GLOBALISATION AND ITS IMPACT ON STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS: US-INDIA AND SINO-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION

Globalisation is a highly contested term, especially in academia all over the world, as it has opened up many opportunities in economy, culture, politics, communications, financial flow, migration, and technology as well as creating new debates. Nations are trying to join global or regional networks of information, trade and cooperative security.1 It has introduced changes in human being’s life-style such as food habit, recreation like internet games and music, on-line shopping, on-line study and so on. Social media such as Facebook and Twitter are connecting people,

Mohammad Morad Hossain Khan is an Assistant Professor of History, Department of General Education at
University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh (ULAB). His e-mail address is: mhkpartha@gmail.com
© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2017.
1
 B. M. Jain, India in the New South Asia: Strategic, Military and Economic Concerns in the Age of Nuclear
Diplomacy, London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2010, p. 1.

irrespective of race, nationality, gender and place, while transnational democracy and free market economy are gaining significance across the world. However, there is a huge debate on the positive and negative aspects of globalisation.2 Politically, civilian and military nuclear cooperation seems to have spawned further in the age of globalisation. North Korea, Iran and Pakistan are often on the list of controversial countries with regard to their nuclear weapons. China and Russia may clutch to defend these countries from the rest of the world like the Cold War politics.3 The United States (US) is not much successful in promoting arms control and nonproliferation in that case.4 While the US under the Bush administration termed North Korea, Iran and Iraq (under Saddam Hussein) as rogue states, it signed a strategic nuclear cooperation treaty with India as a responsible country.5 Thus, gradually and effectively, global centre of political and military gravity is shifting from the North to the Asia Pacific region. This has necessitated the rethinking of the impacts of globalisation, especially on strategic partnerships and emerging trends of nuclear cooperation.6

Against this backdrop, the aim of the paper is to discuss how globalisation affects the world politically, especially in terms of triggering nuclear cooperation. The particular case studies on the US-India Nuclear Deal of 2008 versus the SinoPakistan Nuclear Cooperation will attempt to answer the following questions: What is the political implication of the Nuclear Deal between the US and India in 2008 and Nuclear Cooperation between China and Pakistan in the age of globalisation? Among the above four nuclear powers, the US and China are the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and are global powers, though the US is still considered as the sole superpower, while India and Pakistan, to some extent, are emerging regional powers in Asia.

The paper is divided into the following sections. After the ‘Introduction’ in section one, section two focuses on how globalisation is increasingly leading to interstate and inter-region competition across the world. Section three discusses the case studies on the US-India nuclear agreement versus Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation to argue how the competition triggered by globalisation has helped forge strategic partnerships between these countries. Finally, section four recapitulates the arguments and draws a conclusion.

2
 D. Held and A. McGrew, “The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction”, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds.),
The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to Globalization Debate, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000,
p. 1.
3
 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict”, Strategic
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring, 2013, p. 7. 4 Ibid., p. 10. 5
 Robert S. Litwak, “Living with Ambiguity: Nuclear Deals with Iran and North Korea”, Survival, Vol. 50, No. 1,
2008, p. 94.
6
 B. M. Jain, op. cit., p. 1.

Scholars have different notions about the origin and meaning of ‘globalisation’. According to Scholte, “…‘globalization’ refers to a process of removing state-imposed restrictions on movements between countries in order to create an ‘open’, ‘borderless’ world economy”.7 Held and McGrew contend that, “…globalization refers to these entrenched and enduring patterns of worldwide interconnectedness”.8 They imply mutual or collective dependence on information, communication, culture, business and politics. Global affairs may have strong effects in local culture, economy or other similar areas and, at the same time, domestic or local incidents may affect the international arena as well. Globalisation refers to a tremendous shift in the scale of human social, cultural, economic and political organisations that link distant communities and expand the reach of all sorts of relations across the world.9

More distinctly, some academics, for instance Wadley, go back to 500 CE when West Asia was the centre of integration of the Euro-Asian economy and culture.10 After 1100 CE, Asia was influenced by the introduction of new technologies and the importance of the famous Silk Road which connected China and Europe. Wadley believed that Europe turned to the primary site of globalisation after 1500 CE when the Trans-Atlantic trade and colonisation started following the discovery of new water passage from Europe to Asia and America. The Euro-Atlantic economy and political influence dominated the whole world roughly from the late 19th to the beginning of the 21st century. Wadley notes that, “That unification was primarily territorial, however, based on trade and with cultural encounters of enormous significance.”11 Now the notion of globalisation has changed and it is less about territorial control and more about economic and cultural control or hegemony across the globe. Therefore, Wadley argues, “… the speed of modern communications has made twenty–first-century globalization vastly different in tone from its nineteenth-century counterpart.”12

Though globalisation brings about many positive aspects, especially in terms of economic integration, social mobilisation and common cultural development across the world, it affects the world politically and economically as well.13 According to Castells, international societies are now based on information-technology, restructuring of economy, culture, and politics which lead to a historical redefinition of the relationship among the nations and peoples.14 Even Castells argues that despite huge economic interdependence and multilateralism in global politics,

7
 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, p. 16. 8
 D. Held and A. McGrew, 2000, op. cit., p. 3. 9
 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 10 Susan Snow Wadley (ed.), South Asia in the World: An Introduction, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2014, p. 97. 11 Ibid.
12 Ibid. 13 D. Held and A. McGrew, 2000, op. cit., pp. 26-42. 14 Manuel Castells, End of Millennium, Vol. III, (2nd edition), Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, pp. 367-371.

 China, still a single party state, is emerging as another world power.15 Here, Castells also indicated political division and a possible rivalry among global powers arising out of globalisation.

