POST COVID-19 WORLD ORDER: ARE WE WITNESSING A CHANGE IN HEGEMONIC LEADERSHIP?

“The thing about a crisis-a real one, rather than a confected one is that it exposes realities for what they are, as opposed to how the political class would wish to present them, either to their own people or the world at large”.1 The former Australian Prime Minister’s remark flags that the recent global pandemic Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has already revealed many truths about the contemporary world. The biggest truth is the fragility of the health sector in all countries, be it large or small, strong or weak. The absence of timely and consensus-based decision making by major global powers not only aggravated the situation but also made it clear that the global community would have to face a semi-synchronous public health as well as the economic crisis. Amidst the pandemic, national and global responses to the coronavirus and subsequent economic activities often appear to be late, tepid and disjoined. It has shaken the whole global community irrespective of race, religion,

Md. Jahan Shoieb is Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS).
His e-mail address is jshoieb@biiss.org
©Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2020.
1
 Kevin Rudd, “Kevin Rudd on America, China and Saving the WHO”, The Economist, 15 April 2020. 

geographical position, sex or age. In fact, the outbreak of COVID-19 has disturbed the economic, social, political and religious structures of the whole world. The global community is trying to cope with new normal practices in everyday life. The political impact of the ongoing pandemic is already visible. Almost all European countries have been weakened, national borders were closed overnight, countries like China and Russia have extended support to Europe and elsewhere. However, the United States (US) mostly remained silent in this crisis time. The US and China have been engaged in an intense tug of war blaming each other for the outbreak. The Trump administration took the decision of defunding and cutting off its relationship with the World Health Organisation (WHO) and on the contrary, China pledged to support the global health body

Current global hegemon, the US, is severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Particularly, the US’ healthcare system and economy have become the worst victims of the pandemic. The impact of COVID-19 on the US’ economic health can be understood by the following scenario. Consumption makes 70 per cent of the US’ gross domestic product (GDP), however, that has slumped to a great extent as businesses close and purchases decrease as people worry about their jobs and finances. Businesses constitute 20 per cent of the US’ GDP, but major businesses are putting off investment as they want to clarify on the total cost of COVID-19. Manufacturing makes up about 11 per cent of America’s GDP, but much of the sector will also be disrupted because the global supply chain has been severely affected by the pandemic. For example, because of reduced demand General Motors, and Ford have announced temporary closures of production. The major risk of the US economy is the health crisis accompanied by a financial crisis. Even the impact of COVID-19 can be far more detrimental than the subprime crisis of 2008.2 According to another source, after the attack of coronavirus to the US, in four weeks, about 22 million citizens filed for unemployment benefits. Also, the Small Business Administration which takes care of US entrepreneurs with funding and loans, has already run out of money for its paycheck protection programme. In addition to that, technical glitches have prevented millions of US citizens from receiving their stimulus check from the US Department of Treasury.3

China, on the contrary, has been playing a big role to combat and control a highly infectious disease like the COVID-19. Health systems of China like any other place, encountered an enormous challenge to cope with the disease. However, from

2
 Chris Miller, “The Effect of COVID 19 on the U.S. Economy”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 30 March
2020.
3
 “Covid-19’s Historic Economic Impact, In the U.S. and Abroad”, HUB (Johns Hopkins Magazine), 17 April 2020,
available at https://hub.jhu.edu/2020/04/16/coronavirus-impact-on-european-american-economies/, accessed on 14
May 2020.

the time when the first case was confirmed in China in December 2019, WHO has been jointly working with Chinese government on combating the disease.4 There are some key features in China’s actions against COVID-19. Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, the country has put in place a coordinated effort under which the central authorities exercise overall planning and command and the local authorities work following the instructions, perform their respective duties and cooperate with each other. While closing all outbound routes, the authority of Wuhan carried out two rounds of mass screening of the city’s 4.21 million households, leaving no household unchecked and ruled out all potential sources.5 Till date, it appears that China has become quite successful in controlling the COVID-19 transmission. The WHO-China Joint Mission consisting of 25 experts produced a report on the disease in China where it was mentioned that “China’s rather unique and unprecedented public health response reversed the escalating cases in Hubei and beyond.”6

