Abstract

Bangladesh participates in a dense ecosystem of regional and sub-regional arrangements—SAARC, BIMSTEC, IORA, BBIN, and Indo-Pacific economic or security initiatives—each carrying different rules, instruments, and political logics. This article distils lessons from three decades of engagement and evaluates future options amid great-power competition, supply-chain realignments, and climate imperatives. Building on treaty texts, communiqués, trade and connectivity data, and elite interviews, it proposes a “function-first” approach: rather than treating forums as ends in themselves, Bangladesh should map concrete functions—tariff reduction, standards alignment, transit protocols, digital trade, disaster management, maritime safety—and pursue coalitions where progress is feasible. The analysis shows that variable geometry (e.g., BBIN transport accords) can deliver faster results than universal consensus formats, provided that domestic agencies align procedures and invest in implementation capacity. The article also examines political headwinds: episodic SAARC paralysis, shifting threat perceptions in the Bay of Bengal, and normative divergences across Indo-Pacific visions. It argues that strategic autonomy is best preserved through diversified partnerships, transparent project evaluation, and an emphasis on open, inclusive, and rules-respecting connectivity. Scenario analysis outlines three plausible regional futures to 2030—fragmentation, competitive blocs, and adaptive cooperation—with implications for trade, energy, data governance, and labour mobility. The article concludes with a pragmatic roadmap that leverages Bangladesh’s geoeconomic centrality: anchor multi-modal corridors, champion standards that lower trade costs, operationalise cross-border services (health, education, fintech) near frontiers, and institutionalise review mechanisms to retire stalled initiatives while scaling those that work.

1. Introduction

On 05 August of last year, Bangladesh experienced a massive political transition through the popular mass uprising led by students. After the end of 15 years of tyrannical rule of the Awami League (AL) government, the interim administration headed by Dr Muhammad Yunus took power and has been taking various reformative initiatives. As a crucial part of the reform process, the government is emphasising two priority areas: economic recovery and ensuring the security of the country. On this

Razia Sultana, PhD, is a Senior Research Fellow of Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies. Her email address is: razia@biiss.org © Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2025

new doorstep, Bangladesh seeks cooperation and wants to expand its horizon of opportunities with the international community. This was reflected when (on 28 August 24) Dr Yunus urged for Malaysia’s support to include Bangladesh as a new member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).1 He viewed that it could act as a bridge to strengthen ties with the South Asian regional arrangements2 such as SAARC. On the brink of Bangladesh’s new change, the immediate responses of numerous countries are positive, and several nations have already shown their interests in furthering collaboration with the country. This broad range of support shows the positive mindset of the world community towards the interim government and offers a timely scope for Bangladesh to reap its economic leverage.

Some probable queries can be asked at this juncture of transition: Why does Bangladesh seek to engage with the external community by exploring new regional platforms? Would the engagements with regional arrangements be advantageous for Bangladesh while its prime focus is now on fixing its domestic challenges? If the country intends to join in regional arrangements, what would be its likely foreign policy and strategic approach? Would the country go for realignment with a particular external power, or would it adopt a balancing behaviour with the external entities? In fact it is hard to get definite answers immediately, but it is reasonable to hope that in these current political dynamics, the country seeks to achieve greater political stability and economic prosperity by engaging with the regional bodies, which will assist her in opening new windows of opportunities. From historical records, it is observed that Bangladesh is keen to cooperate with regional partners for multiple reasons, including enhancing trade and investment, removing trade gaps, reducing economic inequality, and ensuring stability in the region. In South Asia in particular, Bangladesh wants a secure and peaceful region conducive to fostering economic growth, and this objective was notably emphasised when Dr Yunus called the South Asian members to revive SAARC.3

Similar to Bangladesh, the entire world is going through an unprecedented transformation witnessed within the contemporary international system. The proliferation of middle powers, the tension of Sino-Indian rivalry, US politics under the Trump administration, the shifting focus towards the Indo-Pacific region, and the resurgence of Cold War-like situations—mostly evidenced in the Russo-Ukraine War,


1 “Yunus: Bangladesh can become bridge between ASEAN, SAARC,” Dhaka Tribune, August 28, 2024. 2 In this paper, regional arrangements denote certain norms and principles in which nationstates agreed to act
collectively, guided by certain principles. Here, the word ‘regional arrangements’ is synonymously used as
‘regional forums’, ‘regional landscape’, and ‘regional frameworks’.
3 “Dr. Yunus for SAARC’s revival for enhanced regional cooperation,” Prothom Alo, August 27, 2024.

and the expansionary trajectory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have had profound impacts on the fabric of both bilateral and multilateral relationships. Moreover, the dominant stature of the USA evident in the current IsraelPalestine War has accentuated the discussion on a nation’s imperative for strategic decision-making freedom (SDF) in contemporary times. The question recurrently arises of how the country can act independently and engage itself regionally and globally. Since the current world situation is more complex than before and the nontraditional security threats loom large, the countries, especially the small nations, have to rethink how they enhance their extent of cooperation in different areas by securing core national interests. 