On the other hand, from the liberal economic point of view, globalisation is often unchallenged. For economic transaction and financial flows, communication is a very important factor. Multinational companies, founded by mostly rich countries, are being established in different developing countries and are making tremendous profits, especially due to cheap labour. Despite such trend, as Thomas Hylland Eriksen argues, “Although it is tautologically true that rich countries are dominant, the situation is not static. China, India, South Korea and other formerly poor countries are emerging as equal players and regional powers such as South Africa and Brazil are both exploited and exploiters in the global economy.”16

Therefore, the rise of the above-mentioned countries has tended to change the political scenario of the globalised world. Obviously, political globalisation necessarily means the system or ways in which nation-states are formed and linked politically with each other. Nation-states maintain new forms of power relations, the relative insignificance of the traditional boundaries, and nation-states foster and cooperate in the growth of international regulatory agencies such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).17

However, G. John Ikenberry termed globalisation as ‘American Hegemony.’ He also noted, “The United States emerged as a global power after the World War II with both opportunity and incentives to organise its environment in a way that would serve its long-term interests.”18 Even though the US is the most dominant political and military power in the current world, some other powers like China are challenging that position in different ways. For instance, according to Shaun Breslin, “The growth of the Chinese economy in general, and growth of Chinese exports in particular, have led to a growing strand of assessing the shifting balance of power in the global political economy.”19 China has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of globalisation since it maintained an average of 8.3 per cent growth per year during the post-reform period from 1978 to 2007 by opening its trades with the world.20 S. K. Bhutani argued that the rise of China as a major power followed by India challenged the US ability, i.e.,

15 Ibid., p. 387. 16 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Globalization: The Key Concepts, Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2007, p. 5. 17 Susan Snow Wadley, op. cit., p. 98. 18 David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2007, p. 45.
19 Shaun Breslin, “Power and Production: Rethinking China’s Global Economic Role”, Review of International
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, October, 2005, p. 735. 20 Tao Xie and Benjamin I. Page, “Americans and the Rise of China as a World Power”, Journal of Contemporary
China, Vol. 19, No. 65, 2010, p. 480.

 
 politically and economically in the 21st century despite the fact that these countries cooperated with each other by becoming trading partners.21 Regarding the relative decline of the US, Earl H. Fry argued that the US was the largest creditor since the Word War II in the world, but today the US is “…the world’s largest debtor country in nominal terms with net external obligations in the range of three trillion dollars”.22

Similarly, India is also one of the most important emerging powers in terms of economy and military.23 In the era of globalisation, especially since 1991, India started huge economic reformation process, i.e., economic liberalisation for its overall development. According to Luce, India earned huge foreign currencies in 2003 through software exports and information-technology services outside its territory than it spent on its oil imports from abroad.24 Luce also added that Indian pharmaceutical companies had more applications for patents pending with the US Food and Drug Administration than any other countries by that time. It indicated how India benefitted through the globalisation process. Further, according to a report published by the investment bank Goldman Sachs in 2003, it was predicted that, “India has the potential to maintain an annual growth rate of 08 per cent until 2020, and that it will overtake the American economy as the second-largest global economy (behind China) by 2042.”25 From the above prediction, it can be argued that India needed a strategic partnership so that it can be a potential political and military power in the long run. That means economic prosperity of India in the age of globalisation has made itself more ambitious in this regard. Therefore, India and the US, joined hands and ultimately became strategic partners with each other through a Joint Statement issued by the US and India on 17 September 2004.26

The US-India strategic partnership may be explained by various factors. Firstly, “In multipolar and bipolar systems, balancing is the primary mechanism to preserve the status quo”.27 The US felt that it needed a potential partner to maintain the current status quo. Secondly, India is the biggest democracy, in terms of its population. It is to be noted that democracies do not fight against each other, according to the Democratic Peace Theory.28 Thirdly, India is situated beside China.

21 S. K. Bhutani, “China and India: Competing Friends or Rivals?”, India Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 4, 2009, pp. 382-392. 22 Earl H. Fry, “The Decline of the American Superpower”, The Forum, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 2007, p. 14. 23 Bruce W. Jentleson, American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century, 3rd edition, New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007, pp. 338-339.
24 Manjeet S. Pardesi, “Understanding the Rise of India”, India Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007, p. 217. 25 Tushar Poddar and Eva Yi, “India’s Rising Growth Potential”, Global Economics Paper, No. 152, 22 January
2007, in Manjeet S. Pardesi, op. cit., p. 212. 26 Adam Ereli, “Press Statement on United States-India Joint Statement on Next Steps in Strategic
Partnership”, 17 September 2004, U.S. Department of State, available at https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2004/36290.htm, accessed on 17 January 2017.
27 Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of
U.S. Decline”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1, Summer, 2011, p. 44. 28 Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, “Polities and Peace”, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1995, pp. 123-
146; and Bruce Russett et al., “The Democratic Peace”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring, 1995, pp.
164-184.

 That means geopolitically, India might be a very significant partner of the US against China. Fourthly, the huge population of India and the US might be an important asset in future to encounter other potential competitors including China. Finally, both the US and India would cooperate with each other so that both can jointly remove any threats from other powers in Asia in particular. Therefore, the US chose India as a strategic partner against China’s possible political motives.

On the other hand, China also tends to manage strong relations with Pakistan for a number of reasons. Firstly, Pakistan is a trusted political ally of China for a long time even though Pakistan was a strong partner of the US during the Cold War period, especially during the former Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. Secondly, Pakistan is also a regular buyer of Chinese products including military hardware. Thirdly, even though politically China and Pakistan are not the same, both maintain a good relationship, often called ‘all-weather friendship’. China is a communist and single party state although economically it changed its policy, while Pakistan in its history has often been controlled by its military rulers. Their common objective seems to contain India in South Asia, since India has had wars with both China and Pakistan. This Sino-Pakistan relationship has turned into a strategic partnership when the US and India began building their strategic partnership.

