MOBUTU'S ZAIRE: THE END OF AN ERA?'

This article, written on the eve of the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko's regime, analyzes the end of his thirty-two-year rule over Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). It examines the long-term decay of Mobutu's kleptocratic state and the immediate factors that led to its downfall. The study details the 1996 rebellion in eastern Zaire, led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and backed by a coalition of regional states, which rapidly advanced across the country. The research explores the reasons for the swift collapse of the Zairian army and the complete erosion of the regime's legitimacy. The paper argues that Mobutu's fall was not merely a military defeat but the culmination of decades of misrule, corruption, and the hollowing out of state institutions. The analysis concludes by looking ahead to the immense challenges of state-building and democratization that would confront any post-Mobutu government, marking the definitive end of a long and destructive era in Central African history.

The fall of Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997 marked the end of one of Africa's longest and most notorious dictatorships. This paper provides an analysis of the final crisis of his regime. The study begins by providing the essential historical context, describing the nature of Mobutu's rule, which was characterized by extreme personal enrichment, systemic corruption (kleptocracy), and Cold War patronage from the West. The core of the article is a detailed account of the "First Congo War," which began in late 1996. It analyzes the composition of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), the rebel movement led by Laurent Kabila, and highlights the crucial role played by the armies of neighboring Rwanda and Uganda in supporting the rebellion. The paper examines the lightning speed of the AFDL's military advance and the surprisingly feeble resistance put up by Mobutu's notoriously corrupt and dysfunctional army. The findings suggest that the regime did not fall because of the rebels' strength, but because the Zairian state itself had effectively ceased to exist, having been hollowed out from within by decades of plunder. The concluding section reflects on the end of the Mobutu era, framing it as the end of the Cold War's perverse logic in Africa, where strategic alignment had often trumped good governance. It ends with a sobering assessment of the future, warning that the overthrow of the dictator was only the first step in the monumental task of building a viable state in the vast and fractured territory of Zaire.