POKHRAN II: RESPONSE OF US, RUSSIA, CHINA AND PAKISTAN

This article analyzes the immediate and medium-term responses of the United States, Russia, China and Pakistan to India’s Pokhran II nuclear tests in May 1998. It situates each actor’s reaction within its strategic doctrine, domestic politics and regional interests. The United States balanced non-proliferation norms with the realities of an emerging partnership with India, initially imposing sanctions while opening quiet strategic dialogues. Russia emphasized commercial and legacy defense ties, seeking to avoid rupture while reaffirming support for global non-proliferation. China framed the tests as destabilizing to Asian security and pressed for restraint and a return to international regimes. Pakistan’s response culminated in reciprocal nuclear tests, reshaping South Asia’s deterrence landscape. The article assesses how these reactions collectively altered crisis stability, export-control regimes and the discourse on minimum credible deterrence.

The body begins with a concise chronology of May–June 1998 and the legal context of the NPT and CTBT. Section One details Washington’s sanctions under the Glenn amendment, congressional debates, and the Strobe Talbott–Jaswant Singh talks that explored export controls, doctrine transparency and Kargil-era crisis management. Section Two examines Moscow’s calculus: maintaining defense trade, leveraging multivector diplomacy and avoiding secondary sanctions while nudging India toward restraint. Section Three analyzes Beijing’s emphasis on strategic balance and concerns over missile defense, along with diplomatic efforts at the UN Security Council. Section Four traces Islamabad’s decision-making, economic pressures, and subsequent articulation of minimum credible deterrence and command-and-control evolution. Section Five evaluates regional risk: crisis signaling, hot-line reliability and confidence-building measures. The conclusion argues that Pokhran II and the responses it provoked embedded nuclear deterrence in South Asia while incentivizing new bilateral and minilateral mechanisms to prevent inadvertent escalation.