decline) under economic and six (state legitimacy, public service, human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized elites, and external intervention) is placed under political and military dimension. All indicators are given equal weight. The final fragility score is calculated by adding the scores. FSI also categorizes countries into groups like 'alert' (score 100.1-120), 'warning' (score 60.1 -100), 'moderate/stable' (score 30.1- 60) and 'sustainable' (0-30). In 2015 FSI, 16 countries were categorized in alert state, 109 in warning, 38 in stable and 15 in sustainable category.

3.5 *World Governance Indicators - Political Stability and Absence of Violence (WGI - PS and AV)*⁵⁹

The WGI is the largest geographical and temporal coverage of all fragility indices yet.⁶⁰ It defines governance as "the traditions and institutions by which

⁵⁸ See "FSI 2015 Methodology" available at <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/methodology/>; and "Fragile State Index 2015", available at <http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi15-report/>, accessed on 22 September 2015.

⁵⁹ For methodological issues see, Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, "The Worldwide Governance Indicators, Methodology and Analytical Issues", *Policy Research Working Paper 5430*, The World Bank: Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth Team, September 2010. Data available at <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators/>, accessed on 22 November 2015.

⁶⁰ Coverage increased from the initial 180 in 1996 to 215 countries and territories in 2013. However, in this

authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”⁶¹ There are two measures of governance corresponding to each of these three areas resulting in a total of six dimensions of governance indices. Out of these six, the index on Political Stability and Absence of Violence closely proxies the state fragility⁶² as it aims to capture the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorist acts. The expert data/opinion polls are assimilated in 6 indicators from 31 sources which include survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms.⁶³ The index scale is about -2.5 (worst) – 2.5 (best) expressed with associated standard error for each country. It also reports the overall position of a country in terms of ‘percentile rank’ where 0 is the lowest and to 100 is the highest rank and reports the lower and upper bounds of 90 per cent confidence interval for governance. Thus, Bangladesh with an estimated score of -1.61 in the Political Stability and Absence of Violence 2013 index has a percentile ranking of 7.58 amongst the 215 states/entities.⁶⁴ The wide coverage of the index has made it a very frequently used measure in statistical analysis. However, the ‘state centrism’, along with the possibility of bias generated through the expert opinion remains its main weaknesses.

3.6 What Do the Fragility Indices Really Measure?

Table 1 lists the periodicity, broad orientation, weighting of each indicator and the extent of externalities captured in these four indices. Several trends emerge from this simple tabulation: First, the coverage of some indices is selective as BTI exclude the OECD countries. Such exclusions, valid or not, recognize the case/class specificity to measure state fragility. Second, the varied periodicity raises the question of specifying the time interval in which fragility should and can be measured. Third, BTI and CIPF tend to emphasize the developmental aspects while FSI and WGI are stability and security orientated. However, all four indices take a ‘maximalist’ approach by including a wide number of domestically orientated state centric attributes. But how much do these indices really tell us about state fragility?

paper, data of 198 countries have been used to facilitate cross index comparison.

⁶¹ Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁶² Mata and Ziaja, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

⁶³ Number of data sources consulted varies from 1 to 9. Data sources includes African Economic Outlook, Business Environment Risk Intelligence, CIRI Human Rights Data Project, Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Insight Global Risk Service, iJET, Institute for Management Development, Institutional Profiles Database, Merchant International Group, Political Risk Services, Political Terror Scale, and World Economic Forum.

⁶⁴ The upper and lower limit of the ‘percentile rank’ for Bangladesh is 11.32 and 4.72 respectively while the standard error of the ‘estimated score’ is .23.

Table 1: Selected Features of Four Fragility Indices

Index	Periodicity (Published)	Orientation and Approach of the Index	Indicators Weighing	External Dimensions
BTI	Every 2 years (2003 and since 2006)	State Centric; largely domestic factors driven; focus on democracy and market economy; expert opinion based; 'Maximalist'.	Equal weight	'International Cooperation'- one of the 17 criterias. Focus on political actor's "willingness to cooperate with outside supporters and organizations."
CIFP	Unknown (2008, 2010, 2011, 2012)	State Centric; domestic factors driven; focus on developmental aspects; 'Maximalist'.	Equal weight	No explicit mention of measures/ indicators.
FSI	Yearly (Since 2005)	Largely domestic factors driven; Focus on stability aspect; 'Maximalist'.	Equal weight	'External Intervention' - one of the 12 dimensions. Includes pressures and measures related to foreign assistance; presence of UN peacekeepers, missions; foreign military intervention; sanctions and credit rating.
WGI	Yearly (Since 1996)	Entirely domestic factors driven; focus on security; expert opinion and survey based; 'Maximalist'.	between 0.010 and 0.094	No explicit mention of measures / indicators.

Source: Author's compilation.

Firstly, the tendency of the state fragility indices to discount the external origins of fragility is indeed confounding.⁶⁵ Whatever limited externalities captured in these indices bear a very little cumulative impact on the overall score and often reflect an assumption that external factors are always positive. Indeed, the fact that many global factors may have pernicious impacts contributing towards fragility is not sufficiently recognized in these models. States in an international system belong to the international society which can bring both progressive and regressive impact affecting its performance. The proximity

⁶⁵ Gros argued, "Why contemporary literature on failed state has tended to discount the external origins of state failure is baffling." Jean Germian Gros, *op. cit.*, p. 549. For an analysis of the external drivers of state fragility, see, OECD's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) paper, "Think Global, Act Global: Confronting Global Factors that Influence Conflict and Fragility", available at [http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC\(2012\)36&docLanguage=En/](http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC(2012)36&docLanguage=En/), accessed on 12 January 2016.

or geopolitical significance of a resource rich peripheral state/region may draw more attention of the major powers; similarly a peripheral state that has prematurely liberalized its economy under the prescriptions of World Bank/IMF or adopted a floating foreign currency exchange rate may be more affected by the exogenous shocks. Relegating fragile states' susceptibility to external factors as a 'potential reflection of state weaknesses' is simply not the answer in a world structured in a Centre-Periphery model. In a globalized world, there are major economic, security and environmental issues that cannot be dealt independently by individual or a group of states. The capacity of the international system is equally important. For example, the methodology used by Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN Secretariat for LDC includes 'remoteness' criteria under the Economic Vulnerability Index that recognizes the need to focus on those sources of vulnerability that "(a) accentuate or perpetuate underdevelopment, (b) not the result of misguided policies but, instead, are such that they limit policymakers' capacity to respond to shocks and (c) are beyond a country's control."⁶⁶ Remoteness is a structural obstacle to trade and growth and a possible source of vulnerability. Countries situated far from major world markets face a series of structural handicaps that may render them less able to respond to shocks in an effective way or to diversify their economies. Again, between 2003-2012, the emerging economies lost US\$ 6.6 trillion in illicit financial flows to the developed world which was more than the Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) combined.⁶⁷ Thanks to the globalization, the trend of illicit outflows is increasing at a staggering average rate of 9.4 per cent per year. The current fragility indices do not take into account such factors that are often beyond a country's control. Similarly, the indices take into account the 'presence of UN troops' as a potential reflection of fragility but does not credit the states contributing large number of troops in UN missions in their assessment of fragility.

Secondly, the absence of a consensus on what constitutes a 'strong state' contributes to the conceptual vacuum of operationalizing state fragility. Indeed, the term 'fragile states' inherently implies a hierarchy - an expression of power, that some states are more capable than the others in fulfilling the 'idealized' functions of a state. Implicit in this idealized image of state lies the Western model - a fixed prescriptive that informs most development and aid activities in fragile states. Such definitional inadequacy amount to 'prototyping' and rating the 'others' and restricts the use of such indices for macro-quantitative research.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ UN Committee for Development Policy (CDP) and Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), *Handbook on the Least Developed Country Category: Inclusion, Graduation and Special Support Measures*, Second Edition, 2015, pp. 53-58.

⁶⁷ The Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the developing countries from 2003 to 2012 was just US\$ 809 billion and the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was US\$ 5.7 trillion over the same 10-year period. See, Dev Kar and Joseph Spanjers, "Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2003-2012", available at <http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/2014-global-report-illicit-financial-flows-from-developing-countries-2003-2012/>, accessed on 06 December 2016, p. vii.

⁶⁸ Jose Manuel Pureza, Mark Duffield, Robert Mathews, Susan Woodward and David Sogge, "Peace Building and Failed States: Some Theoretical Notes", Expert Meeting Paper on *Peacebuilding Process and State Failure Strategies*, organized by Peace Studies Group and Ford Foundation, on 31 March-01 April 2006; Jonathan Di John, "Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature", Crisis States Research Centre Working Paper Series No 2, 2008, available at <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=57427/>, accessed on 27 October 2015.

Thirdly, the indicators often include both (assumed) causes and consequences of fragility. For example, a high score in the explanatory variables like the child mortality, voice and accountability etc. used in most indices are indirect indicators that a state may be weak while their heterogeneous dependent variables like incidence of coup, conflict intensity etc. reflect the disastrous consequence of state weakness; lumping these as indicators stand as “an elaborate and unsupported hypothesis” questioning the construct validity of the indices.

Fourthly, it is often unclear whether the fragility captured in these indices is attributed to the society as a whole or only to the state and its institutions. While the state-society bond is a vital ‘relational’ attribute, putting them under a homogeneous scale of measurement could be misleading. In the context of state, fragility tends to reflect the property of a political system; but, when fragility refers to society as a whole, it becomes a property of society and thus, being defined much more broadly including any kind of political, social or economic instability. What matters in one society may not have similar significance in another. For example, in the domestic context, a religion related social indicator like ‘clerical approval’ in Iraq or Syria would not mean the same in Japan or US.