The coronavirus outbreak has drawn national and international attention, spawning debates and discussions on the trajectory of the future global order. While the general discussion on the virus’ impact on a host is being discussed, discussion on US-China relationship is receiving even more attention is that between the two most powerful countries of the world: the US and China. The rise of India and Russia is also very significant in contemporary international relations. However, when international order is concerned, the rise of China receives the utmost importance. Therefore, this paper mainly focuses on the rise of China and its relationship with the US. Although for the past few years, rise of China and decay of American power were in discussion, the COVID-19 added a twist to this discussion. Notably, the Sino-US relation has been passing a dramatic phase in past few years. During the Obama administration (2009-2016), the bilateral relation between the two countries reached a new height. According to Barack Obama, “the relationship between the United States and China is the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century.”7 In fact, after 44 years of establishing diplomatic relations, the two greatest economic powers forged unprecedented closed ties. However, the situation started to change when president Trump came into power of the US and Xi Jinping became

4
 World Health Organisation, “China Shows COVID 19 Reponses Must Be Tailored to the Local Context”, 04
April 2020, Available at https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19/
news/news/2020/4/china-shows-covid-19-responses-must-be-tailored-to-the-local-context, accessed on 27
June 2020.
5
 “Fighting COVID 19: China in Action”, Xinhuanet.com, 07 June 2020, available at http://www.xinhuanet.
com/english/2020-06/07/c_139120424.htm, accessed on 29 June 2020.
6
 “China Provides Vital Lessons of COVID-19 Containment for Global Response: WHO”, United News of
Bangladesh, 01 March 2020, available at https://unb.com.bd/category/World/china-provides-vital-lessons-ofcovid-19-containment-for-global-response-who/45719, accessed on 29 June 2020.
7
 Cheng Li, “Assessing U.S.-China Relations Under Obama Administration”, BROOKINGS, 30 August 2016,
Available at https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/assessing-u-s-china-relations-under-the-obama-administration/,
accessed on 28 June 2020.

 the President of China. In recent years, the US-China relationship is changing in some core areas. Currently, the two countries are engaged in one of the costly and intensive trade wars. Even if they can resolve it through extensive negotiations, there is no guarantee that it will provide long-term stability in their relationship. Major structural forces are affecting Sino-US bilateral relations and fierce competition has been increasing in the arena of economics, security, technology, artificial intelligence and ideas about governance. It is evident that longstanding source of competition in the field of security and economics is intensifying and simultaneously new areas of competition such as governance and technology are emerging.8

The rise of China in global affairs is not a recent incident, when President Xi Jinping came to power and everything started to change at a rapid pace. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of President Xi is interpreted by many as China’s explicit march to become a global power. Some scholars argue that China took the stage of Beijing Olympic (2008) and specially, the inaugural ceremony of the event as the platform to showcase the new reality. Some also believe that creation of a new bank like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as opposed to the Bretton Woods system (the World Bank and IMF) in 2015 was the new beginning.9 Notably, about 62 years ago, A.F.K. Organski in his book first predicted the possible rise of China and its impacts in the global order. He foretold that the possible rise of China would be spectacular and ‘the power of China ought to eventually become greater” and the “western powers” will find that the most serious threat to their supremacy comes from China”.10 Some international relations and security experts claim that an apparent power transition between the two countries has begun. This change was set in motion by China’s profound and phenomenal economic growth over the past two or three decades.

