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Abstract
1. Introduction
The Rohingya crisis, characterised by the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar’s Rakhine State to neighbouring Bangladesh, has emerged as one of the most pressing and overlooked humanitarian challenges of the 21st century.1 Almost a decade has passed since the mass exodus
Md Jahan Shoieb is Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Bangladesh. His e-mail address is: jshoieb@biiss.org ©Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2025. 1 Nahian Reza Sabriet and Amena Mohsin, “An Analysis of the Patterns and Limits of Humanitarian Responses
of Rohingyas to Bangladesh in 2017 and the country is yet to repatriate a single Rohingya back to Myanmar. The crisis presents multifaceted challenges for both the Rohingya themselves and the host country, Bangladesh. Most notably, declining international funding has imposed an unsustainable burden on Bangladesh, highlighting the pressing necessity for more global responsibility-sharing and policy cooperation. Despite the efforts of the international community, the scale of the crisis has outpaced available resources, leaving many Rohingyas vulnerable to food insecurity, inadequate shelter, and limited access to healthcare and education. The prolonged presence of more than a million Rohingyas in Bangladesh has put several strains on the society and economy of Bangladesh.
Funding for global humanitarian assistance has been fluctuating in recent years. Particularly, funding for the humanitarian sector stalled in 2023, failing to keep pace with increasing global demands.2 Despite the gravity of the crisis, funding for the Rohingyas’ humanitarian cause has also fallen short of the actual requirements. In 2024, the Joint Response Plan (JRP) received 68% of the total demand. In 2023, it received only 48 per cent of the total funding requirement, including funding for the affected community by Cyclone Mocha. Funding has been decreasing rapidly in recent years. It is worth mentioning that since the outbreak of the crisis in 2017 until the end of 2022, donors have contributed nearly US$ 3.6 billion to successive JRPs, amounting to 69 per cent of the total demand.3 The numbers signify that there is a shortfall in funding for the Rohingyas. The UN also admitted that the financing of the Rohingyas’ response is becoming increasingly inadequate, amidst the increase in demand every year.4
According to ISCG5 , the Humanitarian Response Plan for the Rohingya population outlines urgent, large-scale needs: the entire population—100 percent— depends on food assistance for survival. Around 564,000 individuals, including both new and previous arrivals as well as members of the host community, require targeted nutrition support. Among them are approximately 120,000 pregnant and lactating women who need specialised nutritional care. Additionally, more than 62,000 children under the age of five suffer from severe acute malnutrition and require immediate treatment.
to the Rohingyas in Bangladesh,” New Lines Institute Magazine, July 31, 2024. 2
Development Initiatives, Falling short? Humanitarian funding and reform (Development Initiatives,
October 2024), https://devinit-prod-static.ams3.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/media/documents/Falling_short_
Humanitarian_funding_and_reform.pdf
3
Inter-Sector Coordination Group, Bangladesh: Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis,
Joint Response Plan Funding Update 2023 (2023). 4
“Global Trends in Forced Displacement,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Last modified
12 June, 2025, https://www.unhcr.org/global-trends .
5
Inter-Sector Coordination Group, Situation report: Rohingya refugee crisis. Cox’s Bazar: (2017).
Development activists warned that adequate amount of funds will be required
for the Rohingyas. The shortage of funding has further exacerbated the situation and
might have further repercussions if the problem continues unabated. As the Rohingyas
are not allowed to work outside of their camps, they have to depend solely on
assistance provided to them. And it is also very challenging for Bangladesh to
mitigate funding-related challenges.
As repatriation is a distant reality and a cumulative funding shortage, the discussion on the Grand Bargain seems quite pertinent. The Grand Bargain is a unique platform which brings together both donors and aid organisations who have pledged their commitments to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the humanitarian action. Notably, the localisation issue has come to the forefront, particularly since the launch of the Grand Bargain at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016.The signatories of Grand Bargain are working on eight streams: greater transparency, more funding support to national and local responders, increase the use and coordination of cash-based programming, reduce duplication and management costs, improve joint and impartial needs assessments, a participation revolution, increase collaborative humanitarian multi-year planning and harmonizing and simplifying reporting requirements.6 One of the key aspects of the Grand Bargain is to direct at least 25 per cent of the funds to the local actors and ensure proper coordination among the actors so that the aid is effectively utilised.7 A further assessment of the Grand Bargain in the context of the Rohingya case is discussed in the paper.
Although a couple of studies in the field sporadically mentioned the issue of funding shortage, there is a lack of literature dedicated solely to analysing the reasons for the Rohingyas’ funding crisis and the challenges Bangladesh faced. Also, there is a lack of literature mentioning the possible ways to mitigate the challenges emanating from the funding crisis. Hence, the present paper endeavours to fill the gap in the existing academic discourse.
Against this backdrop, the study’s primary objective is to investigate the reasons behind major donors curtailing their funds and the challenges Bangladesh faces as a host country due to the cumulative funding shortage. The paper also aims to propose recommendations for addressing the funding crisis and its broader implications. The key research questions of the proposed study would be: Why is there a decreasing funding trend for Rohingyas? How do Bangladesh and the Rohingyas face challenges due to funding shortages? How can Bangladesh address the challenges of the funding crisis? To answer the questions, the paper is divided into
6 “The Grand Bargain and Localisation Commitments”, https://gblocalisation.ifrc.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/02/Section-2.pdf. 7 Agenda for Humanity, “Initiative Grand Bargain”, https://agendaforhumanity.org/initiatives/3861.
six sections. After the introduction, section two discusses a brief historical overview
of the Rohingya crisis. Section three elaborates why there is a decreasing trend of
funding for the Rohingyas. Section four elaborates challenges for Bangladesh and
Rohingyas due to the funding crisis. Section five gives some policy recommendations
and section six concludes the paper.
