THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICES IN CANADA: A REVIEW OF THEIR ROLE IN POLICY FORMULATION

This article provides a detailed review of the roles of two central executive bodies in the Canadian system of government: the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO). It examines how these two institutions support the Prime Minister in the formulation and implementation of public policy. The study distinguishes between the overtly political and partisan role of the PMO and the non-partisan, public service role of the PCO. The research analyzes the historical evolution of these offices and the trend towards an increasing concentration of power at the center of government. The paper argues that the growth and influence of these central agencies have been a defining feature of modern Canadian governance, leading to a more "presidentialized" style of prime ministerial leadership. The analysis concludes by assessing the implications of this centralization for the traditional principles of cabinet government and parliamentary democracy.

In the Westminster system of parliamentary government, power is constitutionally vested in the cabinet, but in practice, it is often highly concentrated at the center. This paper provides an institutional analysis of the two key central agencies that facilitate this concentration of power in Canada: the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO). The analysis begins by carefully distinguishing between the two bodies. The PMO is presented as the Prime Minister's personal, partisan political staff, responsible for communications, strategy, and political management. The PCO, in contrast, is the professional, non-partisan public service department that supports the Prime Minister in their role as head of government, providing policy advice, coordinating the work of other government departments, and managing the cabinet decision-making process. The core of the paper traces the significant growth in the size and influence of both these offices since the 1960s. It argues that this has led to a fundamental shift in the nature of Canadian governance, away from the traditional model of a collective cabinet and towards a more hierarchical system dominated by the Prime Minister and their central advisors. The findings suggest that this centralization has both strengths and weaknesses. It can lead to greater policy coherence and decisive leadership, but it also carries the risk of marginalizing cabinet ministers, undermining the role of Parliament, and creating an "imperial prime ministership" that is less accountable to traditional democratic structures.