Abstract

This article seeks to explain the "demographic paradox" of the relatively low profile of Islamist politics in Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim-majority country. It examines why, despite the country's overwhelming Muslim population, explicitly Islamist political parties have consistently underperformed in democratic elections since the fall of Suharto in 1998. The study critiques explanations that focus on ideology alone, arguing for a more historically and sociologically grounded analysis. The research posits that the answer to the paradox lies in the unique nature of Indonesian Islam, which has been historically characterized by its syncretism and tolerance, and the dominant role of two massive mainstream Muslim civil society organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, which have advocated for a moderate and pluralistic vision of Islam. The paper argues that these organizations have been the primary vehicles for the political expression of Muslim identity, effectively marginalizing the more hardline Islamist parties. The analysis concludes that the strength of this moderate, civil society-based Islam is the key to understanding the resilience of Indonesia's democracy.

Full Text

Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country, yet its democratic politics have not been dominated by Islamist parties. This paper explores this apparent "demographic paradox." The study begins by presenting the electoral data from the post-Suharto era, which clearly shows that the combined vote share of the Islamist parties has consistently remained in a relatively low range, despite initial fears of a "green wave." The core of the article is an in-depth analysis of the factors that explain this phenomenon. It rejects simplistic explanations and instead focuses on the deep-rooted historical and cultural characteristics of Indonesian Islam. A key argument is the powerful and enduring influence of the country's two giant mass-based Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. The paper provides a detailed analysis of the political orientation of these two groups, which, despite their theological differences, have both historically supported the pluralistic, state ideology of Pancasila and have resisted the call for the creation of a formal Islamic state. The paper argues that these organizations have successfully "captured the middle ground," providing a moderate and culturally authentic form of political Islam that has proven to be far more appealing to the majority of Indonesian voters than the more rigid and doctrinaire ideologies of the Islamist parties. The findings suggest that the strength and moderation of this Islamic civil society is the single most important factor in explaining both the weakness of political Islamism and the remarkable success of Indonesia's democratic transition.