The paper is qualitative and is based on primary and secondary academic literature, reports from international organisations, and scholarly analysis of the paper. Primary data were collected from four key informant interviews (KIIs) and two Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) conducted with the Rohingyas and the host community in Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN) Camp 13 of Ukhia Upazila of Cox’s Bazar district. Data have been collected from concerned government officials, local administration, representatives of international organisations, Rohingyas and host communities in Cox’s Bazar.
2. A Brief History of the Recent Rohingya Influx in Bangladesh
For more than seven years, Bangladesh has hosted approximately 1.2 million Rohingyas and has become a crucial host country for one of the world’s longeststanding refugee crises. The Rohingya community, a Muslim ethnic minority from Rakhine State in Myanmar, has faced various forms of torture, statelessness and forced displacement for decades. The Rohingyas are not officially recognised among the country’s 135 ethnic minority groups and have been denied citizenship in Myanmar since 1982, effectively rendering them stateless.8
The first major exodus of Rohingyas occurred in Bangladesh in 1978, when over 200,000 fled due to a military operation known as “Operation Nagamin” or “Operation Dragon King,” which aimed to verify citizenship and expel ‘foreigners’ from Rakhine state in Myanmar. Another wave took place during 1991-92, bringing approximately 250000 Rohingyas to Bangladesh following further persecution and human rights abuses with a military operation named “Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation.” By April 1992, a repatriation process had begun. To facilitate the repatriation, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) signed a Memorandum of Understanding in May 1993. Between 1993 and 1997, over 230000 Rohingyas voluntarily repatriated to Myanmar.
However, the unprecedented incident occurred in 2017 when the Myanmar military launched a brutal operation against Rohingyas in response to the alleged
8 The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Citizenship and Human Rights in Myanmar: Why Law Reform is Urgent and Possible (ICJ, 2019), https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Myanmar-Citizenshiplaw-reform-Advocacy-Analysis-Brief-2019-ENG.pdf.
attacks by the Rohingya insurgents. The United Nations described this heinous attack
as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing”. That particular incident compelled
740000 Rohingyas to seek refuge in neighbouring Bangladesh, adding to the already
existing Rohingyas and bringing the total to over 1.1 million in 2023.9
And every
year, 30000 new children are being added to the total number.10 Now, approximately
600000 Rohingyas live in the Kutupalong “mega camp”, the world’s largest refugee
camp in the Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh.11 Hosting such a mega camp is a very
challenging task for an under-resourced and overpopulated country like Bangladesh.
On average, Bangladesh spends US$1.22 billion a year for the Rohingya population.12
Details on the fund crisis are discussed in the next section.
To facilitate the repatriation process, Myanmar and Bangladesh established a joint working group shortly after the influx in 2017. In 2018, the two countries signed a repatriation agreement for the Rohingyas with a timetable. Bangladesh and Myanmar agreed to send 1500 Rohingyas each week and aimed to return all of them within two years. Two repatriation attempts were made in 2018 and 2019; however, they were not successful, and not a single Rohingya was repatriated in Myanmar.
Consequently, Bangladesh provided vital support to Gambia for its case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the genocide of the Rohingya community and to hold Myanmar accountable for the heinous act. A petition has recently been filed with the International Criminal Court (ICC) to transfer the trial to Bangladesh instead of The Hague. The lawyers of the ‘Victim Support Group’ have applied on behalf of the Rohingyas. Through this application, they requested that the hearing be held in a neighbouring country to the persecuted Rohingya community.
The political landscape of Myanmar suddenly changed in February 2021 when General Min Aung Hlaing staged a coup and toppled the government of Aung San Suu Kyi. The 2021 coup in Myanmar triggered another wave of persecution against the Rohingyas. The country’s security forces arrested thousands of Rohingyas for their ‘unauthorised travel’. They also enforced additional restrictions on their movement and blocked aid to Rohingya villages and camps. After toppling the NLD,
9
10 UNICEF Bangladesh, Undernourished and overlooked: Rohingya refugee crisis at 8 years, 26 August 2024,
https://www.unicef.org/bangladesh/en/stories/undernourished-and-overlooked-rohingya-refugee-crisis-7-
years#:~:text=About%20a%20million%20Rohingya%20%E2%80%93%20half,been%20born%20into%20
this%20limbo.
11 “The Rohingya in Bangladesh: The World’s Largest Refugee Camp,” Danish Refugee Council, 2021, https://
drc.ngo/it-matters/feature-stories/2021/5/the-Rohingya-crisis/?gclid=CjwKCAjwi6WSBhA-EiwA6Niok0BC
3vujKiKK4bR5ZcgVFJlmfT-mpClN7iNOKhnEuReo30nD6BJyaxoC_ecQAvD_BwE.
12 Jamshed M Kazi, “Who will Bear the Financial Burden of Supporting the Rohingyas in Bangladesh,” The
Diplomat, Last modified October 30, 2021.
the repatriation process has become a concern for Bangladesh and Rohingyas living
in the camps. However, the Bangladesh-Myanmar repatriation talks resumed in 2022
without any concrete output.13
The Rohingya crisis is not a bilateral issue; rather, it has become a regional
security concern. The civil war in Myanmar has changed the domestic scenario of
Myanmar, which has certainly impacted the repatriation process. The prolonged
crisis is taking a toll on the society and economy of Bangladesh. As a host country,
Bangladesh is facing various challenges in sheltering the Rohingyas. Among the
challenges, funding crunch is a major stumbling block. The next section discusses
reasons for the funding shortage.
3. Why is There a Decreasing Trend of Funding for Rohingyas?
According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, 14 although Rohingyas are solely dependent on donor funding for their survival, the current available funds are barely enough to cover their basic needs. The nancing has rapidly declined due to competing globalcrises. The dwindling trend of funding becomes apparent in the JRP Funding Update.15 The report stated that, as of November 30, 2023, 48 per cent of the displaced Rohingyas in Bangladesh were funded, with US$ 444.2 million received against the overall appeal of US$ 918.1 million. From the report, it appears that in the initial phase (2017-2019), there was a moderate percentage of funding shortage which is 27 per cent, 31 per cent and 24 per cent respectively. However, since 2020, the gap between the funds demanded and those allocated has sharply widened.
