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Abstract
This article provides a critical analysis of "TRIPS-Plus" provisions in bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) and their implications for developing countries. It explains how these provisions require developing countries to adopt standards of intellectual property (IP) protection that are significantly higher and more stringent than those required by the WTO's TRIPS Agreement. The study examines the various types of TRIPS-Plus measures, such as the extension of patent terms and data exclusivity, which are often demanded by developed countries, particularly the United States, in their FTAs. The research's central focus is on the negative implications of these provisions for developing countries. The paper argues that they can severely restrict a country's policy space and can have a major adverse impact on access to affordable medicines, by delaying the entry of generic competition. The analysis concludes that TRIPS-Plus represents a major challenge to the development prospects of the Global South.
Full Text
The WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was already a controversial agreement that imposed a global minimum standard for IP protection. This paper analyzes the subsequent and even more contentious phenomenon of "TRIPS-Plus." The study begins by clearly defining what constitutes a "TRIPS-Plus" provision: any measure in a trade agreement that requires a level of IP protection that goes beyond the TRIPS baseline. The core of the article is a detailed examination of the most common and most damaging of these provisions. A primary focus is on the issue of access to medicines. The paper provides a detailed explanation of how provisions like "patent term extensions" and "data exclusivity" can be used to prolong the monopoly of multinational pharmaceutical companies and to block or delay the production of cheaper generic drugs, with devastating consequences for public health in poor countries. The study also analyzes the broader implications of TRIPS-Plus for innovation and technology transfer, arguing that excessively strong IP protection can stifle, rather than promote, the development of indigenous technological capabilities in the South. The findings reveal a powerful and asymmetric negotiating dynamic, where developed countries have used their leverage in bilateral trade negotiations to impose IP standards on developing countries that they could never have achieved in the more democratic, multilateral setting of the WTO. The paper concludes that TRIPS-Plus is a major threat to the development-oriented goals of the global IP system.