Fifthly, the disaggregation of the concept into ‘measurable’ attributes is also fraught with high level of abstraction. The ALC framework introduced in the CIFP is a welcome addition; other indices also include these functions but they subsume them under different dimensions. However, measuring a latent concept like legitimacy is much more difficult than measuring service provision; as a result, the CIFP has to revert to traditionally available indicators like the quality of democracy as measured by the Polity Index – and these indicators can often be culturally biased. Except for the function like ‘monopoly on the use of force’, perception and standard about other state’s functions and public services varies widely. Inclusion of benchmarks that go beyond the core issues, like ‘economic policy’, ‘ease of doing businesses’ further diverge the opinion reducing these indices to an opaque summary measurement. Table 2 below summarizes the limitations of the fragility indices.

Table 2: Brief Summary of Limitations of State Fragility Indices

Areas	Limitations
Conceptual	▪ The idealized image of state mirrors a Weberian model as such the classification (often) viewed as an ‘expression of power’. ▪ ‘Thin’ conceptualization emphasizing state’s functionality/ performance over historicity and the deep (external) structures in which state is embedded. ▪ Both state and society placed under a homogeneous scale of measurement which could be misleading. ▪ Ignore the reality and explanatory importance of irreducible and potentially unobservable international structures that can generate fragility. ▪ Reflects ‘methodological individualism’ with state in the centre and action of human agency underpinning fragility as if states are ‘actors without systems’.

Operationalizing	▪ Fragility is reduced to state's function/ performance on security, economic, political, social and environmental dimensions. ▪ Little or no regards to the effects of international structures, externalities, strategic environment within which a state operate. ▪ Ignores possibilities of reverse causation, i.e. possibility of (international) structures that are beyond states' control accentuating fragility.
Indicators Selection	▪ Numerous domestically focused indicators as proxy. ▪ Include both (assumed) causes and consequences of fragility. ▪ 'One size fits all' approach.
Data Aggregation	▪ Fraught with high level of abstraction. ▪ Equally weighted indicators and aggregation methods tend to blur the distinctions between 'necessary' and 'sufficient' conditions. ▪ Latent concepts (i.e. legitimacy) could be culturally biased.
Data Sources	▪ Use of similar data sources poses a danger of conflation and of redundancy. ▪ Survey based index (BTI) are subjective to the interpretation of the 'experts'.

Source: Author's compilation.

A nuanced understanding of state fragility arguably requires historicising and contextualizing the fragile state problematique taking into account the dynamics of external and internal dimensions. State-making is a historical process and the strategic environment in which this process takes place has a profound impact on a state's future trajectory. To illustrate using a simple example from the microeconomic theory, we know that the price is higher and the output is lower in a monopolized market than in a competitive one. In both markets, the attributes of the actors (i.e. the firms in this case), are identical; every firm tries to maximize its profits and consequently produces the level of output at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue. However, what accounts for the variation in price and output between these markets is not variation in the attributes of the units (i.e. firms) but variation in the environments or market structures (i.e. monopoly vs. competitive) in which they act. Similarly, in the 'world market of states' the 'strategic environment' in which a state operates can have a greater impact on state's performance and future trajectory.

Notwithstanding the imprecise combination of variables and the danger of conflation and of redundancy due to a higher dependency on the expert survey data, these four indices do capture some features of state fragility. The high correlation amongst these four indices (bi-variate correlation coefficient ranging between 0.8 - 0.9)⁶⁹ reflects that, within their conceptual boundaries, they do measure some aspects of 'state fragility'. However, this does not mean causation and could also be due to the fact that they use highly similar data sources. Such ambiguities aside, the central question is perhaps to investigate the future trajectories of these states categorized as 'fragile' in these four indices. In other words, is there a hope for these countries to come out of fragility in near future or are they doomed in a fragility trap?

⁶⁹ Mata and Ziaja, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

CHAPTER IV

IS THERE A 'FRAGILITY TRAP'?

4.1 *Fragility Trap Defined*

'Fragility trap' implies a condition of state stagnation - that the state which has been categorized as 'fragile' will remain stuck in that condition for considerable period of time and their prospect of coming out of fragility, if at all, is severely limited. Within the conceptual boundaries of the fragility indices, each state is assigned with a score that reflects its current status attained over a period of time since its independence. To determine whether a 'fragility trap' exists or not, we need to find out whether the countries that are categorized as 'fragile' will ever be able to attain a pace of improvement that would place them alongside the top ranking 'stable and strong' states and if so in how many years. If the results show that it would take an exponentially high duration for the 'fragile states' to reach that threshold, then we could conclude that the current narrative of the state fragility indices supports the existence of 'fragility trap'. Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews take a similar approach to confirm 'capability trap'. Using a variety of empirical indicators of states' administrative capability, they demonstrate that many states are stuck in 'capability traps' as their implementation capability is both severely limited and improving (if at all) in a snail pace.⁷⁰ According to them, states like Haiti or Afghanistan would take hundreds (if not thousands) of years to reach the capability of Singapore and decades to reach even a moderate capability country like India. However, their focus is on the administrative capability of the states as such they use data that reflect countries' administrative capability namely 'Quality of Government' score from the International Country Risk Guide, 'Government Effectiveness' score from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 'Progressive Deterioration of Public Services' from FSI and scores on 'Resource Efficiency' from the BTI. Our focus is on 'fragility' which encompasses, among others, the capability dimensions as captured in the data of different fragility indices.

4.2 *Data and Calculation Methods*

Considering state consolidation as a historical process, this paper investigates the rate of progress of these states since independence and attempts to predict the length of time in years which would be required for states to emerge from their fragile status. The calculation is performed in 2 stages:

a. The first stage is to create a comparable scale for all four indices to simplify comparison. Thus, all index scores are converted to an ascending scale of 0 – 10 expressed to 3 decimal places. This is achieved in two steps: first converting the

⁷⁰ Pritchett Woolcock and Andrews, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-18.

fragility score in CIPF and FSI in ascending scale as they are rated on a descending scale with the worst performing countries being assigned the highest scores. Thus, Somalia's (the worst performer) score of 114.0 out of 120 in FSI 2014 becomes $(120.000 - 114.000) = 6.000$ and the same in CIPF 2012 index for Somalia is $(9.000 - 7.810) = 1.190$.

Second, rebasing these country scores in a comparable scale of 0-10 is achieved by using the formula: $\{(New\ Maximum - New\ Minimum) \div (Old\ Maximum - Old\ Minimum)\} \times (Country\ Score - Old\ Minimum) + New\ Minimum$. Since the new scale is 0-10, the new minimum is always 0 and the new maximum is always 10. The Old maximum and minimum refers to 120 and 0 in FSI, 1 and 9 in CIPF, 20 and 1 in BTI (as the aggregate value of Status and Management index is taken) and -3 and +3 in WGI (inclusive of standard error). Thus, Somalia's fragility score of 6.000 in FSI 2014 becomes $[(10 - 0) \div (120 - 0)] \times (6 - 0) + 0 = .5$ and the score of 1.190 for Somalia in CIPF 2012 index becomes 1.488 in the new comparable scale of 0-10.

b. The second stage of the calculation involves deriving the number of years for each country to emerge from fragility. It also requires multiple steps and assumptions. First is to establish a threshold score that a country needs to attain in future which is indicative that it has emerged from fragility. One clear threshold score will be to the 'top' ranking country of that particular index. A second and more moderate threshold will be to take the global average fragility score of the index and estimate the years required to reach that status. However, for FSI, the lowest threshold of 'stable' and 'sustainable' status – as defined in that index would be a more appropriate and conservative threshold to consider. Thus, for each index, we define two thresholds as follows:

- BTI: Rescaled score of the 'top' scoring country, Taiwan (8.63) and the global average (5.302).
- CIPF: Rescaled score of the 'top' scoring country, Switzerland (8.463) and the global average 5.264.
- FSI: Lowest threshold of 'stable' states which corresponds to a score of 30, rescaled to 5 and the lowest threshold of 'sustainable' states which corresponds to a score of 60, rescaled to 7.5.
- WGI: Rescaled score of the 'top' scoring country, Greenland (8.19) and the global average (4.93).

Second step is to establish the number of years between the year of independence of each country and the year of the relevant index. Using the date for each country from the COW v. 2011 datasets the number of years which elapsed

between independence and the year of the index is calculated by subtracting the former from the latter.

Third step is to establish the annual rate of progress for each country within each index. Here we are confronted with two problems. First is to guess what could have been the score for a country at its independence? Indeed, some states could have had a better start while others might have had started from zero. However, this paper makes an optimistic assumption that the lowest score of a country at independence could have been the same as the 'worst performer' in that index. If a state's score was higher at the time of independence, this would overstate the duration at which that country could come out of fragility. Conversely, an understatement is possible if the country had a substantially low starting point – which, given the score of the 'worst performers' in all four indices is highly unlikely. Thus, it is an optimistic assumption.⁷¹

The second problem is to decide what measures to apply – i.e. simple average or compound average rate, for calculating the annual rate of progress. To derive a simple average annual rate of progress for each country in an index, the score of the 'worst performer' in that index is subtracted from the country's present score and the result is divided by the 'years since independence'. Again, a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) could be derived by using the formula: $\{(Ending\ Year\ Value / Beginning\ Year\ Value)^{1/Years\ since\ Independence} - 1\}$ where the beginning year value for a country is substituted by the score of the 'worst performer' in that index. However, forward projection for countries using the CAGR formula depicts more number of countries requiring greater number of years to come out of fragility in each index.⁷² Thus, we consider the simple average provides the most optimistic estimate of a country's annual pace of progress and calculate it using the following formula:

1. Optimistic Annual Rate of Progress = (Current Fragility Score - Score of the 'worst performer' in that index) / Year Since Independence

⁷¹ To illustrate with an example, let us consider the case of Pakistan, an independent state since 1947, having a rescaled score (in 0-10 scale) of 1.425 in the FSI 2015 index. The rescaled score of the worst performer in FSI 2015 (i.e. South Sudan) is 0.458. Thus, Pakistan's historic rate of progress out of fragility is $(1.425 - 0.458)/67 = 0.014$. At this rate, Pakistan would take 248 years to become stable and 421 years to reach sustainable status. However, if it is considered that Pakistan had a better start in 1947 compared to South Sudan and had a better fragility score, say 1 instead of 0.458, then its historic rate of progress after 67 years would be $(1.425 - 1)/67 = .0063$. At this rate, Pakistan would take 563 years to become stable and 878 years to reach sustainable status – both of which are higher compared to the previous estimate. Thus, taking the score of the respective worst performers in each index as the score at independence for all countries is an optimistic assumption.

