MODELS OF DERADICALIZATION: THE CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK

Deradicalization is one of the most complex and contested areas in the field of terrorism and security studies. It stands across the mid-ground or grey area of the generic understanding of crime and punishment, incorporates several debatable concepts and models. There is no unitary definition that can be applied in every context or case. On the other hand, since it is a rarely practiced approach, success and probable repercussions have not been vastly studied yet. Moreover, a proper procedure for ensuring successful deradicalization requires engagement of stakeholders and authorities like prison officials, policymakers, monitoring bodies, offender managers, and probation officers. There is also no clearly defined

Abu Salah Md. Yousuf is Senior Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic
Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is: yousuf@biiss.org
© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2021.

 framework that can stratify the pros and cons of a proclaimed deradicalization process. Taking these views as a departure point, this article looks forward to presenting a comprehensive study on deradicalization by taking both national and regional models into account. It also identifies the details of these models and evaluates the effectiveness and challenges of the deradicalization process.

Deradicalization has different components, all of which may have different connotations and can be mutually exclusive or overlapping. There are push and pull factors as well as inhibiting factors; the processes or methods also vary from one to another.1 Since it involves a broad cognitive or psychological approach to addressing a group of individuals, the process also requires a degree of dedicated engagement and rational advancement. On the other hand, this integration is not a linear action that can completely be done by a particular state-actor or completely from the end of the government. As it requires clear policy schemes, it also depends on commitment from the persons or individuals being rehabilitated. Commitments can be differentiated into clusters like normative commitment, affective commitment, or continuous commitment.2 These three kinds of commitments from the end of a former offender or terrorist may also provide different kinds of probable outcomes. Deradicalization can also be understood from the experiences of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. However, it should be kept in mind that civil war and terrorism are not the same and the motivation behind these two is also different. Lack of evaluative studies and holistic guidelines from the United Nations (UN) [or, other related wings, i.e., the United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism (UNOCT)] make this whole idea of deradicalization even more unachievable. However, evidence can be found in different countries based on their initiatives and a general guideline or standard can be drawn. To make the deradicalization process holistic, the frameworks and the work plans must be contextualized.

By studying empirical instances, it can be stated that the issue of terrorism is perceived differently in Western and non-Western countries, or more precisely, in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. The global reach of the Islamic State (IS) has compelled states to provide a robust focus on faith-based terrorism. Arsla Jawaid has identified that Western countries like the Netherlands, Germany, France, or the United Kingdom may focus more on respective policies figuring out legislative amendments including surveillance, extradition, and securitization of travel zones.3 Hence, most of their approaches include a precise focus on

  Daniel Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programmes for Countering Violent
Extremism, New York: Routledge, 2017, p. 25. 2
 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
3
 Arsla Jawaid, “From Foreign Fighters to Returnees: The Challenges of Rehabilitation and Reintegration

 national security and securitization of the state. For example, as Jawaid has noted, both Germany and Australia have focussed on confiscating the passport of any potential foreign terrorist fighter who can be posing threat to national security. On the other hand, Muslim majority countries have mainly taken rehabilitation policies as their primary agenda. Sometimes, success becomes completely relative as the evidence of abandoning radicalism might only be behavioural and not completely psychological or voluntary.4 Collective disengagement also takes multidimensional and multi-purposive forms. For instance, comprehensive disengagement involves a mixture of ideological and behavioural change as well as an organization’s rejection of violence. Substantive disengagement involves only ideological and behavioural levels. Pragmatic disengagement involves behavioural and organizational levels.5 The first two types of engagement strategies have been found in the case of Egyptian Islamist groups like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The latter one has been applied in Algeria regarding the deradicalization of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Army.6

Disintegration models can also encompass both national and regional expanses. It is particularly more relevant to the region of the organization which has a strong legacy of institutional arrangements like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU). Regions comprising homogenous culture and representation can look forward to this kind of framework if it is affected by a significant type of radical threat. All states in the region or the one willing to become a part of the regional deradicalization programme have to identify terrorism and radicalization as a common concern. Hence, the shared platform must inhibit exclusive threats faced by states individually. Nonetheless, states in a particular region can also adopt the common regional framework based on their contexts and experiences, and incorporate the guidelines in national schemes. Methods of deradicalization may differ based on necessity and appropriateness. Authorities can consider using material incentives, social as well as community-level integration policies or may resort to theological talks and dialogues to reorient the ideologies through proper lessons. Alternatively, they can include these and blend them for a robust, all-encompassing outcome.

This article evaluates the effectiveness of both national and regional models by investigating two different examples from each of the categories. To understand the effectiveness of national models, a Western (UK) and a non-Western (Indonesia)

Policies”, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2017, pp. 102-107. 4
 Sam Mullins, “Rehabilitation of Islamist Terrorists: Lessons from Criminology”, Dynamics of Asymmetric
Conflict, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2010, pp. 162-193.
5
 Ibid., pp. 167-168.
6
 Ibid., p. 168.

 country have been selected for comprehensive representation. Similarly, for regional models, the cases of EU and ASEAN have been studied to measure their policies and effectiveness in the region. Since deradicalization strategies are mainly based on faith-based terrorism, the analysis also looks into the issue of whether the approaches are different in Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority areas and how effective they are in their specific areas.