13 Lindsay Maizland, “Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, And Ethnic Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic conflict-rohingya. 14 “Rohingya: Change is Desperately Needed”, Norwegian Refugee Council, Last modified August 25, 2023, https://www.nrc.no/news/2023/august/rohingya-change-is-desperately-needed/ 15 ISCG, Joint Response Plan Funding Update 2023
Various causes of the fund crisis were mentioned in a UNHCR (2020) report.16 According to the report, donor fatigue and competing humanitarian crises have contributed to the shortfall in funding for Rohingya assistance programmes. As other humanitarian conflicts that have attracted global attention are among the reasons for the funding shortage, the Rohingya crisis is no longer on the donors’ priority list.1718 And donor fatigue occurs in a situation when organisations and individuals who previously contributed generously start to curtail or stop their funding for a particular cause feeling financially and emotionally drained by frequent requests. It is often elaborated as “crisis fatigue” or “compassion fatigue” indicating a kind of exhaustion not only for resources but also of empathy instigated by exposure to widespread sufferings and urgent appeals.
Global humanitarian needs have reached an unprecedented level in recent years, mainly due to humanitarian assistance programmes, conflicts, climate-related emergencies and other drivers.19 In 2024, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) estimated that globally, 300 million people would need humanitarian assistance of US$ 46.4 billion to support 180.5 million people out of 299.4 million people in need. However, the global funding flow has been falling short creating a widening gap that tends to leave many humanitarian assistance programmes underfunded including those supporting the Rohingyas.20
There are three main reasons for the global demand for increasing humanitarian assistance. The drivers of these needs are mentioned below:
3.1. Global Conflicts: More Entrenched and Devastating Consequences for Civilians
The global community has recently witnessed widespread conflicts in many parts of the world. To illustrate, in 2023 alone, the Israel-Gaza conflict and widespread conflicts in Sudan caused a dramatic spike in civilian deaths. In that
16 Inter Sector Coordination Group, Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis, (ISCG, 2020).. 17 Interview with the DC Cox’s Bazar.
18 Interview with CIC 13 and 19.
19 “Global Humanitarian Overview 2024”, OCHA, 2024, https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/world/
global-humanitarian-overview-2024-enarfres. 20 Ibid.
year, within five weeks, the number of Palestinian civilians killed was nearly 60 per
cent of the total civilian casualties in 2022, the deadliest year since the Rwandan
genocide in 1994.
It also seems that nearly one in five children were living in or fleeing from conflict zones. In 2024, over 50 nations were involved in active conflicts, creating ripple effects far beyond the borders of war-torn countries. According to an estimate by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), there was a more than 25 per cent increase in global political violence in 2024.21
This surge in conflicts is shifting donors’ attention to newer global crises and diverting funds to those issues. Unsurprisingly, newer problems tend to receive higher priority from donors.
The UNOCHA projected that approximately 305 million people will need humanitarian assistance in 2025. In its newly released 2025 Global Humanitarian Overview (GHO), OCHA mentioned that the main reasons for this unprecedented requirement are mainly due to violence and conflict that have led to the acceleration of needs.22 The global population living in the conflict-prone zone is estimated to have increased to 210 million. Armed conflict compounded with natural disasters has worsened human suffering in Palestine, Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine. The report further mentioned that funding has fallen short of meeting the requirements. Most of the global humanitarian assistance was required in the mentioned four areas. And in 2024, 57 per cent of the requirement was unmet.23 Therefore, it appears that intensified global conflicts demand more funds, whereas a decreasing trend of funding is visible particularly in the case of the Rohingya crisis.
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economy has faced a testing time. Various economic factors, along with other factors like conflict, climate disasters and outbreaks of infectious diseases, have appeared as significant drivers of global financial needs. The mentioned factors are either primary or strong contributors to rising needs in various conflicts, including Syria, Afghanistan, and Venezuela.24
When the Rohingya crisis broke out and there was a massive exodus of Rohingyas from Myanmar to Bangladesh in 2017, the issue attracted significant
21 ACLED, “Conflict Watchlist”, https://acleddata.com/global-analysis/conflict-watchlist. 22 OCHA, “Global Humanitarian Overview 2025”, https://www.unocha.org/events/global-humanitarianoverview-2025. 23 “Global Conflicts to Watch in 2025: Escalating Humanitarian Needs,” Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), December 13, 2024, https://www.csis.org/events/global-conflicts-watch-2025-escalatinghumanitarian-needs. 24 Global Humanitarian Overview 2024.s
global attention. However, with time, other global crises have attracted donors’
attention. For instance, in 2022, most of the largest humanitarian donors contributed
in response to the Ukrainian crisis. However, in 2023, the scenario was mixed. There
was a major slash from significant donors like Germany, Canada and the UK. The
situation somehow was offset by the contribution of a small number of donors like
Norway and Japan.25 Currently, there is a decreasing trend in the number of donors
and a small number of donors are providing the majority of the humanitarian aid.
