SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS THE GULF CRISIS: REALIST OR OPPORTUNIST?

This article provides a critical analysis of the Soviet Union's policy during the Gulf Crisis, precipitated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. It examines the complex motivations behind the Soviet response, which marked a significant departure from its traditional Cold War behavior in the Middle East. The study explores the central debate: was the Soviet policy, which largely aligned with the United States in condemning the invasion and supporting UN resolutions, a reflection of Gorbachev's "new thinking" and a realist commitment to international law (a realist approach)? Or was it a primarily opportunistic move, designed to secure Western economic aid and political goodwill at a time of profound domestic crisis? The research analyzes the internal debates within the Soviet foreign policy establishment and assesses the difficult balancing act Moscow tried to perform between its long-standing relationship with Iraq and its new partnership with the West. The paper concludes that the Soviet policy was a complex amalgam of both principled and opportunistic elements, reflecting a superpower in the throes of a historic and terminal decline.

The 1990-91 Gulf Crisis was the first major international crisis of the post-Cold War era, and it provided a critical test for Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" in foreign policy. This paper analyzes the Soviet response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, questioning whether it was driven by a principled commitment to collective security or by opportunistic calculations. The study begins by detailing the initial Soviet reaction, which, in an unprecedented move, joined the United States in condemning the aggression of its long-term client state, Iraq. It examines the Soviet support for a series of UN Security Council resolutions that imposed sanctions on and authorized the use of force against Iraq. The core of the article is an investigation into the motivations behind this policy. One perspective analyzed is that this was the logical culmination of "new thinking"—a genuine embrace of international law and the principle of collective security. The alternative, opportunist perspective is also critically examined. This view argues that with the Soviet economy in freefall, Gorbachev's primary goal was to curry favor with the West, particularly the United States, in the hope of securing massive financial assistance. The paper also explores the deep divisions within the Soviet government, with hardliners in the military and intelligence services deeply resentful of what they saw as a betrayal of a key ally. The findings suggest that the Soviet policy was a product of its profound weakness, a pragmatic and ultimately unavoidable choice to align with the dominant international consensus in a world it could no longer hope to challenge.