POST-COMMUNIST AFGHANISTAN: IMPLICATIONS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR A NEW ORDER

This article, written in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet-backed communist regime in Afghanistan in April 1992, analyzes the implications, challenges, and prospects for a new political order. It examines the immediate aftermath of the Mujahideen victory, focusing on the deep-seated rivalries and factionalism among the various resistance groups that quickly came to the fore. The study identifies the formidable challenges to state-building, including the destruction of the country's infrastructure, the proliferation of weapons, the presence of millions of landmines, and the deep ethnic and tribal divisions. The research assesses the role of external powers, particularly Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, in influencing the post-communist power struggle by backing rival factions. The paper argues that the end of the war against the Soviets did not bring peace, but rather transitioned into a new and equally destructive phase of intra-Mujahideen civil war. The analysis concludes with a pessimistic prognosis for the establishment of a stable, unified, and peaceful new order in Afghanistan.

The fall of the Najibullah regime in April 1992 marked the end of a fourteen-year-long, devastating war in Afghanistan, but it did not bring peace. This paper provides a contemporary analysis of the immense challenges that confronted the country as it entered the post-communist era. The study begins by detailing the chaotic seizure of Kabul by rival Mujahideen factions, an event that immediately shattered the fragile unity of the anti-Soviet resistance. The core of the article is an examination of the deep-seated challenges to establishing a new political order. The primary challenge identified is the intense factionalism of the Mujahideen, with divisions running along ethnic, tribal, and ideological lines. The paper analyzes the power struggle between the key groups and their leaders, such as the Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e-Islami and the Pashtun-dominated Hezb-e-Islami. Another critical challenge discussed is the complete collapse of state institutions and the "Kalashnikov culture" that permeated Afghan society after years of war. The paper also delves into the destructive role of external patrons, who continued to fuel the conflict by providing arms and funding to their respective proxy factions. The findings paint a grim picture of a country liberated from foreign occupation only to descend into a catastrophic civil war among its liberators. The paper concludes that without a genuine process of national reconciliation and a disarming of the militias, the prospects for a stable new order in Afghanistan were exceedingly bleak.