PEACE INITIATIVES AND PROSPECT OF PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the various peace initiatives that have been undertaken in Afghanistan and a sober assessment of the overall prospects for a lasting peace. It examines the different tracks of the peace process, including the formal efforts by the Afghan government to negotiate with the Taliban, the role of regional powers like Pakistan, and the engagement of the international community, led by the United States. The study provides a critical assessment of the major obstacles to peace, such as the deep-seated mistrust between the parties, the Taliban's refusal to accept the post-2001 constitutional order, and the complex web of external interests that continue to fuel the conflict. The research argues that a sustainable peace requires not just a political settlement with the Taliban but a broader process of national reconciliation. The paper concludes with a cautious and realistic prognosis, suggesting that while the desire for peace among ordinary Afghans is immense, the path to achieving it remains fraught with immense and formidable challenges.

As the international combat mission in Afghanistan was drawing to a close, the quest for a negotiated political settlement with the Taliban gained a new urgency. This paper provides a wide-ranging analysis of the various peace initiatives and the overall prospects for peace. The study begins by mapping out the complex and fragmented landscape of the peace process, with multiple, often-uncoordinated, tracks of dialogue. The core of the article is a critical examination of the fundamental impediments to a successful negotiation. It provides an in-depth analysis of the irreconcilable political positions of the main protagonists: the Afghan government and its international partners, who were committed to preserving the post-2001 constitutional order, and the Taliban, who remained committed to their goal of re-establishing an Islamic Emirate. The paper also delves into the crucial role of external actors, particularly Pakistan, arguing that no peace process can succeed without a fundamental shift in its long-standing policy of providing sanctuary to the Taliban leadership. The findings paint a picture of a "hurting stalemate," where all sides were suffering from the long war but none felt weak enough to make the necessary compromises for peace. The paper concludes with a sober assessment. It suggests that while a full and comprehensive peace settlement was a distant prospect, a more realistic goal might be a gradual process of de-escalation and political accommodation, but even this would require a level of political will and regional cooperation that had so far been absent.