The paper is divided into five sections. The introductory part provides a brief and compact summary of what can be expected from the analysis. The second section looks into different relevant concepts and methods of deradicalization. In this regard, several key concepts are going to be discussed, i.e., anti-radicalization, counter radicalization, deradicalization, rationale of deradicalization as a counterterrorism strategy, and how it can bring optimistic results in comparison to other options. Moreover, it analyzes the paradoxes and challenges along with theoretical debates, different methods of deradicalization, etc. The third section explains models of deradicalization at both national (the UK and Indonesia) and regional (the EU and the ASEAN) levels. It investigates deradicalization programmes in two countries and regions to understand the differences and effectiveness. The fourth section evaluates the programmes from four different perspectives. First, it tries to look at challenges in measuring the effectiveness of the programme; then it chalks out the overall success or effectiveness and failures. Finally, it presents the identified challenges in each of the categories. The fifth section summarizes the overall discussion, prospects, and areas of intervention. 

This section encompasses conceptual debates on deradicalization and explains some relevant definitions which make the term deradicalization more clear. These definitions will help to understand the conceptual complexities regarding deradicalization. It also addresses the rationale behind adopting deradicalization as a salient strategy and points out different methods associated with the process. 

Anti-radicalization can be defined as an all-encompassing policy platform which incorporates every initiative, programme, and policy that can be applied for preventing or countering the process of radicalization.7 Hence, all sorts of processes through which a person can be motivated to support extremist ideologies and choose to participating join extremist activities are considered to be within 7 Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network (CTPN), Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019, London: CTPN, 2019, p. 3. 315 MODELS OF DERADICALIZATION the scope of anti-radicalization programme. According to the Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network (CTPN), “anti-radicalisation is a crowded policy space [where] ... a diversity of opinions exist with respect to the effectiveness of policy in countering violent extremism and interventions are most often context-specific”.8 ‘Transformation’ and ‘mentoring’ are two key words that are being used in the cases of anti-radicalization policy formulations. Preben Bertelsen has focussed on mentoring and using meaningful ways of comprehending and management of life through the identification of common meaning which would accelerate antiradicalization programmes vis-à-vis insecure life attachment, radicalization, and violent extremism.9

The term counter-radicalization is much frequently used compared to anti radicalization. Generally, counter-radicalization is focussed on a preventative approach which aims at the society, e.g., targeting the vulnerable population or a specific group of population. According to the International Centre for CounterTerrorism (ICCT), counter-radicalization has an anticipatory thrust which looks forward to preventing the non-radicalized population from being radicalized without resorting to any coercive or repressive policy.10 The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (UN-CTITF) refers to counterradicalization as a conglomeration of policies and programmes that addresses the conditions which may influence vulnerable individuals to follow the path of extremism.11 In this regard, counterterrorism programme can expand to a multidimensional articulation that incorporates social, political, legal, educational and economic policies. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has identified some key modules regarding terrorism which refer to the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1373 taken in 2001 and suggests states to take legislative action in their territory to make counterterrorism efforts function properly. The UNODC also acknowledges that absence of any universal approach or even a universally defined concept of terrorism has made it harder for countries to adopt strategically strong and effective policies.12

Disengagement refers to “a reverse process that leads an individual to abandon use of violence to achieve her/his goals (which are guided by the radical

8
 Ibid., p. 5.
9
 Preben Bertelsen, “Mentoring in anti-radicalisation. LGT: A Systematic Assessment, Intervention and
Supervision Tool in Mentoring”, in Gwynyth Overland, Arnfinn J. Andersen, Kristin Engh Førde, Kjetil
Grødum and Joseph Salomonsen (eds.), Violent Extremism in the 21st Century, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars
Publishing, 2018, pp. 312-352.
10 Alex P. Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and
Literature Review”, ICCT Research Paper, Vol. 97, No. 1, 2013, p. 22. 11 Ibid., p. 50.
12 Ibid.

 ideology she/he adopted)”.13 Deradicalization, on the other hand, does not just address the means or activities, rather, looks forward to uprooting both the behaviours (actions) and beliefs of a radical person.

Both push and pull factors can contribute to the process of radicalization. Most of the push factors stem from political or social issues and sometimes they are more personal.14 Pull factors are created and popularized by terrorist organizations and is hard to be addressed by any concerned authority or government through existing governance structures. Anti-radicalization is often used synonymously as an alternative to counter-radicalization or counterterrorism, but conceptually, anti-radicalization and deradicalization have a broader scope.15 They not only include counterterrorism policies but also look beyond the existing paradigm and encompasses other relevant issues which can instigate radicalization in the society and eventually spread out an ideological pandemic.

The DDR programme refers to a non-violent and civilian-led approach formulated through a UN mandate. Three generations of DDR have grown since the development of the idea. The first one included the process of former fighters of different states receiving humanitarian aids from UN wings.16 The gradual developments extended the DDR mandate from merely an aid-giving mechanism to sustainable practices (the second generation in the mid-2000s) and the third generation included counterterrorism and counterinsurgency mechanisms. 

