Abstract

This article analyzes the unprecedented political triumph of the Islamist parties in Pakistan, specifically the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) coalition, during the period of 2002-2008. It examines the causes behind their electoral success in the 2002 general elections, which saw them form governments in two of the country's four provinces. The study attributes this success to a combination of factors, including a surge in anti-American sentiment following the invasion of Afghanistan, the manipulation of the political process by the military regime of Pervez Musharraf, and the failure of the mainstream political parties to address the needs of the population. The research then assesses the consequences of their time in power, evaluating their performance in governance and the implementation of their social agenda. The paper concludes by analyzing the reasons for the MMA's subsequent decline and discusses the future prospects for Islamist parties in the Pakistani political landscape.

Full Text

The 2002 general elections in Pakistan produced a surprising and significant outcome: the electoral success of a coalition of religious parties, the MMA, which gained control of the provincial governments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. This paper provides a detailed analysis of the causes and consequences of this "political triumph." The first part of the study examines the unique set of circumstances that led to the MMA's success. A key factor identified is the powerful backlash against the US invasion of neighboring Afghanistan and President Musharraf's alliance with Washington, which the MMA skillfully exploited to mobilize the religious and nationalist vote. The paper also argues that the military regime's marginalization of the two main secular parties, the PPP and the PML-N, created a political vacuum that the MMA was able to fill. The second part of the article provides a critical assessment of the MMA's performance in government from 2002 to 2008. It analyzes their legislative agenda and their record on service delivery, arguing that their performance was generally poor and failed to meet the expectations of their voters. The final section of the paper discusses the subsequent decline of the MMA in the 2008 elections. The findings suggest that the Islamist parties' electoral success was largely a product of a specific and temporary set of circumstances, rather than a sign of a permanent, deep-seated shift in the political orientation of the Pakistani electorate. The paper concludes with a more sober assessment of the long-term electoral prospects of religious parties in Pakistan.