To recapitulate here, it can be said that the current globalisation process helps some countries rise economically. That economic capability ultimately plays an important role politically and militarily. Global superpowers try to maintain their status quo while rising superpowers often endeavour to break the unipolar system by forging partnerships. However, the following case studies will further demonstrate how the nuclear polarisation and cooperation between the US-India and Sino-Pakistan are affected by globalisation. At the same time, the case studies will also present how and why these powers might be engaged in political and military confrontations in the future.
 

There were often ups and downs in the bilateral relations between the US and India. The US is the first republic in the modern world whereas India is the largest democracy. According to Malone, both the countries took around half a century in constructing their complex relationship which evolved rather slowly since they failed to cooperate on common grounds consistently.29 Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Indian Prime Minister (PM) and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the sixteenth PM of India, termed the relationship with the US as “natural” in 1949 and 1998 respectively. Malone explored that the US-India relation is based on a combination of international, regional

29 David M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011, p. 153.

 and domestic factors which shaped their mutual understanding.30 The US-India relationship can be divided into three broad periods: the Nehruvian era including Lal Bahadur Shastri (1947 to 1966), the Indira Gandhi along with post-Indira period (1967- 1989) and the contemporary age (1990 onwards).

During the Nehru era, India followed idealism in foreign policy since it did not want to involve in the Cold War politics; though Homi Jehangir Bhabha, a leading Indian scientist tried to persuade Nehru about the necessity of nuclear weapons at that time but Nehru did not agree.31 Moreover, there was ideological conflict between the US-led capitalist countries and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)-led communist or socialist states roughly from 1945 to 1990s. However, India took a policy of non-alignment which ultimately kept India far from the US to a great extent. For example, India made diplomatic relations with the communist China in 1949 and it did not support the US-led military intervention in the Korean War (during 1950-53). Though India had diplomatic relations with the communist Cuba in 1959, and despite India’s military actions in Goa in 1961, which drove out Portugal, a NATO ally led by the US, the US responded immediately to the Indian appeal for military assistance against China during the Sino-Indian War in 1962.32 According to Ogden, the US gave US$ 80 million in military assistance instantly at that time.33

During the Indira Gandhi regime, the Indo-US relations deteriorated for two major reasons. Firstly, India refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, since China tested nuclear weapons in 1964. Secondly, the War of Liberation of Bangladesh against Pakistan led India towards the former USSR since the US supported Pakistan and communicated with the communist China for reconciliation in July 1971, which went against India. However, when India conducted its so-called peaceful nuclear test in 1974, the US was very shocked since it had provided nuclear materials to India for civilian purposes at that time.34 Henry Kissinger, the then US Secretary of State, described the detonation as a ‘catastrophe’.35

In the post-Cold War era, the US-India relations started growing important, especially due to the liberalisation of economic policy in India. However, India’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 and the further nuclear weapons tests in May 1998 brought the US economic sanctions on India.36 During the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999, the US for the first time intervened in India’s favour which forced Pakistan to withdraw its forces back to the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir.37 The 9/11 events in the US introduced huge political

30 Ibid.
31 B. M. Jain, op. cit., p. 39. 32 David M. Malone, op. cit., pp. 156-158. 33 Chris Ogden, Indian Foreign Policy: Ambition and Transition, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014, p. 141. 34 B. M. Jain, op. cit., p.112; and David M. Malone, 2011, op. cit., pp. 160-161. 35 B. M. Jain, op. cit., p. 47. 36 David M. Malone, op. cit., pp. 164-167. 37 Chris Ogden, op. cit., p. 140.

 changes across the world. The US-India relations improved rapidly when India had immediately extended its overall support for the US Global War on Terrorism (GWoT). By 22 September 2001, the US lifted all sanctions that were imposed on India after its 1998 nuclear tests.38 This paved the way for further cooperation between them.

The US-India cooperation in nuclear sector dates back to 1950s when the US helped India in nuclear programme for civilian purposes. The US built a nuclear reactor at Tarapur in India at that time but the US isolated India, as already stated, due to few reasons including Indian refusal to sign the NPT and its nuclear weapons tests.39 In addition, Indian weak economy, foreign policy, especially its intimate relations with the former USSR were also important factors behind the US policy towards India. However, according to Bajoria and Pan, “since 2000, the United States has moved to build a strategic partnership with India, increasing cooperation in several areas including spaceflight, satellite technology, and missile defense.”40

Most importantly, the year 2004 was a turning point for the relationship between the US and India when they formulated the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), which included the foundation for the nuclear deal of 2008. On 18 July 2005, the US and India announced the most-wide-ranging strategic global partnership in civilian nuclear cooperation, civilian space programme, high technology trade, military cooperation, energy security, and promotion of democracy.41

Finally, the US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was formally signed on 10 October 2008, and it was cleared by the Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG) as well.42 Condoleezza Rice, the then US Secretary of State and Pranab Mukherjee, former Indian Minister of External Affairs, signed the US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement at Washington, D.C. It is to be noted that the framework for the 123 agreement was signed on 18 July 2005, by the then US President George W. Bush and the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.43 As per the Agreement, India will get access to nuclear technology and raw materials like uranium and plutonium. This

38 Ibid., pp. 147-148; and David M. Malone, op. cit., p. 168. 39 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, “Background: The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal”, Council on Foreign Relations,
2010, available at http://www.cfr.org/india/us-india-nuclear-deal/p9663, accessed on 15 December 2015;
and Sharon Squassoni, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress”, CRS Report for Congress,
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 02 July 2005, p. 1. 40 Ibid.
41 Sharon Squassoni, op. cit., p. 2; and David M. Malone, op. cit., p. 169. 42 “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Indian Minister of External Affairs, Pranab Mukherjee at the
signing of the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement”, U.S. Department of State, 2009, available
at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/10/110916.htm, accessed on 14 December 2015; and
Prashant Hosur, “The Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement: What’s the big deal?”, International Journal,
Spring, 2010, p. 435.
43 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, op. cit.; and Zahid Ali Khan, “Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal: The Gainer and
the Loser”, South Asian Studies, A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2013, p. 242.

