NUCLEAR DOCTRINES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This article provides a comparative analysis of the nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan, as they had been articulated following their 1998 nuclear tests. It examines the key elements of India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine, which is based on the principle of "credible minimum deterrence" and a "no first use" (NFU) posture. The study then contrasts this with the more ambiguous but widely understood nuclear doctrine of Pakistan, which is based on a "first use" option to deter a large-scale Indian conventional attack. The research explores the different strategic rationales that underpin these two divergent doctrines, linking them to the two countries' respective security perceptions and conventional military capabilities. The paper argues that the asymmetries in their doctrines create a complex and potentially unstable strategic environment. The analysis concludes by assessing the implications of these doctrines for crisis stability and the risk of nuclear escalation in South Asia.

Following their overt nuclearization in 1998, both India and Pakistan began the process of articulating official nuclear doctrines to guide their new strategic posture. This paper offers a detailed comparative analysis of these two doctrines. The first part of the study is an in-depth examination of India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine. It analyzes the central tenets of "credible minimum deterrence" and the politically significant pledge of "no first use." The paper explores the command and control structures proposed in the doctrine and its vision of a nuclear triad. The second part of the paper provides a contrasting analysis of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. The study explains that while Pakistan did not release a formal public document like India, its doctrine could be clearly inferred from the statements of its officials. This doctrine is characterized by a lower nuclear threshold and the explicit rejection of a no-first-use pledge, a posture designed to deter India's superior conventional military forces. The core of the article is a comparative assessment of these two doctrines, highlighting their fundamental asymmetry. The findings suggest that this "doctrinal asymmetry" is a significant source of strategic instability. India's NFU pledge is seen by Pakistan as not credible, while Pakistan's first-use posture is seen by India as dangerously escalatory. The paper concludes that this mismatch in their strategic thinking, combined with the unresolved Kashmir conflict, makes the India-Pakistan nuclear relationship one of the most dangerous in the world.