GORBACHEV'S POLICY TOWARDS THE ASIA· PACIFIC REGION

This article analyzes the significant shift in Soviet foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. It examines the key elements of his "new thinking" as applied to Asia, articulated in his landmark speeches in Vladivostok (1986) and Krasnoyarsk (1988). The study explores the motivations behind this new policy, including the desire to break out of diplomatic isolation in the region, promote the economic development of the Soviet Far East, and reduce military tensions with China and the United States. The research assesses specific policy initiatives, such as the efforts to normalize relations with China, proposals for regional arms control, and attempts to engage more actively with ASEAN and other regional actors. The paper argues that this represented a fundamental departure from the rigid, military-focused approach of his predecessors. It concludes by evaluating the early impact and long-term prospects of this new Soviet engagement with the Asia-Pacific.

Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union embarked on a radical reorientation of its foreign policy, and nowhere was this "new thinking" more evident than in its approach to the Asia-Pacific region. This paper provides a detailed analysis of this policy shift. It begins by contrasting the new approach with the traditional Soviet policy, which had been largely unsuccessful, confrontational, and heavily militarized. The core of the study is a close examination of Gorbachev's two seminal speeches on Asian policy: Vladivostok in 1986 and Krasnoyarsk in 1988. The analysis deconstructs the key proposals made in these speeches, which included a call for a comprehensive regional security conference, specific arms control measures, and a dramatic new emphasis on economic cooperation. The paper explores the primary drivers of this policy change. Domestically, there was an urgent need to integrate the underdeveloped Soviet Far East into the dynamic regional economy. Internationally, Gorbachev sought to break the de facto anti-Soviet coalition of the US, Japan, and China, and to improve the USSR's image as a constructive Asian power. The research evaluates the concrete diplomatic results of this new policy, focusing on the significant progress made in normalizing relations with China, which culminated in the 1989 Sino-Soviet summit. The findings suggest that Gorbachev's Asia-Pacific policy was a bold and imaginative attempt to replace military competition with diplomatic and economic engagement, fundamentally altering the strategic landscape of the region.