Even though deradicalization is an integral part of counterterrorism strategies, it is not free from debates or critiques. Considering all arguments, it can be stated that deradicalization is a considerable option that can turn out to be successful if policies are farsighted and contextually compatible. Irrespective of any country or a particular region, radical individuals are counted as threats towards society and population in general. However, radicalization cannot be easily mapped or categorized like other. Its effect may seem very small in the first place; but eventually, can result in turmoil creating an irreversible situation. A trivial factor like prison radicalization can result in further catastrophes. Even, regarding inmates who were not convicted for radicalization, may turn out to be prone to radical ideologies because they all share

13 ICF International Inc., “The Endless Terrorism Debate: To De-radicalise or Disengage”, available at https://
www.icf.com/insights/public-policy/terrorism-deradicalise-or-disengage, accessed on 13 April 2020.
14 Daniel Koehler, op. cit., pp. 15-17.
15 CTPN, op. cit., pp. 1-6.
16 Robert Muggah and Chris O’Donnel, “Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”,
Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2015, p. 2.

 a captive environment incorporating alienation, anti-social attitudes, isolationist views, repressive thoughts, and overall violent tendencies which may work as a platform or common ground to build up future networks of extremism and routes of radicalization.17 On the other hand, this also creates possible crime-terror nexuses inside the bars which can be furnished through larger channels when one person is out or released.18 Use of internet and the technological revolution over the years have made it even harder to put the nexus under control. When ideology comes together with motivation, opportunities, and material benefit, a general vulnerability can be smelt inside the prison area. When an inmate leaves the prison with little financial support, the extremist groups are often disguised as sources of patronage through the line they build up in those prisons.19

Radicalization is not officially a particular category of crime. Hence, how a radical person is going to be dealt with depends mostly on policies of a particular state or the practices in a particular governance structure. Degree of radicalization may vary from person to person and a little driblet of radical insight can motivate someone to commit a hideous crime. Nevertheless, some of the convicted who are held may have a nominal amount of radical disposition inside them and be willing to bring a change in their lives with the help of these incentives.20 More importantly, leaving a radical person completely unmonitored may lead to greater risks.

As far as legal questions are concerned, dealing with radical individuals is even more complicated. Radical activists cannot be put under the same umbrella with other criminals as providing general treatment to all prisoners can create a paradox of human rights within the scholarly realm of legal practices. Similarly, as explained before, if the convict turns out to be innocent or wrongly held, the human rights concern becomes a burning question. Thus, the treatment of these convicts has to be humane and free of abuse.21 To preserve human rights of prisoners and make the society free of radical attitudes, deradicalization works as a balancing point that can address the stake of the society as a whole, become helpful for both convicts and common people. Moreover, it is the human rights of any radical inmate who willingly wants to rectify him or her and the state is obliged to provide them with incentives—if not from a legal perspective, but definitely from an

17 Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash and Andrew J. Whitehead, “Radicalisation: Behind Bars and Beyond
Borders”, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, pp. 113-115. 18 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The new arena, the new challenges, Washington, D. C.: US
Institute of Peace Press, 2006.
19 Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash and Andrew J. Whitehead, op. cit., p. 115.
20 Mark Dechesne, “Deradicalization: Not Soft, but Strategic”, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 55, No.
4, 2011, pp. 287-292.
21 Andrew Coyle and Helen Fair, A Human Rights Approach to Prison Management: Handbook for prison staff,
London, UK: Institute for Criminal Policy Research Birkbeck, University of London, 2018.

 ethical ground.22 Following these logics, states can address radicalization, make a comprehensive and empathetic approach towards convicts which may also provide long-term solutions to security concerns of the state. Hence, the entire process of deradicalization will turn into a societal approach that focusses on securitization of society or community where a potential seed of radicalization needs to be uprooted. Deradicalization can be a viable and effective solution as it not only looks forward to preventing the spread of radical thoughts among common people but also addresses the changing grounds of extremism inhabiting in the heart of a radical person who can disseminate them in future.

The process of deradicalization can include multiple methods and phases. Concerns and levels of engagement can be different for groups, e.g., nationalists or separatists, right-wing or left-wing extremists, single-issue, and religiously motivated groups. A model combining radicalization can show different phases of radicalization-sensitivity, group membership, and action. When radicalization and deradicalization are put inside the same frame, the factors can be divided into macro, micro and meso levels.23 Therefore, as these levels of deradicalization are concerned, micro-level considers losing the ideological appeal, the meso-level exposes the convicts to alternative viewpoints and the macro-level provides them with different incentives which can work as a pathway for the new beginning. Thus, the process is not a hardline or rigid approach, rather, has to be operated under a grand design and the entire procedure has to be closely monitored by authorities inside and outside of the prison.

Following the aforementioned discussion, it is obvious that deradicalization requires multiple authorities and stakeholders to be engaged altogether with a compact and comprehensive outlook to be planned out. There is no universal model for application of methods, neither are there concrete classifications. However, several methods can be illustrated from diverse practices found worldwide. Four of the most popular ones are―theological dialogue, material needs, kinship, and cultural integration.

Theological dialogue is one of the most prominent and commonly practiced methods because it directly addresses the root of faith-based radicalization and religious dimension of terrorism. If the ideology itself has to be cleansed, calling a spade to spade

22 Eva Entenmann, Liesbeth van der Heide, Daan Weggemans and Jessica Dorsey, “Rehabilitation for Foreign
Fighters? Relevance, Challenges and Opportunities for the Criminal Justice Sector”, The International Centre
for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, Policy Brief, 2015.
23 Alex P. Schmid, op. cit., p. 56.

 may provide satisfactory and immediate results. Countries like Egypt and Malaysia have already found some satisfactory outcomes following such rehabilitation strategy. The Royal Malaysia Police has associated itself with a religious institution like Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM) which focusses on the spiritual dimension and provides religious teaching to convicts so that they can differentiate between radical thoughts and actual teachings of the religion.24 Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the Ministry of Home Affairs of Malaysia has come forward with a very compendious policy by coordinating all these different stakeholders including the Department of Islamic Development, Ministry of Education, the Prison Department and created a deradicalization programme based on ‘Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah’ which not only focusses on theoretical teachings but also creates welfare opportunities for the detainees as well as their families.25 This holistic type of engagement including families has created a positive attitude among radical convicts and more importantly, the entire preparation has been formulated through an integrated rehabilitation module under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) adopted in 2015.26