In international relations, stable world order if not a myth is a very rare thing. And when it comes, it arises after a great disruption that creates both the desire and conditions for something new.11 A stable global order requires equal distribution of power and a broad acceptance of the rules that operates the new system. Skilled statecraft is another component of a stable world order, since an order has to be made, not born naturally. And no matter how smooth the order is at the initial stage, maintaining it requires innovative diplomacy, functioning institutions as well as effective leadership and actions to adjust with critical circumstances. Eventually, the

8
 Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Fundamentals of US-China Relations”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.
42, No.3, 2019, pp. 93-119.
9
 Manuel Manonelles, “Hegemon Shifts in Times of Covid 19”, Inter Press Service News Agency, 08 May
2020.
10 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, Second Edition, New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968, p. 361. 11 Richard Haass, “How a World Order Ends and What Comes in Its Wake”, Foreign Affairs, January/February
2019.

 
 best managed order comes to an end, the balance of power underpinning the system becomes imbalanced and the institutions supporting the system fail to adapt to new circumstances.12 As China has been rising economically and militarily, an emerging question in international relations is whether the power transition between the US and China is going to occur soon.

Notably, there are international relations theories, namely, the hegemonic stability theory and power transition theory which can assist in understanding possible hegemonic power shifts. The above-mentioned theories explain the connection between hegemonic and rising power, international public goods, the causes of war during hegemonic transitions as well as the stability of global orders.13 The two theories provide venerable frameworks for understanding issues related to sustainability of global order. In fact, they comprise members of a broader family of theories in understanding hegemonic order. And if discussions and analyses on power transition are substantiated by theories, then it become more interesting and meaningful.

In this backdrop, the objective of this paper is to view whether the ongoing COVID-19 is going to change the global power structure. To that end, key research questions of this paper are: What are the takeaways of hegemonic stability theory and power transition theory regarding recent global changes? Has the US-led liberal international order come to an end? What is the impact of COVID-19 on contemporary world order?

To find out answers to those questions, the paper is divided into five sections including introduction and conclusion. The second section is a theoretical analysis of the Sino-US power transition. Section three shed lights on whether the US-led liberal international order has come to an end. And section four focuses on the COVID-19 and the prospect for a new global leadership.

This is a qualitative research work based on secondary sources including books, journals, newspapers, magazines, policy papers, issues briefs, seminar papers, blogs, official websites of different stakeholders, etc.

In international relations, rise and fall of states is a common phenomenon. In the course of time, some states emerge as the superpower and even hegemon of their age, while others drop out of the top ranks and even face challenges in their

12 Ibid.
13 G. John Ikenberry and Daniel. H. Nexon, “Hegemony Studies 3.0: The Dynamics of Hegemonic Orders”,
Security Studies, Vol. 28, Issue 3, 2019, pp. 395-421.

 statehood. Although Spain, Italy, Austria, Hungary and Ottoman Empires failed to secure hegemonic leadership, Germany became successful after the First World War and China appears to do the same. Naturally, the process of changes at the top of international leadership is a topic of significant interest to policymakers as well as scholars. Although it is very difficult to predict the possible pattern or format of power transition, we only can assess the scenario analysing international relations’ theories perspectives as well as recent global context. In the next few paragraphs, using two important theories, hegemonic stability theory and power transition, this chapter tries to assess whether China will soon become a hegemonic power.

The hegemonic stability theory refers that international economic stability and openness are possible when there is a single dominant state in the system or hegemonic power. The basic connotation of the theory is that the distribution of power among states is the primary attribute of the international economic system.14 Notably, in the second half of the 20th century, the hegemonic stability theory was introduced by some thinkers including Stephen Krasner, Robert Keohane and Robert Gilpin. Being introduced in the 1970s, the theory was developed primarily to explain the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana. While explaining the theory, Keohane argues that “order in world politics is typically created by a single dominant power and this order is constituted by the formation of regimes and the provision of public goods.”15 To be considered as a hegemonic power in the global political economy, a country must have access to enough and crucial raw materials, control major sources of capital, control a large market and hold comparative advantages in goods yielding relatively high wages and profits. It also must have a superior position than any other country of the system.16 Only a hegemonic power has the capability to establish rules or norms which facilitate the orderly exchanges amongst countries and also has the ability to punish the transgressors with predictable penalties. It has therefore the incentive to provide the public goods as it is the strongest actor of the system in perpetuating the existing international order that gives the country an upper hand or dominant position. Only a hegemonic leader can provide the public good because it has the strongest position in terms of economy, military and politics.17 The theory of hegemonic stability is very important in understanding the stability and instability

14 Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, “Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment”, Review
of International Studies, Vol. 15, pp. 183-198, 1989. 15 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 31-39.
16 Ibid, pp. 33-34.
17 Mohd. Noor Mat Yazid, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability, Hegemonic Power and International Political
Economic Stability”, Global Journal of Political Science and Administration, Vol. 3, No. 6, December 2015,
p. 68.

 in the international system. According to this theory, the role of a hegemonic power is crucial in creating stability in international economy and politics. Without a responsible and strong hegemonic power, the creation of a stable international order is quite impossible.