⁷² CAGR reflects a 'smoothed' annual progress as it does not capture 'volatility'. However, compared to the simple annual average, CAGR predicts a more daunting picture for countries to emerge from fragility. For example, in BTI 2014, a simple average estimate predicts only 36 countries requiring more than 100 years to reach the 'top ranking country' while the number of countries increases to 88 if the CAGR formula is used. In case of FSI, the use of CAGR estimates 45 countries requiring more than 100 years to become 'stable' compared to a prediction of 31 countries using the simple average estimate.

Finally, having established an optimistic annual rate of progress, we can now make a forward projection for each country. The result gives us the number of years required to reach the desired threshold based on the country's historic trajectory. This is achieved by dividing the difference between the desired threshold score (as defined above) and country's current fragility score with the 'optimistic annual rate of progress' using the following formulas:

2. Years to reach 'Top' = $(\text{Fragility Score of the 'Top' Country} - \text{Country's Current Fragility Score}) \div \text{Annual Rate of Progress (for CIFP, BTI and WGI)}$
3. Years to reach the lowest threshold of 'Stable' state = $(5 - \text{Country's Current Fragility Score}) \div \text{Annual Pace of Progress (For FSI 2015 index)}$
4. Years to reach the lowest threshold of 'Sustainable' state = $(7.5 - \text{Country's Current Fragility Score}) \div \text{Annual Pace of Progress (For FSI 2015 Index)}$
5. Years to reach Global Average = $(\text{Global Average Fragility Score} - \text{Country's Current Fragility Score}) \div \text{Annual Pace of Progress (For CIFP, BTI and WGI)}$

4.3 *Validity and Reliability of the Calculation Method*

At this point, the validity of method of calculation is checked. First, the correlation amongst the four indices has been checked. It is revealed (Table 3) that all four indices retain strong positive correlations after rescaling (correlation coefficient ranges from 0.663 to 0.955).

Table 3: Correlation of the Rescaled Fragility Scores of Four Indices

		WGI 2013 Rescaled Fragility Score on 0-10 Scale	CIFP 2012 Rescaled Fragility Score on 0-10 Scale	BTI 2014 Rescaled Fragility Score on 0-10 Scale	FSI 2015 Rescaled Fragility Score on 0-10 Scale
WGI 2013 Rescaled Fragility Score on 0-10 Scale	Pearson Correlation	1	.791**	.663**	.830**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000
	N	181	180	129	178
CIFP 2012 Rescaled Fragility Score on 0-10 Scale	Pearson Correlation	.791**	1	.777**	.955**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000
	N	180	180	129	178
BTI 2014 Rescaled Fragility Score on 0-10 Scale	Pearson Correlation	.663**	.777**	1	.762**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000
	N	129	129	129	127
FSI 2015 Rescaled Fragility Score on 0-10 Scale	Pearson Correlation	.830**	.955**	.762**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	
	N	178	178	127	178
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).					

Source: Author's calculation.

There is also a strong correlation in 'optimistic annual rate of progress' amongst the four indices (Table 4). The correlation coefficient of the optimistic annual pace of progress ranges from 0.695 (between WGI and FSI) to 0.98 (between FSI and CIFP).

Table 4: Correlation of the Optimistic Annual Rate of Progress of Four Indices

		WGI (2013) Optimistic Annual Pace of Progress	CIFP (2012) Optimistic Annual Pace of Progress	BTI (2014) Optimistic Annual Pace of Progress	FSI (2015) Optimistic Annual Pace of Progress
WGI (2013) Optimistic Annual Pace of Progress	Pearson Correlation	1	.734**	.877**	.695**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000
	N	181	180	129	178
CIFP (2012) Optimistic Annual Pace of Progress	Pearson Correlation	.734**	1	.855**	.980**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000
	N	180	180	129	178
BTI (2014) Optimistic Annual Pace of Progress	Pearson Correlation	.877**	.855**	1	.804**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000
	N	129	129	129	127
FSI (2015) Optimistic Annual Pace of Progress	Pearson Correlation	.695**	.980**	.804**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	
	N	178	178	127	178
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).					

Source: Author's calculation.

Second, to check the internal validity of our method of calculation, we compare the 'actual fragility scores' of a particular year in the past with the 'predicted fragility score' of the same year derived by using our method. A strong positive correlation between the two scores would imply that our predicted fragility score is not derived 'by chance' and validate our method. Accordingly, we select the oldest

year (i.e. 2003 for BTI, 2010 for CIPF, 2006 for FSI and 1996 for WGI) of which data is available for comparison in each index for the bi-variate correlation. The results are listed in Table 5. Indeed, we find that the predicted fragility scores obtained by the calculation method used in this paper are strongly correlated with the actual fragility scores. For example, while comparing the predicted fragility scores of BTI 2003 with the actual data of BTI 2003, we find the correlation coefficient (r) is 0.716 ($N=116$, $p < .01$). Similarly, a comparison predicted and actual fragility scores of CIPF 2010 reveals $r = 0.958$ ($N=190$, $p < .01$), for FSI 2006, $r = 0.944$ ($N=190$, $p < .01$) and for WGI (PS&AV) 1996, $r = 0.531$ ($N=185$, $p < .01$). In case of WGI (PS&AV), correlation coefficient increases to 0.67 when comparing with the data of the year 2000. The high positive correlations between the predicted and actual scores tends to confirm that the fragility scores for each country calculated by using our method are broadly accurate and does not happen by chance. In other words, if the predicted fragility score derived for a past year is strongly associated with the actual score, it is likely that the predicted fragility score for the future years will also be similar (all other things being equal).

Table 5: Bi-variate Correlation of 'Actual' and 'Predicted' Fragility Scores of Four Indices

Actual Fragility Score of	Predicted Fragility Scores of			
	BTI - 2003	CIPF 2010	FSI 2006	WGI 1996
BTI - 2003	.716***			
CIPF - 2010		.958***		
FSI - 2006			.944***	
WGI - 1996				.531***
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level. (2 tailed).				

Source: Author's own.

However, the strong positive correlations between the 'predicted' and the 'actual' fragility score breaks down (except in CIPF) when we concentrate on extreme cases. For example, the correlating coefficient of 'predicted' and 'actual' score involving 15 most fragile states in FSI 2006 is 0.364; in WGI (PS&AV) 1996 it is 0.42 and in CIPF (2012) it is 0.712. In case of BTI 2003, there is a negative correlation (-0.361) between the predicted and actual scores. Such findings add to the criticism that the measurement architecture of these indices is inadequate particularly for the poorly performing countries.

⁷³ To calculate 'predicted' score, the lowest score of the respective index is taken as the score at independence and the remaining year's score are calculated by multiplying it with the respective 'optimistic pace of progresses' as per the calculation methods used in this paper.

4.4 Results and Analysis

Annex A lists the detail results involving all 197 states that are common in two or more indices. It reveals the number of years each country will take to reach the 'sustainable/top' and 'stable/global average' threshold to emerge out of fragility. The negative values in case of some countries (in columns reflecting the 'number of years to reach top/sustainable/global average/stable') reflect that these countries have already crossed the respective thresholds. For example, according to FSI, Singapore has crossed the 'stable' threshold in 1999 and the 'global average' threshold in CIPF in 1982 (see annex A). It is evident from annex A that a great majority of states are stuck in a fragility trap. Table 6 and Figure 7 provide a summary of annex A telling us how many countries will require what duration to emerge from fragility in each index considering the two different thresholds.


- **FSI (2015):** Over half of the countries (53.49 per cent) listed in the FSI will require 50 years or more to reach the lowest threshold of 'sustainable' status out of which 60 countries (33.52 per cent) will need 100 years or more to reach the same status and emerge out of fragility. However, if the threshold is lowered to reaching the 'stable' status, there are still 55 countries that will require 50 years or more to reach that status.

Table 6: Number of Countries and 'Years to Reach' Two Different Thresholds in Four Indices

Number of Year	Number of Countries Reaching 'Top' / 'Sustainable' Status				Number of Countries Reaching Global Average / 'Stable' Status			
	BTI	CIPF	FSI	WGI	BTI	CIPF	FSI	WGI
500 years or more	5	3	10	15	4	2	6	5
400 years or more	7	4	12	20	5	-	7	-
300 years or more	8	7	16	26	-	-	10	-
200 years or more	11	13	33	35	6	3	13	8
150 years or more	21	27	47	44	-	6	17	11
100 years or more	35	51	60	58	8	8	30	19
50 years or more	68	94	95	93	14	21	55	26

Source: Author's calculation.

Figure 7: Cumulative Percentage of Countries Requiring 50 Years or More to Reach 'Top'/'Sustainable' Status in Four Fragility Indices



Source: Author's calculation.

