CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

This article analyzes how leadership turnover and coalition composition in Israel recalibrated negotiation strategies in the 1990s peace process. It examines electoral incentives, party platforms and security doctrines that shaped attitudes toward Oslo implementation, settlements, borders and final-status issues. The study emphasizes sequencing problems—security first versus parallelism—and the role of US mediation in expanding or constraining bargaining space. It argues that domestic coalition arithmetic often trumped international commitments, producing oscillation between confidence-building and retrenchment. The paper concludes that durable progress required cross-camp consensus on minimum parameters and institutions capable of insulating core undertakings from day-to-day politics.

The body starts with a concise history of Oslo’s architecture and early milestones before turning to electoral realignments and their policy implications. Section One analyzes the coalition constraints facing incoming leaders, including veto players and the leverage of small parties in cabinet formation. Section Two dissects security framings—terrorism response, closure regimes and coordination with Palestinian institutions—and how these affected trust and timelines. Section Three reviews settlement dynamics and the politics of freezes, outposts and planning law. Section Four considers US mediation styles, from shuttle diplomacy to bridging proposals, and their interaction with domestic politics on both sides. Section Five assesses public opinion trends and the importance of visible dividends in mobility, policing and economic life. The conclusion identifies institutional safeguards—legislated benchmarks, third-party monitoring and phased mutuality—that could prevent cyclical breakdowns and preserve incremental gains in the face of leadership change.