3.2. Unprecedented Global Climate Emergency
The increase in global temperature is quite visible in the twenty-first century. Unsurprisingly, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) confirmed that 2023 was the hottest year on record and 2024 is on track to be even hotter.26 The world experienced numerous climatic incidents including Tropical Cyclone Freddy in Southern Africa, wildfires in Europe and devastating Storm Daniel in Libya. Between 2021 and 2022 internal displacement due to climate change rose to 45 percent in a year.27
The UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes warned that in the coming decades the global demands for humanitarian assistance in coming decades will grow because of climate change.28 The impact of climate change is no longer a myth or fiction rather it is a reality and has already created and intensified massive humanitarian crises across the world. In addition to the immediate impacts of global climate change, the long-term impacts of global temperature rise may drastically reduce habitability in many parts of the world and cause unprecedented population displacement.29 In such a case, massive humanitarian assistance will be required. In some parts of the world, climate change-related conflicts have resulted in dire consequences. For instance, The Central Sahel region of Africa including Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso is facing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. It is estimated that over 16 million people require assistance and protection, which is 172 per cent higher than that of 2016. And more striking scenario happened in case of internal displacement in that part. The number of internally displaced people surged by over 2400 per cent and
25 Development Initiatives, Falling short? Humanitarian funding and reform. 26 “2024 is on track to be hottest year on record as warming temporarily hits 1.5°C,” World Meteorological Organization, Last modified November 11, 2024, https://wmo.int/news/media-centre/2024-track-be-hottestyear-record-warming-temporarily-hits-15degc. 27 Global Humanitarian Overview 2024. s 28 “Global: Climate change poses humanitarian challenges - top UN official,” reliefweb, Last modified April 08, 2008, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-climate-change-poses-humanitarian-challenges-top-un-official. 29 Andrew Moran, “Climate Change is a Public Health Emergency,” https://medglobal.org/climate-change-isa-public-health-emergency/
flood insecurity has risen by 532 per cent since 2014.30 It implies that global climate
change and related disasters and population displacement are rising and will surely
divert a significant portion of global humanitarian assistance.
4. Challenges for Bangladesh and Rohingyas Due to Fund Crisis
The funding crunch poses multifaceted challenges to Bangladesh’s refugee management system and local economy, exacerbating the conflict between the Rohingyas and the host community. 31 It happens primarily because most of the funds come for the Rohingyas and not for the host community, making the poor local community deprived of sustainable access to funding. The host community complain price hikes of basic goods and local day labourers express dissatisfaction over losing work to the refugees who are often willing to accept far lower wages.32 The prolonged presence of Rohingyas strains Bangladesh’s economy to a great extent, diverting resources away from various development priorities and social services. 33 From the field study, it has appeared that underfunding hampers critical support to Rohingyas in food, health, sanitation, community development, education, recreation, etc.34 The cumulative shortage of funding for the Rohingyas has been creating various challenges for Bangladesh as well as for the Rohingyas themselves. In the next few paragraphs, the challenges are described.
a) Economic Challenges
The Rohingyas are dependent on assistance provided to them and are not allowed to go outside for jobs or education. Therefore, if there is a funding shortage, it creates a major challenge for the Rohingyas. In addition to that, there is a significant number of young Rohingya population living in various camps. However, such a large number of young Rohingyas have low levels of skills and education which also limits their ability to obtain work or employment.35
30 International Rescue Committee, The Central Sahel: How conflict and climate change drive crisis, https:// www.rescue.org/article/central-sahel-how-conflict-and-climate-change-drive-crisis 31 Iqthyer Uddin Md Zahed, “Impact of the Geopolitical Status Quo vis‐à‐vis the Rohingya Crisis on the Social, Economic, and Political Aspects of Bangladesh,” Asian Politics & Policy 15, no. 4 (October 2023): 557-712. 32 Mayesha Alam,“How the Rohingya Crisis is Affecting Bangladesh — and Why it Matters,” The Washington Post, February 12, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/12/how-therohingya-crisis-is-affecting-bangladesh-and-why-it-matters/. 33 Tawfique M. Haque and Tasmia Nower, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Bangladesh: A Geopolitical Analysis,” in The Rohingya Crisis: A Moral, Ethnographic, and Policy Assessment, ed. Norman K. Swazo et al. (London: Routledge, 2020). 34 Interview with the DC of Cox’s Bazar. 35 Md. Noorunnabi Talukder, Md. Irfan Hossain, Abdullah Al Mahmud Shohag, Eashita Farzana Haque, Iqbal EhsaJoseph P. Falcone and Ubaidur Rob, Assessment of Economic Opportunities for Young Rohingyas in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Population Council, 2022).
Cox’s Bazar is already labelled as one of Bangladesh’s poorest districts, with 33 per cent of the population living below the poverty line and is currently experiencing an extra burden on its economy and people.36 The local economy is struggling to take a huge burden of more than one million Rohingyas and that is in many cases leading to competition for limited resources.37 The fund crunch is exacerbating the situation. The presence of Rohingyas is affecting the local industries, particularly, fishing and agriculture. Many Rohingyas are now seeking employment in informal sectors and which often results in extra pressure and over-exploitation of farmland and fisheries which is further exacerbating the tensions.38
b) Host vs Rohingya Grievances
The fund crisis also impacts the host communities’ relations vis-à-vis the Rohingya population living in the camps. As the hosts have already lost their lands and all other supporting means of livelihood due to the influx of Rohingyas, they perceive themselves as more unfortunate than the Rohingyas.39 There is empirical evidence that the host communities in Cox’s Bazar are experiencing economic hardships due to the presence of a large number of refugees.40 The competition in the local job market, the resulting downfall in wages, and increased pressure on local government services have resulted in grievance and marginalization among locals. Unsurprisingly, the local population often complains that there is an increase in living costs and a decrease in access to basic services due to the presence of Rohingyas.41 The situation becomes aggravated due to the cumulative funding crunch. As the host community is supposed to receive 25-30 percent of the total fund, they are becoming deprived due to fund shortage.42 The host communities narrate themselves as the worst sufferers of the crisis as they mention that the Rohingyas once were given their lands and nowadays are impacting their livelihoods.43 They also perceive that international organisations are giving priority to Rohingyas over them creating a sense of marginalisation among themselves.44
36 UNDP Bangladesh, “Strengthening Disaster Risk Management and Community Resilience in Cox’s Bazar”, https://www.undp.org/bangladesh/projects/strengthening-disaster-risk-management-and-communityresilience-coxs-bazar. 37 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (2022). Addressing the Humanitarian Needs of Rohingya Refugees and Host Communities. 38 Khan, M. (2023). The Impact of the Rohingya Crisis on Local Economies in Bangladesh. Institute for Sustainable Development. 39 FGD with the Host Community, FGD Taken on Camp 13 of Ukhia Cox’s Bazar, FGD Taken on 24th October 2024. 40 Hasan, M., Islam, M. R., & Khair, M. (2022). Host Community Perspectives on the Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Cox’s Bazar. Journal of Refugee Studies, 35(1), 132–150. 41 World Bank. (2023). The Socioeconomic Impact of the Rohingya Crisis in Bangladesh: A Comprehensive Study. World Bank Publications. 42 Interview with DC Cox’s Bazar. 43 FGD on the Host Community 44 FGD on the Host Community.
