BETWEEN OFFENCE AND DEFENSE: ANALYZING PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

This article provides a detailed analysis of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, characterizing it as a complex posture that exists "between offence and defense." It examines the core tenets of the doctrine, which is based on the principle of "credible minimum deterrence" but explicitly retains a "first use" option. The study explores the defensive rationale for this posture, which is to deter a large-scale conventional attack from a numerically superior Indian military. However, the research also analyzes the potentially offensive or destabilizing aspects of the doctrine, particularly the ambiguity surrounding its nuclear thresholds and the development of battlefield nuclear weapons. The paper argues that Pakistan's doctrine is a product of its deep-seated security dilemma vis-à-vis India. The analysis concludes by assessing the implications of this doctrine for crisis stability and the risk of nuclear escalation in South Asia.

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is a subject of intense international scrutiny and is central to the security dynamics of South Asia. This paper offers a nuanced analysis of this doctrine, framing it as a posture that is caught between the logic of defense and the potential for offense. The first part of the study focuses on the defensive motivations. It provides a detailed explanation of why Pakistan, as a conventionally weaker power, feels compelled to rely on the early use of nuclear weapons to deter an Indian invasion. The paper explains the concept of "full spectrum deterrence," which aims to deter all forms of aggression, from the sub-conventional to the strategic. The core of the article, however, is a critical examination of the inherent risks and ambiguities of this doctrine. It analyzes the concept of "nuclear thresholds"—the point at which Pakistan might decide to use nuclear weapons—and argues that the deliberate ambiguity surrounding these thresholds creates a significant risk of miscalculation during a crisis. The paper also provides an in-depth analysis of the development of tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons, a development that many analysts fear lowers the nuclear threshold and increases the risk of escalation from a conventional to a nuclear war. The findings suggest that while Pakistan's doctrine may be rational from its own security perspective, it has created a highly volatile and dangerous strategic environment in the subcontinent.