SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS SECURITY AND RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS

This article explores Soviet–Afghan relations through two intertwined lenses: security imperatives that drove intervention and withdrawal, and religious dynamics that shaped resistance, legitimacy, and mobilization. It reconstructs how Kremlin threat perceptions, alliance management, and regime survival calculus interacted with Afghan political fragmentation and the mobilizing power of Islam. The argument is that religious ideas were not epiphenomenal: they structured networks, resource flows, and narratives that constrained Soviet strategies and amplified costs. By situating doctrinal debates and clerical authority within the broader insurgency ecosystem, the paper shows why counterinsurgency struggled to translate tactical gains into durable political control.

The body first maps pre-1979 relations—aid, education exchanges, and military ties—before tracing the decision pathway to intervention and the installation of successive Afghan leaderships. It assesses Soviet operational adaptations—air mobility, advisory footprints, and reconciliation efforts—and why these failed to neutralize cross-border sanctuary dynamics. A central section examines religious institutions and discourse: mosque networks, madrasah influences, fatwas, and fundraising that linked local actors to transnational patrons. It also considers intra-insurgent competition and the role of Pakistan and Gulf supporters. The analysis then evaluates the 1986–1989 withdrawal, including the Geneva Accords, and the legacies for state capacity and regional security. Policy lessons emphasize the limits of external state-building amid religiously framed mobilization, the need to integrate clerical outreach in settlement strategies, and the enduring salience of legitimacy in counterinsurgency outcomes.