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Abstract
This article examines the complex problems of strategic stability in the context of the India-Pakistan nuclear arms race, with a particular focus on the relevance and limitations of Western deterrence theories. It analyzes the key concepts of Western strategic thought, such as mutual assured destruction (MAD), first-strike and second-strike capabilities, and the stability-instability paradox. The study then critically assesses the applicability of these theories, which were developed in the bipolar US-Soviet context, to the unique geopolitical and organizational realities of South Asia. The research explores the specific factors that challenge strategic stability in the region, including the geographical proximity of the two countries, the unresolved conflict over Kashmir, the history of conventional warfare, and the potential for a command and control failure. The paper argues that a direct transposition of Western theories is inadequate and potentially dangerous. The analysis concludes that ensuring strategic stability in South Asia requires the development of indigenous and context-specific confidence-building and risk-reduction measures.
Full Text
The nuclearization of South Asia in 1998 raised urgent questions about the nature of strategic stability between India and Pakistan. This paper delves into this issue by examining the relevance of the vast body of Western deterrence theory that was developed during the Cold War. The first part of the study provides a concise overview of the central tenets of this theory, explaining concepts like deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial, and the crucial requirement of a secure second-strike capability to ensure a stable mutual deterrence relationship. The core of the article is a critical evaluation of how well these concepts travel to the South Asian context. It argues that there are a number of crucial differences that limit their direct applicability. These include the short flight times for missiles, which compress decision-making and increase the risk of a pre-emptive strike; the entanglement of the nuclear issue with a live and persistent conventional conflict in Kashmir; and the organizational and technological challenges that both countries face in establishing fully robust and secure command and control systems. The paper also discusses the "stability-instability paradox" in the South Asian context, suggesting that the nuclear deterrent at the strategic level might be encouraging greater risk-taking at the conventional and sub-conventional levels. The findings suggest that while the general logic of deterrence applies, the specific conditions of South Asia create a much more fragile and crisis-prone form of stability. The paper concludes with a call for a new strategic discourse in the region, one that is focused on developing unique, local solutions for risk reduction and crisis management.