 will help India to fulfil its energy requirements while India has agreed to place 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors under the international inspection or safeguards permanently, especially by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog group, while the US expects to get multi-billion dollar reactor contracts in India.44 The deal has not directed India to give up its nuclear weapons programme whereas the agreement has only imposed restrictions on further nuclear weapons test. If India tests any nuclear weapons, as per the agreement, this will merely lead the US stopping nuclear trade with India.45 India has committed to strengthen the security of its nuclear weapons and agreed not to spread the enrichment and reprocessing technologies to other states. India, without signing the NPT, has also pledged to support international nonproliferation efforts.46

For the US-India nuclear deal, both the US and India have to maintain some legal and strict procedures. For examples, in August 2008, the IAEA’s Board of Governors approved the US-India nuclear deal and in September 2008, after much lobbying made by the US and India, the NSG agreed to specific exemption to India. Finally, the US Congress gave the approval to the bill on 01 October 2008.47 The US government passed the new Hyde Act in order to exempt India from certain nuclear requirements of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954.48 In addition, the Parliament of India also had to approve the agreement in July 2008.49 As Squassoni observed, “Separating civilian and military facilities, placing civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, and applying an additional protocol are all positive steps but it placed India squarely in the company of nuclear weapon states. Many observers have noted that there are no measures in this global partnership to restrain India’s nuclear weapons program.”50

Hosur noted that the US-India nuclear deal has introduced some critical issues. Firstly, it weakens the nuclear nonproliferation efforts in the world. Secondly, it sets a clear example for the countries like Iran, North Korea and Pakistan. Thirdly, this treaty gives India a huge opportunity to produce nuclear weapons, though it opens up Indian civil nuclear programme to the international bodies like the IAEA. Fourthly, this deal may lead to a nuclear competition in South Asia in particular.51 However, the US-India nuclear cooperation has many dimensions and objectives, i.e., national interest in the age of globalisation. One of the vital and common objectives is discussed below.

44 Prashant Hosur, op. cit., pp. 435-436. 45 Ibid.
46 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, op. cit. 47 Ibid.
48 Prashant Hosur, op. cit., p. 435. 49 David M. Malone, op. cit., p.170. 50 Sharon Squassoni, op. cit., p. 3. 51 Prashant Hosur, op. cit., p. 436

The US is the only superpower while China might be another emerging and decisive power at the same time. China’s rise is one of the most important events in the post-Cold War era.52 China is the most populous country in the world and one of the largest countries in terms of its area. It is one of the permanent members of the UNSC.53 Besides economically, China’s position is only second to the US. However, recent data reveals that China has already become the world’s largest economy according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).54 Therefore, China’s economy might boost its political and military ambition in near future across the world, especially in Asia. In that case, the US and Indian strategic partnership might be an important counterbalance to maintain the current status quo, especially in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean. According to the US report for Congress, for the first time, China’s war fleet visited Pakistani naval bases in 2005 and conducted combined naval exercises outside China’s waters55 while China for the first time in 2014 deployed its submarines in the Indian Ocean with a view to supporting counter-piracy patrols.56 In response to regional concerns, “…the submarines were probably also conducting area familiarization, and demonstrating an emerging capability both to protect China’s sea lines of communications and increase China’s power projection into the Indian Ocean.”57

Strategically, China and India share one of the longest borders between any countries; most of it are not settled or defined between them.58 At least, there is no permanent agreement or treaty between these two Asian giants yet. While India is the largest democracy, China still remains the world’s largest one party state.59

52 Jian Yang, “The Rise of China: Chinese Perspectives”, in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato (eds.), The Rise of
China and International Security: America and Asia Respond, New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 13; and Evelyn Goh,
“US Strategic Relations with a Rising China: Trajectories and Impacts on Asia-Pacific Security”, in ibid., p. 64. 53 Fabrizio Eva, “The Geopolitical Role of China: Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon”, Ekistics; Vol. 70, No.
422/423, September-December, 2003, p. 341.
54 “China overtakes US to become world’s largest economy, says International Monetary Fund,” news.com.
au, 2014, available at http //www.news.com.au/finance/china-overtakes-us-to-become-worlds-largesteconomy-saysinternational-monetary-fund/story-e6frfm1i-1227085188115, accessed on 12 December
2015; and “The world’s biggest economies: China’s back”, The Economist, 11 October 2014, available
at http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623758-chinas-back, accessed on 12
December 2015.
55 Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, The United States, 2006, p. 12.
56 Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, The United States, 2015, p. 19.
57 Ibid.
58 Mohan Malik, “India and China: As China Rises, India Stirs”, in Harsh V. Pant (ed.), Indian Foreign Policy in a
Unipolar World, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 174-175. 59 Gareth Price, “China and India: Cooperation and Competition”, Chatham House Briefing Paper, 2007, p. 2,
available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/bpchinaindia0507.pdf,
accessed on 17 December 2015; and David P. Fidler, “The Asian Century: Implications for International Law”,
Singapore Year Book of International Law and Contributors, 2005, p. 9, available at http://www.commonlii.org/
sg/journals/SGYrBkIntLaw/2005/4.html, accessed on 17 December 2015.