c) Environmental Impacts
The fund crunch has been adversely impacting the environment of the Cox’s Bazar district. The settlement of Rohingyas already caused extensive deforestation in that area. And to meet the extensive need for firewood and land for shelter has intensified pressure on the local ecosystems. According to a report of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), approximately 23 per cent of the land area in the refugee camps has been destroyed to meet the demands of the Rohingyas. 45 Consequently, the destruction of vegetation has led to significant soil erosion enhancing the vulnerability of landslides during the rainy season. Additionally, the activities have impacted the region’s biodiversity loss, disrupting ecological balance and jeopardising future sustainability endeavours.46 The fund crisis is also negatively impacting the sanitation and waste management facilities of the Rohingyas. A huge number of Rohingya settlements have strained the local water resources. As most of the Rohingyas meet their daily demands of water from shallow wells and surface water, those are becoming contaminated due to excessive use and inadequate waste management facilities.47
d) Adverse Impact on the Local Job Market
The local job markets witnessed both positive and negative impacts due to the massive influx of Rohingyas to Bangladesh in 2017. In the initial stage, the influx of Rohingyas created job opportunities for local people; however, in recent times it has posed challenges in the local job market. Particularly, the funding crunch for Rohingyas significantly contributes to adverse impacts on the local job market. When Rohingyas cannot afford to maintain their families with their received grants, they tend to find jobs in local markets which in return, create additional strain on the local job market.
Job opportunities are limited, sporadic and occasional for the Rohingyas in the camp areas. Very few Rohingyas, particularly, girls get limited chances of volunteer jobs in camps facilitated by NGOs and INGOs. In addition to that, mobility restrictions on Rohingyas are also a major barrier for Rohingyas in getting jobs outside of the camp areas.
45 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Rohingya Refugee Crisis: Situation Report(IOM, 2018). 46 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Environmental Impact of the Rohingya Crisis (UNEP, 2019). 47 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugee Crisis (UNHCR, 2020).
e) Other Challenges
There are some other challenges of the funding crunch. Among those challenges are the deterioration of law and order and increased criminal activities. As Rohingyas are restricted from seeking formal employment outside the camps, funding shortfalls have led some individuals to resort to illicit activities, including petty theft, robbery, and drug trafficking.48 This situation is dismantling the social fabric in that part of Bangladesh. Moreover, the fund crunch directly impacted the food allocation. While previously per head allocation was US$12 it has come down to US$ 8. And consequently, Rohingyas sometimes resort to unlawful activities to meet their demands.49 The deterioration of the law-and-order situation is becoming apparent in Cox’s Bazar by the Rohingyas. Abductions and human trafficking as well as drug trafficking have increased a lot in recent years.50
The deterioration of law and order and the increase in criminality can be attributed to fund shortfall.51 The Bangladesh Police started “Operation Root Out” in the Rohingya camps to eradicate the rising criminalities in the camp areas. According to reports, approximately one thousand criminals have been arrested from those camps in recent years. Due to fund shortfalls, Rohingyas are resorting to risky sea journeys to the countries of Southeast Asia and beyond. In addition to human trafficking, Rohingya people are becoming associated with drug trafficking, violence, criminalities, and extremism in this region. According to information from law enforcement agencies, approximately 80 percent of the country’s Yaba comes through the Myanmar-Bangladesh border.52 And it is alarming that Rohingyas are involved in this trading.53
The Rohingyas perceive that funding has decreased significantly these days. According to them, the Fund crunch has impacted almost every aspect of their lives. For example, previously the Rohingyas received a certain amount twice a year to repair their shelter. However, nowadays they receive once in two years. They have been witnessing the trend of fund shortage since 2019.54 According to the regulation of the Bangladesh government, the Rohingyas are not allowed to have permanent shelter in the camp areas. Hence, they are forced to live in a risky environment where
48 Interview with the DC of Cox’s Bazar.
49 Interview with the DC of Cox’s Bazar.
50 Interview with the DC of Cox’s Bazar.
51 Interview with the DC of Cox’s Bazar
52 Shafik A. Rahman, “Rohingya Crisis: The Picture of Fund Crisis and its Impacts”, Cetri, Last modified January
16, 2023, https://www.cetri.be/Rohingya-Crisis-The-Picture-of?lang=fr#:~:text=The%20Rohingya%20
crisis%20persisted%20due,decline%20in%20the%20coming%20years.
53 Shafik A. Rahman, “Rohingya Crisis: The Picture of Fund Crisis and its Impacts”.
54 FGD with the Rohingyas
landslides are common in monsoon seasons.55 Their food supply has decreased a lot.
Therefore, they can consume less food than in the past. Simultaneously, they are not
receiving nutritious food. So, they are now prone to be affected by different kinds of
diseases. The amount they receive is not enough to meet their everyday needs. They
mentioned that the rice they receive is not suitable to eat. So, they sell the rice to
nearby markets and buy their desired rice at a higher price.56
5. Recommendations
According to the existing literature and field data, it is evident that the funding crisis is multidimensional with various underlying causes. Some recommendations to mitigate the funding shortage are discussed in the following paragraphs.
a) Efficient Management of Available Funds
As fund curtailment has become a regular phenomenon in recent years and the country is receiving approximately 50 per cent of the demanded funds, the fund disbursement should be done prudently. The allocation should not be decreased in the top priority areas like food, sanitation and accommodation. As they reside in makeshift camps that require frequent repairs, this issue should be considered sensibly. In this regard, it can be mentioned that the IOM comes with a “Smart Camp” idea. This model can be assessed for a sustainable solution to the accommodation problem.
