CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN BANGLADESH: MOVING TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC TRADITION

This article explores the evolution of civilian control of the armed forces in Bangladesh and the institutional requirements for consolidating a democratic tradition. It reviews civil-military relations from independence through the 1990s, identifying legacies of politicization, patterns of military professionalism and the role of constitutional design. The paper argues that credible civilian supremacy rests on three pillars: clear legal authority and oversight mechanisms; capable, insulated professional military institutions; and political party behavior that avoids instrumentalizing the armed forces. It proposes practical confidence-building measures and accountability tools suited to Bangladesh’s governance realities.

The body begins with a periodized narrative of civil-military interaction—transitional governments, coups and subsequent normalization—then develops a framework grounded in Huntington and Janowitz. Section One assesses constitutional provisions, defense budgeting transparency and parliamentary committee practice. Section Two examines professional norms: promotions, staff college curricula and doctrinal emphasis on external defense and disaster response. Section Three evaluates the roles of the cabinet division, home and defense ministries, clarifying lines of authority and the importance of qualified civilian staff officers. Section Four proposes mechanisms to reduce politicization: nonpartisan appointments to sensitive posts, merit-based procurement boards, and codified rules for military aid to civil power. Section Five outlines crisis-management protocols and joint exercises that integrate civilian agencies. The conclusion argues that incremental reforms—combined with predictability in political transitions—can entrench civilian control while strengthening the military’s professional esteem and national service profile.