THE UN PEACE PLAN AND PROSPECT FOR PEACE IN CAMBODIA

This article assesses the United Nations peace plan for Cambodia, which was taking shape in the early 1990s, and evaluates its prospects for bringing an end to the country's long and devastating conflict. It examines the key elements of the plan, which envisioned a comprehensive political settlement involving a ceasefire, the creation of a UN transitional authority (UNTAC), the demobilization of warring factions, and the holding of free and fair elections. The study analyzes the complex diplomatic negotiations that led to the plan, particularly the crucial role of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the P5) in brokering an agreement among the warring Cambodian factions and their external patrons. The research identifies the major challenges and obstacles to the plan's success, including the deep-seated mistrust among the factions, the formidable logistical task of organizing an election in a war-torn country, and the intransigence of the Khmer Rouge. The paper concludes with a cautiously optimistic prognosis, arguing that despite the immense difficulties, the UN peace plan represented the most promising opportunity to date to end the Cambodian tragedy.

The Cambodian conflict, which had raged for over a decade, finally saw a credible prospect for peace with the formulation of a comprehensive UN-led settlement plan. This paper provides a detailed analysis of this peace plan and an assessment of its chances for success. The study begins by outlining the dire context of the conflict, which had involved a Vietnamese occupation, a civil war between four rival factions, and the devastating legacy of the Khmer Rouge genocide. The core of the article is a deconstruction of the ambitious UN peace plan. It details the unprecedented scope of the proposed UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was to be given extraordinary powers to effectively administer the country during the transitional period, including direct control over key government ministries. The paper examines the plan's provisions for disarming and demobilizing the 70% of the factions' armies and the complex process of repatriating hundreds of thousands of refugees in time for a UN-supervised election. The second part of the analysis focuses on the significant challenges ahead. The primary obstacle identified is the attitude of the Khmer Rouge, whose genuine commitment to the peace process was widely doubted. The paper also discusses the logistical nightmare of mounting such a large and complex peacekeeping and electoral mission. Despite these hurdles, the findings conclude on a note of cautious optimism, suggesting that the unique convergence of interests among the major external powers (the P5) and the war-weariness of the Cambodian people provided a real, if fragile, window of opportunity for peace.