UNCLOS III AND THE UNITED STATES

This article provides a detailed analysis of the United States' position regarding the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), focusing on its decision not to sign the treaty. It examines the long and complex history of the UNCLOS negotiations and the key provisions of the convention, including those relating to territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and navigation rights. The study's central focus is on the Reagan administration's objections to the deep seabed mining provisions (Part XI) of the treaty, which it argued were contrary to free-market principles and would deter private investment. The research assesses the political and legal consequences of the US decision to remain outside the treaty regime, while simultaneously declaring that it would abide by most of the non-seabed provisions as customary international law. The paper concludes by evaluating the impact of the US position on the future of global ocean governance.

The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was a landmark achievement of multilateral diplomacy, creating a comprehensive legal order for the world's oceans. However, its universal acceptance was significantly undermined by the decision of the United States not to become a party to the treaty. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the US position. The study begins by summarizing the main features of the convention, highlighting the careful balance of interests it struck between coastal states and maritime powers. It then delves into the specific objections raised by the Reagan administration, which were almost exclusively focused on Part XI, the regime for mining the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction. The analysis details the US critique of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and its enterprise, which were seen as a form of global central planning that was hostile to the interests of private US mining consortia. The paper explores the domestic political context of this decision, linking it to the administration's broader ideological commitment to free-market principles and its skepticism of large international bureaucracies. The final section examines the paradoxical and legally complex position subsequently adopted by the US: to reject the treaty as a whole but to accept its provisions on navigation, EEZs, and other matters as binding customary international law. The findings highlight the profound impact that the opposition of a single superpower can have on the development and universality of a major multilateral legal instrument.