Abstract

This article evaluates the political role of the bureaucracy in Bangladesh, analyzing how administrative elites shape agenda-setting, implementation and distributional outcomes. It traces the historical legacy of colonial and Pakistani civil services, the professional norms of generalist cadres and the incentives generated by pay, posting and promotion systems. The paper argues that bureaucratic power stems from informational advantages and organizational continuity, yet is conditioned by party competition, military interventions and accountability institutions. It examines how reform attempts—secretariat restructuring, decentralization and performance budgeting—have fared in practice and what this implies for development effectiveness and democratic consolidation.

Full Text

The body first reconstructs the evolution of the higher civil service, recruitment pathways and training regimes that socialize administrators into a shared ethos. It then assesses politicization dynamics: transfers tied to electoral cycles, patronage networks and the interplay between ministers and secretaries in shaping policy details. Case illustrations from rural development, health and infrastructure highlight how bureaucratic discretion can both enable problem solving and entrench rent-seeking. A section on local government explores devolution experiments, the capacity gaps at sub-national tiers and coordination problems across line ministries. The article evaluates oversight institutions—Public Service Commission, parliamentary committees, audit bodies—and civil society scrutiny. It concludes with a reform agenda that emphasizes meritocratic HR practices, digital process transparency, empowered local councils and results-based management to align bureaucratic incentives with citizen welfare.