 

Amid these global complexities, Bangladesh, located in a geographically favourable position, has to consider the complexities arising from great power competitions, regional complexities, and other global challenges. While navigating the complex situation, Bangladesh wants to pursue a foreign policy marked by SDF. In this paper, the concept of SDF in the context of regional arrangements refers to a policy choice that avoids excessive dependence on any singular external country and enjoys its full autonomy while making any major foreign policy decision. This principle of SDF indicates Bangladesh’s adoption of an approach that is free from external pressures, thereby enhancing its bargaining capacity and win-win situation in a regional platform.4

It is worth mentioning that since the 1970s, Bangladesh has participated in 30 out of the 80 regional organisations working globally.5 At present, Bangladesh has engaged itself with several regional bodies that include SAARC, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), etc. Through proactive participation in these regional initiatives, the country desires to enhance its economic connectivity, security initiatives, and diplomatic posture. Hence, the key argument of the paper lies that increased participation in more regional platforms can act as a viable strategy for Bangladesh to open more options, which will ultimately help her to adjust to the changing political situation.

Outlining the problem statement in brief, the paper seeks to explore the prospective regional arrangements that Bangladesh could participate in addressing its


4 Delwar Hossain, Roundtable Discussion on “Bangladesh’s Strategic Autonomy: Participation in
International/Regional Organisations including BRICS,” November 05, 2023, BIISS.
5 Md Rais Hasan Sarowar, Roundtable Discussion on “Bangladesh’s Strategic Autonomy

wide-ranging concerns from the economy to the environment. The paper raises some specific questions listed below:

 Considering the regional and global complexities, which new regional bodies Bangladesh can join while safeguarding its SDF?

 What are the probable challenges that Bangladesh may face while joining those prospective regional arrangements?

 How can Bangladesh overcome those challenges by maintaining its SDF?

The significance of discussing this topic in the ongoing political context is manifold. For example, the question of SDF in a small country like Bangladesh is crucial, particularly in light of the termination of the former government, which had been in power for the last 15 years. It is quite often alleged that during this regime, Bangladesh was guided by the strategic choices of its big neighbour, despite attempting to balance with other major powers at different times.6 This has prompted the question of whether Bangladesh can make autonomous policy decisions by itself or whether it is guided by external powers. During the current interim government, the uncertain political climate again stimulated thinking of how Bangladesh should navigate with regional and global actors to secure its key national interests and direct its foreign policy in the future. Having observed the current political situation, it can be said that it is too early to give a comment, direction, or forecast of the strategy. One of the major challenges of the current administration is to get legitimacy and support nationally and internationally. Hence, the interim government will attempt to maintain amicable relationships with all countries to ensure its stability and longevity. Considering the country’s political landscape, engaging with more regional arrangements will help the country regain its international image, create economic opportunities, and attain the development visions that Bangladesh aspires to.7 It can also be anticipated that inclusion in regional bodies will provide Bangladesh with some leverage to handle shared common concerns such as climate change, terrorism, and other related challenges.
 

In order to streamline the discussion and narrow down the scope, the paper solely counts those regional organisations which have received significant interest from the Government of Bangladesh at different times. Also, the country wants to diversify its foreign policy and desires to explore various options for ensuring economic


6 Syful Islam, “Has Bangladesh Lost Its Footing in the China-India Balancing Act?” The Diplomat, July 16,
2024.
7 United Nations, “Regional Integration as a Strategic Avenue for Bangladesh: LDC Graduation with
Momentum,” (Geneva, 2023)

prosperity, political stability, strategic influence, and addressing common global challenges. In particular, the study has discussed nine regional arrangements considering the potential prospects for Bangladesh. These are namely ASEAN, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), Southern Common Market (known as MERCOSUR), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), (for details, see, Annex 2).