To become a hegemon, a state must have three attributes: the capability to enforce the rules of the system, the will to do so, and a commitment to a system which is beneficial to major states. Realist thinkers and analysts, besides their attributes to power politics, frequently underlined the importance of a hegemonic power for systemic stability. If we take the example of Pax Britannica of the 19th century, Great Britain as the hegemonic leader ensured global balance of power and provided security of international trade and simultaneously, it played the role of conflict resolver of the world in crucial times. Similarly, in the post-war hegemonic order, the US played the role of hegemon ensuring political and economic stability at the global level assisted by the governance architecture formed around the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions. There were some regional instruments like the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU) that helped forming the system as well as multilateral platforms like the G20 played an important role for the hegemonic system by facilitating burden sharing mechanisms among important players of the system. 

There is another theory to explain the probable power transition which is the power transition theory. Over the years, this has become one of the most successful structural theories of world politics. There are reasons why the theory continues to generate interest among scholars and policymakers for long. To mention some, the theory offers falsifiable expectations about the future of world politics. For instance, if China continues to grow in terms of different types of power as it has for a couple of decades, there are bright signs that it will surpass the US as the world’s dominant power sometime before the first half of this century. Historic instances represent that power transitions among big powers have corresponded with big wars. These two are the most important strategic projections of the 21st Century.18 These calculations are based on historic instances and are central to the discussions of cooperation, conflict, war and peace among great powers. Power transition theory tends to attack the central issue of global politics-stability among great powers. It posits that the power transition process between China and the US may cause catastrophic war.19

18 Douglas Lemke and Ronald L. Tammen, “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China”, International
Interactions, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2003, p. 270. 19 Ibid.

 A. F. K. Organski, the key proponent of the theory observes there are two fundamental components of the power transition theory. According to him, a country’s power originates from its internal development. Since development occurs at a different pace, dissimilarity in terms of relative power is observed among states. Another fundamental characteristic of power transition theory is that the international order is primarily shaped by the dominant nation or hegemon. Power transition usually happens when a rising power overtakes the dominant power. That sometimes may be peaceful when the rising power is satisfied with the global order. In the case of the US overtaking Britain, the power transition was peaceful as the rising power, the US, was satisfied with the then global order. In some instances, power transition may lead to war, as when a dissatisfied emerging power Germany, grew in power vis-à-vis the hegemon, Britain.20 According to Organski, although dissatisfaction is a relative term, there are two ways to view the subject: first, a dissatisfied emerging power cannot be an ally of the dominant power and it does not possess any part in the existing international order. Therefore, the rising power does not feel itself as a part of the existing system and also does not uphold fundamental values of the system and often finds existing international order functioning against its own interest. And when it becomes powerful enough, it tries to alter the system according to its own interests and preferences.21

Power transition theory also analyses why a rising power and an established power engage into a conflict or even go to war. According to this theory, if the rising state is a status quo one, the process of power transition is expected to be a peaceful one. If the rising state is a revisionist one, power transition between the rising and dominant state may occur through a major war. Therefore, the two explanatory variables of the theory have become central to the discussion of hegemonic change and major war: relative power and degree of satisfaction with the international system.22 The interaction between these variables is the main cause of war and peace in a global system.23 However, based on theoretical and empirical studies, Organski and Kugler mention that a power transition between the hegemonic and rising power is a necessary condition but not enough or sufficient condition for major war.24 There are several assumptions of the power transition theory:

