BANGLADESH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY IN INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ARMS RACE : RELEVANCE OF WESTERN THEORIES

Author: Md. Abdul Mannan

DOI Link: https://www.doi.org/BIISSj2002v23n4a1

ABSTRACT

The article examines the problem of strategic stability in India-Pakistan nuclear arms race in the light of theories that evolved in the West in the context of US-Soviet nuclear competition and its regulation. The paper reveals a difference in the behaviour of the two regional rivals between pre-1998 and post-1998, the year when they conducted nuclear tests. Relationship in the post-1998 period is more crisis-prone in comparison to that of pre-1998. The paper argues that risk of escalation from a crisis situation is high in the absence of a MAD variant of deterrence. It also discusses threats to strategic stability in the context of a potential introduction of new weapons technologies by India and Pakistan. While examining the foundation of strategic stability, the paper reveals that the application of a MAD variant of deterrence in South Asia is problematic. However, the theory that fits best is detente that may seek reconciliation between India and Pakistan on Kashmir issue. It has been argued that detente, as a basic foundation of strategic stability, is very relevant to provide the diplomatic atmosphere for the proper functioning of existing CBMs and for undertaking new CBMs aimed at avoiding nuclear escalation.