UNITED STATES-PAKISTAN RELATIONS DURING THE MUSHARRAF REGIME: US POLICIES, STRATEGIES, AND THE OUTCOMES

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the complex and often-turbulent relationship between the United States and Pakistan during the regime of President Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008). It examines how the relationship was fundamentally transformed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which turned Pakistan from a pariah state under sanctions into a "major non-NATO ally" and a frontline state in the US-led "War on Terror." The study analyzes the key components of the US strategy, which was based on providing massive military and economic aid to Pakistan in return for its cooperation in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The research provides a critical assessment of the outcomes of this policy. It argues that the relationship was a transactional and deeply distrustful one, with both sides pursuing their own interests. The paper concludes that while the partnership achieved some short-term counter-terrorism objectives, it failed to address the underlying problem of the Pakistani state's ambivalent relationship with Islamist extremism, a failure that would have long-term negative consequences for both countries and the region.

The nine-year rule of General Pervez Musharraf was a period of intense and deeply consequential engagement between the United States and Pakistan. This paper provides a detailed analysis of the policies, strategies, and outcomes that defined this relationship. The study begins by charting the dramatic turnaround in the relationship following the 9/11 attacks, when the Musharraf regime made the pivotal strategic decision to abandon its support for the Taliban and align itself with the United States. The core of the article is a critical examination of the nature of the subsequent alliance. It details the massive flows of US military and economic assistance to Pakistan and the close cooperation in counter-terrorism operations, which led to the capture of several high-level al-Qaeda figures. However, the paper then delves into the deep-seated problems and contradictions that plagued the partnership. It analyzes the persistent US concerns about Pakistan's alleged "double game"—fighting some militant groups while continuing to support others, like the Afghan Taliban, that it saw as strategic assets. The paper also explores the Pakistani perspective, including the resentment over US drone strikes and the feeling that its sacrifices in the War on Terror were not fully appreciated. The findings reveal a relationship that was built on a narrow and unstable foundation of short-term, tactical cooperation, rather than a genuine, long-term strategic alignment. The paper concludes that the Musharraf-era policy, while achieving some counter-terrorism successes, ultimately failed to alter the fundamental and problematic dynamics of the Pakistani state's relationship with militancy.