INSURING AGAINST RISKS IN LABOUR MIGRATION: EXPERIENCES OF BANGLADESHIS AND POLICY IMPERATIVES

This article analyzes how Bangladeshi migrant workers manage shocks before departure, while abroad, and on return, and evaluates formal and informal insurance instruments available to them. It discusses pre-departure financing, recruitment risks, contract uncertainty, workplace injury, and income volatility. The study highlights the roles of private insurance, government welfare funds, compulsory savings, and remittance-linked products. It argues that a coherent policy mix—combining financial literacy, enforceable contracts, bilateral agreements, and portable social protection—can reduce household vulnerability while sustaining the developmental gains of migration.

The paper situates migration within a household risk-management framework. Section One maps common risks across the migration cycle and quantifies their impacts on low-income families. Section Two reviews informal mechanisms—kinship networks, community rotating savings, and hawala—and explains why they often fail during covariate shocks. Section Three examines formal instruments: life and health insurance tied to work visas, employer liability, welfare funds at missions, and remittance-linked microinsurance. It identifies design gaps such as exclusions, limited portability, and weak claims processes. Section Four proposes policy measures: standardized contracts, mandatory coverage with credible third-party administration, grievance redress, and bilateral MOUs to ensure portability. The conclusion stresses integrating risk-transfer tools into a broader migration governance agenda to maximize development outcomes.