Providing economic incentives or material needs can also be a very useful option because it can reorient the anti-state mentality of a radical person. Given the prevalent societal and political structures, male terrorist members are supposed to be the primary bread earners of their families.27 Hence, during their absence, these families would have to face different kinds of financial problems. On the other hand, young members of family can also be radicalized and may engage with terrorist groups while searching for new sources of learning. In Singapore, providing incentives to families became successful as the Inter-Agency After-Care Group (ACG) gave both direct and indirect economic impetus to families of detainees. In this regard, wives also got blue-collar jobs based on their skills and the authority ensured uninterrupted educational services for the children of the convicts.28 The incentive also worked in convincing the ex-radical’s family to motivate the person himself and, in turn, creating a moderate support network in the community. It is evident that sometimes, an entire family could be a part of the terrorist groups or might help as a support base of different kind. Using kinship as the primary focal point of emotional, psychological and financial support, the kin network altogether can become part of the collective disintegration programme.29

24 Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, “Malaysia’s Policy on Counter Terrorism and Deradicalisation Strategy”, Journal of
Public Security and Safety, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2016, p. 15. 25 Ibid., p. 13.
26 Ibid.
27 Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez and Christopher Boucek, Deradicalizing Islamist
Extremists, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010. 28 Rohan Gunaratna and Mohamed Feisal Bin Mohamed Hassan, “Terrorist rehabilitation: The Singapore
experience”, in Rohan Gunaratna and Mohamed Bin Ali (eds.), Terrorist Rehabilitation: A New Frontier in
Counter-terrorism, London: Imperial College Press, 2015, pp. 41-70. 29 Ibid., p. 21.

 
Rehabilitation or re-integration is an ingrained part of deradicalization programme and the state cannot think of the assimilation process without the cultural integration of a radical person or a radical offender group. In most cases, radicalization originates from hatred against the existing structure or the dominant culture in society. Exposure to cultural issues of the nation can turn out to be fruitful in changing the views of a radical person. In Tunisia, cultural, athletic, and recreational programmes were introduced to inmates which helped them learn beyond the pre-existing conservative idea about the society and even engaged them in more productive or creative works.30 On the other hand, a lot of radical individuals hold a very negative idea about the Western cultural invasion and its impacts. These programmes can prepare the convicts to be compatible in a liberal society by disseminating the ideas of tolerance and respect.31

Finally, it can be said that defining deradicalization or trying to explain it through a standardized framework is very hard. The methods, dimensions and various devices explained in this section can show how complex it is to create an effective policy of deradicalization in a national or regional context. However, all debates and critiques are very important and needed to be thoroughly discussed in academic platforms until an all-encompassing and full-fledged blueprint is achieved.

This section elaborates on two different models of deradicalization―national and regional. To understand national models, examples of the UK and Indonesia are discussed. The cases of the EU and ASEAN have been analyzed under the regional model. The objective of linking between national and regional models is to identify the core areas where cohesion between these two is necessary. 

In the UK, a multi-agency panel has been created and administered incorporating education, psychosocial health, social services, and religious teachings. The initial focus was to win the confidence of ex-radicals and make them realize the entire programme is initiated for enhancing their betterment and not to serve an ulterior agenda of the state.32 Using a neo-socratic methodology, religion has

30 Natasha Quek and Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff, “Analysis of the Tunisian Foreign Terrorist Fighters
Phenomenon”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 11, No. 5, 2019, pp. 1-5. 31 Wathek Ltifi and Nizar Ben Salah, “The Justice System’s Approach towards Convicted Violent Extremists in
Tunisia”, Maghreb Economic Forum, 2009, p. 4. 32 Rashad Ali, “De-radicalization and Integration in the United Kingdom’s Channel Programme”, George

 been used to reorient the religious beliefs of the convicts addressing their religious, political, jurisprudential, and theological presumptions.33

The entire process is beautifully explained by the term ‘cognitive opening’ which attaches the religious values of the former offenders with the previous trauma, personal circumstances, and other political or religious beliefs.34 Not completely ignoring their existence or rationale, the programme provides an opportunity to deconstruct the previous ideologies or assumptions from the viewpoint of the offender and rationally evaluate their psychological standpoints.35

The Ministry of Justice in its Distance and Disengagement Programme (DDP) has clearly defined that the programme is initiated to include the offenders who are on probation license as well as Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs).36 The programme also includes prisoners who are subjected to Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs) and foreign terrorist fighters or returnees who arrived from Syria or Iraq. Under the deradicalization programme, two key areas are primarily focussed―prevention and pursuit.37 What the government calls intensive dealer intervention, includes both distinguished and abstract areas like reconceptualization of identity and self-esteem while assuring mentoring, theological, ideological, and psychological supports.38 Multi-agency participation has also been mandated and the Home Office has established a Multi-agency Centre (MAC) which includes local authorities as well as other local presence to ensure public protection and emergency response.39 Two other programmes named Motivational and Engagement Intervention (MEI) and the Healthy Identity Intervention (HII) were also introduced in 2010 to encourage and facilitate deradicalization.