Qualitative research methods were considered a prime technique for data collection, which has significance in gathering new insights into the subject matter. For this paper, data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. Among all the qualitative techniques, in-depth interviews were employed with ten Key Informant Interviewees (KII), including academics, economists, security experts, and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) for incorporating insights into the subject matter. For KII, a specific format is followed in four distinct phases: developing a semi-structured KII checklist, selecting respondents, scheduling the interview, and collecting data and interpretation. The selection of KIIs was accomplished based on purposive and snowball sampling methods using both personal and professional networks. For secondary data, numerous sources were used, such as government and non-government documents, academic journals, recent online reports, and newspaper articles.

The structure of the paper is organised as follows: After outlining the Introduction of the paper, Section 2 reviews the literature regarding the concepts of SDF. In addition, this section set up a linkage between SDF and regional organisations in the context of Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s engagement with the existing regional bodies along with the key research gaps have also been touched up in this section. Section 3 has provided detailed information about areas of cooperation of nine regional organisations for Bangladesh. Section 4 highlights the major challenges of participation in such regional bodies while Section 5 provides some suggestions before concluding the paper.


 
 

2. Literature Review and Conceptual Analysis

2.1 Defining Freedom of Strategic Decision-Making

The concept of freedom of strategic decision-making, as already introduced as SDF in the paper, is a relatively understudied but emerging concept within the disciplines of Social and Political Science as well as International Relations (IR). It

has emerged as a recent phenomenon related to the concerns of small countries while tackling the major powers’ influences in world affairs. Protecting the country’s SDF and pursuing its national interest in the complex geopolitical landscape are arduous; hence, studying this emerging field bears significance. In the realm of IR, understanding the concept of SDF is pertinent for a country while navigating its foreign policy, security, and global standing. Within this domain, SDF is sometimes analysed based on core components related to ‘power’, ‘independence’, ‘strategic autonomy’, ‘external constraints’, and ‘domestic factors.’8 Since there is no specific definition of SDF, in this paper, the concept refers to the capacity of a state, organisation, or actor to perform independently and avoid undue interference from external authorities while formulating or implementing strategies.

Although no single theory/theorist comprehensively explains this concept, scholars like Morgenthau, Waltz, Jervis, Wendt, Mearsheimer, and Walt contributed immensely to developing the idea through their works. Realists such as Morgenthau focused primarily on power, state sovereignty and pursuit of national interest which are closely related to SDF.9 Other Realist scholars like Mearsheimer, emphasise the great power politics and competitive nature of the international environment, while Walt10 argues that states form alliances considering security concerns and power dynamics.11 In contrast, Neo-realists such as Waltz propose that a country’s behaviour and choices are shaped by the anarchic structure of an international system.12 Jervis came up with the notion that a country’s strategic choices are decided by the perception and misperception in international politics.13 Wendt—a leading figure of constructivist theory—explains that SDF is influenced by certain factors such as the international social environment and identity and beliefs of a country.14 Other IR scholars like Lake and Powell explained this as a ‘strategic-choice approach’ meaning actors’ capability is contingent upon the behaviours of other actors and each actor must consider other’s actions while making any major policy decision.15 In brief, 
 


8
Joseph Borrel, “Why European strategic autonomy matters,” The European Union (Blog), December 03, 2020,
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en. 9 Hans J Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Alfred A Knopf,
1949). 10 Stephen Walt, “The Origins of Alliances,” (USA: Cornell University Press, 1987). 11 John Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). 12 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (USA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc, 1979). 13 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (USA: Princeton University Press, 2017). 14 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 15 David A Lake and Robert Powell, “International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach,” in Strategic Choice
and International Relation, ed. David A Lake and Robert Powell, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1999). 

these scholars, among others, help to understand how states behave and navigate the complexities of international relations and balance their SDF taking into account both external challenges and domestic factors.