- CIPF (2012):** The forward projection using CIPF fragility scores reveals that 94 countries (48.97 per cent) will require 50 years or more to reach the 'top' ranking country (Switzerland) and emerge out of fragility out of which 51 countries (26.29 per cent) will require 100 years or more to reach the same status. However, if the threshold is lowered to reaching global average, there will still be 21 countries that will require more than 50 years to reach that level.
- BTI (2014):** The BTI has the lowest coverage (129 countries) amongst all four indices. Based on its scores, there are 68 countries (53.49 per cent) that will require 50 years or more to reach Taiwan, the 'top' ranking country in that index and emerge out of fragility out of which 35 (27.13 per cent) countries will require 100 years or more to reach the same status. In case of a lower threshold of reaching 'global average', there will still be 14 countries that will require 50 years or more to reach that level.
- WGI (PS&AV) 2013:** In case of WGI, the number of countries that will require 100 years or more to reach the 'top' (i.e. Greenland) is 46. The number increases to 81 countries in case the 'years to reach top' threshold is taken as 50 years and droops down to 26 countries in case the fragility score threshold is lowered as reaching the 'global average' instead of the 'top' ranking country.

We also take a closer look at some countries that perform poorly according to these indices to supplement the broad picture confirming the fact that a large number of states will require considerable period to emerge out of fragility if they continue to maintain their long run trajectories. Table 7 is a snapshot of Annex A involving 15 most fragile states that appear amongst 40 most fragile states in all four indices. It shows that given their current pace of progress, all 15 states will require over hundred years to reach the 'top' ranking country or stable/sustainable status. For example, Syria would require 625 years to become 'sustainable' (according to FSI), 1,398 years to reach at par with Taiwan (according to BTI), 168 years to reach Switzerland (according to CIFP) and 3,825 years to reach Greenland (according to WGI). Again, according to the FSI Pakistan would require 248 years to become 'stable'. According to the BTI, it would take 185 years for Pakistan to reach the status of Taiwan while a forward projection of CIFP ratings predicts 198 years to reach the 'top' (i.e. Switzerland). The median value of years to reach the 'top' or becoming 'stable' of these 15 countries also vary. The FSI predicts most daunting picture, where the median years to become a 'stable' or 'sustainable' state is 365 and 611 years respectively. In case of BTI and CIFP, the median number of years to reach the respective 'top' ranking country is 185 and 198 years.

Be that as it may, it would be too naive to say that these are perfect estimates. Indeed, it is biased towards states that are relatively new. It is evident both within and between the indices having same fragility score but different 'years since independence' (see Annex A). For example, Argentina and Armenia with almost similar fragility scores takes 114 and 14 years respectively to reach the 'top' ranking country in WGI. Again, Pakistan and Venezuela with similar fragility scores in WGI and CIFP takes different durations to come out of fragility only because they became independent in different times. However, higher values of 'years since independence' does not always imply greater fragility trap. For example, Switzerland and Sweden which gained their statehood in 1816 consistently ranks in the top end of all four indices and are located closer to the world's economic and political 'Centres'.

There are also problems with scaling as it does not tell us whether the difference between a fragility score of 2 and 3 is same as a difference between a score of 6 and 7. Does it take longer for a country to progress from 2 to 4 compared to 6 to 8 or vice versa? The underlying process of progress out of fragility may not be linear; countries could have reached some 'take off' points or a 'tipping point' from where they can achieve either accelerated progress or spiral into more fragility. This essentially relates to the question as to what constitutes 'necessary' and 'sufficient' conditions for fragility. Is a stable external security environment a sufficient or necessary condition for countries to come out of fragility? How much does the presence or absence of a favourable security environment contribute towards the 'take off' or 'tipping off' point for a country? Why did the newly independent countries in Europe following the demise of the former Soviet Union were able to better consolidate their state-building in a shorter period of time compared to the African countries?

Identifying the 'necessary' and 'sufficient' conditions is also essential from a methodological point of view. If a favourable security environment is considered as a 'necessary' condition to come out of fragility, then adding the mean of aggregation of security dimension with others (such as the scores in economic, political, social, environmental dimensions) would be misleading as the other dimension could partly compensate for a lack of security and lift the country over the threshold of fragility. A more valid method would be to multiply the other dimensions with security. The score will then always be zero when security is zero and, thus satisfy the conceptual assumption as a 'necessary' condition.

Despite such limitations, collectively what these arithmetic illustrations show is that within the conceptual boundary of each index, a large number of states will require hundreds of years to come out of fragility if they continue to maintain their long run trajectories. It confirms the existence of 'fragility trap'. Such findings stand as a sharp contrast to the reality. In reality, countries like South Korea - one of the major aid recipient nations and the poorest countries in 1950's, emerged as a donor nation and the 12th largest economy in the world in about 40 years - much less than the periods derived through the data of four fragility indices.

In sum, revealing the fragility trap leaves two choices regarding the fragile state problematique. One is to view these narratives as a 'political constructions' and reject or relegate them as a mere 'expression of power'. Indeed, many scholars have taken this path suggesting that the 'ranking' produced by these indices need to be understood as narrative constructs, which, to borrow from Robert Cox, are 'always for someone and for some purpose'. The other choice is to offer a better framework of analysis to understand and investigate this 'real world' problem of state fragility. The paper subscribes the second choice and unfolds a new framework to analyze state fragility in the next chapter.

Table 7: Fragility Trap: 15 Most Fragile Countries Common in All Four State Fragility Indices

Countries and Territories	WGI (PS&AV)2013			CIFP(2012)			BTI (2014)			FSI (2015)		
	Rescaled Fragility Score (0-10 Scale)	Years to Reach 'Top' (Greenland)	Years to Reach Global Average	Rescaled Fragility Score (0-10 Scale)	Years to Reach Top (Switzerland)	Years to Reach Global Average	Rescaled Fragility Score (0-10 Scale)	Years to Reach 'Top' (Taiwan)	Years to Reach 'Global Average'	Rescaled Fragility Score (0-10 Scale)	Years to Stable (Score 5)	Years to 'Sustainable' (Score 7.5)
SOMALIA	0.421	Infinity	Infinity	1.488	Infinity	Infinity	1.51	Infinity	Infinity	0.500	5786	9000
SYRIA	0.525	3825	2198	3.000	184	76	1.77	1398	720	1.008	384	625
PAKISTAN	0.675	1949	1103	3.213	198	77	3.4	185	67	1.425	248	421
AFGHANISTAN	0.876	1510	837	2.438	590	277	3.135	321	127	1.008	689	1121
SUDAN	1.332	429	225	2.488	335	155	2.35	434	204	0.767	795	1265
CONGO, D.R.	1.283	425	224	2.388	351	166	2.97	209	86	0.858	559	896
IRAQ	1.686	417	208	3.438	206	75	4.065	147	40	1.292	365	611
CEN AFR. REP	1.424	358	185	2.288	402	194	3.725	120	38	0.675	1076	1698
YEMEN, REP.	1.085	246	133	2.713	103	46	3.8	51	16	0.992	180	293
MALI	2.191	180	82	2.738	238	105	4.14	92	24	2.242	84	159
MYANMAR	3.075	125	45	3.250	189	73	3.28	199	75	2.108	116	216
BURUNDI	2.837	113	44	2.913	195	83	4.41	76	16	1.825	121	216
CHAD	3.165	97	34	3.025	184	76	3.075	192	77	0.967	428	694
CÔTE D'IVOIRE	3.248	93	32	3.263	152	59	4.47	76	15	1.667	149	261
MAURITANIA	3.305	90	30	3.550	124	43	4.22	88	22	2.092	96	179
Median Value (Years)		358	185		198	77		185	67		365	611

Source: Author's compilation.


CHAPTER V

STATE FRAGILITY THROUGH THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY FRAMEWORK

5.1 The Centre and Periphery Model

Notwithstanding the scepticism, the Centre-Periphery framework⁷⁴ provides a good analytic tool to examine the global-local interactions to better understand and explain state fragility (See Figure 8). The model presupposes that fragility is concentrated mostly in the Peripheral states. It takes into account two levels of interaction that are mutually inclusive. First, at the external level, it presupposes that the centre of the Centre (C_c) and the centre of the Peripheral states (P_c) are coupled through an interaction structure to facilitate economic, political, social, security interaction between the two. Exploring the nature and interaction structure may allow us to explain the global dimension of state fragility in the Peripheral states. Interaction between the parties is essential for this model to work; mutually isolated parties may not qualify to demonstrate a conflictual or harmonious interaction. Second, at the domestic level each state has its centre(s) (i.e. capital, major cities from where the governmental machineries work) and their respective peripheries. The interaction between C_c and P_c with their respective peripheries (i.e. C_p and P_p) could explain the 'intra' level causality of state fragility specific to that context. Thus, the model allows both historicizing and contextualizing the fragile state problematique. Indeed, the 'inter' and 'intra' level interactions between and within the states cannot be viewed in isolation as they both contribute towards avoiding state fragility particularly in Peripheral states.

Figure 8: Framework of of Analysis: Cente-Periphery Model



Source: Author's own.

⁷⁴ The Centre - Periphery framework and its deviants have been used by many scholars to explain the global-local interactions. See, A. G. Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment", *Monthly Review*, September, 1966, pp. 16-20; Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1969, pp. 167-91. For the criticism of Galtung's model, see, K. E. Boulding, "Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1977, pp. 75-86. Also see, Nancy Scheper-Hughes, *Death without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil*, Berkley and Los Angeles California: University of California Press, 2004, pp.14-18; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World-Economy*, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 49-95. Wallerstein's argument is similar except that he views the world on an exploitative hierarchy with a developed core, semi-periphery and underdeveloped periphery.