The UK had trained over 29,000 prison staff to deal with extremism and deradicalization programmes.40 As explained before, the multi-agency approach also

Washington University Program on Extremism, October 2015.
33 Ibid., p. 7.
34 Helen Lewis, “Why Extremists Need Therapy”, The Atlantic, 11 February 2020, available at https://www.
theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/02/britain-london-terrorism-deradicalization/606376/, accessed on
27 April 2020.
35 Ibid.
36 UK Home Office, “Press Release: Securing the Future: Counter-terrorism Strategy Published”, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/securing-the-future-counter-terrorism-strategy-published, accessed on
27 April 2020.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Government of the United Kingdom, Westminster City Council, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy
for Countering Terrorism, 2018. 40 Adrian Goldberg and Helen Clifton, “De-radicalisation approach needs ‘fundamental review’ - Prison
Officers Association”, BBC News, 10 March 2020, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-51801724,

 includes close monitoring of extremists who are released in the community or open society. In training camps, there are several sessions that focus on systematic and categorical areas of intervention.

The programme looks forward to educating local communities regarding the risk of radicalization and also creating interventions inside vulnerable communities or individuals before any probable crime can be carried out. Two specialized separation centres under Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) have also been created to address the risk of radicalization and safeguard the mainstream population inside the prison.41 As these programmes are still at the pilot stage and are under evaluation and monitoring, the studies cannot confirm any strong success or absolute groundwork which can differentiate the programmes as a primarily British model of deradicalization. However, it can be stated that the UK has taken a very significant initiative by separating the terrorist rehabilitation programme and associating both national and local platforms while addressing multi-purposive and multi-dimensional methods of deradicalization.

The National Anti-Terror Agency of Indonesia defines deradicalization as in corporation of various entities including social, psychological, educational, economic, cultural, human resources followed by a continual process aiming at the terrorist that prepares them as self-sufficient, productive, and useful to the states, society as well as community.42

From theoretical point of view, two major psychological approaches are followed to categorize terrorism―the syndrome approach and the instrumental approach.43 The first one is subjective and addresses the personality type of the detainee starting from her/his social background, psychology, etc. The instrumental approach focusses more on cognitive ideas and helps detainees find out a calculated or moral ground based on benefits at least from actions of terrorism vis-à-vis other non-violent activities. According to scholars like Zora A. Sukabdi, instrumental approach is more applicable in the case of Indonesia.44

The term ‘deportees’ is widely used in Indonesia. The deradicalization programme in Indonesia started in 2017 after around 220 Indonesian foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) were deported from Turkey.45 The national counterterrorism agency

accessed on 30 April 2020.
41 Government of the United Kingdom, Westminster City Council, op. cit.
42 Zora A. Sukabdi, “Terrorism in Indonesia: A review on Rehabilitation and Deradicalization”, Contemporary
Voices: St Andrews Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2015, p. 50. 43 Ibid., p. 37.
44 Ibid., p. 38.
45 Cameron Sumpter, “Returning Indonesian Extremists: Unclear Intentions and Unprepared Responses”, ICCT

 
 of Indonesia, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) has an FTF task force that works along with the Civil Society Against Violent Extremism (C-SAVE). Other related organizations are a youth centre called Panti Sosial Marsudi Putra (PSMP) and Rumah Perlindungan Trauma Centre (RPTC).46 The youth centre is designed for adults with children and the latter one is a psychological counselling centre designed for single adults.

The Ministry of Social Affairs (KEMENSOS) plays a significant role in the process of terrorist rehabilitation, particularly, regarding individuals who were previously charged with crimes but cannot be prosecuted under the available legislation. They would be headed over to the facilities provided by the ministry under its rehabilitation programme―the PSMP and the RPTC. The BNPT has engaged both Islamic clerics and arranged seminar-style sessions for the deportees to reinstall the views of nationalism inside them while rearranging the conservative outlooks towards politics, religion, and social affairs.47 Moreover, cultural integration is a very promising aspect of this programme because it focusses on introducing the conflict with the national philosophy named Pancasila. 48

After the Bali bombings in 2002 by the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the government started the experimental rehabilitation programme under the rubrics of Suryadharma. 49 The program includes both material and non-material assistance to radical convicts. Like the British programme, the Indonesian police has also helped families of former detainees by providing the school fees of the children, supplying food and clothes to the families, and giving the families access inside the prison to have a connection with the convicts.50 They have also ensured humanitarian and psychosocial assistant to the prisoners along with regular healthcare and even allowed prisoner weddings.51 All these initiatives have resulted in changing the minds of many terrorists. Eventually, this particular group of the JI extremists worked alongside police officers to find other militant jihadists.

C-SAVE has also engaged leaders at local and rural levels which are known as desa or village authority and rukun tetangga, the neighbourhood or the communities.52 On the other hand, inclusion of 20 local governments and 12 NGOs has given the entire programme a bigger umbrella. On the legal side, the Ministry

Policy Brief, 2018, p. 4.
46 Ibid, pp. 5-7.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., p. 7.
49 Kirsten Schulze, “Indonesia’s approach to Jihadist Deradicalization”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 8, 2008. 50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Cameron Sumpter, op. cit., p. 8.

of Home Affairs and BNPT signed a memorandum of understanding concerning counterterrorism and cooperation on deradicalization offering further engagement in both national and sub-district levels. This kind of initiative has opened up even more options for coordinating actions including all agencies mentioned above. The private-public cooperation or engagement made it easily achievable and flexible for the inclusivity of diverse dimensions.

