Abstract

This article, written shortly after the 2014 general election in India, analyzes the potential for continuity or change in India's neighborhood policy under the new government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It examines the early signals and rhetoric of the new government, particularly the historic invitation to all SAARC leaders to attend the swearing-in ceremony, which was interpreted as a sign of a new "neighborhood first" policy. The study assesses whether this represented a genuine strategic shift or a continuation of existing policies in a new style. The research explores the key challenges and opportunities in India's relationships with its neighbors that the new government would have to address. The paper concludes by offering a preliminary assessment, suggesting that while the style and emphasis may change, the underlying structural realities of the subcontinent would likely ensure a high degree of continuity in the substance of India's neighborhood policy.

Full Text

The landslide victory of Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 2014 Indian general election raised significant questions about the future direction of the country's foreign policy. This paper provides an early analysis of the potential for continuity or change in India's crucial "neighborhood policy." The study begins by analyzing the symbolic and highly significant first act of the new Prime Minister: the invitation to all the leaders of the SAARC countries to his inauguration. The paper interprets this as a powerful signal of his intent to prioritize and re-energize India's engagement with its immediate neighbors. The core of the article is an exploration of the central question of continuity versus change. It argues that while the rhetoric of "neighborhood first" was new and powerful, many of the substantive challenges and interests that would shape the policy were long-standing and structural. This includes the unresolved border and water disputes, the problem of cross-border terrorism, and the growing strategic presence of China in the region. The paper posits that any Indian government, regardless of its ideological orientation, would have to contend with these same basic realities. However, the paper also explores the potential for change. It discusses how a strong and decisive new government, with a clear majority in parliament, might have a greater capacity to make bold moves and to overcome the domestic political constraints that had often hindered its predecessors, for example, in ratifying the Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh. The paper concludes with a nuanced assessment, suggesting a likely combination of "continuity in substance" with a significant and more assertive "change in style."