As the host communities receive a very negligible amount of assistance and there is a lack of coordination among different stakeholders in assisting them, their assistance should be sent after ensuring proper coordination among relevant stakeholders (UNHCR, IOM, and local administration). It is also important to select potential aid recipients more prudently so that a suitable person receives assistance.
The UN and other international organizations should investigate more innovative funding methods. These may include public-private partnerships (PPPS), social impact bonds and other arrangements that could provide sustainable solutions to the funding shortfall issue. For example, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) partnerships can be a change-maker. By partnering with multinationals, Rohingyas can receive fortified food items, hygiene kits or solar lamps via their supply chains. If the Bangladesh-based multinationals agree to donate a percentage of their Bangladesh-based profits to refugee livelihoods, that
55 FGD with the Rohingyas 56 FGD with the Rohingyas
will be a notable outcome as far as the funding shortage is concerned. The UN on
the contrary, can play a broker in securing tax incentives for companies through
the government of Bangladesh.
b) Robust Diplomatic Initiatives
Although Bangladesh has made various efforts, the country has yet to resolve the issue and manage adequate funds for the Rohingyas.. Bangladesh can think of advocating for a dedicated UN Special Rapporteur on Rohingya Funding to coordinate global appeals. Regional diplomacy and burden sharing can also prove effective. For example, by engaging ASEAN, Bangladesh can demand Myanmar’s compliance with the 2021 ASEAN consensus on repatriation.
Although there has been an enormous task of bargaining in collecting funds for the Rohingyas, there remains a gap between the actual demand and funding. Hence, the UN and its affiliated organisations can play a good role. The UN, particularly its affiliates the UNHCR and IOM, are trying to manage more funds for the Rohingyas. Hence, a concerted effort from international organisations can work as a catalyst in managing the required funds for the Rohingyas. Relevant stakeholders working with the Rohingyas opine that repatriation is the ultimate solution to the crisis.57 To mitigate the shock of the funding crunch, curtailing can be done in the least priority areas and the allocation for basic needs should not be curtailed.
In addition to that, robust diplomatic efforts are required for addressing the root causes of the crisis, including promoting sustainable peace, stability as well as human rights in the Rakhine State of Myanmar are particularly essential for achieving a durable solution to the Rohingya crisis.58
c) Strengthening International Advocacy and Donor Support
Ensuring a continuous flow of funds is vital for the Rohingyas. Therefore, Bangladesh should bolster lobbying efforts at the UN, OIC, and ASEAN to guarantee consistent and ongoing funding. In this context, it is crucial to advocate for a burden-sharing mechanism where wealthy nations make substantial contributions to refugee support.
57 Interview with RRRC Commissioner and DC Cox’s Bazar 58 International Crisis Group. (2021). Bangladesh and Myanmar: A Dangerous Turn in the Rohingya Crisis. International Crisis Group Report, 307.
Effective advocacy also carries enormous importance in mitigating the
funding crisis. And it mainly involves raising awareness, mobilising political
will and influencing regional and international policies to prioritise the needs of
Rohingyas. And the advocacy must be conducted at various levels. First of all,
an effective diplomatic engagement needs to engage all relevant stakeholders.
Hence, policymakers and diplomats of host and donor countries need to elevate
the Rohingya issue in important international agendas, emphasising the gravity and
long-term impact of the crisis.59 Robust diplomatic efforts can foster solidarity and
put pressure on reluctant donors to fulfil their commitments. Advocacy also should
be conducted in regional and global platforms such as the UN General Assembly,
high-level meetings of the UNHCR and regional platforms to galvanise supports and
commitments on Rohingyas’ funding needs. Addressing the funding crisis and other
challenges associated with the Rohingya crisis necessitates concerted efforts and the
cooperation of international actors. Major donor countries like the USA, Australia,
European Commission; international organisations such as the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for
Migration (IOM), and NGOs must work in collaboration to mobilise additional
funding to fulfill the humanitarian needs of the Rohingyas and support the host
communities of Bangladesh.60
It is also essential to conduct public awareness campaigns by civil society, media and advocacy groups in shaping public opinion and maintaining sustained global attention. Here, it can be mentioned that raising awareness about the plight of the Rohingyas and the funding gaps can generate grassroots pressure on policymakers to act. Engagement with private sectors also carries enormous importance. Diversifying funding sources through engagement with corporate social responsibility programs, philanthropic foundations, and impact investors can fill critical gaps and promote innovative funding models.
d) Facilitate Livelihood Skills Training and Education Focusing on Repatriation
Some training programmes are targeting Rohingya girls. Research indicates that approximately 90 per cent of Rohingyas in Bangladesh do not get access to any training.61 The issue of providing livelihood skills training is also supported by field-level stakeholders working with the Rohingyas.62 The suggestion came that, as
59 Feldman, S, Diplomatic Strategies for Humanitarian Funding, International Affairs Review, 2021. 60 World Bank, Bangladesh Development Update: Towards Regulatory Predictability (Dhaka: World Bank
Group, 2019)..
61 Talukder et al. “Assessment of Economic Opportunities for Young Rohingyas in Bangladesh”.
62 Interview with the RRRC Commissioner, Cox’s Bazar.
there is uncertainty on aid, the large number of Rohingyas should be provided with
various livelihood skills like the TVET and vocational training. The core objective
of such trainings should be facilitating the repatriation process. If the Rohingyas
are provided with some training and skills, then it might convince the Myanmar
authorities in taking them back to Myanmar, as they can be in a position to contribute
in the socio-economic development of the country.