The EU works through a multiple number of funded programmes and networks like the Internal Security Fund-police and Justice Programme, European Organisation for Prisons and Correctional Services, European Judicial Training Network, and the European Penitentiary Training Academies Network which all work as a platform together for providing risk assessment tools for deradicalization programmes as well as training facilities to the member states and associated authorities.53 In 2019, the high-level commission expert group on counterterrorism prioritized deradicalization as one of the key strategic areas.54

The organization focusses on capacity building through different options like the Stability Instrument (SI) introduced in 2005 followed by the counterradicalization strategy agreed that same year. Article 4(1) of the SI ensures both technical and efficient financial assistance to the member states in the war against terrorism.55 The EU convention includes counterterrorism in the EU treaty as a part of the common security and defence policy mentioning humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice along with assistance tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and post-conflict stabilizations. Hence, the entire post-conflict resolution works as a key modality for deradicalization strategy and the Union’s role behind such kind of works.56

The EU has also introduced the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in September 2019, a coordinating platform for creating rehabilitation roadmaps and recommendations for the practitioners and locating expert opinions for further amendments.57 The network incorporates different working groups including prison and probation, youth, families, and communities while holding a concrete manual on rehabilitation or integration process for policymakers. Besides RAN,

53 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Radicalisation in prisons, rehabilitation and
reintegration”, available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/counter-terrorism/
radicalisation-prisons-rehabilitation-reintegration_en, accessed on 01 May 2020.
54 Ibid.
55 Gijs De Vries, The Nexus Between EU Crisis Management and Counter-Terrorism, Brussels: EU, 2008, p.
369.
56 Daniel Kohler, op. cit., p. 242.
57 European Commission, op. cit.

and the Policy Planners’ Network on Countering Polarisation and Radicalisation (PPN), the European Counter-Radicalisation Policy Exchange Portal is part of the deradicalization process.58

Different toolkits of the EU have accelerated practical exchanges in countering violent extremism and deradicalization. In this regard, the Innovative Method and Procedure to Assess Counter-Violent Radicalisation Techniques in Europe (IMPACT) and the Terrorism and Radicalisation (TERRA) community programmes can be exemplified.59 It also introduced training courses like the Community Policing and Prevention of Radicalisation (COPPRA) in 2010 and provided Improved Security through Democratic Participation (ISDEP) around 2013-14.60

The UN and EU developed a joint framework on counterterrorism as part of the overall political and legal framework of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS) that looks forward to ensuring global, national, regional cooperation to counter terrorist activities and radicalization. The strategic partnership gives promising options for future engagement where both organizations can find out further areas of cooperation by addressing deradicalization strategies for local, regional and national forums.

The ASEAN has a work plan which focusses on countering the rise of radicalization and violent extremism. The entire work plan aims at the period of 2019- 2025. It is an interdisciplinary, multi-sectoral, whole-of-governments, and whole-ofsociety approach. While mentioning deradicalization, it directly addresses the capacity building of different law enforcement agencies to manage the risk assessments. It takes societal dimensions into account including engagement with community leaders and workers to facilitate integration. It identified four distinguished areas for implementing the work plan that can be useful for preventing radicalization―promoting the approach of moderation, tolerance and dialogues, prevention strategies for maintaining peace and security; strengthening good governance, human rights and rule of law; engaging communities for preventing the rise of radicalization; and empowering the youth for preventing radicalization. Community engagement criterion shows that the plan addresses vulnerable communities and the population who have a higher probability to be radicalized, i.e., poor families, religious converts, specific ethnic groups and groups which have a similar connection with radical entities and suggests that they must be given special care.61

58 Daniel Kohler, op. cit., p. 242.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., pp. 11-17.

In the 2014 ASEAN Summit, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong suggested establishment of a symposium on deradicalization.62 He stated that the threat of terrorism was not completely a military issue and a comprehensive approach should be initiated. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Statement on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism (VECT) also identifies ideologies recalling the UNSCR resolution 2396 that includes development of tailored prosecution, rehabilitation and integration strategies. This statement underlines and emphasizes rehabilitation and integration efforts that include disrupting and preventing financial support to FTFs development and implementation of risk assessment of returnees, relocation of FTFs and their families.

It can be seen that both the national and regional models are useful to ensure essential efforts for successful implementation of deradicalization strategies and managing counterterrorism. Both the EU and ASEAN work not only as a platform for engagement of different working groups, states, networks but also provide necessary legislative structures and frameworks. Member states, therefore, can adopt these strategies and modify them based on their contexts and necessities. 
 

It is hard to declare any absolute success and failure of a deradicalization strategy carried out by a certain country. However, theoretical and practical complexities can be sorted out for further clarification or amendments. This section focusses on the effectiveness of deradicalization models along with challenges and failures.

To evaluate models of deradicalization is crucial to identify categories. There can be integrity evaluation, quantitative evaluation, and qualitative evaluation to determine success and failures of a particular programme.63 These methods require a step-by-step evaluation process, but lack of adequate stakeholders engaged in evaluation and monitoring of a particular programme can become problematic. When these programmes are funded by government or any government-funded institution, they mostly carry a top-down approach. Therefore, intervention of any non-government organization or an independent monitoring body becomes hardly

62 Zakir Hussain, “Asean Summit: PM Lee Proposes Symposium on Deradicalisation”, The Strait Times,
23 November 2014, available at https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/asean-summit-pm-lee-proposessymposium-on-deradicalisation, accessed on 21 April 2020.
63 Daniel Kohler, op. cit., p. 201.

 permissible. Despite having reports of human rights abuse and lack of integrity, there was hardly any action taken by respective governments. Misuse of resources is also not easily identifiable because most of these programmes include a large group of authoritative institutions engaged in multifarious types of works.