5.2 The Nature of Centre-Periphery Interaction

At the very basic level, the nature of interaction between (inter) and within (intra) the Centre and Peripheral state could be characterized as either harmonious or conflictual. At the global level, a harmonious interaction could result in building alliance providing security guarantee, full access to each other's markets, preferential trade arrangements etc. insulating and protecting the Peripheral state from unforeseen security and economic threats/shocks. When such arrangements are truly non-intrusive, unconditional and egalitarian in nature, they may greatly contribute towards the progress of a Peripheral state. In such conditions, the ideals of globalization are truly realized creating a favourable condition for the development and progress of all states. However, in reality, the nature of interaction between the Centre and the Periphery is often conflictual as they are shaped by interests and priorities – particularly that of Centre states. Thus, we find a rapid increase in export of small arms and weapons fuelling the 'new wars',⁷⁵ a protectionist and unfair trade practice such as farm subsidies (in US) or Common Agricultural Policy (in EU), 'currency wars',⁷⁶ climate change challenges etc. rooted in the actions of the states in the Centre. The second and third order impact of such conflictual interaction adversely impacts the security, productive capacity, growth and the overall living conditions in the peripheral states where majority of the humanity lives. A conflictual interaction may also originate from the domestic policies pursued by the Centre states. For example, the unconventional monetary policy pursued by the Federal Reserve of the US and the so called 'taper tantrum' resulted a capital outflow of over US\$ 548 billion from the emerging markets in 2015 alone (largest outflow since 1988) chocking the much needed investment for infrastructural development in the Peripheral states.⁷⁷ Thus, a conflictual interaction between the Cc and Pc creates, what Pope Francis dubbed a 'globalization of indifference'.

Similarly, the nature of 'intra' level interaction between the Centres and the respective peripheries may be harmonious or conflictual. At the 'intra' level, the government at the centre seeks to control its territory and harness its resources,

⁷⁵ For global trend in arms export, see, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, "Trend in International Arms Transfers – 2014", *SIPRI Fact Sheet*, March 2015; Andrew T. H. Tan (ed.), *The Global Arms Trade: A Handbook*, New York: Taylor and Francis, 2010, pp. 3-10. For the effects of global arms trade in Africa, see Matt Schroeder and Guy Lamb, "The Illicit Arms Trade in Africa, A Global Enterprise", *African Analyst*, Third Quarter, 2006, pp. 69-78. For the success and failure of the global efforts for conventional arms control, see, Sibylle Bauer, "Post- Cold War Control of Conventional Arms", in Andrew T. H. Tan (ed.) *op. cit.*, pp. 306-312.

⁷⁶ The main instrument for currency war is the monetary policy. Monetary policies adopted by advanced economies, in particular the US, have contributed to the dramatic weakening of emerging-market currencies. See Dambisa Moyo, "The Global Migration Blowback", *Project Syndicate*, available at www.project-syndicate.org/, accessed on 14 April 2016.

⁷⁷ For details of 'taper tantrum' see, Ratna Sahay, Vivek Arora, Thanos Arvanitis, Hamid Faruquee, Papa N'Diaye, Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, and an IMF Team, "Emerging Market Volatility: Lessons from the Taper Tantrum", *IMF Staff Discussion Note*, SDN14/09, September 2014, pp. 16-24. Also see, Dan McCrum, "EM at the Mercy of Shifting Money Flows", *Financial Times*, 05 October 2015, available at <http://www.ft.com/>, accessed on 18 December 2015.

promulgates and implements policies that may or may not be justified and equitable for the periphery. The prudence (or the lack of it) with which the Centres regulate policies and take care of their respective peripheries in the domestic front is a key determinant of state fragility. Indeed, most fragility definitions capture this discrepancy and distributive injustice between the centre and the periphery. For example, the DFID’s definition of fragile state: “government is not willing or capable of providing core services to most of its populations particularly to the poor” is premised on the distributive injustice by the centres of Peripheral states.

However, the ability of Peripheral states to be ‘willing and capable’ to provide the political good to all its citizens is much harder if it has a conflictual interaction at the global level. Conversely, a harmonious relationship at the global level pays rich dividend. The density of connectivity with other states in terms of coalitions, alliances, trade etc. together with the prudent domestic policies, instruments and roadmaps are crucial to offset or insulate the Peripheral state from the regressive global impact.

5.3 Propensity of State Fragility: Four Propositions

The mutually inclusive nature of interactions within and between the Centre and Peripheral states as discussed above could be of four different variants generating four different hypotheses that can help explain the propensity of state fragility (see Table 8).

Table 8: Propensity of State Fragility				
Interaction between	Nature of Interactions			
centre of Centre and centre of Periphery States (C _c and P _c)	Harmonious	Conflictual	Harmonious	Conflictual
centres of the Centre and Periphery States with their respective peripheries (C _c & P _c with C _p & P _p)	Justified and Equitable	Unjustified and Unequal	Unjustified and Unequal	Justified and Equitable
Propensity of Fragility	No Fragility	Very High	Medium/High	Medium/High

Source: Author’s own.

- H1: If the interaction between the C_c and P_c is harmonious and the interaction between C_c and P_c with their respective peripheries (i.e. C_p and P_p) is based on justified and equitable policy practices it is unlikely for the state to have any fragility.

- **H2:** When the interaction between C_c and P_c is conflictual and policy practice by the C_c and P_c towards their respective C_p and P_p is unjustified and unequal the propensity of fragility is likely to be very high.
- **H3:** If the interaction between the C_c and P_c is harmonious but the policy practice by the C_c and P_c towards their respective C_p and P_p is unjustified and unequal we may see medium or high level of fragility.
- **H4:** If the interaction between C_c and P_c is conflictual but the policy practice by the C_c and P_c towards their respective C_p and P_p is well justified and equitable in nature, the state may show a medium or high level of fragility.

H1 reflects the most ideal condition where all external and internal factors are geared towards complementing each other for the progress and development of the people and the state resulting in no fragility. In such condition (H1), the global forces play a *progressive* role and are sustained by an equally prudent and justified domestic structure and policies resulting in the state's ability to dispense positive political goods to its citizens. The economic, social, political and security exchange between the C_c and the P_c tends to benefit both parties which are subsequently transmitted/distributed by the Centres to their respective peripheries resulting in a positive intra-actor effects. As a result, it is unlikely for the peripheral states to succumb to fragility. Welfare states resembles such a condition where the dividend of progressive global forces is effectively harnessed by a prudent and well structured social welfare system to serve the political good to all its citizens.

The conditions in H2 reflect the opposite of H1; here the external dimension is conflictual and the internal interaction between the respective centres and peripheries are also unjustified and unequal creating a condition of high propensity of fragility. The global factors play a *regressive* role in this situation and are often multiplied or transformed by the unjustified and unequal local conditions reproducing state weakness. The regressive global forces in such conditions may work through multiple channels. For example, the external forces may work as a catalyst to heighten the security dilemma of the peripheral state, fragment the state-society relations by identity restructuring, attract conflict entrepreneurs to fuel or sustain civil wars or internal conflict, facilitate natural resource predation, derail the prospect of economic emancipation due to abrupt and unplanned liberalization etc. All of these result in constraining the state to provide the positive political good to its citizens in the long run and make them fragile, failed or even collapsed state.

However, most Peripheral states straddle in the middle similar to the conditions as described in H3 and H4. These scenarios are not straight-forward and may depend on many associated factors like degree of integration with the international structure,

strategic significance, resourcefulness, demography, remoteness etc. However, in both cases, some degree of fragility is inevitable. In case of H3, the benefits of the progressive global forces are limited to the P_c as the state pursues an unequal and unjustified policy practices towards its peripheries. In such conditions, the external engagements are often used by the political elites to prolong their stay in power and strengthen 'regime security' instead of national security. Coercion is often preferred over consent as the regime in the centre of the peripheral state mostly draws its support and legitimacy from outside. Such condition is particularly sustainable where the Peripheral state is endowed with rich mineral resources and the value exchange from these resources can free the government from raising tax from its own people. As a result, it creates a parasitic domestic elites sustaining on external support whose primary aim is to protect their own power base and maximize their wealth with no particular regards to the people in the periphery. The penetration of progressive global forces into the P_p is fiercely checked by the government in the P_c by coercive means, censorship, banning social media, internet etc.

In case of H4, the 'intra' level structures and policies are justified and equitable as the government in the P_c aims to dispense positive political goods to all its citizens in the face of a conflictual 'inter' actor relationship. Such conflictual interaction between the C_c and P_c may be due to historical, political, economic or security reasons restricting the Peripheral state to become resilient. For example, a hostile or less favourable external environment may compel the state to increase its defence budget to maintain internal order or repel any external attack at the expense of socio-economic development. Geography and demography can also be crucial factors in H4 scenarios. For example, an economically remote or land-locked country located far away from its major trading partners may suffer undue strain on the economy in general and commodity price in particular. The H4 scenario can also explain the demand-driven state fragility attributed to the demographic pressure. High population growth can strain states' capacity to maintain order, provide education, health services, housing etc. However, more population can also increase state's coffer in tax receipt; but that only happens if the economy is growing – which, in a conflictual 'inter' actor relationship is difficult even with sound domestic policy in a globalized world where growth is linked to trade. Indeed as Gros succinctly puts, "autarky is the enemy of any state or political economy based on trade."⁷⁸ Peripheral state may try to minimize the effects of regressive global forces and strive for self-sufficiency and economic independence but a conflictual interaction with the Centre often puts a limit to such struggles.

⁷⁸ Jean-Germain Gros, *op. cit.* p. 556.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Conceptualizing state only as a 'functional entity' and devoid of any history, power relations and fluidity in composition can largely obscure our understanding on state fragility. States' power and propensity to resist or succumb to fragility is embedded within the causal complexes comprising both internal and external factors. State, as a political entity aims to achieve control over its territory and harness its resources - including human resources. In the process of pursuing this aim, states face both 'intra' and 'inter' level challenges that may be at the structural and agency level. The internal structural challenges could be geographic, demographic, economic, class, ethnicity, elite bargain etc. Chief among the external structural constraints are the security dilemma, unequal terms of trade and exchange, adverse international market conditions, remoteness, environmental factors etc. The internal and external challenges are mutually inclusive, contextual and dynamic in nature. Thus, a land-locked country or a country with a high percentage of population in the low elevated coastal zones faces different economic or environmental challenges compared to the opposite.