Education is recognised globally as a life-sustaining, life-saving, and lifetransforming lifelong process and one of the core components of children’s future. It provides children with the knowledge, understanding, and skills necessary to build more prosperous futures for themselves and their communities.63 Ensuring quality, inclusive and equitable education for all is one of the SDG goals.64 There is empirical evidence that children usually suffer a lot during the time of conflict and forced displacement.65 Quality education reduces the probability of replicating violence by children they may have witnessed during a disaster or conflict. “Education in emergencies” refers to education provided in fragile or conflict-affected contexts where humanitarian intervention is inevitable. Providing quality education to children living in an emergency allows them to learn and simultaneously equips them to face ongoing and future conflicts. 66
As mentioned earlier, Rohingyas are only given primary education and do not get access to higher education in and outside of the camp areas. In this regard, it can be mentioned that recently the government of Bangladesh agreed to a pilot project allowing 10000 Rohingya children to enroll in formal education from Grade 6 to 9 through the Myanmar school curriculum assisted by UNICEF.67 The success of the project can pave the way for formal education for RohingyAs there is limited access for Rohingyas to find a job outside of their camps amidst the dwindling nature of their funding, household income-generating activitiesa children and give them some kind of hope and aspiration for a better future. The core objective of this process should also be the successful repatriation.
e) Household Income Generating Activities
As there is limited access for Rohingyas to find a job outside of their camps
amidst the dwindling nature of their funding, household income-generating activities
63 M. Mahruf C. Shohel, :”Education in emergencies: challenges of providing education for Rohingya children living in refugee camps in Bangladesh,” Education Inquiry 13, no. 1 (2020): 104–126, https://doi.org/10.108 0/20004508.2020.1823121. 64 “The 17 Goals,” United Nations, https://sdgs.un.org/goals. 65 Graca Machel, The Impact of War on Children (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2001).. 66 Margaret Sinclair, “Education in Emergencies,” in J Learning for a Future: Refugee Education in Developing Countries (Geneva: UNHCR, 2001)). 67 “Bangladesh Allows Education for Rohingya Children,” The Daily Star, January 28, 2020, https://www. thedailystar.net/rohingya-crisis/news/bangladesh-allows-education-rohingya-refugee-children-1860280.
can be crucial for uplifting the economic conditions of the Rohingya families. It can reduce their dependency on external aid and help them meet their demands. Various household income-generating activities allow them to decrease their aid dependency which is now uncertain due to funding cuts by major donor countries. By establishing self-sufficiency through multifaceted income-generating activities, Rohingya families can lessen the tension of fluctuating aid availability and improve their capability to adapt to a funding shortfall.68
When Rohingya families are engaged in income-generating activities without going outside of their respective camp areas, it can substantially reduce tensions that arise from competition for jobs and aid between the Rohingyas and host communities.69 Empirical evidence suggests that houses engaged in various income-generating activities tend to experience enhanced food security and overall well-being. 70 It can be mentioned here that Rohingya women are traditionally skilled in embroidery, weaving and basket-making. Besides, many Rohingya men have carpentry skills. In South and Southeast Asia, bamboo products have tangible demands. Thus, their skills can be translated into income-generating activities. Hence, NGOs and INGOs can facilitate market linkages to sell their products online. Many Rohingyas may lack the capital necessary to invest in income-generating ventures. Hence, international organisations should extend support to those families who want to reduce their aid dependency.71 However, while engaging Rohingyas in income-generating activities, it should be kept in mind that the host communities are not affected by their activities.72
Considering various concerns and limitations, to increase resilience, strengthen coping mechanisms and ensure food security, support can be provided to produce vegetables inside the camps. This can provide temporary income opportunities allowing the Rohingyas to buy essential items. Besides, skill-based opportunities are important in mitigating the cumulative funding shortage of the Rohingyas.
68 “UN, Global Community Laud Bangladesh’s Decision to Provide Education For Rohingya Children,” The
daily Star, January 29, 2020, https://www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-crisis/news/un-global-community-laudbangladeshs-decision-provide-education-rohingya-children-1860715.
69 Harvey, P., & Houghton, R. (2021). The Role of Local NGOs in Humanitarian Response. Humanitarian
Practice Network. Retrieved from [HPN website].
70 UNDP. (2021). *Impact of the Rohingya Crisis
71 REACH. (2021). Livelihoods and Market Assessment: Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh. REACH Initiative.
Retrieved from [REACH website].