20 Woosang Kim and Scott Gates, “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China”, International Area Studies
Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2015, pp. 219-226. 21 David Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College, December 2011, p. 18.
22 Weiwei Wang, “How to maintain peaceful Sino-US relations”, Asian Education and Development Studies,
Vol. 5 Issue 3, 2016, pp. 278-287.
23 Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy, “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power
Transition Research Program”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 6, December 1999, pp. 675-
704.
24 A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The war Ledger, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,
1980.

a) The nature of the international system is primarily hierarchical and is dominated by a single superpower, international norms are generally created by the most dominant country of the system.

b) The uneven economic growth or difference of economic growth among big powers or particularly between the dominant actor and the challenger may destabilise the system or even slide into war.25

c) If the challenger is dissatisfied, then it may turn into war. It happens particularly amidst the state of parity.26 d) Alliances tend to play the central role contributing to national power and international change.

To understand the format of Sino-US power transition, it is required to analyse some puzzles in the process. The first puzzle in the Sino-US power transition is whether China has the attributes of becoming a global hegemon. According to the hegemonic stability theory, “states can cooperate economically with one another when the hegemonic power holds the ring economically and militarily”.28 As mentioned earlier, Keohane thinks a hegemonic power needs to have access to crucial raw materials, control dominant sources of capital, capability to control a large market and hold comparative advantages in goods, wages and profits. It also must have a superior position than any other country of the system. Notably, for more than a century, the US is the largest economy of the world accounting for over 24 per cent GDP of the world in 2016.29 However, both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) now rate China as the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). The centre for Economic and Business Research predicts that in 2029, China’s economy will surpass the US economy in every parameter.30 The following pie-chart will illustrate a comparison between the US and China in various parameters.

25 Weiwei Wang, op. cit.
26 Ronald L. Tammen, “The Organski Legacy: A Fifty-Year Research Program”, International Interactions,
Vol. 34, Issue 4, 2008, pp. 314-332.
27 Weiwei Wang, op. cit.
28 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading States: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, New
York: Basic Books, 1986, p. 55.
29 The World Bank, “Data Catalog”, available at https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/gdp-ranking,
accessed on 13 July 2020.
30 Cebr, “World Economic League Table 2016”, 26 December 2015, available at https://cebr.com/reports/welt2016/, accessed on 13 July 2020.

 Figure 1: Comparison between the US and China Government bank account

It appears that although the US till date is the only superpower, China in recent years has been growing rapidly. Particularly in some core areas like population, GDP growth, military personnel and exports, it is well ahead of the US. In addition to that, according to the International Energy Agency, China’s share of the global renewable energy supply stands at 15.6 per cent compared with approximately 4.2 per cent in the hands of the US.31

The scenario presented in the pie-chart mainly contains the 2009-2010 data. However, more recent data (2015) can illustrate the scenario.

31 “China V the US: How the Superpowers Compare”, The Guardian, available at https://www.theguardian.com/
news/datablog/2013/jun/The Guardian, 07/china-us-how-superpowers-compare-datablog, accessed on 21 June
20202013.

Table 1: Comparison between the US and China (2015)

The pie-chart and the table refer that in terms of economy, China is quite close to the US and in some parameters, has already surpassed the US. However, in some important areas, it is lagging far behind the US. The size of the US economy and its expenditure in defense sector are far ahead than those of China. The country is still lagging behind the US in terms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flow to the country. Its high-tech exports are four times less than those of the US.32 In different other sectors like market capitalisation, social media, diplomacy and GDP per capita, it is also clearly lagging behind the US. With the same token, it also falls short of a distinct characteristic of a hegemon that the country is yet to achieve a superior position than any other country of the system. It, therefore, lacks the power of norm setting for a new global order.