By and large, each country adopts its strategy to maintain its SDF. India, for instance, emphasises ‘non-alignment’ and ‘multilateralism’ while at the same time, engaging with major global actors such as the US, Russia, and China.16 Taking these dynamics into account, some specific questions can be posed for Bangladesh: What is SDF in Bangladesh’s context and what factors shape its SDF? Is it possible for the country to achieve SDF in these changing circumstances? SDF, to some extent, is a prerogative of the powerful nations while considering the issues of foreign policy and security. Thus, for Bangladesh, several factors need to be taken into account while dealing with the powerful nations for attaining its SDF. First and foremost, upholding and safeguarding Bangladesh’s national interest is the cornerstone of ensuring its security and economic prosperity. Bangladesh wants to increase its capacity to act independently when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible. The second core issue is to understand the actions of other major countries, global trends, and shifting geopolitical dynamics. Bangladesh’s SDF, thus, more or less depends on its capacity to pursue its national goals in the global arena and be free from excessive reliance on a single country or major powers. The third factor is the ability to assess probable risk factors in advance and make necessary preparations accordingly (e.g., taking both immediate and long-term preparations). The fourth key factor is related to crafting a coherent diplomatic approach through building proper negotiations and alliance-building mechanisms with the neighbours and global partners. Finally, it needs to be mentioned that foreign policy decisions are predominantly influenced by the vision and ideology of political leadership since strong political leadership can only navigate the country on the right path during a crisis. In essence, these are the key parameters that guide Bangladesh’s strategic approach while playing in the regional and international arena.

Nonetheless, it is realised that following COVID-19, the concept of SDF is not only confined to a country’s security concerns but also expanded to the issues of economy, technology, and innovation. To act self-reliantly, over 50 years of its journey, Bangladesh has focused on growing gross domestic product (GDP), increasing manufacturing strength, leveraging demographic dividends, attaining development


16 Kabir Taneja and Hasan Alhasan, “The coming of strategic autonomy in the Gulf countries,” ORF
Commentaries, March 29, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-coming-of-strategic-autonomy-inthe-gulf/; S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, (India: Harper Collins, 2022). 

goals, and strengthening the information technology (IT) sector. Instead of following Western models, Bangladesh relies on its own development path to ensure its economic sustainability while engaging with any country or partnership.17 In continuation, the interim government also shows openness to collaboration and has widened the scope of engagement across numerous sectors. Although Bangladesh follows a balanced approach, it also believes this principle must be implemented based on ‘equality’ and a ‘win-win situation’. This core principle with the additional components now serves as a cornerstone of Bangladesh's pursuit of SDF in its foreign policy endeavours.18 Thus, the prevailing definition of SDF in the context of Bangladesh can be articulated in the paper as the capacity to work together with all countries, maintain a balance with regional and global powers, ensure a win-win situation through increased bargaining power, uphold its national interests above everything and make independent foreign policy decisions without undue influence with the external powers. This approach underscores the consideration of both domestic factors and external constraints while maintaining Bangladesh’s SDF.

 

2.2 Contextualising SDF with Bangladesh’s Regional Engagements

Being one of the key littoral or maritime countries in the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh seeks to maintain its neutrality to uphold its core national interest. Certain geopolitical challenges grossly impact Bangladesh because of its geographical location. For example, due to the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific, the rise of China, and the Sino-Indian rivalry, Bangladesh has to take a careful look while balancing or optimising its strategic leverage in its international relationships.19 Bangladesh declared its regional policy through the Indo-Pacific Outlook in April 2023 delineating a neutral posture in the contemporary geo-political and geo-strategic landscape. The Outlook resembles Article 25 of the country’s Constitution, which reaffirms the ‘principles of non-interference, peaceful co-existence, respect for international law and cooperation’.20 That is, instead of defence collaboration with any regional body, the country advocates specific issues and certain parameters linking to ‘economic growth’, a ‘culture of peace’ ‘rules-based-multilateral system’ and ‘equitable and sustainable development’ for a peaceful international order aligned


17 Lailufar Yasmin, “Bangladesh at 50: The Rise of a Bangladesh that Can Say No,” Security Nexus, vol 23,
2022, https://dkiapcss.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Security-nexus-Bangladesh-at-50-Jan-2022.pdf 18 Aynul Islam and Rubel Molla, “Contemporary Geopolitical Competitions in the Bay of Bengal Region: In
Search of Greater Strategic Autonomy for Bangladesh,” BIISS Journal 45, no. 1, (2024): 31-64 19 Johannes Plagemann, “Small states and competing connectivity strategies: what explains Bangladesh’s
success in relations with Asia’s major powers?” The Pacific Review 35, no. 4 (2022): 756–757. 20 Rubiat Saimum, “Bangladesh’s strategic pivot to the Indo-Pacific,” East Asia Forum (Blog), 2023,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371958167_Bangladesh's_strategic_pivot_to_the_Indo-Pacific 

with the United Nations (UN) Charter. Bangladesh's active participation in numerous regional frameworks over the last five decades has also reflected these fundamental notions.

with the United Nations (UN) Charter. Bangladesh's active participation in numerous regional frameworks over the last five decades has also reflected these fundamental notions.