NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION AND THE FUTURE OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA

This article provides a critical analysis of the growing threat of nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia and its profound implications for the future of regional security. It examines the status of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, which, by the early 1990s, had reached a stage of undeclared or "opaque" deterrence. The study analyzes the development and deployment of ballistic missile capabilities by both countries, which added a new and highly destabilizing dimension to the regional arms race. The research explores the dynamics of the India-Pakistan security dilemma in this new nuclearized context, assessing the risks of miscalculation, accidental war, and escalation during a crisis. The paper also evaluates the largely ineffective international non-proliferation efforts in the region. The analysis concludes that the advent of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles had fundamentally and irrevocably altered the strategic landscape of South Asia, creating a fragile and dangerous "balance of terror."

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in South Asia posed the single greatest threat to regional and global security in the early 1990s. This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of this perilous development. The study begins by tracing the trajectory of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, moving beyond official ambiguity to analyze the widely accepted reality of their nuclear weapons capabilities. The core of the article is an examination of the new strategic challenges introduced by the acquisition of ballistic missiles, such as the Prithvi by India and the Hatf series by Pakistan. The paper argues that these delivery systems, by dramatically reducing warning times and increasing the risk of a pre-emptive strike, made the strategic environment far more unstable than it had been during the era of aircraft-deliverable weapons. The analysis delves into the theoretical debates on nuclear deterrence and questions its applicability to the South Asian context, which is characterized by unresolved territorial disputes, intense nationalism, and a history of conventional warfare. It highlights the significant risks of a "stability-instability paradox," where the presence of nuclear weapons might make low-intensity conflicts, like the one in Kashmir, more likely, with the ever-present danger of escalation. The findings paint a grim picture of a region locked in a high-stakes security competition, and the paper concludes with an urgent call for the establishment of robust nuclear risk reduction measures and confidence-building mechanisms to manage this new and dangerous reality.