The second question is whether China is willing to take the hegemonic leadership. To assess the intention of China, the country’s global vision needs to be discussed. China claims that it has a peaceful global vision as maintaining world peace is one of the core foreign policy objectives of the country. The basic objectives of Chinese foreign policy is centered on “safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty, and creating an international environment favorable to its reform, opening and modernisation efforts, as well as maintaining world peace and promoting common development.”33 China’s global vision and foreign policy goals can further be assessed by the speech of a high ranked policymaker of the country where he noted that to make a peaceful global order, the country’s foreign policy would aim to firmly uphold multilateralism and free trade, enhance high quality belt and road

32 Andrea Willige, “The World’s Top Economy: The US Vs China in Five Charts”, World Economic Forum, 05
December 2016, available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/the-world-s-top-economy-the-us-vschina-in-five-charts/, accessed on 15 July 2020.
33 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, “Main Characteristics of China’s
Foreign Policy”, available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zgwjzc/t35077.htm, accessed on 25
June 2020.

 cooperation, usher a new era of China-Russia relations, work more closely with Europe in addressing global challenges, enhance efforts to build a community with shared future with neighbouring countries, further elevate south-south cooperation and actively promote the hotspot issues.34
 

The noble principles of China’s foreign policy indicate that China has the peaceful global vision and currently the country has no Intention to become a global hegemon. However, according to many, the Belt and Road initiative and consolidation of power by President Xi Jinping raises suspicion among many about the real intention of China. Cheng Li notes that President Xi Jinping has repositioned himself as a populist leader in China targeting China’s rise as a global power.35 China’s aspiration of global leadership becomes evident in the 19th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress Report which is China’s most authoritative document. In that document, for the first time in known history, Beijing expressed its intention to contend for global leader. In the document, states that by mid-twenty first century, China aspires to “become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence”.36 In recent years, Beijing is trying to enhance its image before the global community through increased participation in global governance. Currently, the country is the highest contributor in the UN peacekeeping operations.37 In 2020, China funded 12 per cent of the total UN budget38 while in the 2000s, it contributed only 1 per cent.39 In addition to the budget, China heads four of the 15 specialised agencies of the UN: the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). Based on these instances, it appears that China has aspiration to become a hegemonic leader, if not now, in future.

And one of the most important questions is whether the power transition between China and the US will be peaceful or not. There are different viewpoints regarding the nature (peaceful or conflicting) and timeframe of the power transition. Another question

34 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Foreign Policy in a First Changing
World: Mission and Responsibility-Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng at the Lunch Meeting of the
Eighth World Peace Forum”, 08 July 2019, available at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1679454.
shtml, accessed on 25 June 2020.
35 Tarun Chhabra and Ryan Hass, “Global China: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy”, Brookings, September
2019, Available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/global-china-domestic-politics-and-foreign-policy/,
accessed on 29 June 2020.
36 “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress”, Xinhua, 04 November 2017, Available at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm, accessed on 26 June 2020.
37 “Is China Contributing to the United Nations’ Mission”, China Power, available at: https://chinapower.csis.
org/china-un-mission/, accessed on 28 June 2020.
38 Joseph A. Klein, “China’s Hollow Complaints About Late U.S. Payments to the UN”, Canada Free Press,
available at https://canadafreepress.com/article/chinas-hollow-complaints-about-late-u.s.-payments-to-theun1, accessed on 28 June 2020.
39 “Is China Contributing to the United Nations’ Mission”, op. cit.

 that comes to the forefront is, whether the possible power transition between the US and China will occur through conflicts or it will be a peaceful one. Although this paper primarily does not focus on the possibility of conflict while power transitions between the two countries, it will briefly shed light on the issue. Research in the field reveals that conflict while power transition depends on some variables and two of which are relative power and satisfaction of the rising power.40 Gilpin opposes the ‘balance of power’ or balancing theory. He argues that the system naturally goes toward equilibrium. And to create a new system, global war or hegemonic war is required. After a global war a new hegemon will create the new system of the world according to its own preferences. He further argues that the more decisive a victory in the hegemonic war, the more durable the new system will be.41 Organski also notes that the equilibrium or relatively equal distribution of power among the actors is one of two major indicators that are responsible to increase the probability of war.42 As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the US and China are not in the dangerous position of power parity, it can be argued that there is the least possibility of war between them in near future. The next chapter will discuss whether we have come to an end of the US-led liberal international order.