 Though China politically remains communist till today, it liberalised its economy in the 1980s and joined the WTO in 2001 keeping ongoing domestic reforms, attracting more foreign investments, new technology, exports, and joining in the world trade decision-making process.60

From a realistic point of view, the US prefers India as the strategic partner in order to counterbalance or contain China, particularly in Asia.61 In 2005, Manmohan Singh, the then Prime Minister of India, said that India started its journey inspired by some dreams and he welcomed the US on his side. When the US, India and some other allies conducted the Malabar naval exercise in September 2007, China termed that military exercise as anti-China.62 In the post-Cold War era, globalisation, global and regional integration, has made China very potential global actor besides the US, since the rise of China is one of the most significant factors, especially in terms of economy and military in the world.63 While China played an important role against the then USSR in US’s favour, both the US and China reconciled their disputes and established diplomatic relations in the 1970s.

However, in the post-Cold War era, especially after 9/11, the US found China as a potent competitor, especially in Asia. Based on its strong economy, China started developing its military with sophisticated weapons and technology challenging the US unilateral hegemony, especially in Asia. For example, by that time, China had developed the largest military numbering 2,225,000 active-duty personnel with about 800,000 in reserve.64 China’s military expenditure is the third largest after the US and Russia.65

On the other hand, India is also one of the most significant rising powers, especially in terms of economy and military.66 While India is the world’s largest buyer

60 Penelope B. Prime, “China joins the WTO: How, Why and What Now?”, Business Economics, Vol. 37, No. 2,
April, 2002, pp. 5-6.
61 Saadat Hassan, “Indo-US nuclear/strategic cooperation: Chinese response”, Strategic Studies, Vol. 31- 32,
No. 4-1, 31 March 2012, p. 45; Mohammad Samir Hussain, “India-United States Strategic Relations: China
as a Factor,” Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2012, p. 72; and Ashley J. Tellis, “The Evolution of U.S.-
Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship”, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4,
Spring, 2006, pp. 116-120.
62 S. Amer Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement: Steady as they go”, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, A report of the CSIS Wadhwani chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies, 2012, pp. 24-25, available at http://
csis.org/publication/us-india-military-engagement, accessed on 18 December 2015. 63 Bruce W. Jentleson, American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century, (3rd edition), New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007, pp. 321-322; David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might,
Money, and Minds, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008, p. 165; and Louise Merrington, “Australia’s
Engagement with China and India, Australian-China Agenda”, The Australian-China Story, Australian
National University, 2013, p. 4, available at http://www.thechinastory.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/
acap2013_merrington.pdf, accessed on 18 December 2015. 64 Sean Kay, “Global Security”, in Michael T. Snarr and D. Neil Snarr (eds.), Introducing Global Issues, (4th
edition), Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2008, p. 78. 65 Bruce W. Jentleson, op. cit., p. 322. 66 Ibid., pp. 338-339.

 of conventional weapons, it has built one of the largest military forces in the world.67 Since there is a competition between India and China, the US would benefit from the nuclear cooperation with India in two ways. Firstly, the US would sell huge weapons and technology to India. Secondly, the US-India partnership would work together to contain China, especially in Asia.

According to the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence of India, China is a long term security challenge to India.68 As C. Christine Fair has stated that the US views India either as a part of containment policy or as a partner in tackling the rise of China.69 According to her, “… India could be a serious competitor to China and preempt China’s singular rise in the region.”70 Malik also pointed out that India shifted its comprehensive strategy from non-alignment to a multidimensional ‘multi-alignment’ with the world, especially the US with a view to meeting China’s challenges in the region. Firstly, Tibet, the Dalai Lama, China’s post-1962 strategy like arming Pakistan with conventional and nuclear weapons are major concerns against China.71 Malik further contends that, “For India, Pakistan cannot be a threat without China’s military support just as Taiwan cannot constitute a threat to China without US support.”72

Secondly, as Malik argues, China directly or indirectly supports different separatist movements in India by providing small arms and money.73 Thirdly, China’s efforts to modernise military with arms and high technology to India’s neighbouring countries like Pakistan and Sri Lanka can be seen as a process of encirclement of India so that India can be considered as regional power, not global power at all.74 According to Pardesi, the China factor and Sino-Pakistani cooperation were important factors for India in her nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998.75 According to Siddique, the rise of China in terms of economy and military is increasingly challenging the US unilateral domination, especially in Asia in the contemporary world.76 Therefore, it appears that the China factor was the main reason behind the US-India strategic partnership. In addition, China’s military cooperation with Pakistan also played an important role in such US-India alliance.77The process of globalisation gave further incentives to these

67 Shafei Moiz Hali, “Indian Military Expansion 2020: Implications for Pakistan’s National Security”, Defence
Journal, Vol. 15 No. 9, 2012, pp. 69-75; and Walter C. Ladwig III, “Indian Military Modernization and
Conventional Deterrence in South Asia”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2015, p. 730. 68 C. Christine Fair, “India and the US: Embracing a New Paradigm”, in Harsh V. Pant (ed.), Indian Foreign Policy
in a Unipolar World, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 138. 69 Ibid., p. 143. 70 Ibid., p. 150. 71 Mohan Malik, op. cit., p. 170. 72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Manjeet S. Pardesi, “China’s Nuclear Forces and their Significance to India”, The Nonproliferation Review,
Vol. 21, No. 3-4, 2014, p. 338.
76 Qandeel Siddique, “Deeper than the Indian Ocean? An Analysis of Pakistan-China Relations”, SISA Report
No. 16, Centre for International and Strategic Analysis, February 2014, p. 7. 77 Mohammad Samir Hussain, op. cit., p. 79.

 partnerships, as these countries need to enhance their military alliance to sustain growth and protect sea lines of communication.

