THE ARMS RACE IN SOUTH ASIA: SOME APPROACHES TO STABILITY

This article analyzes the escalating arms race in South Asia, primarily between India and Pakistan, and explores potential approaches to enhancing strategic stability. It examines the drivers of the arms race, including the security dilemma, the unresolved Kashmir dispute, and the nuclear ambitions of both countries. The study assesses the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of military modernization in the subcontinent. The research then evaluates a range of approaches to stability, moving from traditional arms control to more comprehensive confidence-building measures (CBMs). It discusses the prospects for agreements on issues like conventional force reductions, nuclear risk reduction, and military-to-military communication. The paper argues that in a region with deep-seated mistrust, CBMs represent the most promising initial step toward breaking the action-reaction cycle of the arms race. The analysis concludes by highlighting the urgent need for sustained dialogue to prevent the region's rivalries from escalating into a catastrophic conflict.

The arms race between India and Pakistan represents one of the most dangerous and persistent threats to international peace and security. This paper, written in the context of the early 1990s, examines the dynamics of this race and explores potential pathways to stability. The analysis begins by dissecting the underlying drivers of the conflict, focusing on the concept of the security dilemma, where the defensive military preparations of one state are perceived as offensive threats by the other, leading to a vicious cycle of escalation. The paper provides an overview of the ongoing military modernization programs in both countries, covering conventional forces as well as the emerging nuclear dimension. The core of the study is an evaluation of different theoretical and practical approaches to achieving stability. It critiques the limitations of formal, top-down arms control treaties in a region with such profound political mistrust. Instead, the paper advocates for a bottom-up approach centered on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). It details a menu of potential CBMs, ranging from agreements on the non-attack of nuclear facilities and prior notification of military exercises, to the establishment of hotlines between military commanders. The findings suggest that these small, incremental steps, while not a substitute for the resolution of core political disputes, are essential for reducing the risk of accidental war and for creating a more predictable and stable strategic environment in South Asia.