U. S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY AND THE NUCLEARIZATION OF SOUTH ASIA

This article analyzes the United States' non-proliferation policy in the aftermath of the May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, which marked the overt nuclearization of South Asia. It provides a critical assessment of the perceived failure of the long-standing US policy, which had been aimed at preventing this outcome. The study examines the immediate US response to the tests, particularly the imposition of economic sanctions on both countries. The research then delves into the subsequent evolution of US policy, from a punitive to a more pragmatic approach focused on "strategic stability" and risk reduction between the two new nuclear powers. The paper argues that the nuclearization of South Asia forced a fundamental and difficult re-evaluation of US non-proliferation strategy. The analysis concludes by assessing the challenges for the US in balancing its global non-proliferation goals with the new reality of a nuclearized subcontinent and the need to maintain stable relationships with both India and Pakistan.

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 dealt a severe blow to the global non-proliferation regime and represented a significant failure of US foreign policy. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of US non-proliferation policy in the context of this new reality. The study begins by tracing the history of US efforts to cap and roll back the nuclear programs of both countries, highlighting the use of sanctions, export controls, and diplomatic pressure. It argues that this policy, while consistent, was ultimately unsuccessful in the face of the powerful domestic security and prestige drivers of the nuclear programs in both India and Pakistan. The core of the article is an examination of the US policy shift after the 1998 tests. It details the initial punitive response, the imposition of a wide range of sanctions under the Glenn Amendment. The paper then charts the gradual but decisive shift away from this punitive stance towards a more pragmatic policy of engagement. This new policy, the paper argues, accepted the reality of nuclear weapons in South Asia and refocused US efforts on managing the dangers of this new situation. This included promoting confidence-building measures, encouraging doctrinal restraint, and working to prevent an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The findings suggest a classic case of foreign policy adaptation, where a long-held ideal (non-proliferation) had to be adjusted to a new and unalterable strategic reality.