Pakistan led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah became independent from the Great Britain on 14 August 1947,78 while the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai came to power on 01 October 1949, defeating the Chinese Nationalists led by President Chiang Kai-shek who moved to Formosa, now known as Taiwan.79

Later, Pakistan became the Islamic Republic while the communist China became the People’s Republic. Like India, Pakistan was one of the first states which extended its diplomatic support to the communist China. Pakistan was the first Muslim state, the second commonwealth and the third country in the world, which recognised the new China’s government on 04 January 1950.80 Both Pakistan and China have more than 520 kilometers of common border. Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Minister of Pakistan termed the friendship with China as “truly iron brothers” in April 2015 while Xi Jinping, President of China as the first China’s President, delivered a speech in a joint session of the Pakistan National Assembly and the Senate.81 A brief discussion of Sino-Pakistan relation is required here for better understanding.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah expressed his desire on 15 November 1946 at a press conference in New Delhi to have an effective Monroe Doctrine in the subcontinent where Pakistan and India would be friendly states and would work together.82 However, the Kashmir issue remains the most complicated problem between Pakistan and India.83 Consequently, Pakistan joined the US-patronised military alliances like the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1950s, which brought huge US military and economic aids to Pakistan.84

78 Tariq Gilani, “US-Pakistan Relations: The Way Forward”, Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Winter,
2006, pp. 84-85.
79 BBC, “China Profile”, BBC News Asia Pacific, 2013, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asiapacific-13017882, accessed on 18 December 2015; and Jeffrey Hays, “Communists Take over China”, 2008,
available at http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=74&catid=2, accessed on 18 December 2015. 80 Raja Muhammad Khan, “Pak-China Relationship”, Defence Journal, Vol. 15, No. 7, February, 2012, pp. 27-28;
and Zhang Jiegen, “China-Pakistan Nuclear Relation after the Cold War and Its International Implications”,
The Centre for International Strategy, Policy and Technology: Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation
(POSSE), 2013, pp. 5-6, available at http://posse.gatech.edu/publications/6-zhang-possevi-china-pakistannuclear-relation-after-cold-war-and-its-international-im, accessed 20 December 2015. 81 Laurence Vandewalle, “Pakistan and China: ‘Iron brothers’ forever?”, European Parliament: DirectorateGeneral for External Policies, Policy Department, 2015, p. 4, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/549052/EXPO_IDA(2015)549052_EN.pdf, accessed on 19 December 2015. 82 B. L. Sharma, The Pakistan-China Axis, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1968, p. 1. 83 Ibid., p. 21. 84 Ibid., pp. 53-70; Shang Quanyu, “China-Pakistan friendship is coming to an end?”, in Pakistan-China
Relations in the Changing Regional Scenario, University of Sind: Area Study Centre, Proceedings of One-Day
International Seminar, 2005, p. 103.

Although Ayub Khan diplomatically proposed to form a joint defence with India in the Cold War period, Nehru did not agree since the solution of Kashmir issue was the precondition of such initiative.85

However, the Sino-Indian War in October-November of 1962 was a significant turning point in the foreign policy of Pakistan towards China.86 Firstly, the Sino-Indian War exposed the weakness and incompetence of Indian military as India was severely defeated. Secondly, Pakistan started rethinking of her relations with the US since it provided huge military aid to India. Pakistan opposed and criticised such military and economic aid to India during and after the war. Thirdly, Pakistan found China as a very trusted friend against India.87 Therefore, Pakistan and China signed the Kashmir border demarcation agreement on 02 March 1963 when a gift of 2,050 square miles of Kashmiri territory was given to China. That territory is still claimed by India as her own land.88 Due to the political pressure from the US and the former USSR, China could not intervene during the Indo-Pakistan War in 1965.89 Interestingly, during the War of Liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, China and the US decided to reconcile their disputes with the help of Pakistan.90 It is to be noted that in its War of Liberation against Pakistan, Bangladesh was supported by India and the USSR while China supported Pakistan whole-heartedly.91 However, China maintained friendship with Pakistan while opening the door for the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971.92

According to Khoso, in the 1980s and in the post-Cold War era, China diplomatically took a cautious policy towards Pakistan, especially regarding Kashmir. China did not openly raise the issue and rather suggested that both India and Pakistan solve the Kashmir issue mutually and peacefully.93 It can be argued that China took a cautious policy since China was emerging as a significant power and was going to join the globalised world with the cooperation of the west. That does not necessarily mean that China changed her policy towards Pakistan. In the post-9/11 era, SinoPakistan relationship needed to enhance to a great extent since the US-India strategic partnership began, especially by nuclear cooperation agreement.

85 B. L. Sharma, op. cit., pp. 71-83; and John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth
Century, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, p. 191. 86 Claude Rakisits, “Pakistan-China Bilateral Relations 2001-2011: A Deepening but Cautious Partnership”,
Security Challenges, Vol. 8, No. 3, Spring, 2012, p. 84. 87 John W. Garver, op. cit., pp. 191-193. 88 B. L. Sharma, op. cit., pp. 93-94. 89 Ibid., p. 112. 90 Tariq Gilani, op. cit., pp. 86-87. 91 Raja Muhammad Khan, op. cit., p. 29. 92 Mohammad Morad Hossain Khan, “India’s and China’s Political Role in the Independence War of
Bangladesh in 1971: A Comparative Study”, Unpublished Master Thesis, School of Culture and Society,
Spring, Aarhus University (Denmark), 2017, pp. 78-84.
93 Ghulam Murtaza Khoso, “Pakistan-China Relations in the Changing Regional Scenario”, Proceedings of
One-Day International Seminar, University of Sind: Area Study Centre, 2005, p. 98.

One of the crucial issues between China and Pakistan includes nuclear cooperation for both civilian and military purposes. Although these neighbours cooperated with each other in many other areas, their cooperation in nuclear field is often condemned by other countries like the US and India. Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme was mainly initiated and developed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Abdul Qadeer Khan respectively.94After independence, Pakistan tried to get help for its nuclear programme from different countries including the US, France, Canada, and the UK. However, China was the most trusted ally which cooperated with Pakistan till today in this sector.95 It is to be noted that China tested its nuclear weapons on 16 October 1964.96 By that time, Sino-Pakistan friendship became very strong.

