Abstract
This article provides a grim analysis of the state of Sri Lanka in 1989, a year in which the country was simultaneously engulfed by two brutal insurgencies that threatened its very existence. In the north and east, the civil war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) raged on, complicated by the presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). In the south, the state was battling a violent insurrection by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a radical Sinhalese nationalist group. The study examines the strategies employed by the government of President Ranasinghe Premadasa to confront these existential threats. The research argues that the state responded with overwhelming and often indiscriminate violence, leading to massive human rights violations. The paper analyzes the complex dynamics between the three main actors—the government, the JVP, and the LTTE—and the state's difficult relationship with the IPKF. The analysis concludes that while the state ultimately succeeded in brutally crushing the JVP insurgency by the end of the year, its ability to "maintain the state" came at a terrible human cost and left the Tamil ethnic conflict unresolved.
Full Text
The year 1989 was arguably one of the darkest and most violent in Sri Lanka's modern history, a period when the state itself seemed on the verge of collapse. This paper analyzes the dual insurgencies that convulsed the island. The first part of the study focuses on the brutal conflict in the Sinhala-majority south between the state security forces and the JVP. It details the JVP's campaign of assassinations, strikes, and intimidation, and the state's counter-insurgency, which involved the widespread use of death squads and forced disappearances. The paper argues that the state's survival was secured through a campaign of terror that effectively mirrored the tactics of its opponent. The second part of the analysis turns to the ongoing ethnic conflict in the north and east. It examines the complex triangular dynamic between the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE, and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), which was increasingly seen as an occupying army by both Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists. The paper details President Premadasa's controversial decision to negotiate with the LTTE and provide them with arms to fight the IPKF, a high-stakes gamble aimed at securing the withdrawal of Indian troops from Sri Lankan soil. The findings paint a picture of a state fighting a war on two fronts, employing ruthless methods to ensure its own survival. While the state was "maintained," the legacy of the extreme violence of 1989 would haunt Sri Lankan society for years to come.