The current quantitative methods used in different state fragility indices to measure state weakness mirrors methodological individualism where the performance of state is atomized into its domestic functionalities. States are treated as 'given' or 'primitive' units with little or no regards to the externalities in which they are embedded. Such reductionist conceptualization restricts the explanatory leverage of taking into account the effects of externalities. As a result of such 'thin' conceptualization, many fragility indices point to a trajectory for the fragile states towards a fragility trap – a condition of state stagnation. Such inadequacies in the state fragility indices can be addressed by reconceptualizing the fragile state problematic and sufficiently including the external drivers of fragility using the Centre – Periphery model. The model also allows contextualizing and historicizing state fragility while emphasizing the need of an enabling external environment for the Peripheral states to emerge out of fragility.

A Peripheral state does not necessarily seek to control the external environment but minimize the adverse impact while its strategy for achieving control for internal environment is often a mixture of coercion and consent. The interests and priorities of the external actors often shape and influence the direction of the policy practice by the political elites of the Peripheral states. Indeed, as we see external players compelled a democratically elected government in Greece to succumb to harsher austerity plans, an ultimatum by the US to 'be prepared to go back to the Stone Age' compelled Pakistan to join the GWoT that has greatly contributed towards its fragility. Such external 'realities' underscore the need

for finding solutions to global issues that are synced and harmonious to internal conditions.

Articulating solutions of the regressive global forces also hinges on the capacity of the international system. Indeed, fighting state fragility relates as much to enhancing the capacity of the international system as it is to the capacity of individual nations. An international system that can prevent or reduce the incentives for the countries to undertake action that are conflictual, uncooperative and inward-looking may help in creating conditions that would allow development of all nations. This can only happen when there is a harmony in the goals and interests. Indeed, a convergence of interests and goals between the developed 'Centre' and the 'Peripheral' fragile states is essential to decrease the 'gap' and effectively address the problem of state fragility. Failing to do that would make the phenomenon of fragile states a rather inevitable feature of the international system.

ANNEX

Annex A: Fragility Trap – Number of Years Required by Each County to Reach 'Top/Sustainable' and 'Stable/Global Average' Threshold

1.2 Countries and Territories	2.1 Years of Independence	3. WGI 2013 - PS & AV				CIFP 2012				5. BTI 2014				6. FSI 2015			
		3.1 Rescaled Fragility Score on 0-10 Scale	3.2 Optimistic Annual Pace of Progress	3.3 Years to Reach 'Top' (Greenland)	3.4 Years to Reach Global Average	4.1 Rescaled Fragility Score on 0-10 Scale	4.2 Optimistic Pace of Progress	4.3 Years to Reach Top (Switzerland)	4.4 Years to Reach Global Average	5.1 Rescaled Fragility Score on 0-10 Scale	5.2 Optimistic Annual Pace of Progress	5.3 Years to Reach 'Top' (Taiwan)	5.4 Years to Reach 'Global Average'	6.1 Rescaled Fragility Score on 0-10 Scale	6.2 Opt Pace of Progress	6.3 Years to Stable (Score 5)	6.4 Years to 'Sustainable' (Score 7.5)
AFGHANISTAN	1919	0.876	0.005	1510	837	2.437	0.01	590	277	3.135	0.017	321	127	1.008	0.006	689	1121
ALBANIA	1944	5.097	0.068	46	-2	5.575	0.06	48	-5	5.86	0.062	45	-9	4.842	0.063	3	42
ALGERIA	1962	3.050	0.052	100	36	4.212	0.055	78	19	4.845	0.064	59	7	3.367	0.056	29	74
ANGOLA	1975	4.380	0.104	37	5	4.162	0.072	59	15	4.215	0.069	64	16	2.658	0.056	42	86
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	1981	6.630	0.194	8	-9	5.8	0.139	19	-4					5.183	0.143	-1	16
ARGENTINA	1841	5.100	0.027	114	-6	6.25	0.028	79	-35	5.875	0.025	109	-23	6.033	0.032	-32	46
ARMENIA	1991	5.117	0.213	14	-1	5.675	0.199	14	-2	5.275	0.164	20	0	4.192	0.162	5	20
AUSTRALIA	1920	6.694	0.067	22	-26	7.55	0.066	14	-35					7.975	0.080	-37	-6
AUSTRIA	1955	7.238	0.118	8	-20	8.113	0.116	3	-25					7.833	0.125	-23	-3
AZERBAIJAN	1991	4.316	0.177	22	3	5.225	0.178	18	0	4.33	0.123	35	8	3.558	0.135	11	29
BAHAMAS, THE	1973	6.868	0.161	8	-12	6.213	0.121	19	-8					5.700	0.128	-5	14
BAHRAIN	1971	2.763	0.056	97	39	4.788	0.08	46	6	4.65	0.073	55	9	4.642	0.097	4	29
BANGLADESH	1971	2.312	0.045	131	58	4.338	0.07	59	13	5.04	0.082	44	3	2.350	0.044	60	117
BARBADOS	1966	7.155	0.143	7	-16	6.575	0.111	17	-12					5.892	0.113	-8	14
BELARUS	1991	4.958	0.206	16	0	5.213	0.177	18	0	3.53	0.088	58	20	3.700	0.141	9	27
BELGIUM	1945	6.529	0.090	18	-18	7.363	0.088	13	-24					7.467	0.102	-24	0
BELIZE	1981	5.289	0.152	19	-2	5.313	0.123	26	0					4.558	0.124	4	24
BENIN	1960	5.467	0.095	29	-6	4.038	0.049	90	25	6.2	0.087	28	-10	3.433	0.055	28	74
BHUTAN	1971	6.333	0.141	13	-10	4.75	0.08	47	6	5.97	0.104	26	-6	3.442	0.069	22	58
BOLIVIA	1848	4.421	0.024	155	21	4.95	0.021	166	15	5.92	0.027	102	-23	3.500	0.018	82	218
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	1992	4.390	0.189	20	3	5.1125	0.181	18	1	5.16	0.166	21	1	3.550	0.141	10	28

BOTSWANA	1966	6.761	0.135	11	-14	5.675	0.091	31	-5	7.415	0.123	10	-17	4.767	0.090	3	30
BRAZIL	1822	4.536	0.022	170	18	5.8625	0.023	113	-26	7.66	0.032	30	-74	4.783	0.023	10	121
BRUNEI																	
DARUSSALAM	1984	6.804	0.220	6	-9	5.7125	0.151	18	-3					4.750	0.143	2	19
BULGARIA	1908	5.293	0.046	62	-8	6.2375	0.046	49	-21	7.22	0.054	26	-36	5.383	0.046	-8	46
BURKINA FASO	1960	3.745	0.063	71	19	4.1125	0.05	86	23	5.165	0.068	51	2	2.567	0.039	62	126
BURUNDI	1962	2.837	0.047	113	44	2.9125	0.029	195	83	4.41	0.056	76	16	1.825	0.026	121	216
CAMBODIA	1953	4.741	0.072	48	3	4.5	0.051	78	15	3.815	0.038	127	39	2.675	0.036	64	133
CAMEROON	1960	4.137	0.070	58	11	3.9	0.046	98	29	3.89	0.044	108	32	2.142	0.031	92	172
CANADA	1920	6.718	0.068	22	-26	7.5375	0.066	14	-35					7.858	0.079	-36	-5
CAPE VERDE	1975	6.344	0.156	12	-9	5.125	0.098	34	1					3.875	0.088	13	41
CEN AFR REP	1960	1.424	0.019	358	185	2.2875	0.015	402	194	3.725	0.041	120	38	0.675	0.004	1076	1698
CHAD	1960	3.165	0.052	97	34	3.025	0.03	184	76	3.075	0.029	192	77	0.967	0.009	428	694
CHILE	1839	5.622	0.030	86	-23	6.8875	0.031	50	-52	8.02	0.037	16	-73	6.542	0.035	-44	28
CHINA	1860	4.090	0.024	171	35	5.1	0.024	142	7	4.975	0.023	162	14	3.633	0.021	66	188
COLOMBIA	1831	2.886	0.014	392	151	5.0375	0.02	175	12	6.22	0.026	94	-36	3.125	0.015	129	300
COMOROS	1975	4.602	0.110	33	3	3.825	0.063	73	23					3.058	0.067	29	67
CONGO, DEM. REP.	1960	1.283	0.016	425	224	2.3875	0.017	351	166	2.97	0.027	209	86	0.858	0.007	559	896
CONGO, REP.	1960	4.223	0.072	55	10	3.725	0.043	110	36	3.725	0.041	120	38	2.433	0.037	70	139
COSTA RICA	1920	6.110	0.061	34	-19	6.6	0.056	34	-24	7.75	0.066	13	-37	6.108	0.060	-18	23
CÔTE D'IVOIRE	1960	3.248	0.053	93	32	3.2625	0.034	152	59	4.47	0.055	76	15	1.667	0.022	149	261
CROATIA	1992	6.023	0.267	8	-4	6.9125	0.271	6	-6	7.315	0.264	5	-8	5.750	0.241	-3	7
CUBA	1909	5.616	0.050	52	-14	5.8875	0.043	60	-15	3.89	0.023	209	62	4.383	0.037	16	83
CYPRUS	1960	5.864	0.103	23	-9	6.675	0.1	18	-14					4.483	0.075	7	40
CZECH REP.	1993	6.754	0.317	5	-6	7.125	0.297	5	-6	8.04	0.311	2	-9	6.883	0.306	-6	2
DENMARK	1945	6.578	0.091	18	-18	8.4	0.103	1	-30					8.208	0.112	-29	-6
DJIBOUTI	1977	4.802	0.122	28	1	3.85	0.068	68	21					2.658	0.059	39	81
DOMINICAN REP.	1924	5.311	0.055	52	-7	5.275	0.043	74	0	5.88	0.049	57	-12	4.067	0.040	23	86
ECUADOR	1854	4.674	0.027	131	10	5.1	0.023	147	7	5.085	0.022	159	10	3.675	0.020	66	190
EGYPT	1937	2.300	0.025	238	106	4.5375	0.041	97	18	4.79	0.043	90	12	2.500	0.027	94	189
EL SALVADOR	1875	4.927	0.033	100	0	5.4875	0.029	102	-8	7.035	0.040	40	-44	4.050	0.026	37	134
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	1968	5.135	0.105	29	-2	3.625	0.049	100	34					2.933	0.054	38	85

