THE INTERNALIZED PEACE PROCESS IN SRI LANKA

This article examines the notion of an “internalized” peace process in Sri Lanka during the 1990s, where core bargaining, agenda-setting, and implementation capacities must be rooted in domestic institutions rather than outsourced to external guarantors. It reviews the evolution of negotiations, ceasefires, and constitutional proposals, showing how military pressures, electoral incentives, and diaspora finance shaped the bargaining space. The paper argues that without cross-party consensus, security-sector alignment, and credible subnational guarantees, peace initiatives oscillate between bold announcements and rapid unraveling. It highlights the crucial role of humanitarian access, language rights, and policing reforms in building confidence, and warns that elite-centric deals can alienate affected communities unless paired with transparent, inclusive processes and locally meaningful dividends.

The body first maps the conflict’s drivers—competing nationalisms, centralization, and territorial control—before assessing the governance constraints that undercut sustained de-escalation. Section One details the logic of internalization: why ownership, sequencing, and administrative capacity matter for ceasefire monitoring, demobilization, and reintegration. Section Two analyzes spoiler dynamics, from factional splits to rent-seeking around checkpoints and aid flows. Section Three evaluates constitutional reform efforts, including devolution packages and language policy, identifying gaps between text and practice. Section Four explores humanitarian corridors, civilian protection, and information integrity as preconditions for trust. The article concludes with a framework that aligns security steps with tangible socio-economic benefits, anchors reforms in provincial institutions, and institutionalizes inter-party pacts so electoral turnover does not reset the process.