Abstract

This article argues that environmentalism in South Asia matured when river basins began to be treated as political communities rather than mere hydraulic systems. Focusing on the Eastern Himalayan rivers, it explores how monsoon variability, glacier dynamics, sediment loads and upstream storage shape food security and energy planning downstream. The study reviews cooperative practices—data sharing, joint gauging, early-warning and sediment management—alongside persistent deficits in transparency and trust. It assesses the political economy of dams, irrigation and power trade, showing how benefits and risks are unevenly distributed across riparian districts. Building a shared water community, the paper contends, requires embedding science in accountable institutions, recognizing ecological services, and sequencing projects with social safeguards. It closes with a pragmatic roadmap that links hydromet networks, adaptive operation rules and livelihood co-benefits to a diplomatically viable basin compact.

Full Text

The body begins by outlining the hydro-climatic character of the Eastern Himalaya: steep catchments, flashy flows, seasonal extremes and large sediment budgets. Section One details why siloed national planning underperforms in such systems, emphasizing the transaction costs of secrecy, duplicated modelling and incompatible design standards. Section Two examines instruments of cooperation: open hydrological data, joint flood forecasting centres, and reservoir rule curves that trade energy for flood moderation when risk is elevated. Section Three turns to distributional politics. It maps who pays for displacement, who gains from power exports, and how benefit-sharing—royalties, local equity stakes, and revenue earmarks—can rebalance outcomes. Section Four develops the ecological case: maintaining environmental flows, fish passages and sediment routing to stabilize deltas and wetlands that underpin agriculture. Section Five set outs an incremental bargain: pilot sub-basin councils, transparent impact audits, and regional market rules for cross-border electricity. The conclusion argues that a shared water community grows from repetitive, verifiable cooperation—small wins institutionalized—until confidence sustains bolder, basin-wide compacts.