Another challenge lies with the contextual heterogeneity of the programmes within a particular state, region, or even beyond a particular region regarding a specific type of violent extremism. In reality, social, political, or regional contexts related to radicalization and deradicalization differ from state to state and person to person. Specifically, when the deradicalization programme is based on the postrelease context of a previously convicted radical person, it is even harder to put the entire situation under a frame by accumulating all the risk reduction initiatives or the alternatives and figuring out an appropriate model.64 It should be considered that the reason behind involvement in a particular type of militancy varies based on personal experiences; the degree of involvement and ideological commitments. Therefore, it is difficult to conceptualize and produce concrete responsive mechanisms. Some common criteria have been established which include different elements like training, leadership, responsibility, and transparency.65 There is also lack of enough academic studies and scientific concepts from criminology or penology to track down all kinds of programmes via a common assessment tool.

The entire concept of deradicalization or rehabilitation is a contested project. It may be comparatively easy to conduct deradicalization process when focussed on a small group or one or two individuals; but while addressing a large group of offenders, it is harder to distinguish which person requires which kind of incentive and how these incentives are going to work for a particular group. Thus, a quantifiable mechanism cannot identify the actual risk of recidivism as human psychology itself is a very complex variable to deal with.66 

To elaborate on the effectiveness of the four models applied in four different contexts, a case by case study can be useful. Measurement of effectiveness depends on who evaluates it and based on what specific precedence. In the UK, both success stories and evasive conclusions are visible. From a study of UK government

64 John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness
of De-radicalization Programs”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2010, pp. 267-291. 65 Daniel Kohler, op. cit., pp. 203-207.
66 Mats Dernevik, Alison Beck, Martin Grann, Todd Hogue and James McGuire, “The Use of Psychiatric and
Psychological Evidence in the Assessment of Terrorist Offenders”, The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry &
Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2009, pp. 508-515.

contractors between 2013 and 2019, satisfactory reports can be identified. However, among individuals who participated in the deradicalization programmes oriented by the British government, only 3 per cent of the previous offenders were found to be engaged in another terror offense after their release.67 The Home Office emphasizes the mixed approach through binding psychological, ideological, and theological dimensions together. Indonesia has also seen some major successes. As mentioned before, some of the militants have been incorporated as associates of the police force and are contributing to society by helping them identify scopes of intervention. One of the major examples is the case of Nasir Abbas who participated as a former militant in Afghanistan and was actively involved in the Bali Bombings. After being introduced to the deer lease collision programme and attending the sessions, he not only managed to rectify himself but also travelled from prison to prison to convince former convicts for participating in deradicalization and rehabilitation programmes and helped them identify problems ingrained in radical thoughts.68

In the EU and ASEAN, developing a common framework helped member states find out solutions from their ends. However, the strong structures of both of the organizations have always been heavily praised and members could easily find out common grounds to act against the threat of radicalization and violent extremism. All members of these two organizations have adopted different frameworks of deradicalization based on their contexts and aspirations and each found different degrees of effective outcomes. For example, Malaysia created strategies including surrender for the rewards programme, process of isolation, and job-training facilities. Singapore has advocated three action plans by creating a larger community engagement programme which includes engaging non-Muslims as a united influence against radicalism within society, creating a space for the majority to play an active role in the deradicalization programme and involving influential religious leaders to come forward. Similarly, Germany created its Violence Prevention Network (VPN) specifically focusing on radical young extremist offenders.69 This shows how regional organizations opened up a common, comprehensive and standardized formulation yet ensuring flexibility for member states to carry out all these programmes individually. The networks and coordinating mechanisms of both organizations have also helped them to be alert regarding the effectiveness and ensure regular monitoring over the years. Moreover, newer areas, i.e., intelligence sharing among the countries within the regions are being explored to bring more effective and beneficial results in the future.

67 Adrian Goldberg and Helen Clifton, op. cit.
68 Kirsten E. Schulze, op. cit.
69 Joshua Nevett, “How Europe Deals with Terror Offenders When They are Freed from Jail”, BBC News,
12 March 2020, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51560046, accessed on 25 April 2020.

 Since all of the aforementioned strategies are still at incipient stages, they are supposed to have some fault lines which can make a strong strategy ramshackle in practice. No programme can bring out absolute success and completely cure or detune radical thoughts from society for good. Nevertheless, government and relevant stakeholders should address these problems and make necessary arrangements to overcome criticisms.

A good example can be given by referring to rehabilitation programmes carried out in the UK. Although studies have shown successful results from a quantitative point of view, many have raised questions regarding its effectiveness. Critics have identified that the London Bridge attacker Usman Khan was enrolled in both DDP and HII programmes. He obtained a license from the jail after serving half of his 16-year sentence for previously plotting a hate crime in 2012.70 It has also been addressed by scholars that keeping convicts out of any rehabilitation programme is not pragmatic, because eventually, they can radicalize more people after serving their prison terms. Similarly, in the case of Indonesia, discrepancies have been identified in the framework itself. The promising phrases present in a blueprint of the deradicalization strategy were hardly implemented. Those who were put under the facilities of the Ministry of Social Affairs, were there for a limited time and it was later found out that the reason behind this timeframe was nothing but lack of staff, knowledge, and resource management mechanism of the ministry.71

It can be understood that coordinating a complex programme is a difficult task for the government. Hence, each state must take care of mismanagement; otherwise, it may result in failures. Lack of evaluation reports or regular studies on the programmes from the two regional organizations can be identified as two crucial reasons that fail to complement the robust framework adapted by the organizations themselves. 

