BETWEEN OFFENCE AND DEFENSE: ANALYZING PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

Outline

1. Contextualising the Concept of Deterrence 2. Genesis of India’s Nuclear Doctrine 3. Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program an d Z.A. Bhutto 4. Pakistan’s Nuclear Command 5. Pakistan’s Thinking on No First Use 6. Pakistan’s First Strike Option 7. Viability of Limited War 8. Issue of Hot Line 9. Possibility of Theft or Diversion of Fissile materials 10. Issue of Disaster Management 11. Pakistan’s Current Missile Capability and India’s Cold Start
Strategy 12. Towards a Strategic Restraint Regime 13. Conclusion

BETWEEN OFFENCE AND DEFENSE: ANALYZING PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

Author: Mohammad Bodrul Alam

DOI Link: DOI: https://www.doi.org/10.56888/BIISSj2006v27n2a2

ABSTRACT

In a post-Cold War unipolar world, the overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan in the South Asia region has added urgency to the ongoing debate on nuclear proliferation and its ramifications for the region itself as well as on the rest of the world. Pakistan, like its arch rival, India, has opted for the path of nuclear weaponisation in 1998 and since then hastaken tangible steps to devise policy formulations related to nuclear strategy. The conceptualization of nuclear deterrence for two South Asian rival countries with deep rooted historical animosities and regional ambitions might be an uphill task unlike the case of the United States and former Soviet Union during the Cold War years when both the countries stayed broadly within the perimeter of deterrence. The paper surmised that with the shaping of nuclear doctrines of Pakistan and India in place, it was hoped that a peace constituency could hopefully take firm hold in South Asia in making sure the proactive peace process currently underway between India and Pakistan was irreversible

BANGLADESH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Outline