STEPS TO DEVALUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

This article explores a range of practical policy steps and arms control measures that could be taken to "devalue" the role of nuclear weapons in international security. It argues that beyond traditional non-proliferation efforts, a concerted strategy is needed to reduce the political prestige and military utility attached to these weapons. The study examines several key steps. These include the adoption of "no first use" policies by nuclear-weapon states, the de-alerting of nuclear forces to reduce the risk of accidental launch, the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to halt the development of new weapons, and deep cuts in existing nuclear arsenals. The research also discusses the importance of strengthening international security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states. The paper posits that these measures, taken together, could help to marginalize nuclear weapons and create the conditions for their eventual elimination. The analysis concludes that devaluing nuclear weapons is a critical and necessary step towards a safer and more secure world.

While the complete elimination of nuclear weapons remains a distant goal, there are numerous practical steps that can be taken to reduce their role, salience, and danger. This paper provides a detailed analysis of such measures, which are collectively aimed at "devaluing" nuclear weapons. The study is structured around a series of concrete policy proposals. The first is the universal adoption of "no first use" pledges, which the paper argues would be a powerful normative step in transforming nuclear weapons from usable instruments of war into purely defensive deterrents of last resort. The second proposal is the "de-alerting" of nuclear arsenals, which involves taking physical steps to increase the time needed to launch nuclear weapons, thereby reducing the risk of a catastrophic launch in response to a false alarm. The third area of focus is the arms control agenda. The paper makes a strong case for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as essential steps to cap the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear weapons. The final section discusses the importance of negative security assurances—pledges by nuclear-weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. The findings suggest that a multi-pronged strategy that combines normative shifts, practical risk-reduction measures, and legal arms control agreements can create a powerful dynamic that progressively diminishes the role of nuclear weapons in international politics, paving the way for a world free from their shadow.