ERITREA	1993	3.707	0.164	27	7	3.325	0.097	53	20	1.55	0.002	3717	1969	1.925	0.070	44	80
ESTONIA	1991	6.209	0.263	8	-5	6.975	0.261	6	-7	8.34	0.297	1	-10	6.350	0.256	-5	4
ETHIOPIA	1941	2.676	0.031	176	72	3.1	0.023	236	95	3.95	0.033	140	40	1.875	0.019	161	290
FUJI	1970	4.956	0.105	31	0	4.8	0.079	46	6					3.600	0.071	20	55
FINLAND	1917	7.265	0.071	13	-33	7.9	0.068	8	-39					8.517	0.083	-42	-12
FRANCE	1944	5.706	0.077	32	-10	7.3625	0.086	13	-24					7.192	0.096	-23	3
GABON	1960	5.562	0.097	27	-7	4.675	0.061	62	10					4.058	0.067	14	52
GAMBIA, THE	1965	4.923	0.094	35	0	3.4	0.041	124	46					2.883	0.049	43	93
GEORGIA	1991	4.227	0.173	23	4	5.575	0.195	15	-2	5.97	0.194	14	-3	3.392	0.128	13	32
GERMANY	1990	6.545	0.266	6	-6	7.9875	0.295	2	-9					7.658	0.300	-9	-1
GHANA	1957	5.034	0.082	38	-1	5.175	0.067	49	1	7	0.096	17	-18	4.008	0.062	16	56
GREECE	1944	4.671	0.062	57	4	6.7	0.077	23	-19					5.617	0.074	-8	26
GREENLAND	1979	8.190	0.229	0	-14												
GRENADA	1974	5.697	0.135	18	-6	6.5	0.132	15	-9					4.717	0.106	3	26
GUATEMALA	1868	3.842	0.024	184	46	4.5125	0.021	188	36	4.995	0.024	152	13	3.300	0.019	87	216
GUINEA	1958	2.957	0.046	113	43	3.1	0.03	180	72	4.895	0.060	62	7	1.258	0.014	262	437
GUINEA-BISSAU	1974	3.446	0.078	61	19	2.6	0.025	232	105					1.675	0.026	126	220
GUYANA	1966	4.264	0.082	48	8	4.575	0.067	58	10					4.125	0.076	11	44
HAITI	1934	3.895	0.044	98	24	3.6625	0.028	172	57	3.555	0.026	199	68	1.292	0.010	356	596
HONDURAS	1899	4.223	0.033	119	21	4.625	0.028	138	23	5.735	0.037	79	-12	3.483	0.026	58	153
HUNGARY	1918	6.299	0.062	31	-22	6.788	0.056	30	-27	6.505	0.052	41	-23	5.908	0.057	-16	28
ICELAND	1944	7.100	0.097	11	-22	7.575	0.09	10	-26					8.050	0.108	-28	-5
INDIA	1947	3.021	0.039	131	48	4.288	0.043	97	23	6.755	0.078	24	-19	3.383	0.044	37	94
INDONESIA	1949	4.166	0.059	69	13	4.9	0.054	66	7	6.235	0.073	33	-13	3.750	0.051	25	74
IRAN	1855	2.885	0.016	340	131	3.875	0.015	302	91	2.495	0.006	990	453	2.733	0.014	158	333
IRAQ	1932	1.686	0.016	417	208	3.438	0.024	206	75	4.065	0.031	147	40	1.292	0.010	365	611
IRELAND	1922	6.463	0.066	26	-23	7.663	0.069	12	-35					7.942	0.081	-36	-5
ISRAEL	1948	3.177	0.042	118	41	6.05	0.071	34	-11					3.383	0.044	36	93
ITALY	1816	5.850	0.028	85	-33	7.163	0.029	45	-66					6.400	0.030	-47	37
JAMAICA	1962	5.294	0.096	30	-4	5.3	0.076	41	0	6.385	0.094	24	-12	4.617	0.080	5	36
JAPAN	1952	6.636	0.102	15	-17	7.8	0.105	6	-24					7.000	0.106	-19	5
JORDAN	1946	3.973	0.053	80	18	4.838	0.051	71	8	4.87	0.049	76	9	3.592	0.046	31	85
KAZAKHSTAN	1991	4.364	0.179	21	3	5.363	0.185	17	-1	4.86	0.146	26	3	4.308	0.167	4	19
KENYA	1963	3.086	0.053	96	35	3.588	0.043	114	39	5.325	0.075	44	0	1.883	0.028	112	201

KOREA, DEM. REP.	1948	4.116	0.057	72	14	4.6	0.049	79	14	1.68	0.003	2698	1406	2.183	0.026	108	203
KOREA, REP.	1949	5.394	0.078	36	-6	7.288	0.092	13	-22	7.79	0.097	9	-26	6.975	0.100	-20	5
KOSOVO	2008	3.359	0.588	8	3	4.275	0.697	6	1	5.715	0.701	4	-1				
KUWAIT	1961	5.237	0.093	32	-3	5.35	0.076	41	-1	5.125	0.068	51	3	5.208	0.090	-2	26
KYRGYZTAN	1991	3.483	0.139	34	10	4.4	0.139	29	6	5.15	0.158	22	1	3.150	0.117	16	37
LAO PDR	1953	5.108	0.078	39	-2	4.075	0.044	100	27	3.895	0.039	121	36	2.958	0.041	50	111
LATVIA	1991	5.954	0.252	9	-4	7	0.263	6	-7	7.615	0.265	4	-9	5.950	0.239	-4	6
LEBANON	1946	2.175	0.026	230	105	4.725	0.049	76	11	4.96	0.051	72	7	2.658	0.032	72	150
LESOTHO	1966	5.544	0.109	24	-6	4.625	0.068	56	9	5.24	0.078	44	1	3.342	0.060	28	69
LIBERIA	1920	4.231	0.041	97	17	3.363	0.02	250	93	5.86	0.046	60	-12	1.892	0.015	204	368
LIBYA	1951	1.984	0.025	246	117	4.225	0.045	94	23	4.36	0.045	94	21	2.058	0.025	116	214
LITHUANIA	1991	6.537	0.278	6	-6	7.45	0.284	4	-8	8.03	0.283	2	-10	6.417	0.259	-5	4
LUXEMBOURG	1944	7.220	0.099	10	-23	7.5	0.088	11	-25					8.150	0.110	-29	-6
MACEDONIA	1993	4.377	0.198	19	3	5.463	0.209	14	-1	6.645	0.245	8	-5	4.625	0.198	2	14
MADAGASCAR	1960	3.809	0.064	69	18	3.65	0.042	116	39	3.94	0.045	104	30	3.033	0.048	41	94
MALAWI	1964	4.626	0.086	42	4	3.975	0.052	87	25	5.89	0.088	31	-7	2.758	0.046	49	103
MALAYSIA	1957	5.086	0.083	37	-2	5.95	0.081	31	-8	5.99	0.079	34	-9	4.508	0.071	7	42
MALDIVES	1965	5.237	0.100	29	-3	4.8	0.07	52	7					3.817	0.069	17	54
MALI	1960	2.191	0.033	180	82	2.738	0.024	238	105	4.14	0.049	92	24	2.242	0.033	84	159
MALTA	1964	6.678	0.128	12	-14	7.238	0.12	10	-16					6.592	0.123	-13	7
MAURITANIA	1960	3.305	0.054	90	30	3.55	0.04	124	43	4.22	0.050	88	22	2.092	0.030	96	179
MAURITIUS	1968	6.560	0.136	12	-12	6.45	0.113	18	-11	7.35	0.127	10	-16	6.233	0.126	-10	10
MEXICO	1831	3.771	0.018	240	63	5.763	0.024	114	-21	6.23	0.026	93	-36	4.017	0.019	51	179
MICRONESIA	1991	6.851	0.292	5	-7	4.875	0.161	22	2					3.867	0.148	8	25
MOLDOVA	1991	4.944	0.206	16	0	5.688	0.2	14	-2	5.925	0.192	14	-3	3.917	0.150	7	24
MONGOLIA	1921	5.832	0.059	40	-15	5.338	0.042	74	-2	6.365	0.052	43	-20	5.250	0.052	-5	44
MONTENEGRO	2006	5.808	0.770	3	-1	5.275	0.631	5	0	6.96	0.681	2	-2	5.483	0.628	-1	3
MOROCCO	1956	4.167	0.066	61	12	5.325	0.069	46	-1	4.53	0.052	79	15	3.783	0.057	21	65
MOZAMBIQUE	1975	4.548	0.109	34	4	3.8	0.062	75	23	5.43	0.101	32	-1	2.758	0.059	38	80
MYANMAR	1948	3.075	0.041	125	45	3.25	0.028	189	73	3.28	0.027	199	75	2.108	0.025	116	216
NAMIBIA	1990	6.549	0.266	6	-6	5.363	0.176	18	-1	6.655	0.214	9	-6	4.100	0.152	6	22
NEPAL	1920	3.098	0.029	177	64	4.138	0.029	150	39	4.175	0.028	157	40	2.458	0.021	119	237
NETHERLANDS	1945	6.862	0.095	14	-20	8.1	0.099	4	-29					7.767	0.106	-26	-3

