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Abstract
This article analyzes how successive UN Secretaries-General structured mediation efforts during the Iran–Iraq War, culminating in Security Council Resolution 598 and the 1988 ceasefire. It details tools used—good offices, fact-finding, back-channel proposals, and sequencing of confidence measures—and evaluates why certain windows proved more productive. The discussion links battlefield stalemate, regional diplomacy, and great-power preferences to shifts in bargaining space. It argues that UNSG mediation was most effective when coupled with credible monitoring arrangements, clear incentives for compliance, and a balanced narrative of responsibility that allowed both parties to claim political cover at home. The case offers generalizable insights for designing peacemaking architectures in protracted interstate wars.
Full Text
The body reconstructs the timeline: escalation dynamics after 1982, the war of the cities, tanker warfare in the Gulf, and diplomatic fatigue that created openings for UN initiatives. It examines the crafting of Resolution 598—ceasefire, withdrawal to internationally recognized boundaries, POW exchanges, and a mechanism to determine responsibility. The article then assesses shuttle diplomacy by the Secretary-General’s envoys, coordination with regional actors, and the role of verification via UN military observers. A section on negotiation theory explains ripeness, mutual hurts, and face-saving as they applied to Tehran and Baghdad. It also highlights obstacles: maximalist demands, domestic constituency pressures, and spoilers seeking advantage from continued conflict. Lessons include the value of sequencing (humanitarian exchanges before boundary talks), the importance of impartial reporting to the Security Council, and the need for economic stabilization support to lock in peace. The conclusion proposes a design checklist—mandate clarity, monitoring resources, and enforcement options—that future mediations can adapt.