72 Interview with RRRC Commissioner, Cox’s Bazar.
d) Localisation of Funds: Implementing the Objectives of the Grand Bargain
The issue of localisation of funds has undergone significant development and changes, particularly since the launch of Grand Bargaining during the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. The essence of the Grand Bargain lies in enhancing humanitarian aid’s effectiveness. The objective is to enhance funding for host communities, reducing operational costs by improving coordination and cooperation. Another key aim is to direct at least 25 percent of funds to local actors to empower them to lead crisis response efforts.73 It aims to ensure aid efficiency by increasing cash-based assistance, enhancing funding predictability, and reducing fragmentation among humanitarian activists.74
Regarding the fund shortage for the Rohingyas, the Grand Bargain’s commitment to direct funding to local actors and localisation could mitigate the challenges of funding shortfalls. By providing more assistance in homegrown capacity building, the international community can enhance the resilience of host communities while ensuring that aid is effectively used to meet the actual needs of the aid recipients.75 The Grand Bargain has the potential to create some real opportunities favourable to mitigate the fund shortfall. Enhanced collaboration among local NGOs, INGOs and donors can ensure resource allocation and improve specific programme implementation. Such partnerships can be pivotal in fulfilling the actual needs of the Rohingya community and can bring confidence among the host communities by fulfilling their core demands. 76 A flexible funding mechanism outlined by the Grand Bargain can allow organisations to respond to real-time needs more efficiently and effectively. It can help implement multi-year programmes crucial for both the Rohingyas and host communities.77
Despite several potential benefits of localisation, some challenges hinder its full realisation in the context of the Rohingya crisis. One of the major barriers is the limited capacity of local NGOs to conduct large-scale humanitarian activities. On the contrary, INGOs and UN agencies often possess extensive experience and
73 Abdul Mannan, “Decreasing funds while repatriation is a distant destiny: can localisation be an answer to the protracted Rohingya crisis?”, Humanitarian Practice Network, Last modified November 01, 2024, https:// odihpn.org/en/publication/decreasing-funds-while-repatriation-is-a-distant-destiny-can-localisation-be-ananswer-to-the-protracted-rohingya-crisis/ . 74 Schraven, B., et al. (2019). The Grand Bargain: Key Commitments and Challenges. ODI Briefing Paper. Retrieved from [ODI website] 75 ALNAP. (2020). Localizing Humanitarian Action: The Role of the Grand Bargain. Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action. Retrieved from [ALNAP website] 76 Harvey, P., & Houghton, R. (2021). The Role of Local NGOs in Humanitarian Response. Humanitarian Practice Network. Retrieved from [HPN website] 77 GHA. (2022). The Grand Bargain: Progress and Challenges. Global Humanitarian Assistance. Retrieved from [GHA website]
technical expertise that local NGOs may lack. This gap in funding, infrastructure, and
operational capacity can impede local NGOs from effectively performing their duty
in cases of complex interventions.78 In addition to that fact, a disparity was observed
in funding allocation. However, the Grand Bargain suggests that at least 25 per cent
of funding be directed to local actors. This aspect has not been fully followed. In the
field research, it has been observed that the host community, particularly those who
reside in camp areas, barely receive any assistance.79 They mentioned that when
they seek aid from IOM or UNHCR, they suggest them go to the local government.
However, when they go to the Union Council for assistance, the local government
representatives mention that they are supposed to receive assistance from the camp
where they reside.80 However, according to IOM, approximately 25 per cent of the
total funds are allocated to the host community. However, as it is directed to the Union
Council or other local government institutions, it is primarily their responsibility to
support the host communities. Hence, it appears that there is a lack of coordination
among relevant stakeholders working with the Rohingyas and host communities.
The localisation presents both positive and negative aspects of the Rohingya crisis. Although it is challenging to deliver humanitarian assistance to a large population, the local NGOs performed that duty very well by demonstrating adaptability and resilience in responding to the requirements of the Rohingya community. This partnership model generates strengths for local and international actors by providing immediate assistance and enabling local organisations to build capacity. Hence, the objectives of the Grand Bargain can be effective in the Rohingya crisis.
G) Other Efforts in Mitigating the Funding Shortage
The issue of transparent and accountable fund management comes to the forefront. Donors are more likely to contribute to projects which are transparent, accountable and demonstrate proper utilisation of funds. In this regard, improving monitoring and evaluation frameworks can build confidence among key donors. 81 As impact assessment is crucial, demonstrating tangible impacts such as improved nutrition and healthcare facilities- can motivate donors through regular reporting and success stories. Some innovative thoughts on funding can be applied such as moving from annual pledges to multi-year support that can ensure continuity of funds with more strategic planning and reduced fragmentation which in the long run can ensure sustainability of fundings.
78 Abdul Mannan, “Decreasing funds while repatriation.” 79 FGD with the Host Community 80 FGD with the Host Community 81 Gulf States Institute, Transparency and Accountability in Refugee Support, 2022, Available at https://www. gsi.org, accessed on 02 July 2025.
6. Conclusion
The Rohingya crisis can be characterised as a protracted one that is taking a big toll on the host country, Bangladesh. More than seven years have passed and still, no repatriation occurred. And there is no indication of repatriation in the near future. The government of Bangladesh is trying its level best to extend support to the forcibly displaced Rohingyas. However, it is a very challenging task for a country already burdened with a huge population. As time passes, the decreasing trend of funding for the Rohingyas becomes prevalent. The donors’ fatigue and the competing global crisis are mainly responsible for the funding crunch. It is also observed that the number of donors is decreasing gradually which is one of the prime reasons for fund reduction. And there are projections that the funds will decrease in the future.
The funding crunch is affecting the forcibly displaced Rohingyas and posing significant challenges that are reflected throughout the humanitarian response programmes for Rohingyas. As humanitarian assistance dwindles, the challenges faced by both the Rohingyas and the host community intensify, creating a cycle of social tension and economic strain in the local economy. The host community becomes the first sufferer. In the long run, the fund crunch can destabilise the social fabric and affect the law-and-order situation. Above all, it can hamper Bangladesh’s GDP growth and destabilise its macroeconomic policies.
The ultimate solution to the funding shortage lies in the successful and voluntary repatriation of the Rohingyas in Myanmar. It appears that the scenario is deteriorating gradually and the issue needs to be resolved within the quickest possible time. Hence, the countries and organisations working on the funding issue should come forward and work comprehensively to meet the funds for the Rohingyas. International organisations and pressure groups need to come up with fresh minds to enhance funding for the Rohingyas. The government of Bangladesh needs to augment diplomatic efforts to resolve the problem and repatriate Rohingyas to their country. To mitigate the funding crunch, the UN has a big role in sensitising the gravity of the problem and representing the urgency of aid flow. Hence, IOM and UNHCR can deploy more efforts in mobilising funds for the Rohingyas.
In a nutshell, it can be said that a meaningful and peaceful repatriation of
Rohingyas can bring an ultimate solution to the problem. For the time being, the
international community must ensure sustained support and funding not only for
the Rohingyas but also for the host communities who are the worst sufferers of this
ongoing crisis. Further research can be conducted on the effectiveness of the Grand
Bargain in reducing the challenges of funding shortfall.