Keywords:
Related Articles:

Abstract
Focusing on the mid-1990s, this article analyzes US-Japan trade frictions as strategic bargaining over market access, industrial policy, and standards rather than a simple dispute about bilateral deficits. It revisits autos and auto parts, semiconductors, and procurement as emblematic issues where structural features of Japan’s economy—distribution keiretsu, administrative guidance, and quality standards—interacted with US demands for measurable results. The paper situates friction within a changing geopolitical context: the Cold War’s end reduced Washington’s tolerance for asymmetries previously justified by alliance politics. It argues that outcomes reflected a mix of pressure tactics, domestic coalitions, and incremental regulatory change rather than sweeping liberalization.
Full Text
The body opens with an overview of macro trends—yen appreciation after the Plaza/Louvre accords, financial deregulation, and Japan’s investment surge into North America. Section One dissects the autos dispute, highlighting dealership networks, parts certification, and voluntary export restraints. Section Two covers semiconductors, detailing price undertakings, anti-dumping actions, and the role of industry associations in shaping compliance. Section Three examines public procurement and standards, including “results-oriented” benchmarks and transparency measures. Section Four explores ramifications for the alliance, noting how security cooperation in Asia coexisted with commercial rivalry. The conclusion argues that the friction produced gradual convergence toward global norms, while demonstrating that advanced economies often contest rules at the technological and regulatory frontier rather than at tariff lines alone.