PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN: THE MUJAHIDEEN FACTOR

This article evaluates how the cohesion and incentives of Mujahideen factions shaped peace prospects in Afghanistan in 1988. It disaggregates the insurgency into networks with distinct command structures, resource streams, and ideological leanings, arguing that external sponsorship both empowered resistance and complicated settlement design. The paper examines the implications of phased troop withdrawals for time preferences, highlighting how expectations of battlefield gains reduced willingness to compromise. It analyzes the role of cross-border sanctuaries, arms flows, and refugee politics in calibrating pressure and protection for different groups. The study contends that any viable settlement would need mechanisms to manage factional spoiling—sequenced ceasefires, cantonment with monitoring, and incentives for coalition governance—while constraining predation and safeguarding civilians. The core insight is that insurgent organizational dynamics, not only interstate guarantees, determine whether a transition holds.

The body traces resource mobilization and accountability within key factions, explaining why decentralized patronage produced both adaptability and indiscipline. It considers how ideological entrepreneurs framed victory narratives and how commanders converted local authority into leverage at national talks. The article reviews regional stakeholders’ calculus—security concerns, refugee burdens, and ideological affinities—and shows how their hedging behavior affected Mujahideen bargaining cohesion. It then sketches settlement architectures: power-sharing formulas with portfolio caps, security sector arrangements blending integration and vetting, and revenue-sharing for border customs to reduce extortion. Monitoring provisions include mixed liaison teams, community complaint hotlines, and sanctions for violations tied to aid conditionality. The conclusion argues that peacemaking must be sequenced: first stop the bleeding via localized ceasefires and humanitarian access; second, build incentives for unified representation; third, progressively transfer authority to institutions capable of absorbing rivalry without reverting to civil war.