HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the enforcement procedures for human rights under the United Nations system. It distinguishes between the charter-based and treaty-based mechanisms for monitoring and promoting compliance with international human rights standards. The study examines the role of key charter-based bodies, such as the Commission on Human Rights and its sub-commissions, including procedures like the 1235 and 1503 procedures for addressing gross violations. The research also provides a detailed analysis of the treaty-based bodies, or committees, that monitor the implementation of the major human rights covenants and conventions. It explains the process of state reporting, the examination of individual complaints, and the power of these committees to issue findings and recommendations. The paper argues that while the UN system lacks a coercive enforcement capacity, its "enforcement" procedures rely on the power of monitoring, reporting, and public condemnation to "shame" states into compliance. The analysis concludes by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of this complex and often-politicized system.

While the United Nations has been instrumental in setting international human rights standards, the enforcement of these standards remains a significant challenge. This paper provides a detailed guide to the complex procedures and mechanisms for human rights enforcement within the UN system. The analysis is divided into two main parts. The first part focuses on the charter-based mechanisms, which derive their authority directly from the UN Charter. It explains the functioning of the then-Commission on Human Rights, the premier political body for discussing human rights. A key focus is the explanation of the confidential "1503 procedure," which allowed for the examination of patterns of gross and systematic violations, and the public "1235 procedure," which allowed for public debate and the appointment of special rapporteurs to investigate specific country situations or thematic issues. The second part of the paper examines the treaty-based mechanisms. It details the work of the expert committees, such as the Human Rights Committee (monitoring the ICCPR), which were established by the major human rights treaties. It explains the mandatory state reporting process, where countries must submit regular reports on their compliance, and the optional protocols that allow these committees to consider complaints from individuals who claim their rights have been violated. The findings reveal a system that is more about promotion and persuasion than about coercion. Its power lies in its ability to shine a light on abuses and to hold states accountable in the court of international public opinion.