The Challenges of conducting a successful deradicalization strategy and its implementation are related to theoretical and practical concerns. Most deradicalization programmes developed when a country faced radical movements or after any particular event or a series of events which might have got much attention in international media. This also points out that most of these rehabilitation strategies or deradicalization programmes lack any long-term strategic plan or risk management efforts before being carried out. Although most of these countries in their official

70 “London Bridge: Usman Khan completed untested rehabilitation scheme”, BBC News, 04 December 2019,
available at https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-50653191, accessed on 01 May 2020.
71 Cameron Sumpter, op. cit., p. 8.

 papers, mention these deradicalization efforts as pilot projects, these projects must be supplemented by continuous and integrated studies that can ultimately provide necessary amenities and ensure increasing effectiveness day by day

One of the key challenges of deradicalization programmes is the lack of enough staff, or precisely, skilled staff. Moreover, incorporating vast areas, e.g., ideological, psychological, vocational, and theological grounds, in a common work plan is also hard.72 It should be remembered that all different actors involved in deradicalization programmes have to provide a unitary voice before convicted persons or groups while conducting the sessions. Thus, decisions have to be regularly studied by any monitoring body to identify inconsistencies or required diversion of the plan.

Another challenge is to locate the programmes’ usefulness for every different kind of person. Although Indonesia provides special care for children, there is no defined strategy for women. On the other hand, the UK strategy does not mention any of those. In some other countries, pre-prison, in prison, and post-prison activities are clearly defined. Saudi Arabia has a distinguished after-care programme73 while Singapore identified three layers or rings including the detainee himself or herself, family of the detainee and the broader Muslim community.74 All these different ideas are somehow overlapping, but at the same time, need to be put under a common framework for proper evaluation and justification. One of the critical areas is utilization of religious teachings or religious clerics. The Mufti-Mustafi approach is a very popular one that incorporates four different stages―conceptualization, classification, explanation and pronouncement.75 Muslim-majority countries enjoy an advantage in applying the religious methods because they can explore inside and beyond common lines of religious teachings and theories of radicalism. Therefore, these four stages can be a bit harder to apply when it comes to the question of a non-Muslim country preparing a session of theological teaching for an ex-radical or former offender.

However, it is necessary for all the countries prepare a consolidated and
scientifically equipped structure for a universal form of deradicalization strategy and
identify how they can be applied in different contexts, countries, localities and upon
different kinds of population who are exposed to different degrees of radicalization.

 72 Daniel Kohler, op. cit.
73 Adam Lankford and Katherine Gillespie. “Rehabilitating terrorists through counter-indoctrination: Lessons
learned from the Saudi Arabian program”, International Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2011, pp.
118-133.
74 Rohan Gunaratna and Mohamed Feisal Bin Mohamed Hassan, op. cit.
75 Ahmad Saiful Rijal Bin Hassan, “The Mufti-Mustafti Approach to Religious Rehabilitation”, Counter
Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2015, pp. 14-20.

Success of different programmes can be taken into account and challenges have to be properly discussed, debated, and addressed to find out newer strategies.

Deradicalization is one of the most sensitive and complicated areas of terrorism and security studies. The complexity does not only lie within the uncertainty of its effectiveness, but is also situated in the legal dimension of the idea. This article tries to point out all these polemics starting from the ambiguity in definition to differences in types of strategies being carried out, differences in methods and models being followed in different parts of the world, and challenges associated with their implementation.

The examples of UK and Indonesia infer how one single concept can be perceived differently in different countries and adopted based on their understandings. However, the analysis also points out some commonalities in the frameworks created by the two different countries and two different organizations― the EU and the ASEAN. On one hand, these strategies look similar and easily comprehendible; they also contain some common methods that might be identified through different terminology or phrases. On the other hand, they seem much contested, heavily stratified, and distorted. Nevertheless, as long as the common objective is to alienate the roots of radicalization from the world, all different ideas and approaches can be put under a common microscope, evaluated and shared regularly among different platforms.

A common institutional framework dedicated to universal arrangements of deradicalization can be very useful to coordinate different ideas, implement new methods and experimentations on a standardized basis. Like the UN has formulated a joint framework with the EU to counter violent extremism, different regional organizations can be included directly in a much broader framework. A distinguished universal scaffold for nurturing ideas of deradicalization can also ensure proper implementation from a top-down formation. In this way, monitoring and evaluation of strategies can be less burdensome. Similarly, intelligence sharing can be considered as one of the key options for the betterment of regions and states in any particular regional arrangement.

The annotated points of the four models that have been criticized, can be taken as examples to safeguard further advancements. A critical lesson learnt from the examples is the level of effort and patience deradicalization requires. This is why the lineage of every deradicalization programme shall not start with just the enrolment of a particular detainee and releasing him or her; rather it must continue

with more compendious engagements at the community level to evaluate not only the success of the programme but also to protect the community from any unwanted repercussion and remove any potential threat to the state.

The idea of deradicalization requires a humanitarian approach and the referent objects have to be the state, society, and convicted individual. This is why the objective of any deradicalization programme has to be clearly defined and proper investigation or studies must be done before such initiative is opened up for experimentation. Stakeholders and staff engaged in the programmes have to be properly equipped with enough resources, knowledge, training and prepared with alternatives for cases when any mismanagement leads to a predicament.

Finally, it can be stated that deradicalization addresses the paradox between human rights and security concerns of a state and makes a soft approach towards counterterrorism. This can bring success in both short and long-terms. The four models discussed in this paper incorporate diverse methods based on specific requirements, contexts and applicability. Therefore, deradicalization serves as a nontraditional option for states to combat the risk of terrorism and radicalization with a pragmatic outlook that commits to bring changes in society