WATER IN WEST ASIAN CONFLICT

This article analyses how water scarcity and control interact with identity, territory and strategy in West Asian conflicts. It reviews the hydro-politics of the Tigris–Euphrates, Jordan and Nile systems as they relate to sovereignty claims, settlement patterns, food security and power generation. The study examines upstream–downstream bargaining, dam construction as state-building, and the use of water infrastructure as leverage or target during crises. It also explores the role of international law—customary principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation, no significant harm, and evolving basin treaties—and the practical limits of adjudication where security dilemmas dominate. Drawing lessons for arid regions elsewhere, the paper argues that de-escalation depends on credible data-sharing, drought-contingent operating rules and third-party facilitation that links energy trade, desalination and conservation to create issue-linkages that expand the zone of possible agreement.

The body first situates climate variability, demand growth and groundwater depletion that narrow policy space. Section One looks at the Tigris–Euphrates basin, modelling storage and release scenarios under Turkey’s GAP projects and their implications for Iraq and Syria. Section Two turns to the Jordan River and Mountain Aquifer, analysing allocation, abstraction monitoring and the political geography of settlements and checkpoints. Section Three reviews the Nile Basin’s then-current tensions, outlining cooperative options such as power-for-water swaps and regional power pools. Section Four proposes conflict-sensitive infrastructure protection, remote sensing for compliance, and basin-level drought triggers that adjust releases without reopening core disputes. A final section presents a negotiation toolkit that sequences technical confidence-building—joint gauging stations, transparent telemetry, peer-reviewed models—before moving to more sensitive allocations. The conclusion underscores that water rarely acts alone as a casus belli, but it consistently shapes incentives and leverage in a region where every cubic metre carries political weight.