INDIA AND THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

This article provides a detailed analysis of India's policy towards the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), focusing on its decision not to sign the treaty in 1996. It examines the historical context of India's long-standing advocacy for universal and non-discriminatory disarmament. The study explores the key reasons for India's rejection of the CTBT, which it argued was a flawed and discriminatory instrument that would perpetuate the nuclear monopoly of the five declared nuclear-weapon states. The research analyzes India's specific objections, including the treaty's failure to link the test ban to a time-bound framework for global nuclear disarmament. The paper also discusses the national security considerations that influenced India's decision, particularly its concerns about the nuclear capabilities of China and Pakistan. The analysis concludes that India's stance on the CTBT was a principled and strategic one, rooted in its consistent critique of the existing nuclear order.

India's decision to block the consensus on and refuse to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 was a major event in the history of arms control. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the rationale behind this controversial decision. The study begins by tracing India's long and consistent history of advocating for a truly comprehensive test ban as a key step towards universal nuclear disarmament. The core of the article is an examination of why India ultimately rejected the treaty that was negotiated. It details India's primary objection: that the CTBT, in its final form, was not a disarmament measure but a non-proliferation measure, designed to freeze the strategic status quo and prevent new states from acquiring nuclear weapons, while allowing the existing nuclear powers to maintain their vast arsenals. The paper analyzes the specific textual issues that India objected to, including the "entry into force" clause, which it saw as an unacceptable infringement on its sovereignty. The study also delves into the strategic and security calculations behind the decision. It explores how Indian policymakers viewed the treaty in the context of the perceived nuclear threats from China and Pakistan, and how keeping the nuclear option open was seen as a vital national security imperative. The findings reveal a policy decision that was based on a complex mix of principled commitment to disarmament, a deep-seated critique of the discriminatory nature of the global nuclear order, and hard-headed strategic considerations.