NEW ZEALAND	1920	7.416	0.075	10	-33	7.75	0.068	10	-37					8.117	0.081	-38	-8
NICARAGUA	1900	4.588	0.037	98	9	4.588	0.028	140	24	5.205	0.032	106	3	3.417	0.026	61	157
NIGER	1960	2.839	0.046	117	46	3.538	0.039	125	44	5.715	0.078	37	-5	1.850	0.026	122	219
NIGERIA	1960	1.534	0.021	317	162	3.4	0.037	138	51	4.985	0.064	57	5	1.467	0.019	189	323
NORWAY	1945	7.219	0.100	10	-23	8.2	0.1	3	-29					8.267	0.113	-29	-7
OMAN	1971	5.794	0.128	19	-7	4.9	0.083	43	4	4.34	0.066	65	15	5.667	0.121	-6	15
PAKISTAN	1947	0.675	0.004	1949	1103	3.213	0.027	198	77	3.4	0.028	185	67	1.425	0.014	248	421
PANAMA	1903	4.777	0.040	86	4	5.8	0.04	67	-14	6.235	0.043	56	-22	5.450	0.045	-10	46
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	1975	4.126	0.097	42	8	4.675	0.086	44	7	5.15	0.093	37	2	3.050	0.066	29	67
PARAGUAY	1876	3.883	0.025	170	41	5.063	0.026	129	8	5.94	0.032	84	-20	4.058	0.026	36	132
PERU	1839	3.713	0.019	237	64	5.6	0.024	120	-14	6.49	0.028	75	-42	4.008	0.020	49	172
PHILIPPINES	1946	3.234	0.042	118	40	4.888	0.052	69	7	6.035	0.067	39	-11	2.808	0.035	63	136
POLAND	1945	6.579	0.091	18	-18	7.225	0.086	14	-23	8.185	0.097	5	-30	6.683	0.090	-19	9
PORTUGAL	1816	6.234	0.030	66	-44	7.413	0.03	35	-71					7.525	0.036	-71	-1
QATAR	1971	7.029	0.157	7	-13	5.913	0.108	24	-6	6.095	0.107	24	-7	6.142	0.132	-9	10
ROMANIA	1878	5.255	0.036	82	-9	6.4	0.037	56	-31	6.85	0.039	45	-39	5.483	0.037	-13	55
RUSSIA	1816	3.749	0.017	263	70	4.813	0.017	215	27	4.57	0.015	263	47	3.333	0.015	115	287
RWANDA	1962	4.860	0.087	38	1	3.6	0.042	115	39	4.9	0.065	57	6	2.483	0.039	65	129
SAMOA	1976	6.681	0.169	9	-10	5.463	0.11	27	-2					4.317	0.102	7	31
SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1975	5.203	0.126	24	-2	3.738	0.061	78	25					3.858	0.087	13	42
SAUDI ARABIA	1927	4.319	0.045	85	13	5.263	0.044	72	0	4.12	0.030	150	39	4.033	0.041	24	84
SENEGAL	1960	4.856	0.084	40	1	4.25	0.053	79	19	6.125	0.085	29	-10	3.083	0.049	39	91
SERBIA	2006	4.841	0.631	5	0	5.288	0.056	57	0	6.82	0.076	24	20	3.850	0.048	24	75
SEYCHELLES	1976	6.449	0.163	11	-9	5.888	0.122	21	-5					4.825	0.115	2	23
SIERRA LEONE	1961	4.745	0.083	41	2	3.613	0.042	116	40	5.445	0.074	43	-2	2.342	0.036	75	145
SINGAPORE	1965	7.223	0.142	7	-16	7.013	0.118	12	-15	6.6	0.104	20	-13	7.133	0.136	-16	3
SLOVAK REPUBLIC	1993	6.833	0.321	4	-6	7	0.29	5	-6	7.94	0.306	2	-9	6.450	0.285	-5	4
SLOVENIA	1992	6.443	0.287	6	-5	7.463	0.299	3	-7	7.705	0.282	3	-9	7.367	0.314	-8	0
SOLOMON ISLANDS	1978	5.621	0.149	17	-5	4.213	0.08	53	13					2.842	0.066	33	70
SOMALIA	1960	0.421	0.00	###	###	1.488	9E-18	#####	#####	1.51	0.000	0	###	0.500	0.001	5786	9000

SOUTH AFRICA	1920	4.904	0.048	68	1	5.288	0.041	77	-1	6.61	0.054	37	-24	4.417	0.042	14	73
SOUTH SUDAN	2011	2.069	0.824	7	3	1.488	4E-16	#####	#####	3.3	0.597	9	3	0.458	0.000	###	###
SPAIN	1816	5.024	0.023	135	-4	7.6	0.031	28	-75					6.592	0.031	-51	29
SRI LANKA	1948	3.990	0.055	77	17	5.113	0.057	59	3	4.895	0.051	73	8	2.450	0.030	84	167
SUDAN	1956	1.332	0.016	429	225	2.488	0.018	335	155	2.35	0.014	434	204	0.767	0.005	795	1265
SURINAME	1975	5.264	0.127	23	-3	5.275	0.102	31	0					4.300	0.099	7	32
SWAZILAND	1968	4.273	0.086	46	8	3.963	0.056	80	23					2.808	0.051	43	92
SWEDEN	1816	6.878	0.033	40	-59	8.3	0.035	5	-87					8.317	0.040	-84	-21
SWITZERLAND	1816	7.288	0.035	26	-68	8.463	0.036	0	-90					8.142	0.039	-81	-17
SYRIA	1961	0.525	0.002	3825	2198	3	0.03	184	76	1.77	0.005	1398	720	1.008	0.010	384	625
TAIWAN, CHINA	1949	6.440	0.094	19	-16	7.7	0.099	8	-25	8.63	0.110	0	-30				
TAJKISTAN	1991	3.105	0.122	42	15	3.9	0.115	40	12	3.585	0.090	56	19	3.050	0.113	17	39
TANZANIA	1961	4.747	0.083	41	2	4.363	0.059	70	15	5.3	0.074	45	0	3.267	0.055	31	77
THAILAND	1887	2.796	0.019	286	113	5.1	0.029	116	6	5.09	0.028	126	7	3.408	0.023	69	176
TIMOR-LESTE	2002	4.354	0.358	11	2	3.85	0.236	20	6					2.450	0.166	15	30
TOGO	1960	4.289	0.073	53	9	3.775	0.044	107	34	4.685	0.059	67	10	2.767	0.043	52	111
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	1962	5.169	0.093	32	-3	5.513	0.081	37	-3					5.108	0.089	-1	27
TUNISIA	1956	3.479	0.054	88	27	5.563	0.073	40	-4	5.15	0.063	55	2	3.683	0.056	24	69
TURKEY	1816	3.009	0.013	394	146	5.163	0.019	176	5	7.085	0.028	55	-63	3.792	0.017	72	220
TURKMENISTAN	1991	5.291	0.221	13	-2	4.15	0.127	34	9	2.82	0.057	102	44	3.542	0.134	11	30
UGANDA	1962	3.599	0.062	74	21	3.863	0.048	97	30	6.065	0.088	29	-9	1.917	0.028	110	199
UKRAINE	1991	3.737	0.151	30	8	5	0.167	21	2	5.07	0.155	23	1	3.642	0.138	10	28
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	1971	6.530	0.145	11	-11	6.238	0.116	19	-8	5.605	0.095	32	-3	6.150	0.132	-9	10
UNITED KINGDOM	1816	5.806	0.027	87	-32	7.563	0.031	29	-74					7.217	0.034	-65	8
UNITED STATES	1816	6.014	0.028	77	-38	6.675	0.026	68	-53					7.058	0.033	-62	13
URUGUAY	1882	6.348	0.045	41	-31	6.725	0.04	43	-36	8.395	0.052	5	-59	6.958	0.049	-40	11
UZBEKISTAN	1991	4.085	0.167	25	5	4.363	0.137	30	7	2.44	0.040	153	71	2.883	0.105	20	44
VENEZUELA, RB	1841	3.205	0.016	308	107	4.925	0.02	176	17	3.56	0.012	428	147	3.450	0.017	90	234
VIETNAM	1954	5.374	0.084	34	-5	5.013	0.061	57	4	4.87	0.056	67	8	3.967	0.058	18	60
YEMEN, REP.	1990	1.085	0.029	246	133	2.713	0.056	103	46	3.8	0.095	51	16	0.992	0.022	180	293
ZAMBIA	1964	5.649	0.107	24	-7	4.55	0.064	61	11	5.725	0.084	34	-5	2.900	0.049	43	94
ZIMBABWE	1965	3.850	0.071	61	15	3.4	0.041	124	46	3.565	0.042	121	41	1.667	0.025	135	236

Source: Author's own

Notes

1. Excludes countries and territories that are not covered in two or more index. (Exception, Greenland as it is the top ranking country in WGI PS&AS).
2. In case of states with multiple dates of entry/exit into the system in COW v2011 dataset, the most recent one is taken.
3. WGI Score rescaled to 0-10 (ascending) using the formula: $\{(New\ Max - New\ Min) \div (Old\ Max - Old\ Min)\} \times (Current\ Score - Old\ Min) + New\ Min$. 'Old minimum' and 'old maximum' is taken as - 3 and + 3 respectively (inclusive of standard error). New minimum and maximum is 0 and 10 respectively.
4. CFP fragility score is inverted to ascending order before rescaling. Old minimum and old maximum is 1 and 9 respectively.
5. BTI fragility score is aggregate of Status and Management scores. Thus old minimum and maximum is 0 -20.
6. FSI fragility score is inverted to ascending order before rescaling. Old minimum and old maximum is 0 and 120 respectively.
7. Optimistic pace of progress is obtained by using formula 1 as illustrated in the text.
8. Years to thresholds (i.e. 'Top', 'Global Average', 'Stable' and 'Sustainable') is obtained by using formula 2, 3, 4 and 5 as illustrated in the text.
9. The negative values indicate that the particular state has already crossed the specified threshold.

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