Abstract

This article examines Iran’s first phase after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, asking what changed and what persisted across elite politics, economic management and foreign policy. It outlines the emergence of new coalitions around President Rafsanjani, the consolidation of institutions such as the Leader’s office and Expediency Council, and the redistribution of influence among the Revolutionary Guard, clerical networks and technocrats. The discussion argues that continuity prevailed in foundational ideology and regime red lines, while tactical adaptation occurred in macroeconomic policy, regional diplomacy and relations with global powers. Market-oriented reforms, partial privatization and reconstruction financing reflected material constraints from war damage and inflation. Regionally, Tehran pursued pragmatic engagement to ease isolation without abandoning support for allied movements. The article concludes that post-Khomeini politics blended guarded innovation with regime-preserving continuity, producing an incremental, path-dependent transformation rather than rupture.

Full Text

The body develops three themes. First, elite configuration: succession rules elevated a less senior cleric as Supreme Leader while expanding the institutional role of the Expediency Council to manage deadlocks between parliament and the Guardian Council. Biographies of leading figures illustrate how patronage and technocratic credibility shaped appointments in oil, planning and central banking. Second, economic policy: post-war reconstruction created pressure for stabilization, exchange-rate rationalization and a cautious opening to foreign credit. The analysis traces debates over subsidy reform, the reactivation of the private sector and the politics of import licensing, showing how distributive coalitions constrained the pace of liberalization. Third, foreign policy: seeking strategic depth and economic breathing space, Iran calibrated ties with Gulf monarchies, rebalanced toward pragmatic state-to-state relations, and managed rivalry with Iraq while keeping support channels to non-state partners. The article assesses how ideology continued to structure identity and legitimation even as policy instruments diversified. It closes with implications for regime resilience: institutionalized arbitration mechanisms reduced coup risks; selective economic opening bought time; and calibrated diplomacy mitigated sanctions exposure—yet structural vulnerabilities, including factional competition and demographic pressures, foreshadowed future contention.