NUCLEAR RIVALRY AND NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES IN SOUTH ASIA: POLICY CONTINGENCY FRAMEWORK

This article develops a policy contingency framework for the non-nuclear weapon states of South Asia (such as Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) in the context of the covert but widely acknowledged nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan. It examines the security dilemmas and strategic challenges faced by these states as a result of living in a nuclearized neighborhood. The study analyzes a range of potential policy responses or contingencies. These include strengthening conventional defenses, seeking security guarantees from external powers, pursuing regional arms control and non-proliferation initiatives, and advocating for a South Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ). The research assesses the pros and cons of each of these options. The paper argues that the non-nuclear states are not merely passive spectators but have a vital interest and a potential role to play in shaping the regional security environment. The analysis concludes that a combination of active multilateral diplomacy and strong advocacy for regional arms control represents the most viable policy path for these states.

The undeclared nuclearization of India and Pakistan in the 1990s created a new and perilous strategic environment for all the countries of South Asia. This paper focuses on the often-overlooked perspective of the region's non-nuclear weapon states and develops a framework for their policy responses. The analysis begins by outlining the specific security threats and dilemmas that the Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry poses for smaller neighbors. These include the risk of being caught in the crossfire of a conventional or nuclear conflict, the potential for radioactive fallout, and the destabilizing effects of a regional arms race on economic development. The core of the article is the construction of a policy contingency framework. It systematically evaluates four distinct strategic options. First, the option of seeking external security guarantees, assessing its feasibility and the risks of entanglement in great power politics. Second, the option of enhancing conventional military capabilities, considering its high economic cost and its potential to be perceived as provocative. Third, the more proactive option of championing regional arms control and confidence-building measures through forums like SAARC. Fourth, the long-standing but so far unsuccessful proposal for a South Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The findings suggest that the most effective strategy for the non-nuclear states is a multi-pronged diplomatic one, which combines a firm commitment to the global non-proliferation regime with a persistent and united advocacy for regional dialogue and risk reduction measures, thereby working to create a more stable and predictable security environment for all.