According to Small, the defeat of Pakistan by India during the War of Liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 played an important role behind China’s decision to assist Pakistan in its military capabilities including nuclear weapons so that Pakistan would never face such a fate against India.97 Especially, when India tested its nuclear bomb in 1974, Pakistan negotiated with China for the same cause and China gave its consent to Pakistan during the visit of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan to China.98

As a consequence, the Foreign Ministers of China and Pakistan signed a Comprehensive Nuclear Cooperation Agreement on 15 September 1986 at Beijing where the former agreed to provide four reactors to the latter for nuclear energy.99 Both the countries did not officially declare the treaty and did not reveal the specific content of the nuclear technology immediately.100 As per the agreement, China was supposed to complete the construction of the four nuclear reactors namely Chashma (Punjab, Pakistan) 1, 2, 3 and 4 by 2011.101

According to Pardesi, China assisted Pakistan in the enrichment of uranium for making nuclear weapons while the former denied any military-related assistance.102 However, two reactors were installed successfully within a short period of time and remaining two were finalised for US$ 2.375 billion in 2010.103 According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “The United States government concluded that prior to its 1992 accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), China had assisted Pakistan

94 Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 32-34. 95 Shelby McNichols, Resources on India and Pakistan: Chronology of Pakistani Nuclear Development, Center
for Nonproliferation Studies: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2000, available at http://cns.miis.
edu/archive/country_india/paknucch.htm, accessed on 21 December 2015. 96 Manjeet S. Pardesi, op. cit., p. 337. 97 Andrew Small, op. cit., p. 4. 98 Ibid., p. 33. 99 Manjeet S. Pardesi, op. cit., p. 341; Raja Muhammad Khan, op. cit., p. 32. 100 Zhang Jiegen, op. cit., p. 6. 101 Raja Muhammad Khan, op. cit. 102 Manjeet S. Pardesi, op. cit., p. 341. 103 Raja Muhammad Khan, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

 in developing nuclear explosives. For example, in 1983, US intelligence agencies reported that China had transferred a complete nuclear weapon design to Pakistan, along with enough weapons-grade uranium for two nuclear weapons.”104

According to the above source, even Chinese scientists were involved in the uranium enrichment process and China provided all sorts of services and materials to Pakistan. Scientists from both China and Pakistan were engaged in the first nuclear test at China’s Lop Nur nuclear test site in 1989.105 As McNichols points out that China actively began assisting Pakistan in its nuclear activities since 1983 though in June 1986, A Q Khan, head of the Pakistan’s nuclear programme, declared to have a programme in order to manufacture an indigenous nuclear reactor. Pakistan’s agreement with China holistically included all necessary nuclear activities such as its design, construction and operation and, accordingly, in September in the same year, Pakistan conducted cold tests of a nuclear implosion device at Chagai of Baluchistan in Pakistan.106

In September 2010, when China signed a pact based on an earlier agreement to transfer two additional plutonium-producing heavy water reactors to Pakistan, the US and India criticised and opposed such initiative.107 From the point of view of China as well as Pakistan, since China signed the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which bans nuclear transfer or cooperation, in 1992 and became the member of Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, recent Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation did not violate any international law. The main reason is that China and Pakistan signed the nuclear agreement in 1986.108 According to a report in March 2013, China and Pakistan signed another agreement to build another 1000-MW power plant at Karachi in Pakistan.109

It is to be noted that like India, Pakistan is also a non-signatory of the NPT whereas 190 states have signed the treaty.110 However, Sino-Pakistan nuclear and military cooperation has also many dimensions and objectives. Many scholars and politicians term the friendship between China and Pakistan as all weather, uninterrupted and trust-bound.111 This friendship is based on four main pillars:

104 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Resources on India and Pakistan: China’s Nuclear Exports and
Assistance to Pakistan”, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1999, available at http://cns.miis.edu/
archive/country_india/china/npakpos.htm, accessed on 22 December 2015. 105 Ibid. 106 Shelby McNichols, op. cit. 107 Andrew Small, op. cit., p. 64; Sharad Joshi, The China-Pakistan Nuclear Deal: A Realpolitique Fait Accompli,
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 11 December, 2011, available at http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/
china-pakistan-nuclear-deal-realpolitique-fait-accompli-1/, accessed on 23 December 2015. 108 Raja Muhammad Khan, op. cit., pp. 31-32. 109 Andrew Small, op. cit., p. 63; and Qandeel Siddique, op. cit., p. 39. 110 Ibid.; and Anwar Iqbal, “Pakistan will not sign NPT, says foreign secretary”, Dawn, 03 June, 2015. 111 Urvashi Aneja, “Pakistan-China Relations: Recent Developments”, IPCS Special Report, p. 3; and Rosheen
Kabraji, “The China-Pakistan Alliance: Rhetoric and Limitations”, Chatham House, Asia Programme Paper, ASP
PP/01, December 2012, p. 4.

geography, history, economics and necessity. Geographically, China and Pakistan are neighbours; history makes the two neighbouring countries friends; economics makes them partners and necessity makes them allies.112 Khan indicates that this necessity is their common political rival, India. However, the main objective is discussed below.
 

