Abstract

This article examines how the then-current WTO negotiations intersected with the food-security priorities of Bangladesh, a net-food-importing developing country frequently exposed to price spikes, climate shocks and logistical bottlenecks. It reviews the negotiating pillars most relevant to food security—agriculture market access, domestic support, export competition and the special safeguard mechanism—explaining how tariff bindings, de minimis caps and disciplines on export restrictions could constrain or enable policy responses during crises. Beyond formal rules, the paper explores trade facilitation and standards issues that shape import reliability and costs, from port procedures to SPS/TBT compliance. Using episodes of global grain price volatility, it evaluates options for public stockholding, targeted safety nets and temporary tariff adjustment within WTO space. The core argument is that Bangladesh needs a pragmatic strategy: protect policy room for emergency response while committing to transparency, better data, and regional procurement that can stabilise expectations and reduce the depth and duration of domestic shocks.

Full Text

The body begins by situating Bangladesh’s cereals balance, import dependency and historical variability in global prices. Section One dissects agricultural domestic-support categories, assessing how input subsidies and public stockholding could be notified without breaching commitments, and why transparency is central to sustaining credibility with trading partners. Section Two evaluates border measures—applied versus bound tariffs, trigger design for a special safeguard mechanism, and the political economy of lowering tariffs in normal times to preserve headroom for crises. Section Three explores non-tariff frictions: documentary requirements, pre-shipment inspection, and SPS conformity that delay shipments when speed is essential. Section Four assesses social protection and market instruments—targeted cash transfers, school feeding, and hedging—emphasising the importance of linked early-warning indicators for droughts and global price spikes. Section Five proposes a regional playbook: pooled procurement with flexible delivery windows, mutual recognition of quality standards, and corridor agreements to reduce inland costs. The conclusion argues that a rules-conscious but citizen-centred approach—using WTO flexibilities, disciplined subsidies and transparent stocks—offers the best pathway to protect poor households while integrating more confidently into world grain markets.