PREVENTIVE DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH ASIA: PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN BANGLADESH, INDIA AND SRI LANKA

This article provides a comparative analysis of the functioning of parliamentary government in three South Asian countries: Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka. It explores the concept of "preventive democracy," examining the institutional and political mechanisms that have been put in place, or have failed to be put in place, to prevent democratic backsliding and the breakdown of constitutional order. The study assesses the specific challenges faced by each country, including political instability, the weakness of parliamentary oversight, and the dominance of the executive branch. The research argues that despite sharing a common British colonial legacy, the practice of parliamentary democracy has evolved in distinct ways in each country. The paper concludes by identifying common challenges and potential areas for institutional reform to strengthen the quality and resilience of parliamentary democracy across the region.

The consolidation of parliamentary democracy in South Asia has been a complex and often-difficult process. This paper undertakes a comparative study of the experiences of Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka, focusing on the challenges of making parliamentary governance effective and resilient. The first part of the study provides a theoretical framing, discussing the ideal of parliamentary democracy and the specific institutional features designed to ensure accountability and prevent the concentration of power. The core of the article is a comparative analysis of the political realities in the three countries. It examines the problem of executive dominance, arguing that in all three cases, the parliament has often struggled to act as an effective check on the power of the Prime Minister and the cabinet. The paper also delves into the issue of political culture, analyzing how the confrontational, "winner-take-all" nature of politics in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka has undermined the deliberative function of their parliaments, a situation contrasted with the more institutionalized, though still challenged, traditions in India. The findings suggest that the formal institutional design is not enough; the sustainability of parliamentary democracy depends on the development of a supportive political culture based on tolerance, compromise, and a shared commitment to the rules of the game. The paper concludes with a call for reforms aimed at strengthening parliamentary committees, empowering the opposition, and fostering a more constructive political discourse.