India’s nuclear tests in May 1998 surprised China since India publicly indicated China, not Pakistan, as a major threat for her national security. Though China held positive views on the US efforts such as sanctions on India and Pakistan at that time, China was not ready to convince Pakistan not to do the same nuclear test at all, since China considers Pakistan as the closest strategic partner and India’s most traditional rival.113 Since China and India find one another as potential competitor, especially in Asia, China intends to contain India by Pakistan in South Asia.114 However, like China, India is also a rising economic and military power. According to the World Bank (WB), India became the world’s third largest economy in 2011.115 Besides, India is a neighbouring country of China and Pakistan. Since there is a historic rivalry between India and Pakistan, and also between India and China, China and Pakistan find their cooperation as a potential strategic counterbalance against India. India fought wars with both China and Pakistan and the cooperation with the US and India is the major concerns for both Pakistani and Chinese interests in this region of Asia.116 China considers India as anti-China partner of the US.117

Politically, ‘Pakistan is China’s Israel’ as indicated by a Chinese diplomat in an interview with Al‐Jazeera English Television on 28 October 2010, in response to a criticism by a US delegation regarding Beijing’s generous military cooperation including nuclear weapons support to Pakistan.118 On the other hand, from the US point of view, India would be the next Australia or the United Kingdom (UK) since India also has the strong military capabilities and its army, navy and air forces are also considered to be highly professional in the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO).119 Strategically, according to Joshi, “It seems clear that China’s motivations in undertaking the deal relate less to the likely impact on Islamabad’s nuclear program, and more to Beijing’s regional balance of power and strategic

112 Raja Muhammad Khan, op. cit., p. 35. 113 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War, Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2010, p. 249.
114 Ibid. 115 “India became third largest economy in 2011: World Bank”, The Hindu, 01 May 2014, available at http://www.
thehindu.com/business/Economy/india-became-third-largest-economy-in-2011worldbank/article5963702.
ece, accessed on 25 December 2015.
116 Rosheen Kabraji, op. cit., p. 23. 117 Robert G. Sutter, op. cit., p. 249. 118 Qandeel Siddique, op. cit., pp. 35-36. 119 C. Christine Fair, op. cit., p. 158.

 stability priorities.”120 As Sutter states, even though China tried to block the US-India nuclear deal at the NSG, China was not successful.121

However, “If the military relationship lies at the heart of China-Pakistan ties, nuclear weapons lie at the heart of the military relationship.”122 From the point of view of Pakistan, since India was developing its nuclear weapons and Pakistan was weaker than India in terms of conventional weapons and military power, Pakistan needed to have such weapons in order to make a balance in South Asia.123 From the Chinese point of view, China supplied nuclear weapons to Pakistan, especially for the India factor.124 According to Robert Ross, China provided nuclear technology and missile weapons support to Pakistan and, thus, China and Pakistan have made a strategic partnership which will certainly help to contain India in the South Asian region.125

Moreover, China and Pakistan signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighbourly Relations in April 2005, which was ratified in 2006.126 According to Kabraji, this treaty is a fundamental instrument to strengthen strategic, economic and cultural relations between China and Pakistan.127 However, according to Small, this treaty gives some legal justification for one side to come to the other’s aid but no obligation, especially in terms of military requirement.128 Malik mentions that China often calls upon India to change its attitude towards China because China considers itself as the global power only next to the US, whereas India is an emerging South Asian regional power from the Chinese point of view.129 The nuclear alliance with the US would definitely embolden India significantly. The US-India strategic partnership at the beginning of the 21st century has mattered to China to a great extent since such alliance would enable the US to monitor and contain China in Asia.130

According to Malik, the US-India nuclear deal would bring a major shift in the balance of power in South Asia, which ultimately went against the interests of China. Moreover, China also opposes India’s ‘Look East Policy’ when India is invited to attend the summits of the ASEAN as the role of India enhances the US containment of China in the region.131 However, the US always welcomes the ‘Look East Policy’ of India while China intends to keep India engaged in the South Asian region only.132

120 Sharad Joshi, op. cit. 121 Robert G. Sutter, op. cit., p. 246. 122 Andrew Small, op. cit., p. 30. 123 Zhang Jiegen, op. cit., p. 6. 124 Siddharth Ramana, “China-Pakistan Nuclear Alliance: An Analysis”, IPCS Special Report 109, August 2011, p. 9. 125 Ibid. 126 Waheeda Rana and Hasan Mahmood, “Changing Dynamics of Pak-China Relations: Policy Recommendations
for Pakistan”, American International Journal of Contemporary Research, Vol. 5, No. 2, April, 2015, p. 99. 127 Rosheen Kabraji, op. cit., p. 7. 128 Andrew Small, op. cit., p. 30. 129 Mohan Malik, op. cit., pp. 164-165. 130 Ibid., pp. 166-167. 131 Ibid., p. 169. 132 Andrew Small, op. cit., p. 54.

The contemporary US-India relationship clearly indicates that the US was ready to accept India as a rising and significant power in Asia and the world. Therefore, India is increasingly seen as a valuable actor in the world politics, which was made possible due to the US efforts such as the nuclear treaty with India.133 Therefore, the above discussion has clearly manifested that the US-India nuclear deal was basically signed with a view to containing China. The school of realism in international politics terms the US-India relations as a necessity. On the contrary, the Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation can distinctly be seen as a political as well as military response which equally indicates their strategic relationship against the US-India alliance. In this case, the major factor is the emergence of India as a regional power. Therefore, such alliance system divides the above four actors as the US, India, China and Pakistan, both politically and militarily. Such alliance and competition may lead to any armed conflict between these two nuclear as well as strategic partners in the future. The policy of containment in the name of balance of power by both the alliances may not bring any positive results to the world. “The containment strategy would give way to counter containment that would be highly disastrous and the objective of achieving the regional and global security would be under threat.”134 To summarise, it can be said that this new kind of military as well as nuclear cooperation and, thus, competition is caused by the fact that globalisation necessitated these countries to safeguard their interests by forging new strategic partnerships. This also implies that this type of competition and strategic partnerships may give rise to new alliance system in the world politics; and security might be more complicated and confrontational in this age of globalisation.

133 Chris Ogden, op. cit., p. 140. 134 Mohammad Samir Hussain, op. cit., p. 81.